• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• 제3권1호
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• pp.38-51
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• 2004

Over the years, most or many companies have focused their attention to the effectiveness and efficiency of their business units. As a new way of doing business, these companies have begun to realize the strategic importance of planning, controlling, and designing their own supply chain system. This paper analyzes the coordination issues in supply chains that consist of one manufacturer and multiple retailers operating under uncertain end customer demand and delivery lead-time. We use the Genetic Algorithm (GA) to determine the appropriate ordering and inventory level at which the manufacturer and multiple retailers can maximize the profit of the chain. This is performed under three controlling policies: the traditionally centralized controlling policy under the manufacturer's perspective, the entire chain’s perspective, and lastly the coordinating controlling policy with an incentive scheme. The outcome from the study reveals that the coordinating controlling policy with an incentive scheme can outperform the traditional centralized controlling policies by creating a win-win situation in which all members of the chain benefit from higher profit, thus resulting in more willingness from all members to join the chain.

• 한국경영과학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국경영과학회 2007년도 추계학술대회 및 정기총회
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• pp.104-107
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• 2007

In this paper, we propose the coordination scheme in a single-manufacturer-multiple-retailer supply chain system. Traditionally, the bargaining power of the single manufacturer is superior to those of retailers. The business environment supported by the e-business scheme may give rise to new business behavior. The multitude of retailer requests the manufacturer to relax the his unilateral lot-sizing policy while they are willing to compensate more than the manufacturer's expected loss caused by abandon his superior bargaining power. The side payment aggregated by the multiple retailers is transferred to the manufacturer according to the degree of the manufacturer's relaxation from the current unilateral lot-sizing policy.

• 한국유통학회지:유통연구
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• 제15권1호
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• pp.25-47
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• 2010

고객만족제고에 관심을 기울이고 노력을 경주하는 기업이 늘어나면서, 유통업자들에게 고객만족제고 인센티브를 제공함으로써 그들의 고객만족노력을 불러일으키고자 하는 노력 역시 활발해 지고 있다. 이러한 노력은 상호 경쟁하는 멀티채널을 운용하는 기업들 역시 마찬가지이다. 그러나 지금까지의 고객만족제고방안에 관한 연구는 종업원이나 단일유통업자 등단일주체에 초점을 두고 진행되어 왔을 뿐 경쟁이 발생하는 멀티채널 상황에서의 고객만족제고 인센티브에 대해서는 별다른 연구가 이루어지지 않고 있다. 이러한 문제의식에서 출발하여, 본 연구에서는 게임이론에 기반한 수리경제학적 분석을 통해 멀티채널을 운용하는 기업의 고객만족제고방안에 주안점을 두어 제조업자가 두 유통업자를 운용하는 멀티채널 모형을 상정하여 고객만족제고 인센티브를 어떻게 제시하는 것이 바람직한지 규명하였다. 본 연구의 주요결과는 다음과 같다: (1)명성수준이 높을수록 고객만족제고 인센티브 수준을 높이는 것이 바람직하다. (2)멀티채널 사이의 보완적 외부효과가 클수록 고객만족제고 인센티브 수준을 높이는 것이 바람직하다. (3)유통비용이 클수록 멀티채널에서의 고객만족제고 인센티브의 수준은 낮게 제시하는 것이 바람직하다. (4)채널간 경쟁강도가 높을수록 고객만족제고 인센티브 수준을 높이는 것이 바람직하다.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
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• 제38권3호
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• pp.117-126
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• 2015

This paper is to analyze an integrated production and inventory model in a single-vendor multi-buyer supply chain. The vendor is defined as the manufacturer and the buyers as the retailers. The product that the manufacturer produces is supplied to the retailers with constant periodic time interval. The production rate of the manufacturer is constant for the time. The demand of the retailers is constant for the time. The cycle time of the vendor is defined as the elapsed time from the start of the production to the start of the next production, while the cycle times of the buyer as the elapsed time between the adjacent supply times from the vendor to the buyer. The cycle times of the vendor and the buyers that minimizes the total cost in a supply chain are analyzed. The cost factors are the production setup cost and the inventory holding cost of the manufacturer, the ordering cost and the inventory holding cost of the retailers. The cycle time of the vendor is investigated through the cycle time that satisfies economic production quantity with the production setup cost and the inventory holding cost of the manufacturer. An integrated production and inventory model is formulated, and an algorithm is developed. An numerical example is presented to explain the algorithm. The solution of the algorithm for the numerical examples is compared with that of genetic algorithm. Numerical example shows that the vendor and the buyers can save cost by integrated decision making.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
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• 제34권4호
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• pp.25-34
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• 2011

