• Title/Summary/Keyword: Manufacturer-retailers

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Purchasing and Inventory Policy in a Supply Chain under the Periodic Review: A Single Manufacturer and Multiple Retailers’ Case

  • Prasertwattana, K.;Chiadamrong, N.
    • Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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    • v.3 no.1
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    • pp.38-51
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    • 2004
  • Over the years, most or many companies have focused their attention to the effectiveness and efficiency of their business units. As a new way of doing business, these companies have begun to realize the strategic importance of planning, controlling, and designing their own supply chain system. This paper analyzes the coordination issues in supply chains that consist of one manufacturer and multiple retailers operating under uncertain end customer demand and delivery lead-time. We use the Genetic Algorithm (GA) to determine the appropriate ordering and inventory level at which the manufacturer and multiple retailers can maximize the profit of the chain. This is performed under three controlling policies: the traditionally centralized controlling policy under the manufacturer's perspective, the entire chain’s perspective, and lastly the coordinating controlling policy with an incentive scheme. The outcome from the study reveals that the coordinating controlling policy with an incentive scheme can outperform the traditional centralized controlling policies by creating a win-win situation in which all members of the chain benefit from higher profit, thus resulting in more willingness from all members to join the chain.

Cooperative ordering policy in a multiple-retailer supply chain system (복수 수요가로 구성된 공급망의 협력적 주문량 결정 방안)

  • Kim, Tae-Bok
    • Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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    • 2007.11a
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    • pp.104-107
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    • 2007
  • In this paper, we propose the coordination scheme in a single-manufacturer-multiple-retailer supply chain system. Traditionally, the bargaining power of the single manufacturer is superior to those of retailers. The business environment supported by the e-business scheme may give rise to new business behavior. The multitude of retailer requests the manufacturer to relax the his unilateral lot-sizing policy while they are willing to compensate more than the manufacturer's expected loss caused by abandon his superior bargaining power. The side payment aggregated by the multiple retailers is transferred to the manufacturer according to the degree of the manufacturer's relaxation from the current unilateral lot-sizing policy.

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Optimal Incentives for Customer Satisfaction in Multi-channel Setting (멀티채널에서의 고객만족제고 인센티브 연구)

  • Kim, Hyun-Sik
    • Journal of Distribution Research
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    • v.15 no.1
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    • pp.25-47
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    • 2010
  • CS is one of the major concerns of managers in the world because it is well known to be a key medium construct for firms' superior outcome. One of the major agents for CS management is retailers. Firms try to manage not only employees but also retailers to promote CS behaviors. And so diverse incentives are used to promote their CS behaviors under diverse channel setting such as multi-channel. However in spite of the rising needs there has been scarce studies on the optimal incentive structure for a manufacturer to offer competing retailers at the multi-channel. In this paper, we try to find better way for a manufacturer to promote the competing retailers' CS behaviors. We investigated how to promote the retailers' CS behavior via game-theoretic modeling. Especially, we focus on the possible incentive, CS bonus type reward introduced in the studies of Hauser, Simester, and Wernerfelt(1994) and Chu and Desai(1995). We build up a multi stage complete information game and derive a subgame perfect equilibrium using backward induction. Stages of the game are as following. (Stage 1) Manufacturer sets wholesale price(w) and CS bonus($\eta$). (Stage 2) Both retailers in competition set CS effort level($e_i$) and retail price($p_i$) simultaneously. (Stage 3) Consumers make purchasing decisions based on the manufacturer's initial reputation and retailers' CS efforts.

    Structure of the Model We investigated four issues about the topic as following: (1) How much total incentive is adequate for a firm of a specific level of reputation to promote retailers' CS behavior under multi-channel setting ?, (2) How much total incentive is adequate under diverse level of complimentary externalities between the retailers' CS efforts to promote retailers' CS behavior?, (3) How much total incentive is adequate under diverse level of cost to make CS efforts to promote retailers' CS behavior?, (4) How much total incentive is adequate under diverse level of competition between retailers to promote retailers' CS behavior? Our findings are as following. (1) The higher reputation has the manufacturer, the higher incentives for retailers at multi-channel are required in the equilibrium.
    shows the increasing pattern of optimal incentive level along the manufacturer's reputation level(a) under some parameter conditions(b=1/2;c=0;$\beta$=1/2). (2) The bigger complimentary externalities exists between the retailers' CS efforts, the higher incentives are required in the equilibrium.
    shows the increasing pattern of optimal incentive level along the complimentary externalities level($\beta$) under some parameter conditions(a=1;b=1/2;c=0). (3) The higher is the retailers' cost, the lower incentives are required in the equilibrium.
    shows the decreasing pattern of optimal incentive level along the cost level(c) under some parameter conditions(a=1;b=1/2;$\beta$=1/2). (4) The more competitive gets those two retailers, the higher incentives for retailers at multi-channel are required in the equilibrium.
    shows the increasing pattern of optimal incentive level along the competition level(b) under some parameter conditions(c=0;a=1;$\beta$=1/2). One of the major contribution points of this study is the fact that this study is the first to investigate the optimal CS incentive system under multi-channel setting.

