Journal of Radiation Protection and Research

The Korean Association for Radiation Protection (대한방사선방어학회)
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Considerations of the Optimized Protective Action Distance to Meet the Korean Protective Action Guides Following Maximum Hypothesis Accidents of Major KAERI Nuclear Facilities

  • Goanyup Lee (Nuclear Emergency and Environmental Protection Division, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute) ;
  • Hyun Ki Kim (Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Team, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute)
  • Received : 2021.10.22
  • Accepted : 2022.05.03
  • Published : 2023.03.31
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Abstract

Background: Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) operates several nuclear research facilities licensed by Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC). The emergency preparedness requirements, GSR Part 7, by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) request protection strategy based on the hazard assessment that is not applied in Korea. Materials and Methods: In developing the protection strategy, it is important to consider an accident scenario and its consequence. KAERI has tried the hazard assessment based on a hypothesis accident scenario for the major nuclear facilities. During the assessment, the safety analysis report of the related facilities was reviewed, the simulation using MELCOR, MACCS2 code was implemented based on a considered accident scenario of each facility, and the international guidance was considered. Results and Discussion: The results of the optimized protective actions were 300 m evacuation and 800 m sheltering for the High-Flux Advanced Neutron Application Reactor (HANARO), the evacuation to radius 50 m, the sheltering 400 m for post-irradiation examination facility (PIEF), 100 m evacuation or sheltering for HANARO fuel fabrication plant (HFFP) facility. Conclusion: The results of the optimized protective actions and its distances for the KAERI facilities for the maximum postulated accidents were considered in establishing the emergency plan and procedures and implementing an emergency exercise for the KAERI facilities.

Keywords

Acknowledgement

This study has been conducted as a part of the project of nuclear emergency preparedness of KAERI.

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