• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.149-177
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• 2014

Today distant oceans around the world are regarded as a major 'global commons' for international trade and transportation. Korea is not an exception, because Korea hugely depends on sea lines of communication (SLOC) for supplying vital commodities such as food and energy resource. As a result, assuring a free and safe use of distant ocean beyond territory is also an important agenda for Korea's maritime security. However there are a number of challenges for Korea to enjoy a free and safe use of distant ocean; dangers of regional maritime conflict in East Asia, naval arms race of China and Japan, and concerns on possible decline of U.S naval presence and power projection capabilities. These factors provide a reasonable basis for Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) to pursue capabilities for major naval operations at distant ocean in a long-term perspective toward the year 2030. The introduction of aircraft carrier and nuclear-powered submarine is a key requirement for achieving this goal. ROKN needs to acquire a 'multi-role strategic landing platform' type of light aircraft carrier, which takes a role to escort naval task force by providing air superiority at distant ocean. Additionally nuclear-powered submarine will offer ROKN a formidable power to carry out offensive missions effectively at distant ocean.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.26 no.4
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• pp.929-940
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• 2016

The IMO e-navigation strategy has requested a communication infrastructure providing authorized seamless information transfer between stakeholders. The Maritime Cloud is the term used to describe the concept of an infrastructure that support authorized, seamless information transfer, adding those elements, that are necessary to support the e-navigation domain. It is necessary to consider the study on maritime cloud security, but the study is still an early stage. In this paper, we propose a secure synchronization method for the maritime cloud services. The proposed method can be synchronize between the vessel based on the SH-Tree, and it has the advantage that there is no exposure information in the synchronization process.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.113-147
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• 2014

While China's military rise is an issue of growing importance to regional security, it is worthwhile to note that it is not China's military modernization per se, but its capacity to project and sustain power along and beyond its borders--in particular, the possibility to resolve forcefully its outstanding maritime disputes and various contingencies. This essay argues that China's "anti-access capability"--a U.S.-coined term originally developed for a Taiwan contingency--is equally applicable to other major regional cases such as the Spratly disputes and a North Korean contingency. Furthermore, notwithstanding China's continuos efforts to develop and deploy various types and classes of weapons/platforms, it is the Russian systems and technologies that are most capable and thus likely assigned to the highest mission-critical areas. In assessing China's current and likely future military capability as well as their implications for the region, it is necessary to take note of the following: • There exists asymmetry of military capability between China and its weaker neighbors. While the PLAN is weak in several important aspects, for instance, many of its neighbors' navies are weaker still. • Some have argued that China's foreign policy behavior apparently became more "assertive" in 2009-2013, but it is wiser to keep in mind that China has almost always been assertive and aggressive when it comes to what China defines as "sovereignty and territorial issues" as well as its newest "core interests." • On the South China Sea disputes it is the function of U.S. presence in the theater--in the form of overseas bases and the freedom of navigation--and the PLA's own limitations to project and sustain power for an extended period of time that have largely prevented armed. • While Taiwan remains the idee fixe of China's diplomacy and military, it is and will be a tough nut to crack. China's recent creeping attempts for economic integration with Taiwan should be seen in this context. • China and Japan, the two regional heavyweights and traditional rivals, will likely have a bilateral relationship that is replete with difficulties and tension. China's unilateral announcement of its ADIZ in November 2013 as well as the occasional yet persistent disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai islands are only the latest manifestation of this deeper and difficult relationship. • For Korean security it is imperative to take into account the geostrategic and historical factors. On top of the existing military threats from North Korea, the ROK should be able to employ a) hedging strategy, b) "limited defense sufficiency" strategy, and c) rock-solid relations with the United States.

• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.61-92
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• 2020

This paper attempts to examine the changes in China's naval strategy and to analyze the goal, range, and method of each strategy during the Xi Jinping's era. Since the founding of New China, the People's Liberation of Army Navy(PLAN) has made four changes in the naval strategy. Under Xi Jinping's administration, China's naval strategy is far seas operation combined with near seas active defense. Now, China's naval strateg y is shifting from a defensive to an aggressive one, increasing the proportion of offensive weapon systems and the number of state-of-the-art warships, and the scope of the naval strategy has been specified in the second island chain including the Indian Ocean. With the changes of naval strategy, the PLAN will set a new strategic goal to secure maritime dominance and implement an assertive strategy to actively respond to the intervention and intrusion of external forces. Moreover, the PLAN will also improve its sea-based deterrence force and the maneuver force to block other countries in the long-distance maritime conflict zones. The operation method of China's future naval strateg y will gradually shift from 'interdiction' to 'rapid-response.'

