• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• 제17권1호
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• pp.112-129
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• 2018

Produced by Chinese local television stations, Maritime Silk Road is a documentary which adopts ancient Maritime Silk Road as a historical nostalgia to interpret "the Belt and Road Initiative", a contemporary Chinese economic, political, and cultural strategy put forward by Chinese government mainly aiming at the countries of Southeast Asia. The main body of this article has three parts and the first part analyses how the documentary adopts computer-generated imagery (CGI) to create a historical nostalgia about ancient Maritime Silk Road in the period of Imperial China. At the same time, this part also presents a sense of diasporic nostalgia of the overseas Chinese. This historical and diasporic nostalgia is related to Chinese President Xi Jinping's political discourse: "Chinese dream" that propagandises to build a strong China put forward by Xi in 2013. The second part analyses how this historical and diasporic nostalgia legitimates Xi's "Chinese dream" and how it responds to recent territorial dispute when China continuously claims its territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea. In this light, the documentary repeatedly mentions two political rhetoric: "coexistence" (gongcun) and "mutual benefit"(huli gongying) as a practical strategy to deal with the dispute between China and some countries of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the third section, the concept of "community of common destiny" (mingyun gongtongti) is adopted by the documentary to depict a convenient and effective organization of China and ASEAN, which is framed as an ultimate goal that Chinese government is depicted as the potential leader of this nostalgic community. At the same time, by providing different and even opposite viewpoints, this article discusses three controversial political rhetoric to present how historical and diasporic nostalgia is politicalized and served for Chinese diplomacy and national interest. Overall, this article argues that the documentary creates a glorious ancient Maritime Silk Road, as a sense of nostalgia, to expand China's economic and political influence, to respond to the controversial issues, and to reassert China's leadership as the centre of Asia.

• Journal of Advanced Marine Engineering and Technology
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• 제40권9호
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• pp.859-867
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• 2016

선박연료유는 운항비의 높은 비율을 차지하는 필수적인 요소이다. 그러므로 기준에 적합한 적정량의 연료유를 수급 받는 것은 운항손실을 예방하기 위해서도 중요한 작업이라 할 수 있다. 하지만 연료유 수급 시 발생되는 분쟁은 연료유 공급항을 중심으로 매년 지속적으로 발생되고 있으며, 선박소유자는 이러한 분쟁을 예방하고 효과적으로 대응하기 위하여 검정업체와의 계약을 통해 독립적 제3자인 선박연료유 검정인을 연료유 수급과정에 참여시켜 사실관계에 대한 증명서 발급을 요청한다. 하지만 현재 연료유 수급분쟁 발생 시 선박연료유 검정원의 지위와 역할이 명확하지 않아 효과적으로 대응하지 못하고 있다. 따라서 이 논문에서 과연 선박연료유 검정인이 가지는 법적지위 및 책임을 규명해보고 선박연료유 검정인이 수급분쟁에 있어서 실질적인 역할을 할 수 있는 대책에 대하여 논하고자 한다.

• 해양환경안전학회지
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• 제8권2호
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• pp.45-52
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• 2002

Recently there have been growing disputes between neighboring local governments over jurisdictional rights or property rights of ocean resources in Korean coastal waters. The reasons for the disputes come mainly from the increasing interests by local governments that begin to see the oceans as the source of resources and wealth. The maritime dispute is more complicated and sticky than the inland ones, and requires not only socio-economical but political approach, therefore sometimes demanding a plenty of time and endeavor. Also coastal states that have suffered from maritime boundary problems have different issues under the different environment and historical background. For Korea, as the maritime boundary issue has very recently soared to the surface, though it was latent for the period as long as 20 years, we have just taken steps toward an institutional approach on it, seemingly more to go to reach an agreeable resolutions to the disputes. This paper highlighted the issues surrounding the maritime boundary on the sea surrounding Korean peninsular after addressing the current situation of the boundary disputes. It will help explore and assess the possible solutions to the boundary conflicts over the lateral boundary between local governments.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• 제33권4호
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• pp.485-495
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• 2011

