• 해양안보
• /
• 제6권1호
• /
• pp.137-161
• /
• 2023

제도주의에 따르면 동맹은 회원국 간의 영토분쟁을 방지하고 우호 관계를 증진시킨다. 그렇다면 나토의 회원국인 그리스와 튀르키예의 에게해 분쟁은 왜 계속되는 것일까? 이 연구는 회원국 간 분쟁을 방지하는 동맹의 역할이 해양영토분쟁에서는 제한적으로 나타나는 메커니즘을 설명한다. 해양영토는 육지영토와 다르게 다층적인 경계로 인한 복잡성을 가진다. 또, 기후변화 등에 따라 경계에 영향을 미치는 기준이 변화하는 유동성이 있으며, 해양영토에 상시 경계가 제한되어 대응의 임계점이 모호하다. 오랜 기간 에게해를 사이에 두고 적대적인 관계를 유지해온 그리스와 튀르키예는 1952년 나토에 가입하면서 동맹 관계를 맺게 되었다. 하지만 동맹의 제도에 따른 정보의 투명성과 지속적인 협력에도 불구하고 해양영토분쟁의 특징으로 인하여 동맹의 회원국 간 분쟁 방지 효과는 제한적일 수밖에 없었다. 특히, 석유 시추 등 자원을 둘러싼 문제로 인해 양국의 갈등이 나토의 다른 회원국들과의 관계 악화로 이어지며, 동맹의 결속과 억제력을 약화시키는 문제도 이어지고 있다. 이 연구의 결과는 대한민국의 주변국과의 해양영토 분쟁 및 동맹관계에도 정책적 함의를 주며, 동맹과 해양영토분쟁 연구에도 기여할 것으로 기대한다.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권42호
• /
• pp.154-195
• /
• 2017

This paper is to analyse conflict between the US and China over the South China Sea and Korea's responses. To this end the paper is composed of 6 chapters titled instruction; the current status of South China Sea sovereignty disputes; changes in US and Chinese maritime security strategies and the strategic values of the South China Sea; key issues and future prospects for US-China conflicts in the South China Sea; South Korea's security and diplomatic responses; and conclusion. The recent East Asian maritime security issue has evolved into a global issue of supremacy between the US and China, beyond conflicts over territorial disputes and demarcation among the countries in the region. China is pursuing offensive ocean policy to expand economic growth. The core of the maritime order that the United States intends to pursue is the freedom of navigation in the oceans and the maintenance of maritime access. China is making artificial islands in the South China Sea, claiming the sovereignty of these islands, building strategic bases in East Asia, and securing routes. The United States has developed several "Freedom of Navigation Operations" to neutralize the declaration of the territorial sea surrounding Chinese artificial islands. We can not be free from marine conflicts in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Regarding the South China Sea dispute, it is expected that the strategic competition and conflict between the two countries will intensify due to China's failure to make concessions of core interests and adherence to the US compliance with international norms. In the midst of conflict over the South China Sea, we need a harmonious balance between our alliance security and economic diplomacy. We must continue our efforts to strengthen the ROK-US alliance but not to make China an enemy. Considering the significant impacts of the oceans on the survival and prosperity of the nation, we must continue to develop our interest in the oceans, appropriate investments and tactical strategies.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권31호
• /
• pp.120-141
• /
• 2013

Korea, China, and Japan forms triangle structure which mixed complicatedly on the history and maritime territorial disputes. Nationalism lies on the basis of triangle structure, and it is a main factor which increase tension and conflicts among three countries. Considering dynamics of changing nationalism circumstance, Ieodo issue needs to prepare active countermeasures which considers cope with nationalism confrontations. The aim of this article is suggests preparations of active countermeasures cope with nationalism provocative actions. First, I will specify nationalism as a factor of territorial dispute, and review characters of Ieodo issue. Second, I will analyse China's nationalism to Ieodo through analysis of China's media contents and coverage trend of Ieodo issue (2006~2008). I will suggest necessity of active defense measures coup with China's nationalism, basis of these analysis. As a result, China's nationalism might be a criterion which measures of China's desire for Ieodo. Stimulating Ieodo coverage of China's state media can be a criterion which predicts China governments's for Jurisdiction of Ieodo. We need active measures coup with China's nationalism Which evolves into a much more bold and assertive.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
• /
• 제17권1호
• /
• pp.112-129
• /
• 2018

