• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
• /
• v.7 no.9
• /
• pp.159-168
• /
• 2020

This is a quantitative research, underpinned by the philosophy of natural science and deduction approach that examines the impact of the various aspects of corporate governance mechanism on the choice of capital structure of Vietnamese listed firms. We focus on the effect of factors such as the board size, the board independence, and especially different ownership structures, which include the managerial ownership, the state ownership, the concentrated ownership, and the foreign ownership. They are the main scopes of corporate governance and are supposed to be relevant to determine the corporate financing choice. To explain the causal relationship between factors, we construct the regression model and then test it by using different statistical method approaches, including the pooled OLS, the fixed effects model, and the random effects model. Data are collected from 336 firms with shares listed in the Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange in Vietnam, totaling 1583 observations. Overall, the results reveal that the board size, state ownership, and concentrated ownership have positive impact on the firm's capital structure, whereas foreign ownership appears to have negative influence on the capital structure. The research does not find evidence of a the correlation between board independence, managerial ownership and corporate capital struture.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
• /
• v.8 no.5
• /
• pp.697-706
• /
• 2021

This quantitative study aims to examine the effect of family ownership on company performance empirically. Specifically, this study examines the moderating effect of corporate governance on the relationship between family ownership and company performance which has never been explored in the previous studies. This study's main target population was all listed companies in the Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD) for 2008-2018. The study used criteria, namely data completeness, to measure research variables and obtained 2996 data or firm-year observations. The research contingency model to test the proposed hypothesis was the General Moment Method (GMM). The study presents the results of data descriptions shows the average, median, maximum, minimum, and standard deviation values for each variable. The descriptive data shows that family ownership is common in Indonesia: 64% of 244 companies in the sample. The inferential analysis results using a multiple regression model test show that family ownership significantly reduces company performance. However, corporate governance proxied by the board of directors, managerial risk profile, and independent commissioners significantly moderate the relationship between family ownership and company performance. Besides, the managerial risk profile and independent commissioners strengthened while the board of commissioners' presence weakened the effect of family ownership on performance.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
• /
• v.17 no.5
• /
• pp.8-17
• /
• 2017

Using 1855 observations from 5 years-371 firms panel data during 2010 to 2014 in Chinese stock exchanges, this study examines the impact of managers' ownership on R & D expenditures. The empirical study finds that when firms are state-owned, managers' ownership have negative relation with the level of R & D expenses as well as the likelihood of executing R & D investment, implying that managers are less likely to invest in high risky projects due to managerial ownership's entrenchment effects to pursue private benefits rather than alignment of interest effect as shareholders. The empirical study also finds that when firms are private-owned, managerial ownership are inverse U shaped related to the level of R & D expenses, implying that managers are less likely to invest in high risky projects due to increasing risk aversion resulting from concentration of private wealth at its high level while managers are more likely to invest in high risky projects due to increasing incentives as shareholders at its low level. The results support that the effects of managerial ownership on R & D expenses may be different according to the ownership type of Chinese listed firms.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
• /
• v.11 no.12
• /
• pp.233-242
• /
• 2020

We posit that employee ownership through defined contribution (DC) plans results in managerial entrenchment, and then examine the effect of the enactment of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 on the relation between the employee ownership and firm performance. By conducting Ordinary Least Square regression with the data from Form 5500 over the period of 1999-2014, we find that firms with large employee ownership increase their firm value measured by Tobin's Q after the adoption of the Act. These findings suggest that the adoption of the Act has been effective to mitigate the negative effect of managerial entrenchment by decreasing the employee ownership and reinforcing the fiduciary duty of plan trustees. Given the fact that we test the effects of the diversification rule on employee ownership using firm performance, further research could aim to examine the effects of the rule on employee ownership using stock return or market reaction.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
• /
• v.24 no.2
• /
• pp.81-111
• /
• 2007

The agency relationship between managers and shareholders has the potential to influence decision-making in the firm which in turn potentially impacts on firm characteristics such as value and leverage. Using an agency framework, we examine the relation between ownership structure and capital structure during post-IMF period. We used the balanced panel data for 378 korean listed companies during the 1999-2005. The panel data sets consist of time-series observation on each of 378 cross-sectional units. The results indicate a non-linear U-shaped relation between the level of managerial share ownership and leverage with the relation reaching a minimum at 58.48 per cent of management share ownership. As managerial share ownership increase from a low level, managers have incentive to reduce the debt level for decreasing the financial risk, resulting in a lower lever of debt. However, when corporate managers hold a significant proportion of a firm's shares, managers have incentive to increase the debt level for leverage effects, resulting in a higher lever of debt.

