• Journal of the Korean Statistical Society
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• v.4 no.2
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• pp.113-125
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• 1975

The money market has been existing in various forms for a long time. Until 1972, however, the market had supplied mainly short-term loans of commercial banks and loans of informal money lenders to business corporations. There was no market for notes and commercial papers of business corporations. Consequently, business corporations had to rely primarily upon commercial banks for short-term credit loans to supplement their working capital. The interest rate on loans of commercial banks had been set below a free market equilibrium rate and thereby, generated excess demands for the loans. Unsatisfied potential borrowers thus had to turn to informal money lenders for short-term cerdit loans of prohibitively high interest rate. Since 1972 investment and finance companies have been operating in the money market and their role in mobilizing short-term loans is increasing. This paper aims at estimating the equilibrium size of the money market.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.55 no.9
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• pp.392-398
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• 2006

Maintenance scheduling of generating units (MSU) has strategic dimension in an oligopolistic market. Strategic MSU of gencos can affect a market power through capacity withdrawal which is related to bidding strategy in an generation wholesale market. This paper presents a combined framework that models the interrelation between competitive bidding and strategic MSU. The combined game model is represented as some sub-optimization problems of a market operator (MO) and gencos, that should be solved through bi-level optimization scheme. The gradient method with dual variables is also adopted to calculate a Nash Equilibrium (NE) by an iterative update technique in this paper. Illustrative numerical example shows that NE of a supply function equilibrium is obtained properly by using proposed solution technique. The MSU made by MO is compared with that by each genco and that under perfect competition market.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.13-25
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• 1999

This paper presents a model of competitive positioning and pricing of new products in a multi-segmented market. The segments in the market are located on a multi-dimensional discrete attribute space with fixed demands. Firms launch products sequentially on the attribute space, incurring fixed and variable costs, and then decide on their product prices. Each firm acts to maximize its profit. Market share of a firm is determined by the position and price of Its product. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium Another equilibrium concept is Introduced and related to the Nash equilibrium. A heuristic algorithm based on genetic algorithms is designed to obtain the Nash equilibrium.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.28 no.4
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• pp.379-389
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• 2002

In this paper, we study the competition between two kinds of suppliers, a bricks and mortars(B&M) and a clicks and mortars(C&M). Using the circular spatial market model, we derive and analyze the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria as a function of offline market share and efficiency of online channel of the C&M supplier. The result can be summarized as follows: (1) Stackelberg equilibrium is always superior to the Nash equilibrium, (2) Under certain conditions, the price of online channel can be higher than that of offline channel, (3) It is impossible for the C&M supplier to encroach on all of the B&M supplier's market, (4) In some cases, the C&M supplier has incentive to lower the efficiency of its online channel for more profit.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.57 no.1
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• pp.20-24
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• 2008

A bid-based pool(BBP) model is representative of energy market structure in a number of restructured electricity markets. Supply function equilibrium(SFE) models of interaction better match what is explicitly required in the bid formats of typical BBP markets. Many of the results in the SFE literature involve restrictive parametrization of the bid cost functions. In the SFE models, two parameters, intercept and slope, are available for strategic bidding. This paper addresses the realistic competition format that players can choose both parameters arbitrarily. In a fixed demand function, equilibrium conditions for generation company's profit maximization have a degree of freedom, which induces multi-equilibrium. So it is hard to choose a convergent equilibrium. However, consideration of stochastic demand function makes the equilibrium conditions independent each other based on the amount of variance of stochastic demand function. This variance provides the bidding players with incentives to change the slope parameter from an equilibrium for a fixed demand function until the slope parameter equilibrium.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.47 no.1
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• pp.101-113
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• 2016

The purpose of this paper is to analyze theoretically and empirically spillover effects of fishery quota on related markets through their demand curves. Theoretically, the spillover effects of a change in quota can be captured through the directly distorted market alone by computing surpluses associated with the new and old equilibrium. This study estimates empirically demand functions in the context of both the partial equilibrium and general equilibrium. The spillover effect can be computed from the difference between these two estimates. The econometric methodology to estimate the demand curves in the context of general equilibrium is presented and illustrated. The empirical result of fishery markets shows that spillover effects transmitted across other markets are not small and approximately account for 43.3% of the partial equilibrium welfare effects.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.77-96
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• 1998

