• 해양안보
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• 제3권1호
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• pp.1-44
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• 2021

중국의 새로운 해양정책법(Maritime Policy Law: MPL)은 중국해안경비대 등의 중국 해양경찰 기관들의 임무를 규제하고, 중국의 주권, 안보, 권리, 이해관계를 보호한다고 주장한다. [하지만] 중국이 본토 주위 및 남중국해에서 넓은 해역에 대한 권리를 주장하고 있다는 점에서, MPL은 훨씬 광범위하게 적용될 수 있다. 중국이 제기하는 대부분의 해양 주장이 국제법에 부합하지 않는다는 점을 고려하면, 이렇게 해양법 집행 관할권을 광범위하게 적용하는 것은 문제의 소지가 많다. MPL이 분쟁해역 또는 공해에서 외국선적 선박에 대한 관할권을 주장한다면, 이는 국제법 위반이다. 무력 사용에 관한 MPL의 많은 규정 역시, 해양법 집행 관할권의 사용에 관한 국제 규칙 및 기준을 위반한 것이며, 모든 국가의 영토 온전성이나 정치적 독립성에 반하는 위협이나 무력사용을 금하는 유엔헌장에도 위배된다. 중국은 MPL을 남중국해와 동중국해에서 불법적인 영토 및 해양 주장을 제기하기 위한 구실로 사용할 수 있으며, 다른 연안국의 배타적경제수역 내 자원 권리 행사를 방해하기 위한 구실로도 사용할 수 있다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권33호
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• pp.148-177
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• 2014

The regional security and stability in Northeast Asia has become more complicated because of a sudden establishment of China's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) on 23 November 2013. One dimensional conflicts on the territorial sovereignty over the islands between the regional States has developed into the two dimensional conflicts like maritime delimitations among the States concerned since they have all ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which adopts the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone regime. Moreover, due to the notion of the outer limit of the continental shelf, the conflicts have developed into three dimensional ones in order to acquire more natural resources even in the seabed. To make matters worse, such three dimensional conflicts have expanded to the airspace as well. The paper will analyze what implications the sudden declaration of China's ADIZ have for the regional security in Northeast Asia from the perspectives of public international law. To this end, the paper 1) starts with the debates on the legal nature of the ADIZ, 2) identifies the Chinese government's political motives for the establishment of the ADIZ over the East China Sea, 3) assesses the responses of the regional States and the USA to the China's establishment of the ADIZ, and then 4) discuss what implications the overlapped ADIZ of the three key States in the region have for the regional security and stability.

• Strategy21
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• 통권32호
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• pp.97-122
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• 2013

The basic stance of the Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 'quiet diplomacy'. However, there had been demands for specific plans for practical protection of Dokdo. In 2011, Prime Minister Kim Hwang Sik mentioned that they are reviewing measures of stationing marines on Dokdo, while on August 10th, 2012, former president Lee Myung Bak visited Dokdo. The visit itself was meaningful as he was the first supreme commander to visit Dokdo. This paper studies on the necessity of naval power on Dokdo to maintain its effective control. The effective control must be done by a national organization in a peaceful and unimpaired method. If so, can stationing naval power, whether directly or indirectly, on Dokdo be considered a violation of 'peaceful' method? A 'peaceful' effective of control meas the right of sovereignty over a territory without other country's protest. In such terms, protecting a territory falls under practicing the right of sovereignty, and therefore does not violate 'peaceful'. In addition, looking at international cases such as Ligitan/Sipadan Case and Pedra Blanca Case, evidences such as 'navy activity', 'flyng ensign', and 'military communication facility installation' was used. In ter case of Yemen-Eritrea dispute over Hanish, methods on effective control over island and sea was also ruled by the installation of military posts and military surveillance activities. Thus, stationing naval power on Dokdo can be a way of maintaining effective control per international law. To station naval poer on Dokdo, Presidential Instruction 24 integrated Defense Guideline Enforcement Ordinance, which is domestic law, must be revised. Reason being, the Enforcement Ordinance states that the navy area of responsibility excluded Ullundo, where Dokdo is under jurisdiction of Ullungdim thus excluding navy control. In addition, considering the diplomatic situation, it is more fut to install navy radar site on Dokdo rather than 'stationing marines'. In other words, enforcing surveillance in the vicinity of Dokdo and installing radar site instead of stationing direct combatants is one way of practicing effective control without stimulating diplomatic disputes.

