• Maritime Security
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.1-44
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• 2021

China's new Maritime Policy Law (MPL) purports to regulate the duties of China's maritime police agencies, including the China Coast Guard, and safeguard China's sovereignty, security, and rights and interest. The MPL has potentially far-reaching application, as China claims extensive maritime areas off its mainland and in the South China Sea. This expansive application of maritime law enforcement jurisdiction is problematic given that most of China's maritime claims are inconsistent with international law. To the extent that the MPL purports to assert jurisdiction over foreign flagged vessels in disputed areas or on the high seas, it contravenes international law. Numerous provisions of the MPL regarding the use of force are also inconsistent with international rules and standards governing the use of maritime law enforcement jurisdiction, as well as the UN Charter's prohibition on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. China could use the MPL as a subterfuge to advance its illegal territorial and maritime claims in the South and East China Seas and interfere with coastal State resource rights in their respective exclusive economic zone.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.148-177
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• 2014

The regional security and stability in Northeast Asia has become more complicated because of a sudden establishment of China's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) on 23 November 2013. One dimensional conflicts on the territorial sovereignty over the islands between the regional States has developed into the two dimensional conflicts like maritime delimitations among the States concerned since they have all ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which adopts the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone regime. Moreover, due to the notion of the outer limit of the continental shelf, the conflicts have developed into three dimensional ones in order to acquire more natural resources even in the seabed. To make matters worse, such three dimensional conflicts have expanded to the airspace as well. The paper will analyze what implications the sudden declaration of China's ADIZ have for the regional security in Northeast Asia from the perspectives of public international law. To this end, the paper 1) starts with the debates on the legal nature of the ADIZ, 2) identifies the Chinese government's political motives for the establishment of the ADIZ over the East China Sea, 3) assesses the responses of the regional States and the USA to the China's establishment of the ADIZ, and then 4) discuss what implications the overlapped ADIZ of the three key States in the region have for the regional security and stability.

• Strategy21
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• s.32
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• pp.97-122
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• 2013

The basic stance of the Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 'quiet diplomacy'. However, there had been demands for specific plans for practical protection of Dokdo. In 2011, Prime Minister Kim Hwang Sik mentioned that they are reviewing measures of stationing marines on Dokdo, while on August 10th, 2012, former president Lee Myung Bak visited Dokdo. The visit itself was meaningful as he was the first supreme commander to visit Dokdo. This paper studies on the necessity of naval power on Dokdo to maintain its effective control. The effective control must be done by a national organization in a peaceful and unimpaired method. If so, can stationing naval power, whether directly or indirectly, on Dokdo be considered a violation of 'peaceful' method? A 'peaceful' effective of control meas the right of sovereignty over a territory without other country's protest. In such terms, protecting a territory falls under practicing the right of sovereignty, and therefore does not violate 'peaceful'. In addition, looking at international cases such as Ligitan/Sipadan Case and Pedra Blanca Case, evidences such as 'navy activity', 'flyng ensign', and 'military communication facility installation' was used. In ter case of Yemen-Eritrea dispute over Hanish, methods on effective control over island and sea was also ruled by the installation of military posts and military surveillance activities. Thus, stationing naval power on Dokdo can be a way of maintaining effective control per international law. To station naval poer on Dokdo, Presidential Instruction 24 integrated Defense Guideline Enforcement Ordinance, which is domestic law, must be revised. Reason being, the Enforcement Ordinance states that the navy area of responsibility excluded Ullundo, where Dokdo is under jurisdiction of Ullungdim thus excluding navy control. In addition, considering the diplomatic situation, it is more fut to install navy radar site on Dokdo rather than 'stationing marines'. In other words, enforcing surveillance in the vicinity of Dokdo and installing radar site instead of stationing direct combatants is one way of practicing effective control without stimulating diplomatic disputes.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.28 no.2
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• pp.280-289
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• 2022

Internal Waters refer to the waters located at the landward side of a baseline and is completely under the sovereignty of a coastal state. However, the right of innocent passage of foreign-flag vessels is recognized in internal waters that are newly incorporated by establishing a straight baseline. Korea has a massive Internal Waters on its south-western coast where the straight baseline is adopted and has a wide Internal Waters that allows innocent passage. A foreign-flag vessel navigating the internal waters must be properly managed according to the interest of the coastal states such as the fishing·safety·security·environment around the Korean coast. Additionally, Territorial Sea comes under the sovereignty of a coastal state and it is a very important sea area for managing the interests of the coastal states. However, several collision accidents involving illegally anchored or drifted foreign-flag vessels have been occurring recently in the Korean Internal Waters and Territorial Sea, and such accidents are a threat to its interests. Thus, this paper analyzes the cases of collision of foreign-flag vessels that anchored or drifted without authorization, and examines domestic·international laws on the passage of foreign-flag vessel through Internal Waters and Territorial Waters. Finally, this paper suggests that unauthorized anchoring of foreign-flag vessels in Korean Internal Waters and Territorial Water violates the requirements for innocent passage and this violation is punishable according to related Acts; a desirable improvement plan for the legal system of passage through Internal Waters and Territorial Waters.

