• 한국안전학회지
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• 제35권3호
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• pp.86-95
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• 2020

This paper describes the work and the results of the final Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for the Jordan Research and Training Reactor (JRTR). This final PSA was undertaken to assess the level of safety for the design of a research reactor and to evaluate whether it is probabilistically safe to operate and reliable to use. The scope of the PSA described here is a Level 1 PSA, which addresses the risks associated with core damage. After reviewing the documents and its conceptual design, nine typical initiating events were selected regarding internal events during the normal operation of the reactor. AIMS-PSA (Version 1.2c) was used for the accident quantification, and FTREX was used as the quantification engine. 1.0E-15/yr of the cutoff value was used to deliminate the non-effective Minimal Cut Sets (MCSs) when quantifying the JRTR PSA model. As a result, the final result indicates a point estimate of 2.02E-07/yr for the overall Core Damage Frequency (CDF) attributable to internal initiating events in the core damage state for the JRTR. A Loss of Primary Cooling System Flow (LOPCS) is the dominant contributor to the total CDF by a single initiating event (9.96E-08/yr), and provides 49.4% of the CDF. General Transients (GTRNs) are the second largest contributor, and provide 32.9% (6.65E-08/yr) of the CDF.

• 한국안전학회지
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• 제24권5호
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• pp.63-68
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• 2009

The urgent VAI method development is required since "The Act of Physical Protection and Radiological Emergency that is established in 2003" requires an evaluation of physical threats in nuclear facilities and an establishment of physical protection in Korea. The VAI methodology is developed to (1) make a sabotage model by reusing existing fire/flooding/pipe break PSA models, (2) calculate MCSs and TEPSs, (3) select the most cost-effective TEPS among many TEPSs, (4) determine the compartments in a selected TEPS as vital areas, and (5) provide protection measures to the vital areas. The developed VAI methodology contains four steps, (1) collecting the internal level 1 PSA model and information, (2) developing the fire/flood/pipe rupture model based on level 1 PSA model, (3) integrating the fire/flood/pipe rupture model into the sabotage model by JSTAR, and (4) calculating MCSs and TEPS. The VAT process is performed through the VIPEX that was developed in KAERI. This methodology serves as a guide to develop a sabotage model by using existing internal and external PSA models. When this methodology is used to identify the vital areas, it provides the most cost-effective method to save the VAI and physical protection costs.

• 한국안전학회지
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• 제34권3호
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• pp.102-110
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• 2019

This paper describes the work and results of the preliminary Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for a research reactor in the design phase. This preliminary PSA was undertaken to assess the level of safety for the design of a research reactor and to evaluate whether it is probabilistically safe to operate and reliable to use. The scope of the PSA described here is a Level 1 PSA which addresses the risks associated with core damage. After reviewing the documents and its conceptual design, eight typical initiating events are selected regarding internal events during the normal operation of the reactor. Simple fault tree models for the PSA are developed instead of the detailed model at this conceptual design stage. A total of 32 core damage accident sequences for an internal event analysis were identified and quantified using the AIMS-PSA. LOCA-I has a dominant contribution to the total CDF by a single initiating event. The CDF from the internal events of a research reactor is estimated to be 7.38E-07/year. The CDF for the representative initiating events is less than 1.0E-6/year even though conservative assumptions are used in reliability data. The conceptual design of the research reactor is designed to be sufficiently safe from the viewpoint of safety.

• 한국안전학회지
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• 제36권3호
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• pp.66-73
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• 2021

This report documents the results of an at-power internal events Level 1 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for a Korea research reactor (KRR). The aim of the study is to determine the accident sequences, construct an internal level 1 PSA model, and estimate the core damage frequency (CDF). The accident quantification is performed using the AIMS-PSA software version 1.2c along with a fault tree reliability evaluation expert (FTREX) quantification engine. The KRR PSA model is quantified using a cut-off value of 1.0E-15/yr to eliminate the non-effective minimal cut sets (MCSs). The final result indicates a point estimate of 4.55E-06/yr for the overall CDF attributable to internal initiating events in the core damage state for the KRR. Loss of Electric Power (LOEP) is the predominant contributor to the total CDF via a single initiating event (3.68E-6/yr), providing 80.9% of the CDF. The second largest contributor is the beam tube loss of coolant accident (LOCA), which accounts for 9.9% (4.49E-07/yr) of the CDF.

• Asian Pacific Journal of Cancer Prevention
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• 제13권11호
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• pp.5695-5699
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• 2012

We investigated the relationships between demographics, lifestyle characteristics, and serum total prostate specific antigen (PSA) concentration and examined the population-based distribution of total PSA by age among 2,246 Korean men with a median age of 45 years. We obtained data about demographic and lifestyle characteristics based on self-reporting using a quetionnaire. We also performed physical examinations, anthropometric measurements, and biochemical measurements. The PSA concentration increased with age and there was a significant difference in total PSA concentration between the age groups of 21-60 years and >60 years. Age >60 years, height ${\geq}1.8$ m, a low frequency of alcohol consumption, and taking nutritional supplements showed a significantly increased odds ratio for increased PSA when 3.0 ng/mL was chosen as the PSA cut-off level. Smoking status, BMI, percent body fat, diabetes mellitus, fatty liver, herbal medicine use, vitamin use, and diet were not significantly associated with total PSA regardless of the cut-off level. When interpreting a single PSA test, height, alcohol consumption, and nutritional supplement use should be considered, in addition to age.

