• Asia Marketing Journal
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• 제14권3호
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• pp.49-68
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• 2012

When a channel is vertically separated, there can be inefficiencies, double marginalization. Channel coordination to amend this inefficiency has been an important issue in marketing and economics. Channel coordination deals with maximization of joint profit and achieving proper profit sharing among participants. In this paper, a manufacturer and heterogeneous multiple retailers with exclusive territory are assumed, and channel coordination with two-part tariff is considered. When multiple heterogeneous retailers are assumed, profit sharing can be an issue even though the tariffs based on marginal cost can maximize joint profit. In case of multiple heterogeneous retailers, the manufacturer earns the same profit (fixed fee) from each retailer. This means that a large retailer occupies all the gaps of channel profit between small and large markets. Then, the manufacturer, which generally plays the role of Stackelberg leader, will consider increasing fixed price or marginal price to earn more profit from large retailer. Those reactions can sacrifice maximization of joint profit by making small retailer withdraw or by changing the sales quantities. In this paper, to maximize joint profit and achieve proper profit sharing, two kinds of optional tariffs are considered. The first is an optional two-part tariff based on marginal cost and the second is an optional modified two-part tariff in which marginal prices are higher than the manufacturer's marginal cost. In both types of optional tariffs, maximization of joint profit in each market can be achieved. Moreover, optional tariffs alleviate the problem of profit sharing. Optional tariffs can provide a manufacturer more profit from a large retailer when profit from a small retailer is given. However, the analysis shows that the maximum share of manufacturer from a large retailer is restricted by the condition for self-selection. In case of optional two-part tariffs based on marginal cost, if the gap between demands is large, the maximum share of the manufacturer is sufficient to achieve proper profit sharing. If the gap between demands is not sufficiently large, the manufacturer cannot earn sufficient share from increased profit. An optional modified two-part tariff where marginal price is more than marginal cost of manufacturer is considered because of this scenario. The marginal price above the marginal cost may additionally control the distribution of the increased profit. However, the analysis shows that a manufacturer's maximum profit from a large retailer with given profit from a small retailer is the same as or lower than the maximum profit when optional two-part tariffs based on marginal cost are applied. Therefore, it can be concluded that the optional modified tariffs do not have additional contribution to profit sharing relative to the tariffs based on marginal cost. Although this paper does not cover all kinds of optional tariffs that are different from tariffs based on marginal cost, it shows the advantage of optional tariffs based on marginal cost and has important theoretical implications. The result of this paper also gives guide for channel coordination. Optional two-part tariff based on marginal cost can increase efficiency in channel coordination.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
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• 제42권3호
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• pp.15-24
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• 2019

Fair Allocation of profits or costs arising from joint participation by multiple individuals or entities with different purposes is essential for their continuing involvement and for their dissatisfaction reduction. In this research, fair allocation of the profits of forming a grand coalition in Three-Echelon Supply Chain (TESC) game that is composed of manufacturer, distributor and retailer, is studied. In particular, the solutions of the proportional method of profit, the proportional method of marginal profit, and Shapley value based on cooperative game theory are proved to be in the desirable characteristics of the core. The proportional method of profit and the proportional method of marginal profit are often used because of their ease of application. These methods distribute total profit in proportion to profits or marginal profits of each game participant. In addition, Shapley value can be defined as the average marginal profit when one game player is added at a time. Even though the calculation of the average of all possible marginal profits is not simple, Shapley value are often used as a useful method. Experiments have shown that the solution of the incremental method, which calculates the marginal cost of adding game players in the order of manufacturers, distributors and retailers, does not exist in the core.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제55권10호
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• pp.440-445
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• 2006

As an electricity industry transforms into a competitive system, an electricity market revolves into a combined market consisting of generation and operating reserve. This paper presents a market model combined by an energy market and an operating reserve market. In a competitive structure, Gencos strive to choose strategic bidding parameters that maximize total profit resulting from an energy market and a reserve market. The primary goal of the paper is to analyze power transactions of generation and operation reserve based on marginal profits and capacity limits at NE(Nash Equilibrium). In case studies, the reserve market and the energy market are compared at the n from the viewpoints of marginal profits, prices and transaction quantities. It is shown that the marginal profit in an energy market is equal to that in a reserve market, and Gencos strategic bidding is greatly influenced by capacity limit.

• 수산경영론집
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• 제33권2호
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• pp.31-48
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• 2002

This paper is aimed to analyze how to evaluate the choice of optimal management measures and level of control in fisheries management under the costly and imperfect management system by comparing with costless and perfect management system that is commonly assumed in the analysis of fisheries regulations. Fishermen would set the level of fishing efforts at the point where the marginal fishing profit for fishing effort is equal to the marginal level of fine under costly and imperfect management system. Therefore, under the case where the marginal fishing profit is higher than the marginal level of fine, the level of fishing efforts would be made at the point which is higher than the level of fishing efforts made under costless and perfect management system and is not a point where the economic profit is maximized in regulated fisheries. From this conclusion, the fishermens avoidance activities against regulations as well as the level of control in fisheries management substantially have an influence on the choice of fisheries management instruments. According to the analysis of optimal fisheries management policy, the economic profits in regulated fisheries are determined by the level of fisheries enforcement costs and total fishing profits, in which as enforcement costs increase the economic profits decrease. In addition, the economic profits vary in response to the level of control in avoidance activities. That is, as avoidance costs decrease, the economic profits increase. The determination of optimal level of control in fisheries management should be made at the point where the marginal regulation costs are equal to the marginal profits from regulated fisheries, in which marginal regulation costs are different according to the type of management measures. And the level of profits changes in response to different levels of avoidance activities. The management measure that can maximize the difference between the marginal regulation costs and marginal profits from regulated fisheries should be chosen as an optimal fisheries management instrument.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
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• 제13권22호
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• pp.113-120
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• 1990