Fisheries products in Korea generally go through three markets, namely the wholesale market at production site (Market A), the wholesale market at consumption site (Market B), and the retail market (Market C), from producers to end consumers. As the products move from Market A through Market B to Market C, the marginal gap of prices asked in these markets demonstrates an apparent relationship. The producers, middlemen, consumers, and governmental departments concerned may influence the marketing prices of fisheries products. This study employing the cointegration theory tries to investigate whether causality of the price-setting among these markets exists and, if any, what it is. The authors have focused their attention on fisheries markets in Pusan, analyzing the long-run equilibrium relationship and causality between the prices of hairtail and squid among markets at different levels. Data used in this study cover the period f개m August 1984 to December 1997 fer hairtail, and the period from May 1989 to December 1997 for squid. The main findings of the study may be summarized as follows: First, regardless of the price time-series of hairtail and squid in individual market, the first difference is necessary fur satisfying the stationary conditions since each time-series is a first integration. This means homogeneous integration of time-series, which is a requirement of the long-run equilibrium of prices at different markets, is satisfied. Second, the study of the long-run equilibrium relationship between the prices at Market A and Market B shows that a long-run equilibrium relationship does exist for selling prices of the two species at Market A and Market B. Third, the ECM (error correction model ) used here to describe the long- and short-run dynamics of price change demonstrates that, in the case of squid, the price change in Market A will lead to a corresponding price change in Market B in the long-run period. In the short-run, however, the price at Market H is not only influenced by the price change in Market A but influence the price at Market A as well, that is, the Prices between Market A and Market B have a feedback effect. It should be stressed that the limitation in data collection, which cover only two species of hairtail and squid, is likely to cause a sampling bias. Nonetheless, we may conclude that a dynamic relation in the formation of prices does exist in view of the transaction amount of species at different markets. It is believed that the conclusion drawn from this study would not only contribute to a long-lasted debate on the direction of causality of price-setting among academic circle and fishing community, but would provide a useful standard for the policy makers in charge of the price-setting of fisheries products as well.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.22 no.4
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• pp.71-80
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• 1997

In this paper, we consider with a market pioneering game among symmetric firms in highly competitive situation. To describe the puzzling situation of timing competition, we construct a dynamic game model and explore the equilibrium solution. As a result, we find a subgame perfect mixed strategy Nash equilibrium conceptually defined by 't$_{0}$ + .elsilon. equilibrium'. Our major finding s include : i) market entry will be occurred in sequential manner even though the condition of each firm is symmetric ii) the optimal timing of market pioneering will be advanced until almost all of the monopolist's profit is dissipated, iii) as the market position of the pioneer is stronger, the timings of the pioneer and the follower are separated, iv) and as the slope of the profit flow is steeper, the entry timing of the two players will be pooled together.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.340-346
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• 2003

This paper presents a game theory application for an analysis of uniform price auction in a simplified competitive electricity market and analyzes the properties of Nash equilibrium for various conditions. We have assumed that each generation firm submits his bid to a market in the form of a sealed bid and the market is operated as a uniform price auction. Two firms are supposed to be the players of the market, and we consider the maximum generation quantity constraint of one firm only. The system demand is assumed to have a linear relationship with market clearing prices and the bidding curve of each firm, representing the price at which he has a willingness to sell his generation quantity, is also assumed to have a linear function. In this paper, we analyze the effects of maximum generation quantity constraints on the Nash equilibrium of the uniform price auction. A simple numerical example with two generation firms is demonstrated to show the basic idea of the proposed methodology.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.29 no.1
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• pp.14-20
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• 2003

The purpose of this paper is an attempt to analyze the dynamic relationship between KSE and KOSDAQ, two competing markets in Korean stock market, in the viewpoint of competition. Lotka-Volterra model, one of well-known competitive diffusion model, is adopted to represent the competitive situations of Korean stock market and it is estimated using daily empirical index data of KSE and KOSDAQ during 1997~2001. The results show that there existed a predator-prey relationship between two markets in which KSE acted as a predator right after the emergence of KOSDAQ. This interaction was altered to a symbiotic relationship and finally to the pure competition relationship. We also perform an equilibrium analysis of the estimated Lotka-Volterra equations and, as a result, it is found that there is a market index equilibrium point that would be stable in the latest relationship.