• Journal of Distribution Science
• /
• v.14 no.8
• /
• pp.51-57
• /
• 2016

Purpose - If control-ownership disparity is large, managers will not actively reduce costs; rather, they will maintain unutilized resources or possess surplus resources even when sales decrease with the purpose of increasing personal utility from status, power, compensation, and prestige. These managers' utility maximizing tendencies cause cost stickiness. We examine whether asymmetric behavior related to costs becomes stronger when there is a large disparity between ownership and control rights. Research design, data, and methodology - We construct a regression model to examine the relationship between control-ownership disparity and cost stickiness. STICKY, a dependent variable representing cost stickiness is a value found using the method of Weiss (2010), and Disparity is an interest variable that shows control-ownership disparity. Results - This study is based from the unique situations in Korea, in which high control-ownership disparity is common in firms. Large control-ownership disparity was found to increase cost stickiness of corporations. Conclusions - The results of this study imply that controlling shareholders may be regarded as a threat to the interests of minority shareholders and corporate values especially when controlling shareholders have significant influence over managers or the power to make managerial decisions as owners of a corporation.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
• /
• v.6 no.4
• /
• pp.21-37
• /
• 2011

The purpose of this article is to analyze the relationship between corporate firm performance and large shareholder ownership. We use the individual firms listed in KOSDAQ and implement the ordinary least squares regression analysis. Our empirical analysis shows that the relationship between large shareholder ownership and market performance is not in accordance with the preceding studies supporting U type. We document, however, that the empirical analysis shows that the relationship between large shareholder ownership and accounting performance is similar to the reverse U type. A robustness test is implemented to generate a more acute analysis. The robustness test shows that the large shareholder's shareholding of 0-50% supports the interest convergence hypothesis; however, more than 50% of the shareholding shows that the large shareholder ownership is not significantly related to the accounting performance.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
• /
• v.7 no.11
• /
• pp.107-115
• /
• 2020

This study is concerned with the relationship between firm's ownership structure and the co-movement of the stock return with the market return. Four different types of firm ownership, including managerial ownership, state ownership, foreign ownership, and concentrated ownership, are among the main features of the company's governance mechanism and have been separately documemented in the previous research to understand their impact on stock price synchronicity. We constructed the regression model, using stock price synchronicity as the dependent variable and the above four components of ownership structure as explanantory variables. The pooled OLS, the fixed effects model, and the random effects are employed to investigate the outcome of the study. Data used in the reserch are of public firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange (HOSE) during the five-year period term from 2015 to 2019. The data sample contains 235 companies from 10 industries with 1135 observations. The results revealed by the fixed effects model, the large ownership and the managerial ownership are found to have adverse effect on the stock price synchronicity, whereas the foreign ownership model is revealed to have positive influence on the stock return co-movement. The effect of the state ownership on the stock price synchronicity is not confirmed.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
• /
• v.27 no.1
• /
• pp.89-120
• /
• 2010

In this paper, we analyse empirically the relations between ownership structure and cash holdings of firms listed on Korea Securities Market and Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. Cash holdings increase as large shareholder's equity holdings increase. Cash holdings increase as the difference between first largest shareholder's and second largest shareholder's equity holdings increase, and cash holdings increase as the ownership concentration increase. Managerial ownership exert a non-linear effects on cash holdings. So to speak, at lower level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders, but at higher level of managerial ownership, the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned, and also at highest level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Cash holdings increase larger in owner-controlled firm than in management-controlled firm. These results support the expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis that large shareholders can extract private benefits from corporate resources under their control at the expense of minority shareholders. This paper contributes to defining information value of large shareholder's equity holdings on cash holdings for a firms' other stakeholders such as investors and creditors, and to strengthening a legal and institutional safeguard for external minority shareholders. Ownership concentration might have negatively affected the evolution of the legal and institutional frameworks for corporate governance and the manner in which economic activity is conducted. It could be a formidable barrier to future policy reform.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
• /
• v.25 no.3
• /
• pp.155-173
• /
• 2008

Controlling for the impacts of main strands of debt maturity theories, we highlight the relationship between syndicated loan maturity and ownership structure of Korean borrowers. We find that as the ownership of large shareholders increases, the maturity of syndicated loans also increases. Additionally, we identify a negative relation between foreigners' ownership and loan maturity, indicating that foreign institutional investors serve valuable monitoring functions; as their equity shares increase, they fully take advantage of frequent renewals through the short maturity of syndicated loan. We also show that the predicted value of leverage is more systematically and positively related to the maturity of syndicated loan.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
• /
• v.38 no.4
• /
• pp.65-78
• /
• 2013