• 해양환경안전학회지
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• 제28권2호
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• pp.280-289
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• 2022

내수란 영해기선의 육지측 수역으로 연안국의 주권이 미치는 수역이며, 다만 직선기선을 채용하여 새로이 내수로 편입된 곳에서는 연안국의 주권과 함께 외국선박에게는 무해통항권이 인정된다. 특히, 우리나라는 서남해안에 직선기선을 채용하여 무해통항이 인정되는 넓은 내수를 보유하고 있는데, 어업 안전 환경 안보 등 연안 이익을 보호하기 위해 내수를 이용하는 외국선박을 적절히 관리할 필요가 있다. 또한, 영해의 경우에도 연안국의 주권이 미치는 수역으로 연안국의 주요 이익의 보호를 위해 매우 중요한 수역이다. 최근 내수나 영해에서 무단정박 정류하는 외국선박과 충돌사고가 빈번히 발생하여 우리나라에 큰 위협이 되고 있다. 이에 이 논문은 우리나라 내수 또는 영해에서 무단으로 정박·정류한 외국선박의 충돌사고에 관한 사례를 분석하고, 외국선박의 내수 및 영해 통항에 관련된 국내외 법체계를 확인하고 고찰하여, 내수 및 영해에서 외국선박의 무단정박은 무해통항요건을 위반한 것으로, 관련 법률에 따른 처벌가능성을 제시하였고, 내수 및 영해통항 및 정박에 관한 바람직한 법제도 정비방안을 제시하였다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권30호
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• pp.177-199
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• 2012

As is generally known, the sovereignty dispute over the Senkaku Islands between China/Taiwan and Japan was triggered by a report commissioned by the UN in 1968, which reported the possibility of a substantial amount of petroleum and natural gas buried in the South China Sea. When the administrative authority over the Ryukyu Islands was transferred from the US to Japan in 1972, jurisdiction over the Senkaku Islands was also transferred. A dispute ensued between China (Taiwan) and Japan over the Senkaku Islands except during the period in which formal relations were established between the two states. This paper will take a look particularly at the events that occurred in the 2000's and discuss their recent trends and aspects of the dispute. Though China and Japan agreed to joint resource development in 2008, the agreed zone was a very small area adjacent to the Korea-Japan Joint Continental Shelf Development Zone, and the points of agreement have not been implemented. China has been developing four oil fields including Chunxiao in its waters adjacent to the median line asserted by Japan. However, China also has been excluding the participation of Japan, while Japan has been strongly objecting to the unilateral development of oil fields by China. If indeed the oil fields on China's side are connected past the median line asserted by Japan, then China's unilateral development will infringe upon the potential sovereign rights of Japan, thereby violating international law.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• 제17권1호
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• pp.112-129
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• 2018

Produced by Chinese local television stations, Maritime Silk Road is a documentary which adopts ancient Maritime Silk Road as a historical nostalgia to interpret "the Belt and Road Initiative", a contemporary Chinese economic, political, and cultural strategy put forward by Chinese government mainly aiming at the countries of Southeast Asia. The main body of this article has three parts and the first part analyses how the documentary adopts computer-generated imagery (CGI) to create a historical nostalgia about ancient Maritime Silk Road in the period of Imperial China. At the same time, this part also presents a sense of diasporic nostalgia of the overseas Chinese. This historical and diasporic nostalgia is related to Chinese President Xi Jinping's political discourse: "Chinese dream" that propagandises to build a strong China put forward by Xi in 2013. The second part analyses how this historical and diasporic nostalgia legitimates Xi's "Chinese dream" and how it responds to recent territorial dispute when China continuously claims its territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea. In this light, the documentary repeatedly mentions two political rhetoric: "coexistence" (gongcun) and "mutual benefit"(huli gongying) as a practical strategy to deal with the dispute between China and some countries of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the third section, the concept of "community of common destiny" (mingyun gongtongti) is adopted by the documentary to depict a convenient and effective organization of China and ASEAN, which is framed as an ultimate goal that Chinese government is depicted as the potential leader of this nostalgic community. At the same time, by providing different and even opposite viewpoints, this article discusses three controversial political rhetoric to present how historical and diasporic nostalgia is politicalized and served for Chinese diplomacy and national interest. Overall, this article argues that the documentary creates a glorious ancient Maritime Silk Road, as a sense of nostalgia, to expand China's economic and political influence, to respond to the controversial issues, and to reassert China's leadership as the centre of Asia.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• 제36권3호
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• pp.303-318
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• 2014

