• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제50권8호
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• pp.1234-1245
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• 2018

The risk of multi-unit nuclear power plants (NPPs) at a site has received considerable critical attention recently. However, current probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) procedures and computer code do not support multi-unit PSA because the traditional PSA structure is mostly used for the quantification of single-unit NPP risk. In this study, the main purpose is to develop a multi-unit Level 2 PSA method and apply it to full-power operating six-unit OPR1000. Multi-unit Level 2 PSA method consists of three steps: (1) development of single-unit Level 2 PSA; (2) extracting the mapping data from plant damage state to source term category; and (3) combining multi-unit Level 1 PSA results and mapping fractions. By applying developed multi-unit Level 2 PSA method into six-unit OPR1000, site containment failure probabilities in case of loss of ultimate heat sink, loss of off-site power, tsunami, and seismic event were quantified.

• 한국안전학회지
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• 제36권3호
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• pp.66-73
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• 2021

This report documents the results of an at-power internal events Level 1 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for a Korea research reactor (KRR). The aim of the study is to determine the accident sequences, construct an internal level 1 PSA model, and estimate the core damage frequency (CDF). The accident quantification is performed using the AIMS-PSA software version 1.2c along with a fault tree reliability evaluation expert (FTREX) quantification engine. The KRR PSA model is quantified using a cut-off value of 1.0E-15/yr to eliminate the non-effective minimal cut sets (MCSs). The final result indicates a point estimate of 4.55E-06/yr for the overall CDF attributable to internal initiating events in the core damage state for the KRR. Loss of Electric Power (LOEP) is the predominant contributor to the total CDF via a single initiating event (3.68E-6/yr), providing 80.9% of the CDF. The second largest contributor is the beam tube loss of coolant accident (LOCA), which accounts for 9.9% (4.49E-07/yr) of the CDF.

• 전기학회논문지
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• 제58권3호
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• pp.444-449
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• 2009

This paper introduces a method to establish performance criteria of the in-house power supply system in nuclear power plants. The performance criteria of the system is presented in terms of the number of function failures and amount of the out-of-service time that can be allowed commensurate with the probabilistic safety assessment results of the nuclear power plants. To obtain the performance criteria such as reliability and availability, the functions of the system were analyzed and probabilistic assessment results were utilized. This method provides quantitative guidelines in selecting and monitoring system functions to determine an adequate level of maintenance quality in order to ensure the probabilistic goals for the safety of the nuclear power plants.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제52권10호
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• pp.2221-2229
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• 2020

After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) accident, level 3 probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) has emerged as an important task in order to assess the risk level of the multi-unit NPPs in a single nuclear site. Accurate calculation of the radionuclide concentrations and exposure doses to the public is required if a nuclear site has multi-unit NPPs and large number of people live near NPPs. So, there has been a great need to develop a new method or procedure for the fast and accurate offsite consequence calculation for the multi-unit NPP accident analysis. Since the multi-unit level 3 PSA is being currently performed assuming that all the NPPs are located at the same position such as a center of mass (COM) or base NPP position, radionuclide concentrations or exposure doses near NPPs can be drastically distorted depending on the locations, multi-unit NPP alignment, and the wind direction. In order to overcome this disadvantage of the COM method, the idea of a new multiple location (ML) method was proposed and implemented into a new tool MURCC (multi-unit radiological consequence calculator). Furthermore, the MURCC code was further improved for the multi-unit level 3 PSA that has the arbitrary number of multi-unit NPPs. The objectives of this study are to (1) qualitatively and quantitatively compare COM and ML methods, and (2) demonstrate the strength and efficiency of the ML method. The strength of the ML method was demonstrated by the applications to the multi-unit long-term station blackout (LTSBO) accidents at the four-unit Vogtle NPPs. Thus, it is strongly recommended that this ML method be employed for the offsite consequence analysis of the multi-unit NPP accidents.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제56권4호
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• pp.1225-1233
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• 2024

Level 3 probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is performed to calculate radionuclide concentrations and exposure dose resulting from nuclear power plant accidents. To calculate the external exposure dose from the released radioactive materials, the radionuclide concentrations are multiplied by two factors of dose coefficient and a finite cloud dose correction factor (FCDCF), and the obtained values are summed. This indicates that a standard set of FCDCFs is required for external exposure dose calculations. To calculate a standard set of FCDCFs, the effective distance from the release point to the receptor along the wind direction should be predetermined. The TID-24190 document published in 1968 provides equations to calculate FCDCFs and the resultant standard set of FCDCFs. However, it does not provide any explanation on the effective distance required to calculate the standard set of FCDCFs. In 2021, Sandia National Laboratories (SNLs) proposed a method to predetermine finite effective distances depending on the atmospheric stability classes A to F, which results in six standard sets of FCDCFs. Meanwhile, independently of the SNLs, the authors of this paper discovered that an infinite effective distance assumption is a very reasonable approach to calculate one standard set of FCDCFs, and they implemented it into the multi-unit radiological consequence calculator (MURCC) code, which is a post-processor of the level 3 PSA codes. This paper calculates and compares short- and long-range FCDCFs calculated using the TID-24190, SNLs method, and MURCC method, and explains the strength of the MURCC method over the SNLs method. Although six standard sets of FCDCFs are required by the SNLs method, one standard sets of FCDCFs are sufficient by the MURCC method. Additionally, the use of the MURCC method and its resultant FCDCFs for level 3 PSA was strongly recommended.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제50권8호
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• pp.1246-1254
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• 2018