Produced by Chinese local television stations, Maritime Silk Road is a documentary which adopts ancient Maritime Silk Road as a historical nostalgia to interpret "the Belt and Road Initiative", a contemporary Chinese economic, political, and cultural strategy put forward by Chinese government mainly aiming at the countries of Southeast Asia. The main body of this article has three parts and the first part analyses how the documentary adopts computer-generated imagery (CGI) to create a historical nostalgia about ancient Maritime Silk Road in the period of Imperial China. At the same time, this part also presents a sense of diasporic nostalgia of the overseas Chinese. This historical and diasporic nostalgia is related to Chinese President Xi Jinping's political discourse: "Chinese dream" that propagandises to build a strong China put forward by Xi in 2013. The second part analyses how this historical and diasporic nostalgia legitimates Xi's "Chinese dream" and how it responds to recent territorial dispute when China continuously claims its territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea. In this light, the documentary repeatedly mentions two political rhetoric: "coexistence" (gongcun) and "mutual benefit"(huli gongying) as a practical strategy to deal with the dispute between China and some countries of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the third section, the concept of "community of common destiny" (mingyun gongtongti) is adopted by the documentary to depict a convenient and effective organization of China and ASEAN, which is framed as an ultimate goal that Chinese government is depicted as the potential leader of this nostalgic community. At the same time, by providing different and even opposite viewpoints, this article discusses three controversial political rhetoric to present how historical and diasporic nostalgia is politicalized and served for Chinese diplomacy and national interest. Overall, this article argues that the documentary creates a glorious ancient Maritime Silk Road, as a sense of nostalgia, to expand China's economic and political influence, to respond to the controversial issues, and to reassert China's leadership as the centre of Asia.

• 한국측량학회지
• /
• 제29권2호
• /
• pp.149-155
• /
• 2011

육지자원이 고갈됨에 따라 해양자원에 대한관심이 집중되고 있다. 이에 따라 일본 및 중국과 같은 인접 국가들은 해양 영토를 확장하기 위해 정부차원의 많은 예산을 투입하고 있는 상황이다. 인접국가와의 경계 분쟁 시 정확한 영해기점 산출은 분쟁을 해결할 수 있는 과학적인 자료가 될 수 있다. 따라서, 이들 기점들에 대한 체계적이고도 지속적인 유지관리가 필요한 상황이다. 그러나, 우리나라 영해기점은 10여 전에 관측된 자료로 새롭게 갱신되지 않아 이에 대한 재검토가 필요하다고 할 수 있다. 본 연구에서는 영해기점 성과의 재검토를 위하여, 과거 측량한 성과를 비교 분석하고자 하였다. 연구 결과 제주도 지역에서는 많은 차이를 나타내고 있어 기점에 대한 재조정이 필요할 것으로 판단된다. 본 연구를 통해 영해기점에 대한 지속적인 유지관리가 필요함을 알 수 있었으며, 해양경계에 대한 지속적인 관심은 해양영토의 수호뿐만 아니라 해저자원에 대한 보호측면에서도 필요하다고 하겠다.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권40호
• /
• pp.37-81
• /
• 2016

This paper aims to use crossover analysis to uncover similarities and differences between the U.S-Japan relationship in the World War II era and the modern U.S-China relationship, and to forecast the possibility of the outbreak of war between U.S and China by applying the steps to war theory. The steps to war theory argues that the probability of the outbreak of war between two states within five years would approach 90 percent, if they have ongoing territorial dispute, alliance, rivalry, and arms race. The comparison exposes some similarities with the territorial dispute, alliance, rivalry, but reveals dissimilarities with arms race. U.S-Japan relationship in the World War II era had the arms race, which does not exist the modern U.S-China Relationship. The result of comparison is that the probability for the Outbreak of War between U.S and China correspond to third stage(Risk Level). it means that the probability for the Outbreak of War between U.S and China is 55%. But, There are four elements(① Perception of Leader ② Mutual dependence of economy ③ Possession of nuclear weapon ④ Ravages of war) that reduce the probability for the Outbreak of War. Considering the four elements, the probability for the Outbreak of War between U.S and China is a slim chance. But the probability for the Outbreak of War between U.S and China is excluded because of territorial dispute, alliance, rivalry. So, This paper suggests three points.(① Developing military options ② Reducing the misconception of intend, ③ Promoting navy exchanges) to prevent of Outbreak of War.

• 해양환경안전학회지
• /
• 제8권2호
• /
• pp.45-52
• /
• 2002

Recently there have been growing disputes between neighboring local governments over jurisdictional rights or property rights of ocean resources in Korean coastal waters. The reasons for the disputes come mainly from the increasing interests by local governments that begin to see the oceans as the source of resources and wealth. The maritime dispute is more complicated and sticky than the inland ones, and requires not only socio-economical but political approach, therefore sometimes demanding a plenty of time and endeavor. Also coastal states that have suffered from maritime boundary problems have different issues under the different environment and historical background. For Korea, as the maritime boundary issue has very recently soared to the surface, though it was latent for the period as long as 20 years, we have just taken steps toward an institutional approach on it, seemingly more to go to reach an agreeable resolutions to the disputes. This paper highlighted the issues surrounding the maritime boundary on the sea surrounding Korean peninsular after addressing the current situation of the boundary disputes. It will help explore and assess the possible solutions to the boundary conflicts over the lateral boundary between local governments.

