• Journal of Preventive Medicine and Public Health
• /
• v.57 no.1
• /
• pp.73-82
• /
• 2024

Objectives: The unsafe use of pesticides in agriculture represents a major hazard to human health. This study was conducted to investigate the association between pesticide exposure and health symptoms among chili farmers in northeast Thailand. Methods: This cross-sectional analytic study included 141 chili farmers in Sakon Nakhon Province, in northeast Thailand. Data regarding health symptoms were gathered using a self-report questionnaire. A medical technician tested blood cholinesterase activity using an erythrocyte method, and an occupational medicine specialist at Ramathibodi Hospital in Bangkok, Thailand reviewed the results. Associations between personal characteristics, pesticide exposure factors, and health symptoms were analyzed using multiple logistic regression. Results: Of the 141 chili farmers studied, 66.7% experienced pesticide poisoning, as indicated by below-normal cholinesterase levels. Fatigue was the most frequently reported symptom associated with pesticide exposure, affecting 37.6% of participants. This was followed by nausea and vomiting (31.9%), dizziness (14.9%), and dry throat (14.9%). Multivariate logistic regression analysis revealed that several factors were significantly associated with adverse symptoms: amount of work experience, volume of pesticides used, use of chemical pesticides, use of leaking containers during spraying, direct pesticide exposure while working, contact with pesticide-soaked clothing, consumption of food and drinks in the fields, and blood cholinesterase level indicating risk. Conclusions: This study suggests potential health risks for chili farmers stemming from exposure to and contamination by pesticides used in agricultural practices. To mitigate these risks, it is essential to supply personal protective equipment and to implement educational programs aimed at improving protective behaviors among farmers.

• Korean Journal of Animal Reproduction
• /
• v.23 no.4
• /
• pp.281-291
• /
• 1999

The objective of this study was to optimize the freezing/thawing method of in vitro produced Hanwoo blastocysts. Day 7 blastocysts after IVF were vitrified using EFS40 (40% ethylene glycol, 18% ficoll, 0.3 M sucrose and 10% FBS added m-DPBS) as a freezing solution and electron microscope (EM) grid (V-G) or straw (V-S) as an embryo container. In both method, freezing/thawing were treated by 2-step, treatment time was required in V-G method and V-S method, for 2 min / 3 min and 3.5 min / 10 min, respectively. Embryo survival was assessed as re-expanded and hatched rates at 24 h and 48 h after warming, respectively. The results obtained in these experiments were summarized as follows: when the effect of exposure in vitrification solution and chilling injury from freezing procedure on in vitro produced expanded blastocysts were examined, at 24 h after warming, embryo survival in exposure group (100.0%) was not different compared to that in control group (100.0%), although those results were significantly different with two vitrified groups (V-G: 87.8, V-S: 77.8%) (P＜0.001). However, at 48 h after warming, hatched rates of V-G group (67.8%) were significantly higher than those of V-S group (53.3%) (P＜0.05). In addition, this hatched rate in V-G group was not different with that in exposure group (73.3%). When the effects of embryo developmental stage (early, expanded and early hatching blastocysts) and embryo container (EM grid and straw) to the in vitro survival of vitrified-warmed day 7 Hanwoo blastocysts were simultaneously examined, fast developed embryos were indicated the better resistance to freezing than delayed developed one, irrespective of embryo containers (early; 57.1 ＆ 24.4%, expanded; 84.7 ＆ 60.6%, early hatching; 91.7 ＆ 80.0%) (P＜0.001). Especially, in expanded and early hatching blastocysts, embryo survival of V-G group (67.8, 95.0%) was significantly higher than those of V-S group (53.0, 65.0%) at 48 h post warming, respectively (P＜0.05, P＜0.001). Therefore, this study indicates that Hanwoo blastocysts can be cryopreserved more simple, efficient and successful by vitrification method using EM grid.

• Clean Technology
• /
• v.21 no.3
• /
• pp.141-152
• /
• 2015

As environmental issues are emerging, bio-plastic suppliers in leading countries have been foreseeing the strong needs for environment-friendly materials such as eco-packing materials due to increased attention and regulation on recycle. To catch up with the demand, various types of bio-plastics based on natural feedstocks were developed and released on a market. These bio-plastic products drew the great attention even in domestic industries. At present, international oil price fluctuation and heavy charge on waste raise the unit cost of production and disposal expense of conventional plastic materials. These conditions make bio-plastic an alternative, because it is not restrained by oil prices and problem in the disposal. It is also expected that bio-plastic will be applied to various types of products including containers, industrial supplies, disposables, and medical supplies. However, the bio-plastic is still in its infancy, thus more research and understanding should be followed to put it to application. Bio-plastic is considered as environment-friendly material with high potential which has the advantages of production and disposal.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Radiology
• /
• v.14 no.4
• /
• pp.425-431
• /
• 2020

