• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제53권9호
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• pp.2888-2898
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• 2021

Vital area identification (VAI) is an essential procedure for the design of physical protection systems (PPSs) for nuclear power plants (NPPs). The purpose of PPS design is to protect vital areas. VAI has been improved continuously to overcome the shortcomings of previous VAI generations. In first-generation VAI, a sabotage fault tree was developed directly without reusing probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) results or information. In second-generation VAI, VAI model was constructed from all PSA event trees and fault trees. While in third-generation VAI, it was developed from the simplified PSA event trees and fault trees. While VAIs have been performed for NPPs in full-power operations, VAI for NPPs in low-power and shutdown (LPSD) operations has not been studied and performed, even though NPPs in LPSD operations are very vulnerable to sabotage due to the very crowded nature of NPP maintenance. This study is the first to research and apply VAI to LPSD operation of NPP. Here, the third-generation VAI method for full-power operation of NPP was adapted to the VAI of LPSD operation. In this study, LPSD VAI for a few plant operational states (POSs) was performed. Furthermore, the operation strategy of vital areas for both full-power and LPSD operations was discussed. The LPSD VAI method discussed in this paper can be easily applied to all POSs. The method and insights in this study can be important for future LPSD VAI that reflects various LPSD operational states. Regulatory bodies and electric utilities can take advantage of this LPSD VAI method.

• 한국압력기기공학회 논문집
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• 제15권1호
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• pp.33-39
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• 2019

An 1,500MW advanced power reactor required the standard design approval by a Korean regulatory body in 2014. The reactor has been designed to have a 4-train independent safety concept and a passive auxiliary feedwater system (PAFS). The full power risk or core damage frequency (CDF) of 1,500MW advanced power reactor has been reduced more than that of APR1400. However, the risk during the low power and shutdown (LPSD) operation should be reduced because CDF of LPSD is about 4.7 times higher than that of internal full power. The purpose of paper is to analysis design alternatives to reduce risk during the LPSD. This paper suggests design alternatives to reduce risk and presents sensitivity analysis results.

• 한국안전학회지
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• 제35권1호
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• pp.107-115
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• 2020

This paper introduces the first vital area identification (VAI) process for the physical protection of nuclear power plants (NPPs) during low power and shutdown (LPSD) operation. This LPSD VAI is based on the 3rd generation VAI method which very efficiently utilizes probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) event trees (ETs). This LPSD VAI process was implemented to the virtual NPP during LPSD operation in this study. Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) had developed the 2nd generation full power VAI method that utilizes whole internal and external (fire and flooding) PSA results of NPPs during full power operation. In order to minimize the huge burden of the 2nd generation full power VAI method, the 3rd generation full power VAI method was developed, which utilizes ETs and minimal PSA fault trees instead of using the whole PSA fault tree. In the 3rd generation full power VAI method, (1) PSA ETs are analyzed, (2) minimal mitigation systems for avoiding core damage are selected from ETs by calculating system-level target sets and prevention sets, (3) relatively small sabotage fault tree that has the systems in the shortest system-level prevention set is composed, (4) room-level target sets and prevention sets are calculated from this small sabotage fault tree, and (5) the rooms in the shortest prevention set are defined as vital areas that should be protected. Currently, the 3rd generation full power VAI method is being employed for the VAI of Korean NPPs. This study is the first development and application of the 3rd generation VAI method to the LPSD VAI of NPP. For the LPSD VAI, (1) many LPSD ETs are classified into a few representative LPSD ETs based on the functional similarity of accident scenarios, (2) a few representative LPSD ETs are simplified with some VAI rules, and then (3) the 3rd generation VAI is performed as mentioned in the previous paragraph. It is well known that the shortest room-level prevention sets that are calculated by the 2nd and 3rd generation VAI methods are identical.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제54권1호
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• pp.152-161
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• 2022

We analyzed mitigation strategies for steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) accidents using MARS code under both full-power and low-power and shutdown (LPSD) conditions. In general, there are two approaches to mitigating SGTR accidents: supplementing the reactor coolant inventory using safety injection systems and depressurizing the reactor coolant system (RCS) by cooling it down using the intact steam generator. These mitigation strategies were compared from the viewpoint of break flow from the ruptured steam generator tube, the core integrity, and the possibility of the main steam safety valves opening, which is associated with the potential release of radiation. The "cooldown strategy" is recommended for break flow control, whereas the "RCS make-up strategy" is better for RCS inventory control. Under full power, neither mitigation strategy made a significant difference except for on the break flow while, in LPSD modes, the RCS cooldown strategy resulted in lower break and discharge flows, and thus less radiation release. As a result, using the cooldown strategy for an SGTR under LPSD conditions is recommended. These results can be used as a fundamental guide for mitigation strategies for SGTR accidents according to the operational mode.