• Strategy21
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• s.30
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• pp.177-199
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• 2012

As is generally known, the sovereignty dispute over the Senkaku Islands between China/Taiwan and Japan was triggered by a report commissioned by the UN in 1968, which reported the possibility of a substantial amount of petroleum and natural gas buried in the South China Sea. When the administrative authority over the Ryukyu Islands was transferred from the US to Japan in 1972, jurisdiction over the Senkaku Islands was also transferred. A dispute ensued between China (Taiwan) and Japan over the Senkaku Islands except during the period in which formal relations were established between the two states. This paper will take a look particularly at the events that occurred in the 2000's and discuss their recent trends and aspects of the dispute. Though China and Japan agreed to joint resource development in 2008, the agreed zone was a very small area adjacent to the Korea-Japan Joint Continental Shelf Development Zone, and the points of agreement have not been implemented. China has been developing four oil fields including Chunxiao in its waters adjacent to the median line asserted by Japan. However, China also has been excluding the participation of Japan, while Japan has been strongly objecting to the unilateral development of oil fields by China. If indeed the oil fields on China's side are connected past the median line asserted by Japan, then China's unilateral development will infringe upon the potential sovereign rights of Japan, thereby violating international law.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.112-129
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• 2018

Produced by Chinese local television stations, Maritime Silk Road is a documentary which adopts ancient Maritime Silk Road as a historical nostalgia to interpret "the Belt and Road Initiative", a contemporary Chinese economic, political, and cultural strategy put forward by Chinese government mainly aiming at the countries of Southeast Asia. The main body of this article has three parts and the first part analyses how the documentary adopts computer-generated imagery (CGI) to create a historical nostalgia about ancient Maritime Silk Road in the period of Imperial China. At the same time, this part also presents a sense of diasporic nostalgia of the overseas Chinese. This historical and diasporic nostalgia is related to Chinese President Xi Jinping's political discourse: "Chinese dream" that propagandises to build a strong China put forward by Xi in 2013. The second part analyses how this historical and diasporic nostalgia legitimates Xi's "Chinese dream" and how it responds to recent territorial dispute when China continuously claims its territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea. In this light, the documentary repeatedly mentions two political rhetoric: "coexistence" (gongcun) and "mutual benefit"(huli gongying) as a practical strategy to deal with the dispute between China and some countries of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the third section, the concept of "community of common destiny" (mingyun gongtongti) is adopted by the documentary to depict a convenient and effective organization of China and ASEAN, which is framed as an ultimate goal that Chinese government is depicted as the potential leader of this nostalgic community. At the same time, by providing different and even opposite viewpoints, this article discusses three controversial political rhetoric to present how historical and diasporic nostalgia is politicalized and served for Chinese diplomacy and national interest. Overall, this article argues that the documentary creates a glorious ancient Maritime Silk Road, as a sense of nostalgia, to expand China's economic and political influence, to respond to the controversial issues, and to reassert China's leadership as the centre of Asia.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• v.36 no.3
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• pp.303-318
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• 2014

The rising global demand for energy resources may lead to greater interest in the Arctic region. Since it has various resources, such as oil and gas, and large potential as a strategic location in exploration and production (E&P), there is likely to occur island sovereignty issues between the five arctic costal states and other countries. While global warming has led to the opening of the Northeast Passage and the Northwest Passage, several obstacles may impede the development of this area such as the low temperature environment, infrastructure problems in a limited area, flow assurance, environmental regulations, etc. To overcome these problems, various techniques have been applied in the exploration, development, production, transportation, and environment fields and it seems to be made technical development in extreme environment. In this study, the E&P status of representative states and development technologies in the Arctic region have been summarized with regard to carrying out E&P related to drilling, development, production, and operation in oil and gas fields. Furthermore, environmental factors have been taken into account to enhance progress with regard to E&P and ensure sustainable development in the Arctic. On that basis, it will be possible to secure oil and gas field development, production technology and R&D infrastructure in the Arctic.

• Strategy21
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• s.30
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• pp.99-142
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• 2012