• Maritime Security
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• v.4 no.1
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• pp.83-113
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• 2022

Although China's maritime militia has not been well known despite its long history, it is recently emerging as a serious threat to maritime security, causing neighboring countries' security concerns due to the growing number of maritime disputes with China. In this regard, it is now time to clearly define the true nature of the Chinese maritime militia. A close look at the organization and roles of the Chinese maritime militia reveals that it is an organization that is systematically managed and operated by the Chinese government and the People's Liberation Army of China. Its role is to serve the purpose of "contributing to the protection and expansion of China's marine interests." In addition, the threat factors of the Chinese maritime militia were analyzed by examining the cases of maritime disputes between the Chinese maritime militia and neighboring countries. First, the Chinese maritime militia has implemented the "Gray Zone Strategy." Second, it is a systematic organization supported by the Chinese government and the People's Liberation Army. Third, it is a maritime power that cannot be ignored as the world's largest militia organization. Fourth, it has a strategic flexibility that enables the execution of the dual mission of working for a living such as commercial fishing and serving in the maritime militia. The threats of the Chinese maritime militia are not limited to Southeast Asian countries located in the South China Sea. This is also the case in Korea as the country cannot avoid maritime disputes with China such as the Ieodo issue and the boundary delimitation of the West Sea. Accordingly, this study was focused on presenting a predictable scenario and countermeasures based on the analysis through a scenario technique with respect to the two cases that are most likely to occur in Korea-China relations. Finally, beyond identifying the nature of the Chinese maritime militia, this study takes a further step to share considerations as to how the organization may operate and develop in the future and how we can cope with its moves.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.5-27
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• 2018

The purpose of this paper is to look at USN's efforts to rebuild its combat power in the face of a reemergence of great powers competition, and to propose some recommendations for the ROKN. In addition to the plan to augment its fleet towards a 355-ships capacity, the USN is pursuing to improve exponentially combat lethality(quality) of its existing fleet by means of innovative science and technology. In other words, the USN is putting its utmost efforts to improve readiness of current forces, to modernize maintenance facilities such as naval shipyards, and simultaneously to invest in innovative weapons system R&D for the future. After all, the USN seems to pursue innovations in advanced military Science & Technology as the best way to ensure continued supremacy in the coming strategic competition between great powers. However, it is to be seen whether the USN can smoothly continue these efforts to rebuild combat strength vis-a-vis its new competition peers, namely China and Russian navy, due to the stringent fiscal constraints, originating, among others, from the 2011 Budget Control Act effective yet. Then, it seems to be China's unilateral and assertive behaviors to expand its maritime jurisdiction in the South China Sea that drives the USN's rebuild-up efforts of the future. Now, some changes began to be perceived in the basic framework of the hitherto regional maritime security, in the name of declining sea control of the USN as well as withering maritime order based on international law and norms. However, the ROK-US alliance system is the most excellent security mechanism upon which the ROK, as a trading power, depends for its survival and prosperity. In addition, as denuclearization of North Korea seems to take significant time and efforts to accomplish in the years to come, nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence by the US is still noting but indispensible for the security of the ROK. In this connection, the naval cooperation between ROKN and USN should be seen and strengthened as the most important deterrents to North Korean nuclear and missile threats, as well as to potential maritime provocation by neighboring countries. Based on these observations, this paper argues that the ROK Navy should try to expand its own deterrent capability by pursuing selective technological innovation in order to prevent this country's destiny from being dictated by other powers. In doing so, however, it may be too risky for the ROK to pursue the emerging, disruptive innovative technologies such as rail gun, hypersonic weapon... etc., due to enormous budget, time, and very thin chance of success. This paper recommends, therefore, to carefully select and extensively invest on the most cost-effective technological innovations, suitable in the operational environments of the ROK. In particular, this paper stresses the following six areas as most potential naval innovations for the ROK Navy: long range precision strike; air and missile defense at sea; ASW with various unmanned maritime system (UMS) such as USV, UUV based on advanced hydraulic acoustic sensor (Sonar) technology; network; digitalization for the use of AI and big data; and nuclear-powered attack submarines as a strategic deterrent.

• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.273-310
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• 2020

This study aims at empirically analyzing the overall mechanism of the "Gray Zone Strategy", which has begun to be used as one of Chinese major maritime security strategies in maritime conflicts surrounding the South China Sea and East China Sea since early 2010, and comparing the resulting conflict patterns in those reg ions. To this end, I made the following two hypotheses about Chinese gray zone strategy. The hypotheses that I have argued in this study are the first, "The marine gray zone strategy used by China shows different structures of implementation in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, which are major conflict areas.", the second, "Therefore, the patterns of disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea also show a difference." In order to examine this, I will classify Chinese gray zone strategy mechanisms multi-dimensionally in large order, 1) conflict trends and frequency of strategy execution, 2) types and strengths of strategy, 3) actors of strategy execution, and 4) response methods of counterparts. So, I tried to collect data related to this based on quantitative modeling to test these. After that, about 10 years of data pertaining to this topic were processed, and a research model was designed with a new categorization and operational definition of gray zone strategies. Based on this, I was able to successfully test all the hypotheses by successfully comparing the comprehensive mechanisms of the gray zone strategy used by China and the conflict patterns between the South China Sea and the East China Sea. In the conclusion, the verified results were rementioned with emphasizing the need to overcome the security vulnerabilities in East Asia that could be caused by China's marine gray zone strategy. This study, which has never been attempted so far, is of great significance in that it clarified the intrinsic structure in which China's gray zone strategy was implemented using empirical case studies, and the correlation between this and maritime conflict patterns was investigated.