• Journal of Distribution Science
• /
• v.14 no.8
• /
• pp.51-57
• /
• 2016

Purpose - If control-ownership disparity is large, managers will not actively reduce costs; rather, they will maintain unutilized resources or possess surplus resources even when sales decrease with the purpose of increasing personal utility from status, power, compensation, and prestige. These managers' utility maximizing tendencies cause cost stickiness. We examine whether asymmetric behavior related to costs becomes stronger when there is a large disparity between ownership and control rights. Research design, data, and methodology - We construct a regression model to examine the relationship between control-ownership disparity and cost stickiness. STICKY, a dependent variable representing cost stickiness is a value found using the method of Weiss (2010), and Disparity is an interest variable that shows control-ownership disparity. Results - This study is based from the unique situations in Korea, in which high control-ownership disparity is common in firms. Large control-ownership disparity was found to increase cost stickiness of corporations. Conclusions - The results of this study imply that controlling shareholders may be regarded as a threat to the interests of minority shareholders and corporate values especially when controlling shareholders have significant influence over managers or the power to make managerial decisions as owners of a corporation.

• Management & Information Systems Review
• /
• v.31 no.1
• /
• pp.45-63
• /
• 2012

The purpose of this study is to investigated the association between the percentage of common stock held by a company's CEO and measure firm performance in down and up markets. We found that managerial ownership is associated positively with firm performance. We also found that although firms with high insider ownership generally outperform other firms, this relationship is diminished in down markets and is increased in up market. These results suggest that investment strategies based on the assumption that high insider ownership is associated positively with financial performance may be faulty in declining market.

• Management & Information Systems Review
• /
• v.34 no.3
• /
• pp.61-78
• /
• 2015

The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of cash holdings on internationalization of listed manufacturing firms. We explore moderating effect of managerial ownership between cash holdings and internationalization of firms. We analysed cross-sectional data of 645 listed companies from 2000 to 2013 using the fixed effects estimation. Empirical results showed that the there was a positive significant relation between cash holdings and internationalization of firms This study also found that managerial ownership have a significant negative moderating effects in the pathway between cash holdings and internationalization Cash liquidities can be rapidly induced internationalization. Managerial ownership increase agency cost, therefore, it might have a negative effects on internationalization These results suggest that agency cost with cash holdings is very important for cash management.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
• /
• v.4 no.5
• /
• pp.15-26
• /
• 1981

While one characteristic of modern enterprises is that their forms are mostly stock company type profit organization the other characteristic is that such modern enterprises have mostly been managing under separation between capital and management. The term "Separation of ownership and Management" means that a company is controlled and managed not by its financier or investor but by the professional manager equipped with scientific management skill and knowledge. Nowadays, separation between capital and management could be adopted by advent of professional managers, and the enterprises are managed not exclusively by the interested group of stockholders but by the professional managers Professional managers can manage their enterprises in such a way as to guarantee to achieve sociality and public interests required in the modern enterprises. The purpose of this study is to formalize management ideology of enterprises in Daegu Area by means of comparative study on the degree of separation of ownership and management among enterprises in the United States, Japan and Daegu Area, thus to advise enterprising men of management idea-logy formalized. Findings from the comparative study are as follows 1. There are differences in staffing and financing between enterprises of the United States and those of Japan and Daegu Area. 2. Degree of Separation of ownership and management in Japan and Daegu Area is much less than that of the United States, and 3. The degree of separation of ownership and management is higher in open enterprises in Daegu Area. Accordingly. enterprises in Daegu Area should adopt up-to-data management theory and techniques in order to be developed themselves, and furthermore, to contribute to both the nation and the local community in economic development. In modern industrial society, the scale enterprise organization is growing very rapidly and the managerial circumstances are very much complicate and variable , thus the demand for the competent managers equipped with management knowledge and ability are high. The necessity of systematic and efficient managerial training is social demand needed urgently in modern industrial society. Therefore, it is necessary for the enterprising men in Daegu Area to establish cooperation system between university and industry in which they can participate voluntarily.luntarily.

• International Commerce and Information Review
• /
• v.19 no.1
• /
• pp.257-278
• /
• 2017

The paper examines the ownership structure and the firm value of online firms in the world. Data are gathered by using FACTIVA database for firms in the Dow Jones index for the 2014 fiscal year. The Ordinary Least Squares regressions, the Generalized Linear Model, and the model selection criteria are employed to analyze the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables. The paper tests theories such as the convergence of interest theory, the managerial entrenchment theory, and the eclectic theory. The paper finds that the ownership structure has an influence on the firm value depending on the rank of the large shareholders. While the first large shareholders have a negative association with the firm value, the presence of the second and the third large shareholders have a positive influence on the firm value. The paper also finds that the identity of the largest shareholders whether they are insiders or outsiders have an influence on the firm value. The proportion of shareholding by a large shareholder and her identity are variables which predict a firm value.