Withe increased North Korea's security threats, the South Korean navy has been faced with deteriorating security environment. While North Korea has increased asymmetric forces in the maritime and underwater with the development of nuclear weapons, and China and Japan have made a large investment in the buildup of naval forces, the power of the Pacific fleet of the US, a key ally is expected to be weakened. The biggest threat comes from China's intervention in case of full-scale war with North Korea, but low-density conflict issues are also serious problems. North Korea has violated the Armistice Agreement 2,660 times since the end of Korean War, among which the number of marine provocations reaches 1,430 times, and the tension over the NLL issue has been intensifying. With tension mounting between Korea and Japan over the Dokdo issue and conflict escalating with China over Ieo do Islet, the US Navy has confronted situation where it cannot fully concentrate on the security of the Korean peninsula, which leads to need for strengthening of South Korea's naval forces. Let's look at naval forces of neighboring countries. North Korea is threatening South Korean navy with its increased asymmetric forces, including submarines. China has achieved the remarkable development of naval forces since the promotion of 3-step plan to strengthen naval power from 1989, and it now retains highly modernized naval forces. Japan makes an investment in the construction of stat of the art warship every year. Since Japan's warship boasts of its advanced performance, Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force is evaluated the second most powerful behind the US Navy on the assumption that submarine power is not included in the naval forces. In this situation, naval power construction of South Korean navy should be done in phases, focusing on the followings; First, military strength to repel the energy warship quickly without any damage in case of battle with North Korea needs to be secured. Second, it is necessary to develop abilities to discourage the use of nuclear weapons of North Korea and attack its nuclear facilities in case of emergency. Third, construction of military power to suppress armed provocations from China and Japan is required. Based on the above naval power construction methods, the direction of power construction is suggested as follows. The sea fleet needs to build up its war potential to defeat the naval forces of North Korea quickly and participate in anti-submarine operations in response to North Korea's provocations. The task fleet should be composed of 3 task flotilla and retain the power to support the sea fleet and suppress the occurrence of maritime disputes with neighboring countries. In addition, it is necessary to expand submarine power, a high value power asset in preparation for establishment of submarine headquarters in 2015, develop anti-submarine helicopter and load SLAM-ER missile onto P-3C patrol aircraft. In case of maine corps, division class military force should be able to conduct landing operations. It takes more than 10 years to construct a new warship. Accordingly, it is necessary to establish plans for naval power construction carefully in consideration of reality and future. For the naval forces to safeguard maritime sovereignty and contribute to national security, the acquisition of a huge budget and buildup of military power is required. In this regard, enhancement of naval power can be achieved only through national, political and military understanding and agreement. It is necessary to let the nation know that modern naval forces with improved weapon system can serve as comprehensive armed forces to secure the command of the sea, perform defense of territory and territorial sky and attack the enemy's strategic facilities and budget inputted in the naval forces is the essential source for early end of the war and minimization of damage to the people. If the naval power construction is not realized, we can be faced with a national disgrace of usurpation of national sovereignty of 100 years ago. Accordingly, the strengthening of naval forces must be realized.

• Strategy21
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• s.40
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• pp.5-36
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• 2016

Recently, the Japanese government revised the three guidelines of its security policy, the National Security Strategy(NSS), the National Defense Program Outline and Midterm Defense Buildup Plan, exceptionally at one time. This means Japan has been seeking the new strategy and strengthening military power considering changing regional security environment. Moreover, Japan revised the security laws for the right to collective self-defense, which authorized the use of force even when Japan is not under attack. Also, Japan renewed the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in twenty years, and has expanded JSDF's scope of activity to a worldwide level. These changes imply Japan would constantly seek to build military forces focusing on naval forces. Because Japan's naval forces, the JMSDF is the means that allow Japan to use its force at anywhere overseas and expand its roles and missions in international society by the basis of the right to collective self-defense. This research will analyze Japan's new maritime strategy and trend of force development and eventually look for the implication on our maritime security These days, Japan has perceived Chinese rapid increase of naval power and pursuing of maritime hegemony as a grave threat. In response to this, Japan is designing new maritime strategy, which are "remote islands defense and recapture" and proactively develop a new type of naval forces to accomplish this new strategy. The Japan's "remote island defense and recapture strategy" is to harden its defensive posture in Nansei islands which correspond to China's 1st island chain for chinese A2/AD strategy and directly encounter with China and to protect its own dominium and maritime interest while supporting US national strategy in East Asia. Japan continues to build compact, multi-functional ship to accomplish "remote island defense and recapture strategy" and keep strengthening its maritime power projection capability to include build of new amphibious ship, and large, multi-functional ship which can provide effective C2. These changes imply that Japan is shifting its strategy from passive and defensive to proactive and aggressive way and continues to pursue naval buildup.The implication of Japan's new maritime strategy and naval buildup needs to be observed carefully and we need to keep developing naval power required to protect our maritime sovereignty and interest.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.32
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• pp.95-122
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• 2012

The ocean in the 21st century is getting emphasized as a treasury of natural resources and a growth engine for the nation. And nations around the world have entered into the hyper-competition to take the initiative for those marine resources. Under the situation, the Korea Coast Guard is devoting itself with full force to protecting maritime sovereignty, ensuring maritime safety and security and preserving the marine environment. Purpose of this study is to analyze Maritime Policing Act of 2012 and their problems and to suggest improvement measures. Objectives of Maritime Policing Act of 2012 is national Defence, policing for maritime security, protection of marine natural resources and marine facility in territorial waters and exclusive economic zone(EEZ) of Korea. Limits of Maritime Policing Act of 2012 are as follows. First, As organization related rules in Maritime Policing Act of 2012 are not enough, Maritime police agency Act should be revised and enacted in order to cope with future administrative demands and legal ground. Second, Article 22 penal regulation is more severe than regulations of another Act. Third, Article 14 should be made improvement for pre-prevention through the pre-report and the establishment of prohibition boundary in maritime demonstration.