• 한국항해항만학회지
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• 제47권6호
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• pp.437-447
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• 2023

항만 산업의 동향은 적극적인 4차 산업 기술을 도입하여 자동화 항만, 스마트 항만 등 새로운 항만의 형태로 발전하고 있다. 그러나 항만의 발전 이면에는 항만 및 컨테이너 터미널 내 사이버 보안 사고 및 위협 가능성 또한 높아지고 있다. 이에 항만 내 사이버 보안 강화와 관련된 연구가 필수적이나 국내에서 진행되는 관련 연구는 미비한 실정이다. 이에 본 연구는 국내 대표 항만인 부산항 중 가장 4차 산업 기술을 적극적으로 도입하는 컨테이너 항만을 중심 사이버 보안 강화를 위한 요인을 도출하고 향후 강화 방안을 도출하고자 하였다. 연구결과 부산항 컨테이너 터미널 사이버 보안 강화를 위한 요인은 네트워크 구축 및 정책 지원, 교육 표준화 및 인력 양성, 법·제도적 요인으로 분류되었다. 이후 도출된 요인을 바탕으로 다중회귀 분석을 실시하였으며 분석 결과를 바탕으로 향후 부산항 컨테이너 터미널의 안전성 확보 및 강화, 신뢰성 확보 및 강화, 성과 및 만족도 향상을 위한 세부 요인을 도출하였다. 본 연구는 점차 증가하는 항만 및 컨테이너 터미널 내 사이버 보안 공격에 대응하여 부산항 컨테이너 터미널의 사이버 강화를 위한 방향성을 제시했다는 점에서 의의를 지닌다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권40호
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• pp.82-114
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• 2016

The purpose of this article is to analyze the progress of North Korea's SLBM threat, and to assess the technological capacity and threat level of its SLBMs. Currently, North Korea has approximately 1000 ballistic missiles, such as the SCUD, Musudan, and Nodong, in stock. This article pays close attention to the background and strategical implication behind North Korea's obsession with developing SLBMs despite possessing sufficient means to launch provocations with its current arsenal of ground based ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Based on the abovementioned analysis, this article will recommend possible response directions for the ROK Armed Forces to North Korea's SLBM threat. It is highly difficult to detect SLBMs due to its stealthy nature, as it is launched underwater after covert infiltration. North Korea's SLBM is considered a game changer in that even one SLBM can significantly change the strategic balance of North East Asia. North Korea's SLBM test launch in August has made a 500km flight, landing 80km inside the JADIZ (Japan Air Defense Identification Zone), and as such, it is assessed that North Korea already possesses underwater ejection and cold launch capabilities. The most realistic response to North Korea's imminent SLBM threat is bolstering anti-submarine capabilities. ROK Armed Forces need to upgrade its underwater kill-chain by modernizing and introducing new airborne anti-submarine assets and nuclear-powered submarines, among many options. Moreover, we should integrate SM-3 missiles with the Aegis Combat system that possess strong detection capabilities and flexibility, thereby establishing a sea-based Ballistic Missle Defense (BMD) system centered around the Aegis Combat System, as sea-based ballistic missile threats are best countered out in the seas. Finally, the capabilities gap that could arise as a result of budgetary concerns and timing of fielding new assets should be filled by establishing firm ROK-US-Japan combined defense posture.

• 해양환경안전학회지
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• 제4권2호
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• pp.69-83
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• 1998

Sea transportation has long been a vital component of the transport systems of the world. The great majority of imports and exports to and enlarge their national merchant marines. This effort is meant partly to arrest earlier trends of having their trade carried by ships from outside the region and partly to promote regional integration and improve the national balance of payments. However, sea transportation has been exposed to various types of threats on the high seas, in coastal waters and in port areas. Piracy is any robbery or other violent action, for private ends and without authorization by public authority, committed on the seas. Because piracy has been regarded as an offense against the law of nations, the public vessels of any state have been permitted to seize a pirate ship, to bring it into port, to try the crew(regardless of their nationality or domicile), and, if found guilty, to punish them and to confiscate the ship. Piracy has occurred in all stages of maritime history. The increased size of merchant vessels, the improved naval patrolling of most ocean highways, the regular administration of most islands and land areas of the world, and the general recognition by governments of piracy as an international offense resulted in a great decline in piracy in the 19th and 20th centuries. Piracy has, however, occurred in the 20th century, and the practice of hijacking ships has developed into a new form of piracy. The number of incidents of sea piracy against ships reported was 229 in 1997. Since 1991, 1,051 such acts have been reported. The purpose of this research is to examine the origin and development of the piracy to understand the current situation of such violence on the seas. In addition, what should be done by international community will be presented to prevent the piracy in the future.

