• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.119-148
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• 2020

The purpose of this study is to examine the perceptions of neighboring countries on the gray zone and to explore Korea's maritime strategy. The concept of gray zones appears in various ways from country to country. In international relations, the gray zone is a comprehensive space between war and peace. The gray zone in the ocean is an unstable space in which competition between the US and China is represented and proxy wars are possible, and the gray zone needs strategic management. This study summarizes the concept of gray zones in the maritime security field, examines the gray zone strategies of neighboring countries, and suggests Korea's gray zone strategies. In particular, the recognition of the gray zone itself is the core of the problem, and it is necessary to strengthen information sharing to clarify the problem about the gray zone and accurately recognize the gray zone situation. The CMG(Complex Maritime Geostrategy) framework attempted in this study is expected to be helpful in understanding the nature of various gray zone issues around Korea and preparing for a geostrategy based on the analysis.

• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.37 no.6
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• pp.709-718
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• 2013

In this study, AHP analysis was conducted through a survey that was organized by 9 job categories. The results show that sustainable operation risks have the highest priority level among all criteria with management interest having the highest priority level within sustainable operation risks related attributes. The most important risk attributes among stakeholder risks appeared to be asset security and cargo and conveyance security, with education and training being the most important among regulatory risks. Effective management and response to the risks from export controls on strategic trade require an understanding of supply chain security and compliance programs, effective training programs, investments for development of security systems that meet international standards. In addition, the government needs to focus on developing professionals and providing support for companies with compliance programs, working closely with businesses.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.142-176
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• 2018

So far, the main threat to South Korea was North Korea. That is why South Korea established a strategy based on the threat of North Korea and most of the budget on defense was used to deter North Korea. Even though the neighboring countries(China, Japan, and Russia) are growing as a real threat with abilities and intentions based on their powerful naval forces, South Korea has not yet been able to establish a strategy that regards neighboring countries as a threat. But the decades-old structural mechanism of the Korean security environment is undergoing a radical change on April 27, 2018, through the South-North summit and the Panmunjom Declaration. Under the changing security environment, South Korea was placed in a complicated dilemma that had to deal with threats of two axes(China), three axes(China, Japan), and four axes(Japan, Russia). If the one axis threat(North Korea) is dominated by land threats, the second, third and fourth axis threats are threats from the sea. This paper analyzed the maritime strategy of Korea within the framework of maritime-geopolitics, in other words recognition and expansion of the sphere of maritime. I have designed that the maritime defense space that we can deny from threats is divided into three lines of defense: 1 line (radius 3,000km), 2 lines (2,000km), and 3 lines (1,000km). The three defense zones of the three lines were defined as an active defense(1 line), defensive offense(2 line), active offense(3 line). The three defense zones of the three lines were defined as the sphere of core maritime, As a power to deny the sphere of core maritime, it was analyzed as a maneuvering unit, a nuclear-powered submarine, the establishment of missile strategy, and the fortification of islands station. The marine strategy of South Korea with these concepts and means was defined as 'Offensive Maritime Denial Strategy'.

• Journal of Ocean Engineering and Technology
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.113-119
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• 2011

The Korea navy has a vital national interest in maritime security. The national strategy for maritime security focuses on preventing terrorism, crime, and hostile acts in the maritime domain. This requires the development of high speed crafts for maritime security in the South Korea domain. This paper reviews the state of the art on the development of high speed craft internationally, including efforts by the U.S. navy, and analyses the riverine environment to operate high speed crafts in South Korea. This paper makes specific proposals for high speed craft such as their main dimensions, speed, endurance, hull structure material, propulsion system, and general arrangement and 3D shape. This paper was used in the generation of basic resources for future ROC (requirement of capability) of high speed crafts using an engineering methodology.

• Strategy21
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• s.30
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• pp.200-235
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• 2012