This paper is concerned with marginal analysis in the detailed estimation method. In a broad sense all estimates are marginal estimates in as much as they are concerned with creating changes from a current course of action. Only after a detailed ostinato is made can the engineering realize and exploit the advantages of marginal analysis. Marginal analysis is good tool for nonlinear break-even analysis adapted real world, and much more information and efficiency of CVP(Cost-Volumn-Profit) are provided with marginal analysis.

• 자원ㆍ환경경제연구
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• 제12권1호
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• pp.75-90
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• 2003

본 연구는 도로혼잡의 외부효과를 제거하기 위한 정책방안으로 선행연구들이 제안한 피구세의 타당성 여부를 편익측면의 분석을 통해 재조명하고 있다. 본 연구는 예산제약 조건과 시간제약 조건하의 효용극대화 모형을 이용하여 고속도로 이용을 통해 얻을 수 있는 사적 한계편익과 사회적 한계편익을 규명하고 있다. 그 결과 본 연구는 사적 한계편익과 사회적 한계편익의 차이인 외부 시간비용 만큼을 피구세로 부과할 것을 제안하고 있다. 이 때 외부 시간비용은 고속도로 혼잡으로 인해 고속도로 이용자가 추가로 부담하는 한계시간비용의 가치를 나타낸다. 그리고 본 연구는 효용 극대화 모형을 통해 도출한 피구세의 크기와 이윤(또는 부)의 극대화를 통해 선행연구들이 도출한 피구세의 크기가 동일하다는 사실을 이론적으로 보여주고 있다. 아울러 본 연구는 효용극대화 모형을 통하여 사회적 평균혼잡비용과 사적 한계혼잡비용이 일치한다는 사실도 동시에 보이고 있다.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2005년도 제36회 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.819-821
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• 2005

Since the System Marginal Price (SMP) is a vital factor to the market entities who intend to maximize the their profit, the short-term marginal price forecasting should be performed correctly. In a electricity market, the short-term trading between the market entities can be generally affected a short-term market price. Therefore, the exact forecasting of SMP can influence on the profit of market participants. This paper presents a methodology of day-ahead SMP foretasting using Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA). To show the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed method, the numerical studies have been performed using historical data of SMP in 2004.

• 지역연구
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• 제14권2호
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• pp.51-64
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• 1998

This paper investigates how the factor inputs of firms are affected by the expectation about land-price increase in the future. We develope a two-factor (land and labor) model, in which expectation about land-price increase plays a key role in determining the "optimal" input level of labor and land. Expecting capital gains from input of the land when land price increases, firms input land up to the point where the marginal productivity of land falls short of the marginal cost of purchasing the land, in order to maximize the "joint-profit". That is, firms have an incentive to use more land than they do when capital gains are not expected. We mean joint-profit by profit in the standard sense plus capital gains. Once the land is input "excessively", the productivity of labor increase and labor is also input more, since land and labor are assumed as complementary in production. This mechanism works in the opposite direction when land price decrease. This paper suggests that land price fluctuation is a major destabilizer of an economy.or destabilizer of an economy.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제55권2호
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• pp.85-93
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• 2006

Since the SMP(System Marginal Price) is a vital factor to the market participants who intend to maximize the their profit and to the ISO(Independent System Operator) who wish to operate the electricity market in a stable sense, the short-term marginal price forecasting should be performed correctly. In an electricity market the short-term market price affects considerably the short-term trading between the market entities. Therefore, the exact forecasting of SMP can influence on the profit of market participants. This paper presents a new methodology for a day-ahead SMP forecasting using ARIMA(Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average) model based on the time-series method. And also the correction algorithm is proposed to minimize the forecasting error in order to improve the efficiency and accuracy of the SMP forecasting. To show the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed method, the case studies are performed using historical data of SMP in 2004 published by KPX(Korea Power Exchange).

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제51권12호
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• pp.638-646
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• 2002

This paper presents an efficient algorithm for evaluating the Profit and revenue of generating units in a competitive electricity market based on the probabilistic production costing technique. The accurate evaluation of the profit and revenue of generating units for long-term perspectives is one of the most important issues in a competitive electricity market environment. For efficient calculation of the profit and revenue of generating units under the equivalent load duration curve(ELDC), a new approach to figure out the marginal plants and the corresponding market clearing prices during a time period in a probabilistic manner is developed. The mathematical formulation and illustrative application of the suggested method is presented.