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An Integrated Production and Inventory Model in a Single-Vendor Multi-Buyer Supply Chain (단일 공급자 다수 구매자 공급체인에서 통합 생산 및 재고 모형)

  • Chang, Suk Hwa
    • Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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    • v.38 no.3
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    • pp.117-126
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    • 2015
  • This paper is to analyze an integrated production and inventory model in a single-vendor multi-buyer supply chain. The vendor is defined as the manufacturer and the buyers as the retailers. The product that the manufacturer produces is supplied to the retailers with constant periodic time interval. The production rate of the manufacturer is constant for the time. The demand of the retailers is constant for the time. The cycle time of the vendor is defined as the elapsed time from the start of the production to the start of the next production, while the cycle times of the buyer as the elapsed time between the adjacent supply times from the vendor to the buyer. The cycle times of the vendor and the buyers that minimizes the total cost in a supply chain are analyzed. The cost factors are the production setup cost and the inventory holding cost of the manufacturer, the ordering cost and the inventory holding cost of the retailers. The cycle time of the vendor is investigated through the cycle time that satisfies economic production quantity with the production setup cost and the inventory holding cost of the manufacturer. An integrated production and inventory model is formulated, and an algorithm is developed. An numerical example is presented to explain the algorithm. The solution of the algorithm for the numerical examples is compared with that of genetic algorithm. Numerical example shows that the vendor and the buyers can save cost by integrated decision making.

Generalized Single Manufacturer and Multiple Retailers Supply Chain Model in JIT Purchasing (JIT구매를 고려한 단일 제조업자-다소매업자의 공급사슬에서 통합재고모형)

  • Kim, Dae-Hong
    • Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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    • v.34 no.4
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    • pp.25-34
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    • 2011
  • In this paper, we investigate an inventory system where a single manufacturer purchases and processes raw materials in order to deliver finished goods to multiple retailers. Earlier study in this type of supply chain only consider a single raw material in order to produce finished goods, but we consider multi-raw materials in order to produce finished goods. Also, we develop an iterative solution procedure to find the order quantity for the finished goods and raw materials, and the number of shipments between manufacturer and retailers that minimizes the total cost per unit time of the raw materials ordering and holding, manufacture's setup and finished goods holding, the retailer's ordering and inventory holding. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate that jointly considering the total cost results in less total cost than that of considering them separately.

Time Lost forever: Relational bonds of watch manufacturers with retailers in India

  • AMAWATE, Vibhas
    • Journal of Distribution Science
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    • v.19 no.5
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    • pp.23-34
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    • 2021
  • Purpose: This study identifies the critical elements of relationship management required to be studied in distribution sciences to create a relational bond of watch manufacturers with their retailers in India. The offline watch retail market is undergoing a rapid transformation due to technology intervention in the product portfolio and the advent of online retailing. The study identifies the interrelationships amongst the constructs of interdependence, trust, affective commitment, and information exchange to form long-lasting relational bonds in the watch industry. Research design, data and methodology: We used a path analysis to investigate the relationship between interdependence, trust, affective commitment, and information exchange. Data has been collected from 143 watch retailers using judgmental sampling method. Results: The data analysis suggested the establishment of measurement and structural model. The absolute and relative goodness of fit models in the causal analysis are 0.628 and 0.959 suggesting a sufficient fit index. Based on the analysis of direct and indirect effects, the results indicate that trust fully mediates the effect of interdependence and information exchange of retailers with the manufacturer. Conclusions: Trust plays an important role in driving commitment and information exchange between watch manufacturers and retailers. Interdependence in the manufacturer-channel relationships would lead to affective commitment only when trust exists in the relationship. [AMAWATE, Vibhas.] in Web of Science and Scopus).

