• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.94
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• pp.163-192
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• 2011

A posteriori physicalists criticize non-physicalist arguments based on the framework of two-dimensional semantics. Most of them argue for physicalism based on the analogy between scientific identity statements and psychophysical identity statements. This paper argues for another version of aposteriori physicalism, so called physicalism employing 'phenomenal concept strategy' or 'exceptionalist strategy', which appeals to merely the nature of phenomenal concept without recourse to a semantic framework. Loar's phenomenal concept strategy employs the aspect of our recognitional ability of objects in criticizing non-physicalism, leading to the argument that phenomenal concepts are 'exceptional' in applying conceivability-possibility link. I critically examine Stoljar's, Chalmers', Raffman's criticisms against Loar's exceptionalists strategy. Loar's phenomenal concept strategy reflects well our psychological aspects surrounding the acquisition and the possession of 'phenomenal concept'. In several respects, Loar's exceptionalist version of a posteriori physicalism is the best explanation for accounting for both the explanatory gap and the a posteriority of psychophysical identity.