• Strategy21
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• s.42
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• pp.83-113
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• 2017

After defeat in World War II, Japan's Peace Constitution committed the country to forego the acquisition of offensive military capabilities. However, in the midst of the post-cold war period, Japan began to change its security posture in line with the so-called 'normal state theory', which called for a more robust defense posture and expanded security activities. The second Abe administration promoted these security policies by issuing a National Security Strategy as well as a new National Defense Program Outline(NDPO) in 2013 and by establishing new security institutions such as the National Security Council. The Abe administration also adopted the new concept of a 'Unified Mobile Defense Force' in the 2013 which replaced the 'Dynamic Defense Force' as a new criteria for the Self-Defense Force's acquisition of military capabilities. In this new concept of military capabilities, the Ground Self-Defense Force is planning to replace existing divisions with mobile divisions and to form 'Amphibious Rapid Deployment Bridge' for the first time in 2018, which has long been taboo in Japan. Japan has experience a Marine Corps in the past. Likewise, an offensive changes in the military strategy can change the spectrum of strategy and 'Amphibious Rapid Deployment Bridge' plays a big role in this. Furthermore, Japan is increasing the Coast Guard's budget and capabilities in preparation for contingencies around the Senkaku islands (called the Diaoyu in Chinese). The South Korea navy should utilize Japan's changing security posture to deter immediate threat such as North Korea's military provocations and potential enemy threat such as China, Japan, Russia.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.28 no.3
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• pp.451-458
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• 2022

In Korea, five major ports have been designated as sulfur oxide emission control areas to reduce air pollutant emissions, in accordance with Article 10 of the "Special Act on Port Air Quality" and Article 32 of the "Ship Pollution Prevention Regulations". As regulations against vessel-originated air pollutants (such as PM, CO2, NOx, and SOx) have been strengthened, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries(MOF) enacted rules that newly built public ships should adopt eco-friendly propulsion systems. However, particularly in diesel-electric hybrid propulsion systems,the demand for precise control schemes continues to grow as the fuel saving rate significantly varies depending on the control strategy applied. The conventional Power Take In-Power Take Off(PTI - PTO) mode control adopts a rule-based strategy, but this strategy is applied only in the low-load range and PTI mode; thus, an additional method is required to determine the optimal fuel consumption point. The proposed control method is designed to optimize fuel consumption by applying the equivalent consumption minimization strategy(ECMS) to the PTI - PTO mode by considering the characteristics of the specific fuel oil consumption(SFOC) of the engine in a diesel-electric hybrid propulsion system. To apply this method, a specific fishing vessel model operating on the Korean coast was selected to simulate the load operation environment of the ship. In this study, a 10.2% reduction was achieved in the MATLAB/SimDrive and SimElectric simulation by comparing the fuel consumption and CO2 emissions of the ship to which the conventional rule-based strategy was applied and that to which the ECMS was applied.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.5-36
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• 2014

This article aims to analyze the diplomatic challenges currently facing China as well as the foreign policy the Xi Jinping administration is adopting to address them. With these purposes in mind, it will look into three areas: first, diplomatic tasks confronting the Xi leadership; second, foreign policy that the Xi administration has implemented since the 18th Party Congress in 2012; and third, the prospects for China's foreign policy under the Xi leadership. As the Xi Jinping administration entered into office, it has encountered two major diplomatic challenges. One is the searching for a new foreign policy, and the other the restructuring of the existing foreign affairs and national security systems. The Xi administration, during its first year in office, has responded actively to tackle these issues. To begin with, it has attempted to make some adjustments on foreign policy while maintaining the Deng Xiaoping line of foreign policy. One of these modifications is placing emphasis on national "core interest," as illustrated by changes in guideline for maritime conflicts, pushing for building maritime power, and proclamation of Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea. Second is the decision on the new guideline for peripheral diplomacy. That is, the administration regarded creating peaceful and stable environments to realize "Chinese Dream" as an important goal of foreign policy, and proposed such new guiding ideology as "familiarity, integrity, benefit, and accommodation." In additoin, the Xi administration restructured the existing foreign affairs and national security systems. Establishing the Central State Security Committee and the Internet Leading Small Group (LSG) are cases in point. As comprehensive organizations for policy coordination that encompass party, government, and military, the two LSGs are in charge of enacting related policies and fine-tuning policy implementation, based upon leadership consisting of chiefs of each relevant organs. Moreover, since Xi himself became the chief of these two newly-found organs, the conditions under which these LSGs could demonstrate unified leadership and adjusting role in its implementation of military, diplomatic, and security policies were developed. The future Chinese diplomacy will be characterized with three main trends. First, peripheral diplomacy will be reinforced. The peripheral diplomacy has become far more important since the Work Conference on Peripheral Diplomacy in October 2013. Second, economic diplomacy will be strengthened with an eye on reducing the "China Threat Theory," which still exists in Asia. Third, the policies to isolate the Philippines and Japan will continue in regard to maritime disputes. All in all, Chinese diplomacy in the Xi Jinping era is likely to feature practical diplomacy which combines both hard and soft approaches to best realize Chinese national interest.