• 한국원자력학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국원자력학회 1997년도 춘계학술발표회논문집(1)
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• pp.611-616
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• 1997

The Level 1 probabilistic safety assessment(PSA) for Wolsong(WS) 2/3/4 nuclear power plant(NPPs) in design stage is performed using the methodologies being equivalent to PWR PSA. Accident sequence evaluation program(ASEP) human reliability analysis(HRA) procedure and technique for human error rate prediction(THERP) are used in HRA of WS 2/3/4 NPPs PSA. The purpose of this paper is to introduce the procedure and methodology of HRA in WS 2/3/4 NPPs PSA. Also, this paper describes the interim results of importance analysis for human actions modeled in WS 2/3/4 PSA and the findings and recommendations of administrative control of secondary control area from the view of human factors.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제44권5호
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• pp.459-470
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• 2012

From the PSA point of view, the Fukushima accident of Japan in 2011 reveals some issues to be re-considered and/or improved in the PSA such as the limited scope of the PSA, site risk, etc. KAERI (Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute) has performed researches on the development of an integrated risk assessment framework related to some issues arisen after the Fukushima accident. This framework can cover the internal PSA model and external PSA models (fire, flooding, and seismic PSA models) in the full power and the low power-shutdown modes. This framework also integrates level 1, 2 and 3 PSA to quantify the risk of nuclear facilities more efficiently and consistently. We expect that this framework will be helpful to resolve the issue regarding the limited scope of PSA and to reduce some inconsistencies that might exist between (1) the internal and external PSA, and (2) full power mode PSA and low power-shutdown PSA models. In addition, KAERI is starting researches related to the extreme external events, the risk assessment of spent fuel pool, and the site risk. These emerging issues will be incorporated into the integrated risk assessment framework. In this paper the integrated risk assessment framework and the research activities on the emerging issues are outlined.

• Asian Pacific Journal of Cancer Prevention
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• 제14권5호
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• pp.3289-3292
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• 2013

Introduction: The purpose of this study was to identify clinical profiles of patients with low risk of having bone metastases, for which bone scanning could be safely eliminated. Materials and Methods: This retrospective cross sectional study looked at prostate cancer patients seen in the Urology Departments in 2 tertiary centres over the 11 year period starting from January 2000 to May 2011. Patient demographic data, levels of PSA at diagnosis, Gleason score for the biopsy core, T-staging as well as the lymph node status were recorded and analysed. Results: 258 men were included. The mean age of those 90 men (34.9%) with bone metastasis was $69.2{\pm}7.3$ years. Logistic regression found that PSA level (P=0.000) at diagnosis and patient's nodal-stage (P=0.02) were the only two independent variables able to predict the probability of bone metastasis among the newly diagnosed prostate cancer patients. Among thowse with a low PSA level less than 20ng/ml, and less than 10ng/ml, bone metastasis were detected in 10.3% (12 out of 117) and 9.7% (7 out of 72), respectively. However, by combining PSA level of 10ng/ml or lower, and nodal negative as the two criteria to predict negative bone scan, a relatively high negative predictive value of 93.8% was obtained. The probability of bone metastasis in prostate cancer can be calculated with this formula: -1.069+0.007(PSA value, ng/ml)+1.021(Nodal status, 0 or 1)=x Probability of bone metastasis=$2.718^x/1+2.718^x$. Conclusion: Newly diagnosed prostate cancer patients with a PSA level of 10ng/ml or lower and negative nodes have a very low risk of bone metastasis (negative predictive value 93.8%) and therefore bone scans may not be necessary.

• 한국안전학회지
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• 제15권2호
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• pp.126-135
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• 2000

Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is an engineering analysis method to identify possible contributors to the risk from a nuclear power plant and now it has become a standard tool in safety evaluation of nuclear power plants. PSA consists of three phases named as Level 1, 2 and 3. Level 2 PSA, mainly focused in this paper, uses a step-wise approach. At first, plant damage states (PDSs) are defined from the Level 1 PSA results and they are quantified. Containment event tree (CET) is then constructed considering the physico-chemical phenomena in the containment. The quantification of CET can be assisted by a decomposition event tree (DET). Finally, source terms are quantitatively characterized by the containment failure mode. As the main benefit of PSA is to provide insights into plant design, performance and environmental impacts, including the identification of the dominant risk contributors and the comparison of options for reducing risk, this technique is expected to be applied to the industrial safety area.

• Asian Pacific Journal of Cancer Prevention
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• 제15권7호
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• pp.3087-3091
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• 2014

Purpose: To determine the utility of digital rectal examination (DRE), serum total prostate specific antigen (tPSA) estimation, and transrectal ultrasound (TRUS) for the detection of prostate cancer (PCa) in men with lower urinary tract symptoms (LUTS). Materials and Methods: All patients with abnormal DRE, TRUS, or serum tPSA >4ng/ml, in any combination, underwent TRUS-guided needle biopsy. Eight cores of prostatic tissue were obtained from different areas of the peripheral prostate and examined histopathologically for the nature of the pathology. Results: PCa was detected in 151 (50.3%) patients, remaining 149 (49.7%) showed benign changes with or without active prostatitis. PCa was detected in 13 (56.5%), 9 (19.1%), 26 (28.3%), and 103 (74.6%) of patients with tPSA <4 ng/ml, 4-10 ng/ml, 10-20 ng/ml and >20 ng/ml respectively. Only 13 patients with PCa had abnormal DRE and TRUS with serum PSA <4 ng/ml. The detection rate was highest in patients with tPSA >20 ng/ml. The association between tPSA level and cancer detection was statistically significant (p<0.01). Among 209 patients with abnormal DRE and raised serum PSA, PCa was detected in 128 (61.2%). Conclusions: The incidence of PCa increases with increasing serum level of tPSA. The overall screening and detection rate can be further improved by using DRE, TRUS and TRUS-guided prostate needle biopsies.