• Strategy21
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• 통권34호
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• pp.58-92
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• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제4권1호
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• pp.63-87
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• 2020

This article not only theoretically explores the necessity and effect of constructive minilateralism and subregionalism in Northeast Asia, but also delves into a series of practical solutions from viewpoint of seeking common ground while reserving differences in this region. The main contents are as follows: First, the various obstacles that hinder the formation of regionalism, subregionalism and minilateralism in the Northeast Asia are discussed. That is to say, geopolitical realism, My Country First ideology, exclusive nationalism in the socio-historical context, and North Korea's latest provocations, etc. Second, this article explores the philosophy and basic principles of realizing Northeast Asia regionalism and minilateralism. Third, in the 21st century, Northeast Asia becomes the center of the world. It examines the core points, controversial focus and platform for building sub regionalism in the region. Finally, based on the institutional platform such as minilateralism and sub regionalism, the various ideas and practical plans of cross-border cooperation among major countries in Northeast Asia were discussed. Because there are a lot of obstacles, so first of all it is more appropriate to promote economic or functional minilateralism or sub regionalism than multilateral cooperation. In order to promote the formation of regionalism and minilateralism in Northeast Asia, the issues to be considered are as follows: First, for the sake of leading regional solidarity and minilateral economic cooperation, it is advisable for China, as a regional economic power, to implement a stable and responsible diplomacy. Secondly, regional solidarity based on credible politics and security should be promoted for a long time beyond the level of economic cooperation. Third, the primary prerequisite for the realization of Northeast Asian regionalism is that in the process of denuclearization of North Korea, the stability and peace mechanism of the Korean Peninsula should be established. Fourth, with the continued hegemonic competition between the United States and China in Northeast Asia, under the circumstance that countries in the region are pushed into so-called "East Asian Paradox", it is profoundly important for them to consider transition from the hostile relationship as the "Thucydides trap" to the order of "coexistence" in which competition and cooperation run side by side, and the two countries should explore a conversion plan for the foreign policy line. This mutual cooperation and peaceful coexistence of the US-China relationship will create a friendly atmosphere for the formation of regionalism in Northeast Asia. In the future, the cooperation of minilateralism in Northeast Asia will break the existing conflict between the maritime forces and the continental forces in order to promote peace. And along with the philosophy that "peace is economy", recent policies of common prosperity as the framework, such as China's "Belt and Road Initiative", North Korea's "Special Zone and Development Zone Policy", Russia's "New Eastern Policy", Japan's participation in the Belt and Road Initiative and South Korea's The "Korean Peninsula New Economy Map" are organically linked and it should promote the so-called "networked regionalism".

• 해양안보
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• 제4권1호
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• pp.57-82
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• 2022

이 논문은 Z세대의 관점에서 현재 해군 인력 활용 체제의 한계점에 관해 탐구하고 개선방안을 고찰하는 논문이다. 밀레니얼 세대에 이어 Z세대가 등장하고 있고, 군 인력구성에서의 비율 또한 점진적으로 증가하고 있다. 해군의 임무 특성상 X세대와 다른 특성을 가진 밀레니얼 세대와 또 다른 특성이 있는 Z세대와의 융합은 필연적으로 고찰해야 하는 과제 중 하나이다. 좁은 함정(艦艇)이라는 공간에는 폭넓은 임무 수행을 위해 수많은 장비를 탑재하고 이를 24시간 동안 동등한 수준의 전투력으로 운영할 많은 수의 승조원이 함께 생활하게 되는데, 이러한 특수한 작전환경에서 승조원 간 세대 갈등은 크나큰 전투력 악화로 이어질 수 있다. 신세대 장병은 이전 세대와 다른 측면에서의 사회적 어려움을 겪고 있고 군에 대한 가치관이 서로 다르기에, 그들 간의 진정한 화합을 위해서는 각 세대의 가치관의 차이점에 대해 자세히 탐구하고 군 조직은 이러한 변화에 대해 적절한 대처를 하고 있는지 검토해 보아야 한다. 이에 따라, 1장과 2장에서 기성세대와 구분되는 밀레니얼 세대와 Z세대의 성장기에 겪었던 환경과 이를 바탕으로 형성된 가치관에 대해 알아보고 세대 간 갈등의 해결 필요성을 제기한다. 3장에서는 군사 강국이 MZ세대와의 공존을 위해 시행 중인 방안 분석을 통해 교훈을 도출한다. 4장에서는 해군만의 특수한 작전 환경에 대해 살펴보고, 현재 한국 해군의 인력 활용의 현주소를 수병, 부사관, 장교, 정책적 차원으로 살펴보면서 세대 간 융합의 장애 요소를 식별하고 이에 대응한 개략적인 해결방안을 제시한다. 5장에서는 세대 간 특성 인식을 통한 진정한 공감의 필요성과 기술 중심군인 해군에게 인력 활용 문제 해결의 중요성을 재고하며 향후 인력 활용 문제 및 세대 간 갈등 문제를 해결한 해군 조직의 기대상에 대해 서술하였다.