• Title/Summary/Keyword: Maritime Piracy

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A Study on the Development of Supporting System for Distribution of S-63 ENCs (S-63 암호화된 전자해도 공급을 위한 지원시스템 개발연구)

  • Oh, Se-Woong;Jang, Won-Seok;Park, Jong-Min;Park, Han-San;Suh, Sang-Hyun
    • Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Navigation and Port Research Conference
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    • 2007.12a
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    • pp.181-183
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    • 2007
  • Copyright infringement and data piracy are pervasive problems of digital era and Electronic Navigational Charts(ENC) are not free from these issues. Aside from the economic impact, the unofficial distribution of nautical information has sign띠cant safeη concerns. Therefore, official distributors of nautical information have sought appropriate methods to protect their data and to provide the mariner with a certificate of authenticity through the adoption of security schema. However, a plethora of different security schema provided by independent distributors markedly complicates the software development of Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS) manufacturers and makes it more difficult to achieve the goal of seamless world-wide electronic navigational database easily accessible to the mariner. A fundamental concern of IHO is that adoption of a single, centrally administered security scheme for all ENCs could improve the ease of use of ENCs and enhance safety of navigation. IHO have driven protection scheme as S-63, S-63x. NORI(National Oceanographic Research Institute) necessarily need protection scheme and supporting system for nautical information. This paper presents protection scheme for NORI and proposes support system for ENC protection.

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India-South Korea Relations: Economic and Strategic Dimensions (한국-인도 간 관계: 경제적 및 전력적 측면에서의 평가)

  • Sharma, Raj Kumar
    • Strategy21
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    • s.39
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    • pp.251-267
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    • 2016
  • 한국과 인도 간 관계(이후 한국-인도 관계)는 오랜 역사를 통해 정치, 사회, 경제 및 전략적 측면에서 지속적으로 발전되었다. 특히 인도의 "동방정책(Look East Policy)" 채택과 한국의 "중견국 외교(Middle-power diplomacy)" 선언 간 동질성을 모색하는 차원에서 최근에 더욱 긴밀히 발전되고 있다. 즉 최근에 이르러 갑자기 발전된 관계가 아니라는 논지이다. 이에 본 논문에서는 한국과 인도 간 관계를 역사적 시각, 탈냉전 이후 시각, 경제적 시각 및 교육 및 문화적 그리고 지정학적 시각에서 평가하고자 한다. 특히 역내 중견국(middle power) 대표적 국가를 활용한 긴밀한 전략적 협력을 강조하고자 한다. 이를 위해 2004년 노무현 대통령의 인도 공식 방문 이후 2015년 1월 박근혜 대통령의 방문까지의 양국 간 전략적 협력 관계를 조명해 본다. 이에 따라 양국 관계는 이미 공개된 바와 같이 이는 사이버, 방산, 군사협력 및 정보교환 등의 분야로 구체화되고 있다. 일부는 이를 중국을 견제하는 양국 간의 협력이라고 평가하나, 본 논문은 특정 국가를 지목하기보다, 역내 중견국으로서의 전략적 관계 증진을 통한 역내 이익 보호에 있다고 평가한다. 특히 양국 간을 지리적으로 연결하는 해양을 통한 해양협력에 대한 논의를 추가한다. 예를 들면 역내 자연재난 구조작전(DR operation) 및 인도주의 지원작전(HA operation) 해양협력과 현재 진행되고 있는 아덴만 해적퇴치작전(Anti-piracy naval operation)이다.

A Study on Piracy Matters and Introduction of the Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on Board Ships (해적사건 대응을 위한 무장경비원제도 도입방안에 관한 연구)

  • Roh, Ho-Rae
    • Korean Security Journal
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    • no.41
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    • pp.293-326
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    • 2014
  • Piracy is a worldwide issue, but the deteriorating security situation in the seas off Somalia, the Gulf of Aden and the wider Western Indian Ocean between 2005 and 2012 and in the increasing number of attacks in the Gulf of Guinea are a major problem. The depth of concern for the problem internationally is amply demonstrated by the levels of co-operation and coordination among naval and other forces from several countries that have assembled in the west Indian Ocean region and the Gulf of Aden to escort ships carrying humanitarian aid to Somalia and to protect vulnerable shipping. Notwithstanding this unprecedented effort, the vast sea area in which the pirates now operate makes it difficult to patrol and monitor effectively, particularly with the limited resources available. More resources, in the form of naval vessels and aircraft, are needed and at every opportunity the IMO encourages Member Governments to make greater efforts to provide the additional naval, aerial surveillance and other resources needed through every means possible. IMO provide interim guidance and recommendations to be taken into account when considering the use of PCASP(privately contracted armed security personnel) if and when a flag State determines that such a measure would be lawful and, following a full risk assessment, appropriate. The interim guidance and recommendations of IMO are not intended to endorse or institutionalize the use of armed guards. Therefore, they do not represent any fundamental change of policy by the Organization in this regard. It is for each flag State, individually, to decide whether or not PCASP should be authorized for use on board ships flying their flag. If a flag State decides to permit this practice, it is up to that State to determine the conditions under which authorization will be granted. Therefore, Korea should be introduced rationally PCASP for safe shipping. PCASP on board ships is much the same to special guard personnel of security services industry act. Act plan of Oceans and fisheries ministry on PCASP collides with special guard personnel system of National Police Agency. Rather than new law making, PCASP regukations have to be included in security services industry act. Management Agency of PCASP is to not Oceans and fisheries ministry, but Central Headquarters Korea Coast Guard of Public Safety and Security Ministry because of specialty and closely connection.