The rising global demand for energy resources may lead to greater interest in the Arctic region. Since it has various resources, such as oil and gas, and large potential as a strategic location in exploration and production (E&P), there is likely to occur island sovereignty issues between the five arctic costal states and other countries. While global warming has led to the opening of the Northeast Passage and the Northwest Passage, several obstacles may impede the development of this area such as the low temperature environment, infrastructure problems in a limited area, flow assurance, environmental regulations, etc. To overcome these problems, various techniques have been applied in the exploration, development, production, transportation, and environment fields and it seems to be made technical development in extreme environment. In this study, the E&P status of representative states and development technologies in the Arctic region have been summarized with regard to carrying out E&P related to drilling, development, production, and operation in oil and gas fields. Furthermore, environmental factors have been taken into account to enhance progress with regard to E&P and ensure sustainable development in the Arctic. On that basis, it will be possible to secure oil and gas field development, production technology and R&D infrastructure in the Arctic.

• Strategy21
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• 통권30호
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• pp.99-142
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• 2012

Withe increased North Korea's security threats, the South Korean navy has been faced with deteriorating security environment. While North Korea has increased asymmetric forces in the maritime and underwater with the development of nuclear weapons, and China and Japan have made a large investment in the buildup of naval forces, the power of the Pacific fleet of the US, a key ally is expected to be weakened. The biggest threat comes from China's intervention in case of full-scale war with North Korea, but low-density conflict issues are also serious problems. North Korea has violated the Armistice Agreement 2,660 times since the end of Korean War, among which the number of marine provocations reaches 1,430 times, and the tension over the NLL issue has been intensifying. With tension mounting between Korea and Japan over the Dokdo issue and conflict escalating with China over Ieo do Islet, the US Navy has confronted situation where it cannot fully concentrate on the security of the Korean peninsula, which leads to need for strengthening of South Korea's naval forces. Let's look at naval forces of neighboring countries. North Korea is threatening South Korean navy with its increased asymmetric forces, including submarines. China has achieved the remarkable development of naval forces since the promotion of 3-step plan to strengthen naval power from 1989, and it now retains highly modernized naval forces. Japan makes an investment in the construction of stat of the art warship every year. Since Japan's warship boasts of its advanced performance, Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force is evaluated the second most powerful behind the US Navy on the assumption that submarine power is not included in the naval forces. In this situation, naval power construction of South Korean navy should be done in phases, focusing on the followings; First, military strength to repel the energy warship quickly without any damage in case of battle with North Korea needs to be secured. Second, it is necessary to develop abilities to discourage the use of nuclear weapons of North Korea and attack its nuclear facilities in case of emergency. Third, construction of military power to suppress armed provocations from China and Japan is required. Based on the above naval power construction methods, the direction of power construction is suggested as follows. The sea fleet needs to build up its war potential to defeat the naval forces of North Korea quickly and participate in anti-submarine operations in response to North Korea's provocations. The task fleet should be composed of 3 task flotilla and retain the power to support the sea fleet and suppress the occurrence of maritime disputes with neighboring countries. In addition, it is necessary to expand submarine power, a high value power asset in preparation for establishment of submarine headquarters in 2015, develop anti-submarine helicopter and load SLAM-ER missile onto P-3C patrol aircraft. In case of maine corps, division class military force should be able to conduct landing operations. It takes more than 10 years to construct a new warship. Accordingly, it is necessary to establish plans for naval power construction carefully in consideration of reality and future. For the naval forces to safeguard maritime sovereignty and contribute to national security, the acquisition of a huge budget and buildup of military power is required. In this regard, enhancement of naval power can be achieved only through national, political and military understanding and agreement. It is necessary to let the nation know that modern naval forces with improved weapon system can serve as comprehensive armed forces to secure the command of the sea, perform defense of territory and territorial sky and attack the enemy's strategic facilities and budget inputted in the naval forces is the essential source for early end of the war and minimization of damage to the people. If the naval power construction is not realized, we can be faced with a national disgrace of usurpation of national sovereignty of 100 years ago. Accordingly, the strengthening of naval forces must be realized.