Over the past few years, due to the climate change of the earth, the Arctic's sea ice cover is undergoing a historic transformation - thinning, extent reduction in all seasons, and mitigation in the area of multi-year ice in the central Arctic Ocean. These changes allow for increases in maritime access throughout the Arctic Ocean and for potential longer seasons of navigation and possibly transarctic voyage in the summer. These changes also allow more exploration for oil, gas, and other minerals. The Arctic is now an archetype of the complex, multi-dimensional global problems of the twenty-first century. Military security, environmental security, and economic security interact. The potentially enormous economic stakes, sufficient to change the strategic balance among the states of the region, set off competitive pressures for national advantage. Korea, which is heavily dependent upon the sea lane in terms of transportation of its exports and imports, is very much interested in the Arctic sea routes. Korea believes that the Artic sea route, particularly the Northern Sea Route (NSR), could serve as a new useful sea lane, which will enable shorter times between East Asia and Europe, thus resulting in substantial cost saving for ship operators. In addition to shipping, Korea is interested in other Arctic-related maritime industries. Korea, as a leading shipbuilder in the global market, is interested in building ice breakers, drill ships, and other vessels which can contribute to safe operation in Arctic resource development and exploration. Korea, as one of the future stakeholders in Arctic maritime activities, should be ready to foster international cooperation in the region.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.28 no.4
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• pp.497-506
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• 2024

In this study, we proposed security information and event management for ship as a technology to respond to maritime cybersecurity regulations and evolving cyber threats. We analyze the main technologies of network management system and security information and event management, which are representative technologies for responding to ship cyber security, and propose SIEM for ships based on this. Optimized for ships based on the International Maritime Organization's Maritime Cyber Threat Management Guidelines, IACS UR E26, 27, etc. Derive the main functions of the SIEM for ship, linkage and normalization plan for the ship's heterogeneous equipment, ship's cyber threat and ship detection policy to identify ship's cyber security threats, and ship's operating environment and operating personnel.

• Strategy21
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• s.37
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• pp.32-64
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• 2015

This paper examines the types and trends of North Korea's military provocations and regional maritime threats against South Korea, and is focusing on the Republic of Korea's naval development and modernizations by the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) on future actions, what directions of the ROKN has taken thus far in response, as well as an examination of how the ROKN might respond to vulnerabilities identified throughout modern history. Importantly, this paper does not consider the domestic, bilateral, multilateral, regional and global political dimensions of the situation on the Korean Peninsula; nor does it consider the North Korea's transitional power politics, but including North Korea's nuclear program and submarine-launched ballistic missile developments, as a caveat, this paper is based on open sources in Korean and English language, and thus information concerning provocations is indicative only.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.8
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• pp.351-381
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• 2010

Established on February 1st, 2010, The ROKN maritime task flotilla has a goal to successfully cope with North Korea and other potential threats. Unlike precedents of its kind, The ROKN maritime task flotilla is expected to concentrate more an far-sea strategies than coastal strategies. In such circumstances however, the existing maritime logistics systems have limitations upon which to utterly support the operation conception of the ROKN maritime task flotilla seven. To ensure it's efficiency, transformation of the systems is prerequisite. The purpose of this study is to deduce an adequate maritime logistics system for the ROKN maritime task flotilla by evaluating the limitation of the current system and foreseeing its performance necessary abilities to operate in the future. In order to do this, the study presented problems and the direction of development on the structural and behavioral sides. Fist, regarding problems in the structure of maritime logistics system, the investigation pronounced the need of improvement in mobile logistics support ability and its speed. In addition, for the behavioral side, the need of improvement in logistics cooperation system and self-maintenance ability was affirmed. For the development of an adequate maritime logistics system, the study suggested the amelioration in the operation of an adequate mobile logistics support platform and the speed of the logistics using high-speed transportation such as planes for the structural side. Moreover, for the behavioral side, it recommended th enhancement of logistics cooperation system including the nations that already imported th weapon system, amelioration of self-maintenance ability, and necessity to operate mobile maintenance group.

• Maritime Security
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.1-44
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• 2021

China's new Maritime Policy Law (MPL) purports to regulate the duties of China's maritime police agencies, including the China Coast Guard, and safeguard China's sovereignty, security, and rights and interest. The MPL has potentially far-reaching application, as China claims extensive maritime areas off its mainland and in the South China Sea. This expansive application of maritime law enforcement jurisdiction is problematic given that most of China's maritime claims are inconsistent with international law. To the extent that the MPL purports to assert jurisdiction over foreign flagged vessels in disputed areas or on the high seas, it contravenes international law. Numerous provisions of the MPL regarding the use of force are also inconsistent with international rules and standards governing the use of maritime law enforcement jurisdiction, as well as the UN Charter's prohibition on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. China could use the MPL as a subterfuge to advance its illegal territorial and maritime claims in the South and East China Seas and interfere with coastal State resource rights in their respective exclusive economic zone.

• Proceedings of KOSOMES biannual meeting
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• 2018.06a
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• pp.48-48
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• 2018