• 대한조선학회논문집
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• 제56권5호
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• pp.383-388
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• 2019

It is essential to reduce the Infra-red signature for increasing ship's survivability in ship design stage. However the ship's IR signature is quite sensitive to the maritime and atmosphere. Therefore, it is very important to select the marine meteorological data to be applied to the signature analysis. In this study, we selected the three meteorological sample sets from the population of the Korea Meteorological Administration's marine environment data in 2017. These samples were selected through the two-dimensional stratified sampling method, taking into account the geopolitical threats of the Korean peninsula and the effective area of the buoy. These sample sets were applied to three naval ships classified by their tonnage, and then the IR signature analysis was performed to derive the Contrast Radiant Intensity (CRI) values. Based on the CRI values, the validity of each sample set was determined by comparing Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF), and Probability Density Function (PDF). Also, we checked the degree of scattering in each sample set and determined the efficiency of analysis time and cost according to marine meteorological sample sets to confirm the possibility of a probabilistic method. Through this process, we selected the standard for optimization of marine meteorological sample for ship IR signature analysis. Based on this optimization sample, by applying probabilistic method to the management of IR signature for naval ships, the robust design is possible.

• 한국지능시스템학회논문지
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• 제21권3호
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• pp.307-316
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• 2011

대부분의 해양 사고는 인적 요인에 의해 발생하며, 항행 전문가들은 그 문제의 해결을 위해인적 요인의 영향을 받지 않는 항행 지원 시스템을 요구하였다. 항행을 지원하기 위한 인공지능 기술 중에서 전문가 시스템은 전문가의 지식이나 경험들을 이용한 지식베이스와 그 추론 엔진의 구현을 통해 기계가 해당 분야의 전문가 역할을 대신할 수 있는 중요한 기법이다. 현실세계에서 복잡한 상황에 대한 정확한 판단을 하기 위해서는 여러 분야의 전문가에 의한 종합적인 판단이 필요하며, 특히, 그러한 판단은 여러 위험요소가 잠재되어 있는 항행상황에서 더욱 중요하다. 이 논문에서는 블랙보드 시스템을 이용하여 다양한 전문가 시스템으로부터 얻은 항행 안전 지식의 융합 방법을 제안하고, 테스트 시스템을 설계 및 구현하여 제안하는 방법의 타당성을 보인다.

• 한국산학기술학회논문지
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• 제20권9호
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• pp.233-239
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• 2019

무인 잠수정은 접경지역이나 적 잠수함이나 잠수정이 출몰하는 위협지역에서 감시 정찰 임무 가능한 주요 무기체계로 국내 외에서 활발한 연구 개발이 진행되고 있다. 무인 잠수정의 주요 활용처는 민수 분야에서는 해저 자원 탐사, 재난 예측, 해저 지형 조사 등에 활용가능하고, 국방 분야에서는 위협 지역이 등에서 적 잠수함/정 등에 대한 대잠 정찰, 기뢰 제거 등에 활용 가능하다. 본 논문에서는 무인 잠수정의 무게별, 임무별 주요 분류에 대해서 살펴보고, 무게별 주요 분류 기준에 따라 휴대용급, 경량급, 중량급, 대형급 무인 잠수정의 국외 개발 동향을 조사 분석한다. 이를 기반으로 국내 무인 잠수정 개발 동향을 조사 분석하여 국외 대비 국내 현황을 살펴본다. 또한 앞서 조사 분석된 국내 외 주요 무인잠수정 개발 현황을 통하여, 본 논문에서는 미래 국내 무인 잠수정의 핵심 기술로 은밀성 강화와 통합 전장 운영이 가능한 자율제어 기술, 수중 장기 체류가 가능한 차세대 에너지원 기술, 소형화 및 경량화 기반의 정밀 센서 기술 등 미래 무인 잠수정에 대한 발전 방안을 제시한다.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제15권5호
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• pp.1909-1928
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• 2021

At present, the Colombian government shares information on threats or vulnerabilities in the area of cybersecurity and cyberdefense, from other government agencies or departments, on an ad-hoc basis but not in real time, with the surveillance entities of the Government of the Republic of Colombia such as the Joint Command of Cybernetic Operations (CCOCI) and the Cybernetic Emergencies Response Team of Colombia (ColCERT). This research presents the MS-CSIRT (Management System Computer Security Incident Response Teams) methodology, that is used to unify the guidelines of a CSIRT towards a joint communication command in cybersecurity for the surveillance of Information Technology (IT), Technological Operations (TO), Internet Connection Sharing (ICS) or Internet of Things (IoT) infrastructures. This methodology evaluates the level of maturity, by means of a roadmap, to establish a CSIRT as a reference framework for government entities and as a guide for the areas of information security, IT and TO to strengthen the growth of the industry 4.0. This allows the organizations to draw a line of cybersecurity policy with scope, objectives, controls, metrics, procedures and use cases for the correct coordination between ColCERT and CCOCI, as support entities in cybersecurity, and the different companies (ICS, IoT, gas and energy, mining, maritime, agro-industrial, among others) or government agencies that use this methodology.

