• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.48 no.1
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• pp.52-57
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• 2023

Background: Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) operates several nuclear research facilities licensed by Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC). The emergency preparedness requirements, GSR Part 7, by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) request protection strategy based on the hazard assessment that is not applied in Korea. Materials and Methods: In developing the protection strategy, it is important to consider an accident scenario and its consequence. KAERI has tried the hazard assessment based on a hypothesis accident scenario for the major nuclear facilities. During the assessment, the safety analysis report of the related facilities was reviewed, the simulation using MELCOR, MACCS2 code was implemented based on a considered accident scenario of each facility, and the international guidance was considered. Results and Discussion: The results of the optimized protective actions were 300 m evacuation and 800 m sheltering for the High-Flux Advanced Neutron Application Reactor (HANARO), the evacuation to radius 50 m, the sheltering 400 m for post-irradiation examination facility (PIEF), 100 m evacuation or sheltering for HANARO fuel fabrication plant (HFFP) facility. Conclusion: The results of the optimized protective actions and its distances for the KAERI facilities for the maximum postulated accidents were considered in establishing the emergency plan and procedures and implementing an emergency exercise for the KAERI facilities.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.41 no.4
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• pp.368-372
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• 2016

Background: Methodologies for a series of radiological consequence assessments show a distinctive difference according to the design principles of the original nuclear suppliers and their technical standards to be imposed. This is due to the uncertainties of the accidental source term, radionuclide behavior in the environment, and subsequent radiological dose. Both types of PWR and PHWR are operated in Korea. However, technical standards for evaluating atmospheric dispersion have been enacted based on the U.S. NRC's positions regardless of the reactor types. For this reason, it might cause a controversy between the licensor and licensee of a nuclear power plant. Materials and Methods: It was modelled under the framework of the NRC Regulatory Guide 1.145 for light-water reactors, reflecting the features of heavy-water reactors as specified in the Canadian National Standard and the modelling features in MACCS2, such as atmospheric diffusion coefficient, ground deposition, surface roughness, radioactive plume depletion, and exposure from ground deposition. Results and Discussion: An integrated accident consequence assessment code, ACCESS (Accident Consequence Assessment Code for Evaluating Site Suitability), was developed by taking into account the unique regulatory positions for reactor types under the framework of the current Korean technical standards. Field tracer experiments and hand calculations have been carried out for validation and verification of the models. Conclusion: The modelling approaches of ACCESS and its features are introduced, and its applicative results for a hypothetical accidental scenario are comprehensively discussed. In an applicative study, the predicted results by the light-water reactor assessment model were higher than those by other models in terms of total doses.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Safety
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• v.27 no.6
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• pp.192-204
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• 2012

For a severe accident of nuclear power plant, an approach to estimation of the radiological source term using a severe accident code(MELCOR) has been proposed. Although the MELCOR code has a capability to estimate the radiological source term, it has been hardly utilized for the radiological consequence analysis mainly due to a lack of understanding on the relevant function employed in MELCOR and severe accident phenomena. In order to estimate the severe accident source term to be linked with the radiological consequence analysis, this study proposes 4-step procedure: (1) selection of plant condition leading to a severe accident(i.e., accident sequence), (2) analysis of the relevant severe accident code, (3) investigation of the code analysis results and post-processing, and (4) generation of radiological source term information for the consequence analysis. The feasibility study of the present approach to an early containment failure sequence caused by a fast station blackout(SBO) of a reference plant (OPR-1000), showed that while the MELCOR code has an integrated capability for severe accident and source term analysis, it has a large degree of uncertainty in quantifying the radiological source term. Key insights obtained from the present study were: (1) key parameters employed in a typical code for the consequence analysis(i.e., MACCS) could be generated by MELCOR code; (2) the MELOCR code simulation for an assessment of the selected accident sequence has a large degree of uncertainty in determining the accident scenario and severe accident phenomena; and (3) the generation of source term information for the consequence analysis relies on an expert opinion in both areas of severe accident analysis and consequence analysis. Nevertheless, the MELCOR code had a great advantage in estimating the radiological source term such as reflection of the current state of art in the area of severe accident and radiological source term.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Safety
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• v.37 no.6
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• pp.166-173
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• 2022

A variety of input parameters are taken into consideration while performing a Level 3 PSA. Some parameters related to plume segments, spatial grids, and particle size distribution have flexible input formats. Fine modeling performed by splitting a number of segments or grids may enhance the accuracy of analysis but is time-consuming. Analysis speed is highly important because a considerably large number of calculations is required to handle Level 2 PSA scenarios for a single-unit or multi-unit Level 3 PSA. This study developed a sensitivity analysis supporting interface called MACCSsense to compare the results of the trials of plume segmentation with the results of the base case to determine its impact (in terms of time and accuracy) and to support the development of a modeling approach, which saves calculation time and improves accuracy. MACCSense is an automation tool that uses a large amount of plume segmentation analysis results obtained from MUST Converter and Mr. Manager developed by KAERI to generate a sensitivity report that includes impact (time and accuracy) by comparing them with the base-case result. In this study, various plume segmentation approaches were investigated, and both the accuracy and speed of offsite consequence analysis were evaluated using MACCS as a consequence analysis tool. A simultaneous evaluation revealed that execution time can be reduced using multi-threading. In addition, this study can serve as a framework for the development of a modeling strategy for plume segmentation in order to perform accurate and fast offsite consequence analyses.