• Strategy21
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• 통권40호
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• pp.5-36
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• 2016

Recently, the Japanese government revised the three guidelines of its security policy, the National Security Strategy(NSS), the National Defense Program Outline and Midterm Defense Buildup Plan, exceptionally at one time. This means Japan has been seeking the new strategy and strengthening military power considering changing regional security environment. Moreover, Japan revised the security laws for the right to collective self-defense, which authorized the use of force even when Japan is not under attack. Also, Japan renewed the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in twenty years, and has expanded JSDF's scope of activity to a worldwide level. These changes imply Japan would constantly seek to build military forces focusing on naval forces. Because Japan's naval forces, the JMSDF is the means that allow Japan to use its force at anywhere overseas and expand its roles and missions in international society by the basis of the right to collective self-defense. This research will analyze Japan's new maritime strategy and trend of force development and eventually look for the implication on our maritime security These days, Japan has perceived Chinese rapid increase of naval power and pursuing of maritime hegemony as a grave threat. In response to this, Japan is designing new maritime strategy, which are "remote islands defense and recapture" and proactively develop a new type of naval forces to accomplish this new strategy. The Japan's "remote island defense and recapture strategy" is to harden its defensive posture in Nansei islands which correspond to China's 1st island chain for chinese A2/AD strategy and directly encounter with China and to protect its own dominium and maritime interest while supporting US national strategy in East Asia. Japan continues to build compact, multi-functional ship to accomplish "remote island defense and recapture strategy" and keep strengthening its maritime power projection capability to include build of new amphibious ship, and large, multi-functional ship which can provide effective C2. These changes imply that Japan is shifting its strategy from passive and defensive to proactive and aggressive way and continues to pursue naval buildup.The implication of Japan's new maritime strategy and naval buildup needs to be observed carefully and we need to keep developing naval power required to protect our maritime sovereignty and interest.

• 시큐리티연구
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• 제32호
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• pp.95-122
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• 2012

2012년 8월 23일에 시행예정인 "해양경비법"은 해상에서의 경찰권 발동의 근거법을 제정했다는 점에서 그 의의가 있으나 다음과 같은 한계가 있다. 첫째로, 해양경찰의 조직법적 근거가 미약하다. 이는 행정조직 설치의 근거를 법률이 아니라 하부령인 대통령령과 국토해양부령에 위임하는 형태로 엄격한 의미에서 행정조직법정주의에 어긋나는 측면이 있다. 둘째로, "해양경비법" 제14조의 항해보호조치 규정은 이미 발생한 해상집단행동에 대한 조치 중심으로 기술되어 있으므로 사전예방적인 측면을 더 강화하여 "해상집회시위의 사전신고제", "해상집회시위의 금지구역설정" 등의 규정의 신설이 필요하다고 생각된다. 셋째로, "해양경비법" 제22조 과태료는 과중한 측면이 있다. 해양경찰의 해상검문검색에 대한 불응에 대하여 200만원을 부과하는 것은 과중한 편이다. 해상의 특수성을 인정하더라도 과중한 측면이 있으므로 100만원 정도를 부과하는 것이 합당할 것으로 생각된다. 넷째로, 해양경찰내에 자원관리부서를 신설하여 해양조사 및 자원관리 역량을 강화하고, 다른 기관의 해양조사선박을 지원하고, 해양경찰이 직접 조사할 필요성이 있으며, 주변국과 해양자원 관련사항을 발생한 경우 효율적 대응이 필요하다.