The importance of performing Level 3 probabilistic safety assessments (PSA) along with a general interest in assessing multi-unit risk has been sharply increasing after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) accident. However, relatively few studies on multi-unit Level 3 PSA have been performed to date, reflecting limited scenarios of multi-unit accidents with higher priority. The major difficulty to carry out a multi-unit Level 3 PSA lies in the exponentially increasing number of multi-unit accident combinations, as different source terms can be released from each NPP unit; indeed, building consequence models for the astronomical number of accident scenarios is simply impractical. In this study, a new approach has been developed that employs the look-up table method to cover every multi-unit accident scenario. Consequence results for each scenario can be found on the table, established with a practical amount of effort, and can be matched to the frequency of the scenario. Preliminary application to a six-unit NPP site was carried out, where it was found that the difference between full-coverage and cut-off cases could be considerably high and therefore influence the total risk. Additional studies should be performed to fine tune the details and overcome the limitations of the approach.

• 한국안전학회지
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• 제34권3호
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• pp.102-110
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• 2019

This paper describes the work and results of the preliminary Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for a research reactor in the design phase. This preliminary PSA was undertaken to assess the level of safety for the design of a research reactor and to evaluate whether it is probabilistically safe to operate and reliable to use. The scope of the PSA described here is a Level 1 PSA which addresses the risks associated with core damage. After reviewing the documents and its conceptual design, eight typical initiating events are selected regarding internal events during the normal operation of the reactor. Simple fault tree models for the PSA are developed instead of the detailed model at this conceptual design stage. A total of 32 core damage accident sequences for an internal event analysis were identified and quantified using the AIMS-PSA. LOCA-I has a dominant contribution to the total CDF by a single initiating event. The CDF from the internal events of a research reactor is estimated to be 7.38E-07/year. The CDF for the representative initiating events is less than 1.0E-6/year even though conservative assumptions are used in reliability data. The conceptual design of the research reactor is designed to be sufficiently safe from the viewpoint of safety.

• 한국안전학회지
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• 제35권3호
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• pp.86-95
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• 2020

This paper describes the work and the results of the final Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for the Jordan Research and Training Reactor (JRTR). This final PSA was undertaken to assess the level of safety for the design of a research reactor and to evaluate whether it is probabilistically safe to operate and reliable to use. The scope of the PSA described here is a Level 1 PSA, which addresses the risks associated with core damage. After reviewing the documents and its conceptual design, nine typical initiating events were selected regarding internal events during the normal operation of the reactor. AIMS-PSA (Version 1.2c) was used for the accident quantification, and FTREX was used as the quantification engine. 1.0E-15/yr of the cutoff value was used to deliminate the non-effective Minimal Cut Sets (MCSs) when quantifying the JRTR PSA model. As a result, the final result indicates a point estimate of 2.02E-07/yr for the overall Core Damage Frequency (CDF) attributable to internal initiating events in the core damage state for the JRTR. A Loss of Primary Cooling System Flow (LOPCS) is the dominant contributor to the total CDF by a single initiating event (9.96E-08/yr), and provides 49.4% of the CDF. General Transients (GTRNs) are the second largest contributor, and provide 32.9% (6.65E-08/yr) of the CDF.

• 한국원자력학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국원자력학회 1997년도 춘계학술발표회논문집(1)
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• pp.611-616
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• 1997

The Level 1 probabilistic safety assessment(PSA) for Wolsong(WS) 2/3/4 nuclear power plant(NPPs) in design stage is performed using the methodologies being equivalent to PWR PSA. Accident sequence evaluation program(ASEP) human reliability analysis(HRA) procedure and technique for human error rate prediction(THERP) are used in HRA of WS 2/3/4 NPPs PSA. The purpose of this paper is to introduce the procedure and methodology of HRA in WS 2/3/4 NPPs PSA. Also, this paper describes the interim results of importance analysis for human actions modeled in WS 2/3/4 PSA and the findings and recommendations of administrative control of secondary control area from the view of human factors.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제54권8호
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• pp.2933-2940
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• 2022

Approximations such as the delete-term approximation, rare event approximation, and minimal cutset upper bound (MCUB) need to be prudently applied for the quantification of a seismic probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) model. Important characteristics of seismic PSA models indicate that preserving the success branches in a primary seismic event tree is necessary. Based on the authors' experience in modeling and quantifying plant-level seismic PSA models, the effects of applying negate-down to the success branches in primary seismic event trees on the quantification results are summarized along with the following three insights gained: (1) there are two competing effects on the MCUB-based quantification results: one tending to increase and the other tending to decrease; (2) the binary decision diagram does not always provide exact quantification results; and (3) it is identified when the exact results will be obtained, and which combination provides more conservative results compared to the others. Complicated interactions occur in Boolean variable manipulation, approximation, and the quantification of a seismic PSA model. The insights presented herein can assist PSA analysts to better understand the important theoretical principles associated with the quantification of seismic PSA models.