Antecedents of Manufacturer's Private Label Program Engagement : A Focus on Strategic Market Management Perspective (제조업체 Private Labels 도입의 선행요인 : 전략적 시장관리 관점을 중심으로)

  • Lim, Chae-Un;Yi, Ho-Taek
    • Journal of Distribution Research
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    • v.17 no.1
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    • pp.65-86
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    • 2012
  • The $20^{th}$ century was the era of manufacturer brands which built higher brand equity for consumers. Consumers moved from generic products of inconsistent quality produced by local factories in the $19^{th}$ century to branded products from global manufacturers and manufacturer brands reached consumers through distributors and retailers. Retailers were relatively small compared to their largest suppliers. However, sometime in the 1970s, things began to slowly change as retailers started to develop their own national chains and began international expansion, and consolidation of the retail industry from mom-and-pop stores to global players was well under way (Kumar and Steenkamp 2007, p.2) In South Korea, since the middle of the 1990s, the bulking up of retailers that started then has changed the balance of power between manufacturers and retailers. Retailer private labels, generally referred to as own labels, store brands, distributors own private-label, home brand or own label brand have also been performing strongly in every single local market (Bushman 1993; De Wulf et al. 2005). Private labels now account for one out of every five items sold every day in U.S. supermarkets, drug chains, and mass merchandisers (Kumar and Steenkamp 2007), and the market share in Western Europe is even larger (Euromonitor 2007). In the UK, grocery market share of private labels grew from 39% of sales in 2008 to 41% in 2010 (Marian 2010). Planet Retail (2007, p.1) recently concluded that "[PLs] are set for accelerated growth, with the majority of the world's leading grocers increasing their own label penetration." Private labels have gained wide attention both in the academic literature and popular business press and there is a glowing academic research to the perspective of manufacturers and retailers. Empirical research on private labels has mainly studies the factors explaining private labels market shares across product categories and/or retail chains (Dahr and Hoch 1997; Hoch and Banerji, 1993), factors influencing the private labels proneness of consumers (Baltas and Doyle 1998; Burton et al. 1998; Richardson et al. 1996) and factors how to react brand manufacturers towards PLs (Dunne and Narasimhan 1999; Hoch 1996; Quelch and Harding 1996; Verhoef et al. 2000). Nevertheless, empirical research on factors influencing the production in terms of a manufacturer-retailer is rather anecdotal than theory-based. The objective of this paper is to bridge the gap in these two types of research and explore the factors which influence on manufacturer's private label production based on two competing theories: S-C-P (Structure - Conduct - Performance) paradigm and resource-based theory. In order to do so, the authors used in-depth interview with marketing managers, reviewed retail press and research and presents the conceptual framework that integrates the major determinants of private labels production. From a manufacturer's perspective, supplying private labels often starts on a strategic basis. When a manufacturer engages in private labels, the manufacturer does not have to spend on advertising, retailer promotions or maintain a dedicated sales force. Moreover, if a manufacturer has weak marketing capabilities, the manufacturer can make use of retailer's marketing capability to produce private labels and lessen its marketing cost and increases its profit margin. Figure 1. is the theoretical framework based on a strategic market management perspective, integrated concept of both S-C-P paradigm and resource-based theory. The model includes one mediate variable, marketing capabilities, and the other moderate variable, competitive intensity. Manufacturer's national brand reputation, firm's marketing investment, and product portfolio, which are hypothesized to positively affected manufacturer's marketing capabilities. Then, marketing capabilities has negatively effected on private label production. Moderating effects of competitive intensity are hypothesized on the relationship between marketing capabilities and private label production. To verify the proposed research model and hypotheses, data were collected from 192 manufacturers (212 responses) who are producing private labels in South Korea. Cronbach's alpha test, explanatory / comfirmatory factor analysis, and correlation analysis were employed to validate hypotheses. The following results were drawing using structural equation modeling and all hypotheses are supported. Findings indicate that manufacturer's private label production is strongly related to its marketing capabilities. Consumer marketing capabilities, in turn, is directly connected with the 3 strategic factors (e.g., marketing investment, manufacturer's national brand reputation, and product portfolio). It is moderated by competitive intensity between marketing capabilities and private label production. In conclusion, this research may be the first study to investigate the reasons manufacturers engage in private labels based on two competing theoretic views, S-C-P paradigm and resource-based theory. The private label phenomenon has received growing attention by marketing scholars. In many industries, private labels represent formidable competition to manufacturer brands and manufacturers have a dilemma with selling to as well as competing with their retailers. The current study suggests key factors when manufacturers consider engaging in private label production.