In this paper, we investigate an inventory system where a single manufacturer purchases and processes raw materials in order to deliver finished goods to multiple retailers. Earlier study in this type of supply chain only consider a single raw material in order to produce finished goods, but we consider multi-raw materials in order to produce finished goods. Also, we develop an iterative solution procedure to find the order quantity for the finished goods and raw materials, and the number of shipments between manufacturer and retailers that minimizes the total cost per unit time of the raw materials ordering and holding, manufacture's setup and finished goods holding, the retailer's ordering and inventory holding. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate that jointly considering the total cost results in less total cost than that of considering them separately.

• 유통과학연구
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• 제19권5호
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• pp.23-34
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• 2021

Purpose: This study identifies the critical elements of relationship management required to be studied in distribution sciences to create a relational bond of watch manufacturers with their retailers in India. The offline watch retail market is undergoing a rapid transformation due to technology intervention in the product portfolio and the advent of online retailing. The study identifies the interrelationships amongst the constructs of interdependence, trust, affective commitment, and information exchange to form long-lasting relational bonds in the watch industry. Research design, data and methodology: We used a path analysis to investigate the relationship between interdependence, trust, affective commitment, and information exchange. Data has been collected from 143 watch retailers using judgmental sampling method. Results: The data analysis suggested the establishment of measurement and structural model. The absolute and relative goodness of fit models in the causal analysis are 0.628 and 0.959 suggesting a sufficient fit index. Based on the analysis of direct and indirect effects, the results indicate that trust fully mediates the effect of interdependence and information exchange of retailers with the manufacturer. Conclusions: Trust plays an important role in driving commitment and information exchange between watch manufacturers and retailers. Interdependence in the manufacturer-channel relationships would lead to affective commitment only when trust exists in the relationship. [AMAWATE, Vibhas.] in Web of Science and Scopus).

• 한국유통학회지:유통연구
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• 제17권1호
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• pp.65-86
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• 2012

우리나라에 유통업체상표(Private Label)가 도입된 지 10년이 넘었음에도 불구하고 유통업체 상표에 대한 대부분의 연구는 소비자 관점에서 진행되어져 왔다. 본 연구는 유통업체상표를 소비자 관점이 아닌 제조업체의 관점에서 바라본 연구로, 제조업체의 유통업체상표 생산에 영향을 미치는 내외부적 요인들에 대해서 자원기반이론과 S-C-P Paradigm의 통합적인 연구모형인 전략적 시장관리 관점을 제시하였다. 연구결과를 보면, 제조업체의 마케팅 역량이 높을수록 전체 매출에서 유통업체상표가 차지하는 매출이 적은 것으로 나타났으며, 마케팅 역량에는 제조업체 브랜드명성, 마케팅 투자, 제품포트폴리오 등이 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 또한 제조업체의 마케팅 역량과 유통업체 상표 생산 간의 관계에는 제조업체의 경쟁강도가 조절효과를 미치는 것으로 나타났는데, 이는 일반적으로 마케팅 역량이 높은(낮은) 기업일수록 전체 매출에서 유통업체상표가 차지하는 비율이 낮지만(높지만), 이러한 기업들 중 경쟁강도를 낮게 지각하는 제조업체의 전체매출 중 유통업체상표가 차지하는 매출은 경쟁강도를 높게 지각하는 제조업체들에 비해 상대적으로 높게 나타났다. 이러한 연구결과를 바탕으로, 본 연구는 유통업체상표 생산에 대한 이론 및 실무적인 시사점을 제시하고 있다.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• 제14권3호
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• pp.49-68
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• 2012