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Eurasian Naval Power on Display: Sino-Russian Naval Exercises under Presidents Xi and Putin (유라시아 지역의 해군 전력 과시: 시진핑 주석과 푸틴 대통령 체제 하에 펼쳐지는 중러 해상합동훈련)

  • Richard Weitz
    • Maritime Security
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    • v.5 no.1
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    • pp.1-53
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    • 2022
  • One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.

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Strengthening International Collaboration for Counter-Piracy Efforts - Focusing on Counter-Piracy Operations Off the Coast of Somalia - (해적퇴치를 위한 국제공조 확대 방안 - 소말리아 해적퇴치 방안을 중심으로 -)

  • Kim, Duk-Ki
    • Strategy21
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    • s.31
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    • pp.251-293
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    • 2013
  • 해적은 공해상 해상안전을 위협 한다는 점에서 '인류공동의 적'으로 규정되어 모든 국가가 이를 규제할 수 있는 보편적 관할권이 행사되는 범죄이다. 한국을 포함한 아시아 지역 국가들은 말라카해협 통항에 관해 깊은 이해관계를 갖고 있어 해적 소탕에 대한 의지가 강한 편이다. 이러한 의지는 2006년 '아시아해적퇴치정보공유센터(ReCAAP ISO)'의 창설에 밑거름이 되었으며, 아시아 지역에서 해적이 출현하면 동 센터를 통해 17개국 회원국으로 즉시 통보되고, 주변국의 해경과 해군이 유기적인 작전을 통해 해적을 효율적으로 퇴치하고 있는 모범사례다. 그러나 2009년 소말리아 내란에 따른 무정부 상태가 지속되면서 소말리아 및 아덴만에서의 해적활동이 극성을 부리기 시작했으며, 선박납치 행위가 급증하자 세계 각국에서 함정과 항공기를 파견하여 해적퇴치 활동을 전개하고 있으나 근절되지 않을 뿐만 아니라 해적의 활동해역이 확대되고 있다. 이러한 배경 하에 시작된 본 연구는 연구결과를 중심으로 다음과 같은 대응 방안을 제시한다. 첫째, 소말리아 해적의 근본원인은 국가의 붕괴에서 비롯된 치안부재와 열악한 경제사정 등 내부적인 요인이 크기 때문에 다국적 해군 활동으로 인한 근본적인 해적퇴치에는 한계가 있다. 따라서 국제적인 차원에서 '지역협력협정'체결은 물론, 소말리아 국가재건을 위한 노력이 함께 이루어지는 종합적인 대책이 필요하다. 그러나 보다 더 근본적인 해결책은 유엔차원에서 빠른 시간 내에 소말리아가 정치적 안정을 유지할 수 있도록 정치적 차원에서의 지원이 필요하며, 해적과 테러리스트가 연계됨으로써 국제문제로 확대되지 않도록 하는 노력도 병행되어야 한다. 둘째, 해적문제는 특정국가에만 해당되는 것이 아니라 초국가적인 문제임을 감안하여 유엔안전보장이사회 결의 제1851호에서 '지역 센터' 설립을 권고하고 있는 것처럼 2006년 아시아 국가들이 설치한 ReCAAP ISO와 같은 형태의 지역국가 간 협력기구 또는 유엔 차원의 해적 전담기구를 설치하여 국제사회 공조 하에 해적에 대처하는 방안을 추진하는 것이 필요하다. 셋째, 최근 발생하고 있는 해적행위는 주로 항구 등 내수, 영해 등 연안국의 관할권이 행사되는 지역에서 발생하고 있어 유엔해양법상의 규정은 이러한 '해적' 퇴치에 더 이상 효율적이지 못하다. 국제사회는 이러한 문제점을 인식하여 국제해사기구 (IMO) 등 국제기구를 통해 영해내의 해적 처벌을 위해 최선의 노력을 기울이고 있다. 향후 궁극적으로는 유엔해양법협약의 개정을 통해 법적인 문제점이 개선되어야 한다. 넷째, 전술적인 측면에서도 지상에 기지를 두고 있는 해적들의 지도부가 그 동안 쌓아 놓은 네트워크를 이용하여 다국적 해군에 대한 정보를 수집하고 대응방안을 강구함으로써 나름대로의 생존전략을 구사할 것으로 예상된다. 특히, 선박을 납치한 후 소말리아 연안으로 이동하면서 해군함정과 대치하는 과정에서 해적들이 살상을 당하는 사례가 증가함에 따라 지금까지는 피랍된 선박의 선원을 단순히 해적활동에 참여시키거나, 항해지원을 위한 목적 등으로만 활용했는데, 앞으로는 해적들의 인명피해를 최소화하기 위해서라도 선원들을 방패막이로 활용할 가능성이 더욱 높아질 것으로 예상된다. 따라서 참가하는 해군함정 또는 부대간 해적들의 활동 관련 정보를 공유하는 등 사전에 정보를 획득하기 위한 협력을 강화해야 한다. 다섯째, 한국군함이 삼호주얼리호를 납치했던 소말리아 해적을 한국까지 대리고 와서 처벌하는 것은 불합리하고, 많은 문제점을 야기할 수 있기 때문에 향후 해적처벌을 위한 국제사법기구의 설치가 요구된다. 회원국 분담금으로 운영되는 유엔에 산하기관을 설치하여 소말리아 인접국에서 해결하도록 적극적인 노력을 경주할 필요가 있다. 마지막으로, 선박회사에서도 자국 선박이 위험구역으로 지정된 해역을 항해할 경우를 대비해서 선박자동식별 시스템 구축을 확대하고, 해적이 선박에 승선했을 경우를 대비해서 안전구역(citadel)을 설치하여 선원의 안전을 확보하는 등의 대책이 필요하다. 본 연구를 통해 해양안보는 어느 특정국가에게만 주어진 것이 아니며, 해적행위도 특정 국가의 선박을 대상으로 하는 것이 아니므로 각국 정부간 공동의 협력과 국제사회의 공조가 반드시 실현될 때 해적의 위협으로부터 선박의 안전과 국제사회의 평화가 실현될 수 있다는 것을 강조하고자 한다.