On February 11, 2011, upon request of the International Seabed Authority, 'the Seabed Dispute Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea(henceforth Chamber)' rendered its advisory opinion on the responsibilities and obligations of States sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area. The advisory opinion covered three questions: What are the legal responsibilities and obligations of the sponsoring states with respect to the sponsorship of activities in the Area? What is the extent of liability of a State Party for any failure to comply with the LOS Convention and relevant instruments? What are the necessary and appropriate measures that a sponsoring State must take in order to fulfil its responsibilities? In particular, the Chamber delivered its opinion on the different responsibilities and obligations of developed and developing sponsoring states. This paper reviews the above three questions through analyzing the advisory opinion and makes some recommendations for the fulfillment of the responsibilities and obligations of Korea as a sponsoring states.

• Strategy21
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• 통권44호
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• pp.103-141
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• 2018

As the South China Sea maritime dispute illustrates, when considering the place where maritime claims occur, states do not have many choices to respond to maritime claims in which disputed areas are located far away from the land and are surrounded by the sea. As Mearsheimer (2014) points out, the sea stops power projection. Therefore, in order to adopt coercive as well as peaceful settlement policies to deal with maritime claims, states need to overcome obstacles (the sea) to project power. It means that if states want to conduct a specific foreign policy action, such as negotiating maritime borderlines or arguing sovereignty on islands, they need a tool (naval power) to coerce or to persuade the opponent. However, there are lack of research that studies maritime claims from the perspective of naval power. This research project fills this gap based on naval power. How do relative levels of naval power and (dis) parities of naval power influence the occurrence of MIDs over maritime claims? Naval power is a constitutive element during maritime claims. If disputants over maritime claims have required naval power to project their capability, it means that they have the capability to apply various ways, such as aggressive options including MIDs, to accomplish their goals. So, I argue that when two claimants have enough naval power to project their capabilities, the likelihood of MIDs over maritime claims increases. Given that one or both states have a certain level of naval power, how does relative naval power between two claimants influence the management of maritime claims? Based on the power transition theory, I argue that when the disparities of relative naval power between claimants becomes distinctive, militarized conflicts surrounding maritime territory are less probable. Based on the ICOW project which codes maritime claims from 1900 to 2001, the empirical results of the Poisson models show if both claimants have projectable naval power, the occurrence of MIDs over maritime claims increases. In addition, the result shows that when disputants maintain similar relative naval powers, they are more likely to initiate MIDs over maritime claims. To put it differently, if naval capabilities' gap between two claimants becomes larger, the probability of the occurrence of MIDs decreases.

• Strategy21
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• 통권40호
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• pp.144-161
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• 2016

A unanimous Award has been issued on 12 July 2016 by the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the arbitration instituted by the Republic of the Philippines against the People's Republic of China. The current security issues in the regional sea shall be carefully reflected to anticipate whether the Award could resolve the existing political conflict or rather will grow military tension in the region. The Award clearly directs the scope of delimiting maritime jurisdiction to coastal States in the Southern China sea, so it seems to help facilitating finding resolutions of regional disputes on maritime boundaries. On the other hand, there are several limitations in reality to implementation of the decisions included in the Award. USA could use the decisions to restrict military activities and exercise of unilateral maritime jurisdiction by China in the region, while China shall encounter guilt to illegitimacy of its activities as well as shaking the legal foundation of its policy in the region. Then the resolution of this dispute through application of international law would rather cause more political confusion. The intension of bringing the case to an international court were to resolve political difficulties. If, however, the political difficulties are not properly reflected in the legal decisions, such decision would possibly raise more political risks.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• 제28권2호
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• pp.175-186
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• 2006

There are disputes for oil and gas development between China and Japan in the East China Sea. These involve the area where China is already carrying out activities of oil and gas development and where Japan is proclaiming its EEZ. China insists that the Chinese activities on oil and gas development area are being carried out within the Chinese jurisdictional waters even if the median line principle of Japanese proclamation is applied in delimitation. Indeed, the permit for Japanese development is causing disputes between China and Japan because its permit allows development in the waters adjacent to Chinese development area. h the event, the core of this dispute around the oil and gas field in the East China Sea relates to issues of maritime boundary delimitation and issues of resources acquisition with both states. Chinese policy on oil and gas development is to first consider development issues in accordance with a median line principle where waters toward to China from the median line should be developed by China and the area toward Japan from the median line within the Chinese continental shelf should be jointly developed. However, the Japanese position is that the East China Sea should be jointly developed, and Japan hopes to eventually convince China to accept its median line delimitation. With on-going development of such issues, Korea should establish a strategy of negotiation based on analyses of resource distributional conditions and other strategic factors in the Korean delimitation area. In particular, Korea should prepare and make the best use of joint development zone established in an agreement between the ROK and Japan concerning the development of the southern part of continental shelf adjacent to both states.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• 제26권4호
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• pp.669-678
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• 2004

