• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.89-120
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• 2010

In this paper, we analyse empirically the relations between ownership structure and cash holdings of firms listed on Korea Securities Market and Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. Cash holdings increase as large shareholder's equity holdings increase. Cash holdings increase as the difference between first largest shareholder's and second largest shareholder's equity holdings increase, and cash holdings increase as the ownership concentration increase. Managerial ownership exert a non-linear effects on cash holdings. So to speak, at lower level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders, but at higher level of managerial ownership, the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned, and also at highest level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Cash holdings increase larger in owner-controlled firm than in management-controlled firm. These results support the expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis that large shareholders can extract private benefits from corporate resources under their control at the expense of minority shareholders. This paper contributes to defining information value of large shareholder's equity holdings on cash holdings for a firms' other stakeholders such as investors and creditors, and to strengthening a legal and institutional safeguard for external minority shareholders. Ownership concentration might have negatively affected the evolution of the legal and institutional frameworks for corporate governance and the manner in which economic activity is conducted. It could be a formidable barrier to future policy reform.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.129-136
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• 2014

This paper examines the effects of dominating large shareholders and foreign blockholders on credit ratings. An effective governance mechanism is expected to lead to higher credit ratings through its impact on default risk of the firm. Our results show that dominating large shareholders have an adverse impact on credit ratings of domestic firms on the level of its statistical significance. Foreign shareholders are positively associated with credit ratings, contributing to the higher credit worthness of domestic firms.

• Journal of Information Processing Systems
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.375-388
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• 2012

PVSS stands for publicly verifiable secret sharing. In PVSS, a dealer shares a secret among multiple share holders. He encrypts the shares using the shareholders' encryption algorithms and publicly proves that the encrypted shares are valid. Most of the existing PVSS schemes do not employ an ElGamal encryption to encrypt the shares. Instead, they usually employ other encryption algorithms like a RSA encryption and Paillier encryption. Those encryption algorithms do not support the shareholders' encryption algorithms to employ the same decryption modulus. As a result, PVSS based on those encryption algorithms must employ additional range proofs to guarantee the validity of the shares obtained by the shareholders. Although the shareholders can employ ElGamal encryptions with the same decryption modulus in PVSS such that the range proof can be avoided, there are only two PVSS schemes based on ElGamal encryption. Moreover, the two schemes have their drawbacks. One of them employs a costly repeating-proof mechanism, which needs to repeat the dealer's proof at least scores of times to achieve satisfactory soundness. The other requires that the dealer must know the discrete logarithm of the secret to share and thus weakens the generality and it cannot be employed in many applications. A new PVSS scheme based on an ElGamal encryption is proposed in this paper. It employs the same decryption modulus for all the shareholders' ElGamal encryption algorithms, so it does not need any range proof. Moreover, it is a general PVSS technique without any special limitation. Finally, an encryption-improving technique is proposed to achieve very high efficiency in the new PVSS scheme. It only needs a number of exponentiations in large cyclic groups that are linear in the number of the shareholders, while all the existing PVSS schemes need at least a number of exponentiations in large cyclic groups that are linear in the square of the number of the shareholders.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.143-147
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• 2013

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance structure on the cost of debt. Total sample is divided into the small sample, the medium sample and the large sample of equity concentration, based on the equity ownership of large shareholders. Our regression results show that foreign investors are not associated with the cost of debt in the small and medium samples of equity ownership, whereas foreign investors are significantly associated with the reduction in the cost of debt in the large sample of equity concentration. Academic implications of our findings are that as the ownership of dominating shareholders rises, they seek their private interests of perks causing an increase in agency costs and a decrease in firm's economic value, thus expanding borrowing costs. Practical business implications are that foreign investors may alleviate agency problem of dominating large shareholders in the firm through monitoring activities, thus enhancing the efficiency of business decision-makings.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.257-278
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• 2017

The paper examines the ownership structure and the firm value of online firms in the world. Data are gathered by using FACTIVA database for firms in the Dow Jones index for the 2014 fiscal year. The Ordinary Least Squares regressions, the Generalized Linear Model, and the model selection criteria are employed to analyze the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables. The paper tests theories such as the convergence of interest theory, the managerial entrenchment theory, and the eclectic theory. The paper finds that the ownership structure has an influence on the firm value depending on the rank of the large shareholders. While the first large shareholders have a negative association with the firm value, the presence of the second and the third large shareholders have a positive influence on the firm value. The paper also finds that the identity of the largest shareholders whether they are insiders or outsiders have an influence on the firm value. The proportion of shareholding by a large shareholder and her identity are variables which predict a firm value.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.14 no.8
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• pp.51-57
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• 2016