• 수산경영론집
• /
• 제24권1호
• /
• pp.45-64
• /
• 1993

The law of territorial sea is a fundamental law by which the width of sovereign domain of a coastal state is determined. The P.R.China'a regime on the territorial sea was established through the Declaration on China's Ttrritorial Sea of 1958 and the P.R.China's Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Law of 1992. And the P.R.China's consistent policy on the territorial sea can be summarized as follows ; \circled1 The adoption of the straight baseline and 12 nautical miles of the territorial sea width, \circled2 The foreign merchant vessels can enjoy the right of innocent passage, while requesting for prior permission for the foreign military vessels on the entry into territorial sea. \circled3 The Chiungchow Strait and the Bohai Bay are claimed as the internal waters. \circled4 Enlistment of the whole coastal islands including the Taiwan. 12 nautical miles of the territorial sea width can be recognized as lawfull with respect to the 1982 UNLOS Convention. But the P.R.China's Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Law of 1992 contains some problems on the legality viewed in the light of customary international law. Firstly, it can be said that the adoption of simple straight baseline is not reasonable, and it must be investigated closely on the hidden intention of China. Secondly, there involved some possibility of international dispute on making Tung Tao which is 69 nautical miles apart from the mainland of a basepoint and on making the Bohai Bay of a historic bay. And also public notification of all basepoints for the straight baselines is necessary to meet the requirement of customary international law, Thirdly, two military zones established unilaterally in 1950 are illegal with respect to the customary international law, and they must be repealed deservedly. Fourthly, there have a lot of restrictions on the innocent passage even for foreign merchant vessels by the municipal law such as the Maritime Traffic Safety Law. As a conclusion, the P.R.China's territorial sea regime contains some illegal elements such as unilateral expansion of the maritime sovereignty or jurisdiction. In order to meet the general principle of the international law, the P.R.China's territorial sea policy must be modified on the basis of multilateral agreement with the states concerned. And Korea, as a state with opposite, has a definite right to take countermeasure agaist the P.R.China's contiguous zone.

• 안보군사학연구
• /
• 통권13호
• /
• pp.687-738
• /
• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권31호
• /
• pp.27-56
• /
• 2013

The United Nations Command (UNC) and the communist North failed to reach an agreement on where the maritime demarcation line should be drawn in the process of signing a truce after the Korean War because of the starkly different positions on the boundary of their territorial waters. As a result, the Armistice Treaty was signed on July 1953 without clarification about the maritime border. In the following month, Commander of the UNC unilaterally declared the Northern Limit Line (NLL) as a complementing measure to the Armistice. Referring to this, North Korea and its followers in South Korea wrongfully argue that the NLL is a "ghost line" that was established not based on the international law. However, one should note that the waters south of the NLL has always been under South Korea's jurisdiction since Korea's independence from Japan on August 15, 1945. There is no need to ask North Korea's approval for declaring the territorial waters that had already been under our sovereign jurisdiction. We do not need North Korea's approval just as we do not need Japan's approval with regard to our sovereign right over Dokdo. The legal status of the NLL may be explained with the following three characteristics. First, the NLL is a de facto maritime borderline that defines the territorial waters under the respective jurisdiction of the two divided countries. Second, the NLL in the West Sea also serves as a de facto military demarcation line at sea that can be likened to the border on the ground. Third, as a contacting line where the sea areas controlled by the two Koreas meet, the NLL is a maritime non-aggression line that was established on the legal basis of the 'acquiescence' element stipulated by the Inter-Korea Basic Agreement (article 11) and the Supplement on the Non-aggression principle (article 10). Particularly from the perspective of the domestic law, the NLL should be understood as a boundary defining areas controlled by temporarily divided states (not two different states) because the problem exists between a legitimate central government (South Korea) and an anti-government group (North Korea). In this sense, the NLL problem should be viewed not in terms of territorial preservation or expansion. Rather, it should be understood as a matter of national identity related to territorial sovereignty and national pride. North Korea's continuous efforts to problematize the NLL may be part of its strategy to nullify the Armistice Treaty. In other words, North Korea tries to take away the basis of the NLL by abrogating the Armistice Treaty and creating a condition in which the United Nations Command can be dissolved. By doing so, North Korea may be able to start the process for the peace treaty with the United States and reestablish a maritime line of its interest. So, North Korea's rationale behind making the NLL a disputed line is to deny the effectiveness of the NLL and ask for the establishment of a new legal boundary. Such an effort should be understood as part of a strategy to make the NLL question a political and military dispute (the similar motivation can be found in Japan's effort to make Dokdo a disputed Island). Therefore, the South Korean government should not accommodate such hidden intentions and strategy of North Korea. The NLL has been the de facto maritime border (that defines our territorial waters) and military demarcation line at sea that we have defended with a lot of sacrifice for the last sixty years. This is the line that our government and the military must defend in the future as we have done so far. Our commitment to the defense of the NLL is not only a matter of national policy protecting territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction; it is also our responsibility for those who were fallen while defending the North-Western Islands and the NLL.