Circular shareholding is established when at least three member firms in a business group hold stock in other member firms and form a series of ownership in a circular way. Although there have been many studies which investigated a negative effect of circular shareholding on firm's value, few studies have discussed how to resolve the problem given complicated ownership structures of large business groups. This paper is based on a mixed integer programming model, which was proposed in the author's previous research and can identify the ownership share divested in order to resolve circular shareholding. Since the optimization model becomes too complicated for large business groups and requires a sophisticated software to solve it, we propose a simple heuristic method that can find a good approximate solution to the model. Its applications to twelve Korean large business groups show that the heuristic method is not just computationally attractive but also provides near-optimal solutions in most cases.

• Korean Management Science Review
• /
• v.32 no.2
• /
• pp.15-35
• /
• 2015

Large business groups typically have central firms through which their controlling families establish (or acquire) new firms and maintain control over other member firms. Research on corporate governance has developed metrics to identify those central firms and investigated an impact of the centrality on ownership structure and firm's financial performance. This paper introduces centrality metrics used in social network analysis (SNA) to measure how crucial a role each firm plays in the ownership structure of its business group. Then, the SNA centrality metrics are compared with the metrics developed in corporate governance field. Also, we test the relationship between the SNA centrality metrics and firm's value. Experimental results show that the SNA centrality metrics are closely correlated with the centrality metrics used in corporate governance and are significantly correlated with firm's value.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
• /
• v.6 no.3
• /
• pp.67-79
• /
• 2019

This study examines the impact of corporate governance on capital structure decisions based on a large panel of Chinese listed firms. Using the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator to control for unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity, and persistency in capital structure decisions, we document that the ownership structure plays a significant role in determining leverage ratios. More specially, we find that managerial ownership has a positive and significant impact on firms' leverage, consistent with the incentive alignment hypothesis. We also find that managerial ownership only affects the leverage decisions of private firms in the post-2005 split share reform period. State ownership negatively influence leverage decisions implying that SOEs may face fewer restrictions in equity issuance and may receive favourable treatments when applying for seasoned equity ¿nancing, thus use less debt. Furthermore, our results show that while foreign ownership negatively influences leverage decisions, legal person shareholding positively influences firms' leverage decisions only for state controlled firms. We also find that the board structure variables (board size and the proportion of independent directors) do not influence firms' capital structure decisions. Our findings suggest that recent ownership reforms have been successful in terms of providing incentive to managers through managerial shareholdings to take risky financial choices.

• International Commerce and Information Review
• /
• v.19 no.1
• /
• pp.257-278
• /
• 2017

The paper examines the ownership structure and the firm value of online firms in the world. Data are gathered by using FACTIVA database for firms in the Dow Jones index for the 2014 fiscal year. The Ordinary Least Squares regressions, the Generalized Linear Model, and the model selection criteria are employed to analyze the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables. The paper tests theories such as the convergence of interest theory, the managerial entrenchment theory, and the eclectic theory. The paper finds that the ownership structure has an influence on the firm value depending on the rank of the large shareholders. While the first large shareholders have a negative association with the firm value, the presence of the second and the third large shareholders have a positive influence on the firm value. The paper also finds that the identity of the largest shareholders whether they are insiders or outsiders have an influence on the firm value. The proportion of shareholding by a large shareholder and her identity are variables which predict a firm value.

• International Area Studies Review
• /
• v.13 no.1
• /
• pp.241-263
• /
• 2009

This paper explores the impacts of ownership structure on performance of listed firms in China using 1994-2002 data. Using a new ownership classification scheme, this paper analyzes the impact of three factors, the ownership identity, equity ownership by the controlling shareholder, and equity ownership by the minority shareholders, on the performance of firms. Panel regression analysis shows that the firms controlled by the government are outperformed by firms controlled by private owners, supporting the hypothesis that the state pursues political objectives such as excess employment rather than profit maximization or the hypothesis that political interference by the Party or government may cause high political costs. Regression results also show that higher equity ownership by the controlling shareholder improves firm performance in private controlled firms and partially in marketized corporate controlled firms. The results also show that higher equity ownership by relatively large shareholders (from top 2 to top 10 shareholders) leads to better performance in marketized corporate controlled firms and partially in private controlled firms.