When a channel is vertically separated, there can be inefficiencies, double marginalization. Channel coordination to amend this inefficiency has been an important issue in marketing and economics. Channel coordination deals with maximization of joint profit and achieving proper profit sharing among participants. In this paper, a manufacturer and heterogeneous multiple retailers with exclusive territory are assumed, and channel coordination with two-part tariff is considered. When multiple heterogeneous retailers are assumed, profit sharing can be an issue even though the tariffs based on marginal cost can maximize joint profit. In case of multiple heterogeneous retailers, the manufacturer earns the same profit (fixed fee) from each retailer. This means that a large retailer occupies all the gaps of channel profit between small and large markets. Then, the manufacturer, which generally plays the role of Stackelberg leader, will consider increasing fixed price or marginal price to earn more profit from large retailer. Those reactions can sacrifice maximization of joint profit by making small retailer withdraw or by changing the sales quantities. In this paper, to maximize joint profit and achieve proper profit sharing, two kinds of optional tariffs are considered. The first is an optional two-part tariff based on marginal cost and the second is an optional modified two-part tariff in which marginal prices are higher than the manufacturer's marginal cost. In both types of optional tariffs, maximization of joint profit in each market can be achieved. Moreover, optional tariffs alleviate the problem of profit sharing. Optional tariffs can provide a manufacturer more profit from a large retailer when profit from a small retailer is given. However, the analysis shows that the maximum share of manufacturer from a large retailer is restricted by the condition for self-selection. In case of optional two-part tariffs based on marginal cost, if the gap between demands is large, the maximum share of the manufacturer is sufficient to achieve proper profit sharing. If the gap between demands is not sufficiently large, the manufacturer cannot earn sufficient share from increased profit. An optional modified two-part tariff where marginal price is more than marginal cost of manufacturer is considered because of this scenario. The marginal price above the marginal cost may additionally control the distribution of the increased profit. However, the analysis shows that a manufacturer's maximum profit from a large retailer with given profit from a small retailer is the same as or lower than the maximum profit when optional two-part tariffs based on marginal cost are applied. Therefore, it can be concluded that the optional modified tariffs do not have additional contribution to profit sharing relative to the tariffs based on marginal cost. Although this paper does not cover all kinds of optional tariffs that are different from tariffs based on marginal cost, it shows the advantage of optional tariffs based on marginal cost and has important theoretical implications. The result of this paper also gives guide for channel coordination. Optional two-part tariff based on marginal cost can increase efficiency in channel coordination.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• 제8권1호
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• pp.1-13
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• 2009

This paper presents a coordinated planning model of price-dependent demand for a single-manufacturer and a single-retailer. The demand is assumed to be normally distributed, with its mean being price dependent. The manufacturer and retailer coordinate with each other to jointly and simultaneously determine the retail selling price and the retailer order quantity to maximize the joint expected total profit. This model is then compared to a 'returns' policy model where manufacturer buys back unsold items from the retailers. It is shown that the optimal total profit is higher for coordinated planning model than that for the returns policy model, in which the retail price is set by the retailer. A compensation or profit sharing scheme is then suggested and it is shown that the coordinated model with profit sharing yields a 'win-win' situation. Numerical results are presented to illustrate the profit patterns for both linear and nonlinear demand functions. The coordinated planning model, in addition, has a lower optimal price than for a returns policy model, which would result in higher sales, thus expanding the markets for the whole supply chain.

• 지식경영연구
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• 제12권3호
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• pp.73-96
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• 2011

Recent market saturation makes the local retailers consider an attempt to innovate the market with the retailer's brand. This is the retailers' efforts to expand the market control through the enhancement of private brands. As the competition among manufacturers extends to the competition between manufacturers and retailers, the marketing knowledges of manufacturers need to be diversified to the ones that can be applied to the manufacturers and retailers due to their bilateral competition. This research concentrates on the customer acquisition strategy (attack strategy) and customer retention strategy (defense strategy) in the place of both sides of manufacturers and retailers. Also this research targets to develop the differential marketing strategies for target market's National Brand(NB)/Private Brand(PB) purchase by analyzing individual customer's purchase probability on repurchase and switch-purchase of NB and PB. This study is based on the data of frequently consumed product, tomato ketchup on scanner panel from the ERIM data of University of Chicago, USA. This study compares and analyzes the NB and PB repurchases and switch-purchase of 4 types. The comparisons provide the informations that which factors should be managed for the attack strategy, the defense strategy, and the differential marketing strategies both for manufacturers and retailers. This research is expected to contribute on cumulating the industrial knowledges of retailers' and manufacturers' survival strategy, expecially focusing on the effect of marketing factors and consumer-characteristic factors.