Coastal states are adopting maritime boundary delimitation as their primary maritime policy because maritime jurisdiction directly relates to vast economic interest. This becomes specially important and sensitive when complex maritime boundary issues are involved between neighboring coastal states. China has not actively carried out nor declared maritime boundary delimitation until recently with any country except Agreement between China and Viet Nam on the demarcation of the territorial water, the exclusive economic zones and the continental shelf of China and Vet Nam in the Gulf of Tonkin on 25 December 2000 (hereinafter, the Gulf of Tonkin Agreement). The principles that governs maritime boundary delimitation are to consider primarily an agreement between States concerned, however, if no agreement can be reached, all relevant circumstances are considered to achieve an equity between concerned States. Relevant circumstances are length of coastline, form of coastline, existence and position of island or islands, speciality of geology/topography, and factor of economy and deffnce. Factors which sinologists are considering in regard to continental shelf delimitation of the Yellow Sea are as follows; i) geographical factor, ii) geological factor, iii) topographical factor, iv) environment and ecological (factor, v) historic interest, and vi) social and economic interest. The 'Gulf of Tonkin Agreement' is completed by basically applying the principle of delimitation according to median line which seems that China has adopted the maritime boundary delimitation principle of 'half and half' which was the intention of chinese government. At the same time, China recognized Viet Nam's dominion and sovereign right over the partial exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of Dao Bach Long Vi in Gulf of Tonkin. This case can be considered as an example of mutual concession or compromise in delimiting maritime boundary for states of concerned.

• Strategy21
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• 통권31호
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• pp.120-141
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• 2013

Korea, China, and Japan forms triangle structure which mixed complicatedly on the history and maritime territorial disputes. Nationalism lies on the basis of triangle structure, and it is a main factor which increase tension and conflicts among three countries. Considering dynamics of changing nationalism circumstance, Ieodo issue needs to prepare active countermeasures which considers cope with nationalism confrontations. The aim of this article is suggests preparations of active countermeasures cope with nationalism provocative actions. First, I will specify nationalism as a factor of territorial dispute, and review characters of Ieodo issue. Second, I will analyse China's nationalism to Ieodo through analysis of China's media contents and coverage trend of Ieodo issue (2006~2008). I will suggest necessity of active defense measures coup with China's nationalism, basis of these analysis. As a result, China's nationalism might be a criterion which measures of China's desire for Ieodo. Stimulating Ieodo coverage of China's state media can be a criterion which predicts China governments's for Jurisdiction of Ieodo. We need active measures coup with China's nationalism Which evolves into a much more bold and assertive.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• 제32권4호
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• pp.427-437
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• 2010

The Korean Government is trying to construct an ocean research station in Dokdo's water. The station would be the third ocean research station following the Ieodo station and the Gageocho station. Although the new station would served as a scientific research base for peaceful and academic purposes, the construction of the station will almost certainly lead to a diplomatic dispute between Japan and Korea in the near future due to the disputed ownership of the island. In light of the diplomatic protests against the construction of the Ieodo station by the Chinese Government, various domestic and international legal issues which could be raised regarding the construction of the Dokdo station need to be reviewed. Therefore, this article reviews the international legal status of the station and the rights and duties pertaining to its construction, investigates the domestic legal grounds relating to the construction and operation of the marine scientific installation, evaluates the international legal impacts of the construction on the expansion of maritime jurisdiction, the effective control on Dokdo and the negotiations on maritime boundary delimitation, and finally draws conclusions on the future activities of the Korean Government for the construction and operation of the Dokdo Ocean Research Station.