When a radiation generating device is installed in an export container due to COVID-19, the purpose of this study was to measure the space dose in the radiation room and to study the effectiveness of the shielding wall in the laboratory. Air dose measurement method was set behind the X-ray tube, 50 cm, 100 cm, 200 cm, and measured 12 locations. The dose values before and after the use of the movable radiation shielding wall were compared by measuring 3 locations behind the X-ray tube using the movable radiation shielding wall. The measured values were 50 cm on the left behind the X-ray tube: 1.446 μSv, behind the X-ray tube: 0.545 μSv, and 50 cm on the right behind the X-ray tube: 1.466 μSv. Measurements behind the radiation barrier were 0.190 μSv, 0.204 μSv, and 0.191 μSv. As a result of performing the corresponding sample t test of the average value according to the use of movable barrier walls, p <0.001 was found. As a result of the actual measurement, the medical exposure of the examiner due to the shielding wall in the laboratory decreased to 82.3%. In order to reduce occupational exposure in screening radiological laboratories, it is recommended that sufficient separation from radiation sources and the use of shielding walls are recommended.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
• /
• v.47 no.4
• /
• pp.195-203
• /
• 2022

Background: The aim of the present study was to determine radioactive concentrations in fertilizers known to contain essential nutrients. Results of this study could be used as basic data to monitor the impact of chemical fertilizers on the environment and public health. Nitrogen fertilizers, calcium fertilizers, sulfur fertilizers, phosphate acid fertilizers, and potassium chloride fertilizers were used in this study. Materials and Methods: Five chemical fertilizers were pulverized, placed in polyethylene containers, and weighed. The time to measure each specimen was set to be 3,600 seconds for a scintillator-based gamma-ray spectroscopy system. Concentration of gamma radionuclide was analyzed based on obtained spectra. At the end of the measurement, the spectrum file was stored and used to calculate radioactive concentrations using a gamma-ray spectrometer software. Results and Discussion: In the nitrogen fertilizer, 3.49 ± 5.71 Bq/kg of ¹³⁷Cs, 34.43 ± 7.61 Bq/kg of ¹³⁴Cs, and 569.16 ± 91.15 of ⁴⁰K were detected whereas ¹³¹I was not detected. In the calcium fertilizer, 5.74 ± 4.40 Bq/kg of ¹³⁷Cs (the highest concentration among all fertilizers), 22.37 ± 5.39 Bq/kg of ¹³⁴Cs, and 433.67 ± 64.24 Bq/kg of ⁴⁰K were detected whereas ¹³¹I was not detected. In the sulfur fertilizer, 347.31 ± 55.73 Bq/kg of ⁴⁰K, 19.42 ± 4.53 Bq/kg of ¹³⁴Cs, 2.21 ± 3.49 of ¹³⁷Cs, and 0.04 ± 0.22 Bq/Kg of ¹³¹I were detected. In the phosphoric acid fertilizer, 70,007.34 ± 844.18 Bq/kg of ⁴⁰K (the highest concentration among all fertilizers) and 46.07 ± 70.40 Bq/kg of ¹³⁴Cs were detected whereas neither ¹³⁷Cs nor ¹³¹I was detected. In the potassium chloride fertilizer, 12,827.92 ± 1542.19 Bq/kg of ⁴⁰K was and 94.76 ± 128.79 Bq/kg of ¹³⁴Cs were detected whereas neither ¹³⁷Cs nor ¹³¹I was detected. The present study examined inorganic fertilizers produced by a single manufacturer. There might be different results according to the country and area from which fertilizers are imported. Further studies about inorganic fertilizers in more detail are needed to create measures to reduce ⁴⁰K. Conclusion: Measures are needed to reduce radiation exposure to ⁴⁰K contained in fertilizers including phosphoric acid and potassium chloride fertilizers.

• Journal of the Institute of Electronics and Information Engineers
• /
• v.52 no.2
• /
• pp.182-192
• /
• 2015

In this paper, we introduce how to change the reaction rate as mol concentration when we scan enhanced MRI with GBCA(Gadolinium Based Contrast Agent), Also show the changing patterns depending on diverse MRI sequences which are made by different physical principle. For this study, we made MRI phantom ourselves. We mixed 500 mmol Gadoteridol with Saline in each 28 different containers from 500 to 0 mmol. After that, MR phantom was scanned by physically different MRI sequences which are T1 SE, T2 FLAIR, T1 FLAIR, 3D FLASH, T1 3D SPACE and 3D SPCIR in 1.5T bore. The results were as follows : *T1 Spin echo's Total SI(Signal Intensity) was 15608.7, Max peak was 1352.6 in 1 mmol. *T2 FLAIR's Total SI was 9106.4, Max peak was 0.4 1721.6 in 1 mmol. *T1 FLAIR's Total SI was 20972.5, Max peak was 1604.9 in 1 mmol. *3D FLASH's Total SI was 20924.0, Max peak was 1425.7 in 40 mmol. *3D SPACE 1mm's Total SI was 6399.0, Max peak was 528.3 in 3 mmol. *3D SPACE 5mm's Total SI was 6276.5, Max peak was 514.6 in 2 mmol. *3D SPCIR's Total SI was 1778.8, Max peak was 383.8 in 0.4 mmol. In most sequences, High signal intensity was shown in diluted lower concentration rather than high concentration, And also graph's max peak and pattern had difference value according to the each different sequence. Through this paper which have quantitative result of GBCA's reaction rate depending on sequence, We expect that practical enhanced MR protocol can be performed in clinical field.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
• /
• 1993.06a
• /
• pp.1051-1054
• /
• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.