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Optional Tariffs for Channel Coordination

  • Song, Jae-Do
    • Asia Marketing Journal
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    • v.14 no.3
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    • pp.49-68
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    • 2012
  • When a channel is vertically separated, there can be inefficiencies, double marginalization. Channel coordination to amend this inefficiency has been an important issue in marketing and economics. Channel coordination deals with maximization of joint profit and achieving proper profit sharing among participants. In this paper, a manufacturer and heterogeneous multiple retailers with exclusive territory are assumed, and channel coordination with two-part tariff is considered. When multiple heterogeneous retailers are assumed, profit sharing can be an issue even though the tariffs based on marginal cost can maximize joint profit. In case of multiple heterogeneous retailers, the manufacturer earns the same profit (fixed fee) from each retailer. This means that a large retailer occupies all the gaps of channel profit between small and large markets. Then, the manufacturer, which generally plays the role of Stackelberg leader, will consider increasing fixed price or marginal price to earn more profit from large retailer. Those reactions can sacrifice maximization of joint profit by making small retailer withdraw or by changing the sales quantities. In this paper, to maximize joint profit and achieve proper profit sharing, two kinds of optional tariffs are considered. The first is an optional two-part tariff based on marginal cost and the second is an optional modified two-part tariff in which marginal prices are higher than the manufacturer's marginal cost. In both types of optional tariffs, maximization of joint profit in each market can be achieved. Moreover, optional tariffs alleviate the problem of profit sharing. Optional tariffs can provide a manufacturer more profit from a large retailer when profit from a small retailer is given. However, the analysis shows that the maximum share of manufacturer from a large retailer is restricted by the condition for self-selection. In case of optional two-part tariffs based on marginal cost, if the gap between demands is large, the maximum share of the manufacturer is sufficient to achieve proper profit sharing. If the gap between demands is not sufficiently large, the manufacturer cannot earn sufficient share from increased profit. An optional modified two-part tariff where marginal price is more than marginal cost of manufacturer is considered because of this scenario. The marginal price above the marginal cost may additionally control the distribution of the increased profit. However, the analysis shows that a manufacturer's maximum profit from a large retailer with given profit from a small retailer is the same as or lower than the maximum profit when optional two-part tariffs based on marginal cost are applied. Therefore, it can be concluded that the optional modified tariffs do not have additional contribution to profit sharing relative to the tariffs based on marginal cost. Although this paper does not cover all kinds of optional tariffs that are different from tariffs based on marginal cost, it shows the advantage of optional tariffs based on marginal cost and has important theoretical implications. The result of this paper also gives guide for channel coordination. Optional two-part tariff based on marginal cost can increase efficiency in channel coordination.

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A Coordinated Planning Model with Price-Dependent Demand

  • Nagarur, Nagendra N.;Iaprasert, Wipanan
    • Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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    • v.8 no.1
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    • pp.1-13
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    • 2009
  • This paper presents a coordinated planning model of price-dependent demand for a single-manufacturer and a single-retailer. The demand is assumed to be normally distributed, with its mean being price dependent. The manufacturer and retailer coordinate with each other to jointly and simultaneously determine the retail selling price and the retailer order quantity to maximize the joint expected total profit. This model is then compared to a 'returns' policy model where manufacturer buys back unsold items from the retailers. It is shown that the optimal total profit is higher for coordinated planning model than that for the returns policy model, in which the retail price is set by the retailer. A compensation or profit sharing scheme is then suggested and it is shown that the coordinated model with profit sharing yields a 'win-win' situation. Numerical results are presented to illustrate the profit patterns for both linear and nonlinear demand functions. The coordinated planning model, in addition, has a lower optimal price than for a returns policy model, which would result in higher sales, thus expanding the markets for the whole supply chain.

The Strategies of Manufacturers and Retailers for Customer Acquisition and Retention Using Scanner Panel Data (스캐너 패널 데이터를 이용한 유통업체와 제조업체간의 고객확보 및 유지 전략에 관한 연구)

  • Lee, Seung-yon;Son, Jungmin
    • Knowledge Management Research
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    • v.12 no.3
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    • pp.73-96
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    • 2011
  • Recent market saturation makes the local retailers consider an attempt to innovate the market with the retailer's brand. This is the retailers' efforts to expand the market control through the enhancement of private brands. As the competition among manufacturers extends to the competition between manufacturers and retailers, the marketing knowledges of manufacturers need to be diversified to the ones that can be applied to the manufacturers and retailers due to their bilateral competition. This research concentrates on the customer acquisition strategy (attack strategy) and customer retention strategy (defense strategy) in the place of both sides of manufacturers and retailers. Also this research targets to develop the differential marketing strategies for target market's National Brand(NB)/Private Brand(PB) purchase by analyzing individual customer's purchase probability on repurchase and switch-purchase of NB and PB. This study is based on the data of frequently consumed product, tomato ketchup on scanner panel from the ERIM data of University of Chicago, USA. This study compares and analyzes the NB and PB repurchases and switch-purchase of 4 types. The comparisons provide the informations that which factors should be managed for the attack strategy, the defense strategy, and the differential marketing strategies both for manufacturers and retailers. This research is expected to contribute on cumulating the industrial knowledges of retailers' and manufacturers' survival strategy, expecially focusing on the effect of marketing factors and consumer-characteristic factors.

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