• 정보보호학회논문지
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• 제26권4호
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• pp.929-940
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• 2016

국제해사기구(IMO)의 e-Navigation 전략에 따라, 선박 및 육지간 안전하고 정확한 정보 전달을 지원하는 통신 인프라가 필요한 상태이다. 해사클라우드는 이러한 필요성에 따른 해양 통신 인프라의 개념으로 사용되고 있으며, e-Navigation 도메인 지원에 필요한 여러 요소들을 지원하고 있다. 안전한 해양 환경을 위해서는 해사 클라우드에 대한 연구와 함께 보안의 고려가 반드시 필요하나, 아직까지 해사 클라우드 보안에 대한 연구는 초기 단계이다. 본 논문에서는 해사 클라우드 서비스의 원활한 제공에 필요한 데이터의 안전한 동기화 기법을 제안하였다. 제안한 방식은 본 논문에서 제안한 SH-Tree 기반으로 선박간 동기화가 가능하며, 동기화 과정에서 정보 노출이 없다는 장점이 있다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권33호
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• pp.113-147
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• 2014

While China's military rise is an issue of growing importance to regional security, it is worthwhile to note that it is not China's military modernization per se, but its capacity to project and sustain power along and beyond its borders--in particular, the possibility to resolve forcefully its outstanding maritime disputes and various contingencies. This essay argues that China's "anti-access capability"--a U.S.-coined term originally developed for a Taiwan contingency--is equally applicable to other major regional cases such as the Spratly disputes and a North Korean contingency. Furthermore, notwithstanding China's continuos efforts to develop and deploy various types and classes of weapons/platforms, it is the Russian systems and technologies that are most capable and thus likely assigned to the highest mission-critical areas. In assessing China's current and likely future military capability as well as their implications for the region, it is necessary to take note of the following: • There exists asymmetry of military capability between China and its weaker neighbors. While the PLAN is weak in several important aspects, for instance, many of its neighbors' navies are weaker still. • Some have argued that China's foreign policy behavior apparently became more "assertive" in 2009-2013, but it is wiser to keep in mind that China has almost always been assertive and aggressive when it comes to what China defines as "sovereignty and territorial issues" as well as its newest "core interests." • On the South China Sea disputes it is the function of U.S. presence in the theater--in the form of overseas bases and the freedom of navigation--and the PLA's own limitations to project and sustain power for an extended period of time that have largely prevented armed. • While Taiwan remains the idee fixe of China's diplomacy and military, it is and will be a tough nut to crack. China's recent creeping attempts for economic integration with Taiwan should be seen in this context. • China and Japan, the two regional heavyweights and traditional rivals, will likely have a bilateral relationship that is replete with difficulties and tension. China's unilateral announcement of its ADIZ in November 2013 as well as the occasional yet persistent disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai islands are only the latest manifestation of this deeper and difficult relationship. • For Korean security it is imperative to take into account the geostrategic and historical factors. On top of the existing military threats from North Korea, the ROK should be able to employ a) hedging strategy, b) "limited defense sufficiency" strategy, and c) rock-solid relations with the United States.

• 해양안보
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• 제1권1호
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• pp.61-92
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• 2020

본 논문은 중국의 시기별 해군전략의 전략운용 목표, 범위, 방식을 살펴보고, 시진핑 시기 해군전략의 목표와 특징, 전략적 함의를 분석해 보는 데 그 목적이 있다. 신(新)중국 성립 이후 해군은 현재까지 총 네 번에 걸쳐 전략변화를 구사하였다. 현재 시진핑 시기 중국의 해군전략은 근해적극방어전략이 결합된 원해호위전략이다. 현재 중국의 해군전략은 공격성 무기체계로 인해 공격적 전략으로 전환되고 있고, 최신식 함정의 비중이 높아지고 있으며, 운용범위는 연안과 근해를 벗어나 전 세계 해양이 대상이 되었다. 중국의 해군전략이 전환됨에 따라 중국 해군은 해양주도권 확보를 전략적 목표로 설정하고 외부 세력의 개입과 침입에 적극 대응하기 위한 공세적 전략을 실행할 것이다. 이에 중국 해군은 원거리 지역 해상 분쟁지역에서 분쟁당사국들을 더욱 압박하기 위해 억제전력과 기동전력을 향상시킬 것이다. 또한 중국의 해군전략은 '차단'에서 '신속대응'이라는 운용 방식으로 점차 전환될 것으로 전망한다.