• 시큐리티연구
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• 제39호
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• pp.319-353
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• 2014

2001년 9/11 테러공격 이후에 미국은 사이버 안보를 가장 위중한 국가안보 문제로 인식한다. 미국 국방부는 2013년 처음으로 사이버 전쟁이 물리적인 테러보다 더 큰 국가안보 위협임을 확인했다. 단적으로 윌리암 린(William J. Lynn) 국방부 차관의 지적처럼 오늘날 사이버 공간은 육지, 바다, 하늘, 우주 다음의 '제5의 전장(the fifth domain of warfare)'이라고 함에 의문이 없다. 인터넷의 활용과 급속한 보급은 사이버 공간에서의 상상하지 못했던 역기능을 창출한 것이다. 이에 사이버 정보와 사이버 네트워크 보호까지를 포괄하지 않으면 국가안보 수호의 목표를 달성할 수 없게 되었다. 그런데 이러한 위험성에도 불구하고 각국은 운영상의 효율성과 편리성, 국제교류 등 외부세계와의 교류확대를 위해 국가기간망의 네트워크화를 더욱 확대해 가고 있고 인터넷에의 의존도는 심화되고 있다. 하지만 그 실천적인 위험성에도 불구하고 우리의 법제도적 장치와 사이버 안전에 대한 인식수준은 현실을 제대로 반영하지 못하고 있는 것으로 판단된다. 오늘날 가장 실천적이고 현실적인 위협을 제기하는 사이버 안보의 핵심은 하나도 둘도 계획의 구체성과 실천력의 배양이다. 대책회의나 교육 등은 부차적이다. 실전적인 사이버 사령부와 사이버 정보기구 그리고 사이버 전사의 창설과 육성에 더 커다란 노력을 경주해야 하고, 우리의 경우에는 가장 많은 경험을 가지고 인력과 장비를 가진 국가정보원의 사이버 수호 역량을 고양하고 더 많은 책무를 부담시키고 합리적인 업무 감독을 다하는 것에 있다고 할 것이다. 이에 본고는 법규범적으로 치안질서와 별개 개념으로서의 국가안보에 대한 무한책임기구인 국가정보기구의 사이버 안보에 대한 책무와 그에 더하여 필요한 사이버 정보활동과 유관활동의 범위를 검토하고자 한다. 사이버 테러와 사이버 공격을 포괄한 사이버 공격(Cyber Attack)에 대한 이해와 전자기장을 물리적으로 장악하는 전자전에 대한 연구도 포함한다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권32호
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• pp.123-159
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• 2013

The purpose of this research paper is to re-valuate the factors that affected the Royal Navy's rearmament and preparation for war by conducting analysis on the discussion held in the Britain on the strategic priorities and Navy's coping measures adopted during the interwar period. After the end of the WWI, each of the military arms of the Britain faced significant difficulty in securing budget and increasing their military power all throughout the interwar period, and the Navy was not an exception. The WWII that got started on September 1939 was the turning point in which this difficulty led to full-fledged crisis. Immensely many criticisms followed after the war and problems were identified when it comes to the Royal Navy's performance during the war. This type of effort to identify problem led to the attempt to analyze whether Royal Navy's preparation for war and rearmament policy during interwar period were adequate, and to identify the root causes of failure. Existing studies sought to find the root cause of failed rearmament from external factors such as the deterioration of the Britain itself or pressure from the Treasury Department to cut the budget for national defense, or sought to detect problems from the development of wrong strategies by the Navy. However, Royal Navy's failed preparation for the war during interwar period is not the result of one or two separate factors. Instead, it resulted due to the diverse factors and situations that the Britain was facing at the time, and due to intricate and complex interaction of these factors. Meanwhile, this research paper focused on the context characterized by 'strategic selection and setting up of priorities' among the various factors to conduct analysis on the Navy's rearmament by linking it with the discussion held at the time on setting up strategic priorities, and sought to demonstrate that the Navy Department's inadequate counter-measures developed during this process waned Royal Navy's position. After the end of WWI, each of the military arms continued to compete for the limited resources and budget all throughout the interwar period, and this type of competition amidst the situation in which the economic situation of Britain was still unstable, made prioritization when it comes to the allocation of resources and setting up of the priorities when it comes to the military power build-up, inevitable. Amidst this situation, the RAF was able to secure resources first and foremost, encouraged by the conviction of some politicians who were affected by the 'theory of aerial threat' and who believed that curtailing potential attack with the Air Force would be means to secure national security at comparatively lower cost. In response, Navy successfully defended the need for the existence of Navy despite the advancement of the aerial power, by emphasizing that the Britain's livelihood depends on trade and on the maintenance of maritime traffic. Despite this counter-measuring logic, however, Navy's role was still limited to the defense of overseas territory and to the fleet run-off instead of sea traffic route production when it comes to the specific power build-up plan, and did not understand the situation in which financial and economic factors gained greater importance when it comes to the setting up of strategic priorities. As a result, Navy's plan to build its powers was met with continual resistance of the Treasury Department, and lost the opportunity to re-gain the status of 'senior service' that it had enjoyed in the past during the competition for strategic prioritization. Given that the strategic and economic situation that Korea faces today is not very different from that of the Britain during the interwar period, our Navy too should leverage the lessons learned from the Royal Navy to make the effort to secure viable position when it comes to the setting of priorities in case of national defense strategy by presenting the basis on why maritime coping should be prioritized among the numerous other threats, and by developing the measures for securing the powers needed effectively amidst the limited resources.

• Strategy21
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• 통권31호
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.