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Pirates in History and International Law Centering around the Viking Pirates (역사상 해적과 국제법상 해적 : 바이킹 해적을 중심으로)

  • Kim, Joo-Sik
    • Strategy21
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    • s.30
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    • pp.263-285
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    • 2012
  • History, demonstrating convincingly that pirates have arisen continuously for a lengthy period of time throughout the world, is able to become a cooperative study of international law in terms of pirates matters ; Viking pirates. There are beneficial topics for the study of true nature of viking activities and the settlement of present pirates matters ; How were the pirates activities of Vikings, What sort of relations do they have between Vikings and other pirates which have arisen in world history, What are the differences compared to present concept of pirates. There were active pirates activities in the coast and waters of Scandinavia even before the period of the Migration Age because of geographical condition. With those experiences, Vikings began to ambush Britain Islands sailing across the North Sea since the late 8C, ages of migration in earnest. They ambushed all coasts of the European Continent expending boundary until the late of 11C. Pirate activities in a sort of guerrilla operations were operated when they encountered Islams in the Iberian Peninsula and the coast of North Africa. They showed twofold attitudes ; if the defence of the region and sea was weak, they plundered, or if strong, traded. In plundered europeans' position, Vikings were pirates with cruelty and barbarians. In vikings position, they were normal human beings who did a pirate activity to lead a better life. Viking pirates showed different characteristics in terms of three aspects ; area and aspect of action, activity after piracy. Meanwhile, Viking pirates showed several differences with pirates defined in terms of modern international law. Among the satisfying conditions of pirates, required by the international law of the sea, Vikings fulfilled animus furandi, desire for gain, activities for hatred and revenge, and private ends. Other conditions including attacking authority of the vessels, activities toward private ships, activities in the coast and the land, and illegal terroristic activities toward ships are found in viking pirates. However, Viking pirates do not show the activities in high seas and in the outside of a State's jurisdiction. In addition, it cannot be excluded that they pirated with vessels of regional leaders and the Sovereign, not private ships. Contrary to the definition of concept in terms of modern international law toward pirates, Viking invaded foreign waters, came on shore to foreign land and island, went up-stream the rivers to the back of interior, and attacked churches and abbeys. Strangely, they sometimes settled down in the places where they had pirated. Today, pirates appearing in history and defined in international law exist simultaneously and separately. It means, the historical nature and the nature under the international law are turning up differently. Historical cases of pirates should be reflected to modern international law. If so, it seems that the clue to solve pirate problems can be arranged. History is the immortal living thing, which not just existed as a past but reflects present.

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