• 해양안보
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• 제4권1호
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• pp.83-113
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• 2022

중국의 해상 민병대는 긴 역사에 비해 잘 알려지지 않았으나, 최근 주변국과의 다양한 해양 분쟁을 통해 주변국들의 우려와 심각한 위협으로 부상하고 있다. 따라서, 현 시점에서 중국 해상 민병대의 실체에 대한 명확한 이해가 필요할 때이다. 중국 해상 민병대의 편성과 역할 검토를 통해 중국의 해상 민병대는 '중국의 해양이익 보호와 신장을 위한 해상 민병대의 기여'라는 목적에 맞춰 중국 정부와 인민해방군에 의해 조직적으로 관리되고 운용되는 조직이라는 것을 알 수 있었다. 또한, 중국의 해상 민병대가 운용 되었던 주변국과의 해양 분쟁 사례 검토를 통해 이들의 위협요인을 도출할 수 있었다. 첫 번째, 중국 해상 민병대는 '회색지대전략'을 수행하며, 두 번째, 정부와 인민해방군의 지원을 받는 체계화된 조직이다. 세 번째, 전 세계에서 가장 큰 규모의 민병조직으로 간과할 수 없는 해양세력이며, 네 번째, 생업 종사와 해상 민병이라는 이중임무 수행이 가능한 전략적 유연성을 갖추고 있다는 점이다. 중국 해상 민병대의 위협은 남중국해에 위치한 동남아시아 국가들만의 문제가 아니다. 우리나라도 이어도 문제, 서해 해상 경계선 획정 문제 등 중국과의 해양 분쟁에서 자유로울 수만은 없는 국가이다. 따라서 중국과 발생할 수 있는 가장 가능성 높은 2가지 사례에 대해 시나리오 기법 분석을 통해 예상 시나리오와 대응방안을 살펴보았다. 마지막으로, 중국 해상 민병대의 실체를 직시하고 이들이 향후 어떻게 운용 및 발전될 것이며, 우리는 어떻게 대응해 나가야 할 것인지에 대한 고민을 제시하였다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권44호
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• pp.5-27
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• 2018

The purpose of this paper is to look at USN's efforts to rebuild its combat power in the face of a reemergence of great powers competition, and to propose some recommendations for the ROKN. In addition to the plan to augment its fleet towards a 355-ships capacity, the USN is pursuing to improve exponentially combat lethality(quality) of its existing fleet by means of innovative science and technology. In other words, the USN is putting its utmost efforts to improve readiness of current forces, to modernize maintenance facilities such as naval shipyards, and simultaneously to invest in innovative weapons system R&D for the future. After all, the USN seems to pursue innovations in advanced military Science & Technology as the best way to ensure continued supremacy in the coming strategic competition between great powers. However, it is to be seen whether the USN can smoothly continue these efforts to rebuild combat strength vis-a-vis its new competition peers, namely China and Russian navy, due to the stringent fiscal constraints, originating, among others, from the 2011 Budget Control Act effective yet. Then, it seems to be China's unilateral and assertive behaviors to expand its maritime jurisdiction in the South China Sea that drives the USN's rebuild-up efforts of the future. Now, some changes began to be perceived in the basic framework of the hitherto regional maritime security, in the name of declining sea control of the USN as well as withering maritime order based on international law and norms. However, the ROK-US alliance system is the most excellent security mechanism upon which the ROK, as a trading power, depends for its survival and prosperity. In addition, as denuclearization of North Korea seems to take significant time and efforts to accomplish in the years to come, nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence by the US is still noting but indispensible for the security of the ROK. In this connection, the naval cooperation between ROKN and USN should be seen and strengthened as the most important deterrents to North Korean nuclear and missile threats, as well as to potential maritime provocation by neighboring countries. Based on these observations, this paper argues that the ROK Navy should try to expand its own deterrent capability by pursuing selective technological innovation in order to prevent this country's destiny from being dictated by other powers. In doing so, however, it may be too risky for the ROK to pursue the emerging, disruptive innovative technologies such as rail gun, hypersonic weapon... etc., due to enormous budget, time, and very thin chance of success. This paper recommends, therefore, to carefully select and extensively invest on the most cost-effective technological innovations, suitable in the operational environments of the ROK. In particular, this paper stresses the following six areas as most potential naval innovations for the ROK Navy: long range precision strike; air and missile defense at sea; ASW with various unmanned maritime system (UMS) such as USV, UUV based on advanced hydraulic acoustic sensor (Sonar) technology; network; digitalization for the use of AI and big data; and nuclear-powered attack submarines as a strategic deterrent.