Purpose - If control-ownership disparity is large, managers will not actively reduce costs; rather, they will maintain unutilized resources or possess surplus resources even when sales decrease with the purpose of increasing personal utility from status, power, compensation, and prestige. These managers' utility maximizing tendencies cause cost stickiness. We examine whether asymmetric behavior related to costs becomes stronger when there is a large disparity between ownership and control rights. Research design, data, and methodology - We construct a regression model to examine the relationship between control-ownership disparity and cost stickiness. STICKY, a dependent variable representing cost stickiness is a value found using the method of Weiss (2010), and Disparity is an interest variable that shows control-ownership disparity. Results - This study is based from the unique situations in Korea, in which high control-ownership disparity is common in firms. Large control-ownership disparity was found to increase cost stickiness of corporations. Conclusions - The results of this study imply that controlling shareholders may be regarded as a threat to the interests of minority shareholders and corporate values especially when controlling shareholders have significant influence over managers or the power to make managerial decisions as owners of a corporation.

• Korean small business review
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• v.42 no.3
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• pp.195-220
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• 2020

In this study, we examined the effects of major shareholder's holdings and foreign shareholder's holdings on capital structure with the samples of listed non-financial firms in KOSPI and KOSDAQ. More specifically, we conduct the data on 7,074 large firms and 2,394 SMEs(Small-Medium Enterprises) before and after the adoption of K-IFRS from 2002 to 2019. The main results can be summarized as follows. The results indicate that the adoption of K-IFRS affects the capital structure of large firms more than SMEs. The major shareholder's holdings and the foreign shareholder's holdings of the large and SMEs listed on the KOSPI and the KOSDAQ market have a significant effect on the leverage ratio. It can be seen that major shareholders of large firms and SMEs reduce the leverage ratio by recognizing the use of debt as financial risk. In addition, it can be seen that regardless of whether or not K-IFRS is adopted, foreign shareholders recognize the use of debt as financial risk and reduce the leverage ratio in order to reduce the investment risk.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.16 no.9
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• pp.5829-5835
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• 2015

This paper investigates the impact of corporate governance structure on the firm's debt costs under different governance environments. We find that after the 2008 banking crisis, family firms with controlling shareholders benefit from lower debt cost through the strong control rights of dominating large shareholders, compared with the firms with diversified minority-shareholders. Foreign investors are related statistically to the higher cost of debt. Before the 2008 banking crisis, cash flows and growth potentials are positively associated with the firm's cost of debt.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.14 no.11
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• pp.5434-5441
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• 2013

Using longitudinal data of 575 sample from 122 firms in large business conglomerates from 2001 to 2008, this study examines the impact of controlling shareholders' control-ownership disparity on executive compensation. The empirical study finds that controlling shareholders' control-ownership disparity is negatively related to the level of executive compensation and moderate negatively the relation between firm performance and executive compensation. This finding suggests that controlling shareholders' control rights in excess of ownership rights lead to decreased executive compensation in order to relieve the concerns of stakeholder about the potential agency costs of controlling shareholder, and have, on the other hand, entrenchment effects on the decision of executive compensation by decreasing its sensitivity on firm performance.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.5 no.4
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• pp.127-133
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• 2018

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is one of the strategies for managing firms' business activities but may have heterogeneity depending on ownership structures. This study investigates the association between group-affiliation and CSR activities. Drawing on a theory from the prior research, this study predicts that group-affiliated firms are less likely to invest on CSR activities. For instance, prior research finds that controlling shareholders expropriate the values of minority shareholders. As one of the motivations of investing on CSR activities is the harmonization among the stakeholders, it leads to the prediction that firms controlled by large shareholders are less likely to engage in CSR activities. Second, group-affiliated firms under poor financial performance benefit from other group members through sharing their financial resources. Thus, there is less incentive for managers of group-affiliated firms to increase their financial performance by conducting CSR. By leveraging firms listed in Korean stock market and CSR score from Korea Economic Justice Institute, the result shows that the group-affiliation is negatively related to CSR activities. The result is consistent in case of applying propensity score-matched sample. Based on the findings of this study, this paper contributes to the related literature by showing the significant association between group-affiliation and CSR decisions.