• 해양안보
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• 제1권1호
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• pp.273-310
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• 2020

본 연구는 최근 남중국해와 동중국해를 둘러싼 해양 갈등에서 중국의 주요 해양안보전략 중 하나로 사용되기 시작한 "회색지대전략"의 전반적인 메커니즘을 경험적으로 분석하고, 그로 인한 남중국해 및 동중국해 분쟁 양상을 비교하는 데에 그 목적을 둔다. 이를 위해 필자는 중국의 회색지대전략에 관한 두 가지 가설들을 세워 남중국해와 동중국해 분쟁에서 중국의 회색지대전략이 어떻게 '구사'되어 왔고 '구성'되어 있는지, 상대국은 어떤 방식으로 그것에 대응하는지 살펴보고, 그로 말미암아 각 분쟁들의 양상은 어떤 유사점과 차이점을 보이는지 밝혀냈다. 필자가 이 연구에서 수립한 가설들은 첫 째, "중국이 활용하는 해양 회색지대전략은 주요 분쟁 지역인 남중국해와 동중국해에서 각기 다른 수행 구조를 보인다는 것"이다. 두 번째는, "이에 따라 남중국해와 동중국해에서 벌어지는 분쟁의 양상 역시 차이를 보인다는 것"이다. 이를 논증하기 위해 필자는 중국의 회색지대전략 메커니즘을 크게 차례대로 1) 분쟁 추이와 전략 수행의 빈도, 2) 전략의 유형과 강도, 3) 전략 수행의 행위자, 4) 상대국의 대응 방식으로 다차원적인 구분을 시도하고, 양적 모델링을 바탕으로 이에 관련 데이터를 수집했다. 이후, 2010년부터 2020년 06월에 이르는 약 10년 가량의 데이터(중국의 회색지대전략 사용과 분쟁 동향 등)를 가공하고, 직접 연구 모형을 설계해 회색지대전략에 대한 새로운 범주화와 조작적 정의를 시도했다. 이를 바탕으로 필자는 중국이 활용하는 회색지대전략의 포괄적인 메커니즘들과 남중국해와 동중국해의 분쟁 양상도 성공적으로 비교해 최종적으로 모든 가설을 검증할 수 있었다. 결론 부분에서는 검증된 결과를 재차 정리하고, 중국의 회색지대전략으로 인해 비롯될 수 있는 동아시아 역내의 안보 취약성을 극복해 나가야 함을 강조하는 것으로 마무리했다. 본 연구는 지금까지 한 번도 시도되지 않았던 연구로서 중국의 회색지대전략이 수행되는 구조를 밝히고, 이것과 해양 분쟁 양상 간의 상관관계를 양적 방법론을 이용해 규명했다는 데에 큰 의의가 있으리라 생각된다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권42호
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• pp.83-113
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• 2017

After defeat in World War II, Japan's Peace Constitution committed the country to forego the acquisition of offensive military capabilities. However, in the midst of the post-cold war period, Japan began to change its security posture in line with the so-called 'normal state theory', which called for a more robust defense posture and expanded security activities. The second Abe administration promoted these security policies by issuing a National Security Strategy as well as a new National Defense Program Outline(NDPO) in 2013 and by establishing new security institutions such as the National Security Council. The Abe administration also adopted the new concept of a 'Unified Mobile Defense Force' in the 2013 which replaced the 'Dynamic Defense Force' as a new criteria for the Self-Defense Force's acquisition of military capabilities. In this new concept of military capabilities, the Ground Self-Defense Force is planning to replace existing divisions with mobile divisions and to form 'Amphibious Rapid Deployment Bridge' for the first time in 2018, which has long been taboo in Japan. Japan has experience a Marine Corps in the past. Likewise, an offensive changes in the military strategy can change the spectrum of strategy and 'Amphibious Rapid Deployment Bridge' plays a big role in this. Furthermore, Japan is increasing the Coast Guard's budget and capabilities in preparation for contingencies around the Senkaku islands (called the Diaoyu in Chinese). The South Korea navy should utilize Japan's changing security posture to deter immediate threat such as North Korea's military provocations and potential enemy threat such as China, Japan, Russia.

• 해양환경안전학회지
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• 제28권3호
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• pp.451-458
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• 2022

In Korea, five major ports have been designated as sulfur oxide emission control areas to reduce air pollutant emissions, in accordance with Article 10 of the "Special Act on Port Air Quality" and Article 32 of the "Ship Pollution Prevention Regulations". As regulations against vessel-originated air pollutants (such as PM, CO2, NOx, and SOx) have been strengthened, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries(MOF) enacted rules that newly built public ships should adopt eco-friendly propulsion systems. However, particularly in diesel-electric hybrid propulsion systems,the demand for precise control schemes continues to grow as the fuel saving rate significantly varies depending on the control strategy applied. The conventional Power Take In-Power Take Off(PTI - PTO) mode control adopts a rule-based strategy, but this strategy is applied only in the low-load range and PTI mode; thus, an additional method is required to determine the optimal fuel consumption point. The proposed control method is designed to optimize fuel consumption by applying the equivalent consumption minimization strategy(ECMS) to the PTI - PTO mode by considering the characteristics of the specific fuel oil consumption(SFOC) of the engine in a diesel-electric hybrid propulsion system. To apply this method, a specific fishing vessel model operating on the Korean coast was selected to simulate the load operation environment of the ship. In this study, a 10.2% reduction was achieved in the MATLAB/SimDrive and SimElectric simulation by comparing the fuel consumption and CO2 emissions of the ship to which the conventional rule-based strategy was applied and that to which the ECMS was applied.

• Strategy21
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• 통권33호
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• pp.5-36
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• 2014

This article aims to analyze the diplomatic challenges currently facing China as well as the foreign policy the Xi Jinping administration is adopting to address them. With these purposes in mind, it will look into three areas: first, diplomatic tasks confronting the Xi leadership; second, foreign policy that the Xi administration has implemented since the 18th Party Congress in 2012; and third, the prospects for China's foreign policy under the Xi leadership. As the Xi Jinping administration entered into office, it has encountered two major diplomatic challenges. One is the searching for a new foreign policy, and the other the restructuring of the existing foreign affairs and national security systems. The Xi administration, during its first year in office, has responded actively to tackle these issues. To begin with, it has attempted to make some adjustments on foreign policy while maintaining the Deng Xiaoping line of foreign policy. One of these modifications is placing emphasis on national "core interest," as illustrated by changes in guideline for maritime conflicts, pushing for building maritime power, and proclamation of Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea. Second is the decision on the new guideline for peripheral diplomacy. That is, the administration regarded creating peaceful and stable environments to realize "Chinese Dream" as an important goal of foreign policy, and proposed such new guiding ideology as "familiarity, integrity, benefit, and accommodation." In additoin, the Xi administration restructured the existing foreign affairs and national security systems. Establishing the Central State Security Committee and the Internet Leading Small Group (LSG) are cases in point. As comprehensive organizations for policy coordination that encompass party, government, and military, the two LSGs are in charge of enacting related policies and fine-tuning policy implementation, based upon leadership consisting of chiefs of each relevant organs. Moreover, since Xi himself became the chief of these two newly-found organs, the conditions under which these LSGs could demonstrate unified leadership and adjusting role in its implementation of military, diplomatic, and security policies were developed. The future Chinese diplomacy will be characterized with three main trends. First, peripheral diplomacy will be reinforced. The peripheral diplomacy has become far more important since the Work Conference on Peripheral Diplomacy in October 2013. Second, economic diplomacy will be strengthened with an eye on reducing the "China Threat Theory," which still exists in Asia. Third, the policies to isolate the Philippines and Japan will continue in regard to maritime disputes. All in all, Chinese diplomacy in the Xi Jinping era is likely to feature practical diplomacy which combines both hard and soft approaches to best realize Chinese national interest.

• 한국정보통신학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국정보통신학회 2015년도 추계학술대회
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• pp.445-447
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• 2015

동북아시아의 정세는 일본, 중국, 필리핀, 베트남 등 동중국해 연안 국가 간 영토 분쟁, 북한의 연이은 핵실험 및 장거리 탄도미사일 발사 시험, 중국의 랴오닝급 항공모함 건조 등으로 인해 급변하고 있다. 특히 불안정한 북한의 상황, 중국의 해군력 증강을 통한 A2/AD(Anti-Access/Area Denial, 반접근/지역거부) 전략 등으로 인해 미국의 아시아 태평양 지역 안보 전략의 재검토가 불가피하게 되었다. 본 논문에서는 변경된 미국의 아시아 태평양 안보 전략과 미 해군 전력의 재배치 계획에 대해 조사 및 분석하고, 변화된 주변 환경이 우리의 안보에 미치는 영향에 대해 분석하였다.