• Journal of Venture Innovation
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• v.3 no.2
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• pp.95-109
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• 2020

The source of value-added creation in modern times has been transformed from material to man's value-added generating power, and ownership of the means of production has been converted from a particular landlord, capitalist to a person with value-added capacity, and a system of capital participation is needed beyond the profit-sharing system or performance incentive system in which workers of an enterprise participate in simple profits if they significantly increase the added value of the company. It is also necessary to introduce our private stock system as a means of addressing the problem of capital bias and for the stable development of capitalism. The purpose of Employee Stock Ownership Plans is to improve the economic and social status of workers and promote labor-management cooperation by allowing workers to acquire and hold shares of the stock company in which the employee ownership association is established through the employee ownership association, but the reality is that our stock ownership system has failed to achieve its purpose due to insufficient protection against the employee. In terms of welfare, the acquisition of our company shares should include active government support for the welfare of workers' ownership on a social welfare level rather than on the logic of the capital market, and in terms of investment, it would not be appropriate to apply the regulation for investor protection to see workers' acquisition of our company shares as 'investment' in the view of workers' willingness to own shares on the stock market. Therefore, as a way to support and deregulate employee's stock acquisition, 1. Expanding direct support, such as tax support, 2. As employee's stock ownership association is being discussed as a division's nature, it is less effective in terms of various management, not investment, and 3. Those who own stocks with 1% of the company's shares and 300 million won in face value will be classified as major shareholders. As a way to reduce the risk of management of our company owners and cooperative funds, As a measure to reduce the risk of management of our company owners and cooperative funds, only our employee shareholders' association shall manage the fund in a long-term deposit, and even though our employee's stock is managed by the association or company after the end of the deposit period, the management of each employee shall be allowed and In terms of improving the utilization of our company's stock and fund, 1. Employee's stockholders are prohibited from lending during the deposit period, but it is necessary to improve profitability by allowing them to borrow under strict restrictions, 2. It is necessary to make the use of the employee's welfare funds available for the preservation of losses, and to stipulate the redemption obligations of unlisted companies in order to improve the redemption system of our company.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.91-116
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• 1991

Market liberalization progressing simultaneously with high and rapidly rising domestic wages has created an adverse business environment for domestic firms. Korean firms are losing their international competitiveness in comparison to firms from LDC(Less Developed Countries) in low-tech industries. In high-tech industries, domestic firms without government protection (which is impossible due to the liberalization policy and the current international status of the Korean economy) are in a disadvantaged position relative to firms from advanced countries. This paper examines the division of roles between the private sector and the government in order to achieve a successful structural adjustment, which has become the impending industrial policy issue caused by high domestic wages, on the one hand, and the opening of domestic markets, on the other. The micro foundation of the economy-wide structural adjustment is actually the restructuring of business portfolios at the firm level. The firm-level business restructuring means that firms in low-value-added businesses or with declining market niches establish new major businesses in higher value-added segments or growing market niches. The adjustment of the business structure at the firm level can only be accomplished by accumulating firm-specific managerial assets necessary to establish a new business structure. This can be done through learning-by-doing in the whole system of management, including research and development, manufacturing, and marketing. Therefore, the voluntary cooperation among the people in the company is essential for making the cost of the learning process lower than that at the competing companies. Hence, firms that attempt to restructure their major businesses need to induce corporate-wide participation through innovations in organization and management, encourage innovative corporate culture, and maintain cooperative labor unions. Policy discussions on structural adjustments usually regard firms as a black box behind a few macro variables. But in reality, firm activities are not flows of materials but relationships among human resources. The growth potential of companies are embodied in the human resources of the firm; the balance of interest among stockholders, managers, and workers of the company' brings the accumulation of the company's core competencies. Therefore, policymakers and economists shoud change their old concept of the firm as a technological black box which produces a marketable commodities. Firms should be regarded as coalitions of interest groups such as stockholders, managers, and workers. Consequently the discussion on the structural adjustment both at the macroeconomic level and the firm level should be based on this new paradigm of understanding firms. The government's role in reducing the cost of structural adjustment and supporting should the creation of new industries emphasize the following: First, government must promote the competition in domestic markets by revising laws related to antitrust policy, bankruptcy, and the promotion of small and medium-sized companies. General consensus on the limitations of government intervention and the merit of deregulation should be sought among policymakers and people in the business world. In the age of internationalization, nation-specific competitive advantages cannot be exclusively in favor of domestic firms. The international competitiveness of a domestic firm derives from the firm-specific core competencies which can be accumulated by internal investment and organization of the firm. Second, government must build up a solid infrastructure of production factors including capital, technology, manpower, and information. Structural adjustment often entails bankruptcies and partial waste of resources. However, it is desirable for the government not to try to sustain marginal businesses, but to support the diversification or restructuring of businesses by assisting in factor creation. Institutional support for venture businesses needs to be improved, especially in the financing system since many investment projects in venture businesses are highly risky, even though they are very promising. The proportion of low-value added production processes and declining industries should be reduced by promoting foreign direct investment and factory automation. Moreover, one cannot over-emphasize the importance of future-oriented labor policies to be based on the new paradigm of understanding firm activities. The old laws and instititutions related to labor unions need to be reformed. Third, government must improve the regimes related to money, banking, and the tax system to change business practices dependent on government protection or undesirable in view of the evolution of the Korean economy as a whole. To prevent rational business decisions from contradicting to the interest of the economy as a whole, government should influence the business environment, not the business itself.

• Korean Journal of Heritage: History & Science
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• v.52 no.2
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• pp.220-239
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• 2019

According to the National Currency (國幣) article in GyeongGukDaeJeon (經國大典), the ChoSonT'ongPaeJiIn (朝鮮通幣之印) was a seal that was imprinted on both ends of a piece of hemp fabric (布). It was used for the circulation of hemp fabric as a fabric currency (布幣). The issued fabric currency was used as a currency for trade or as pecuniary means to have one's crime exempted or replace one's labor duty. The ChoSonT'ongPaeJiIn would be imprinted on a piece of hemp fabric (布) to collect one-twentieth of tax. The ChoSonT'ongPaeJiIn (朝鮮通幣之印) was one of the historical currencies and seal materials used during the early Chosun dynasty. Its imprint was a means of collecting taxes; hence, it was one of the taxation research materials. Despite its value, however, there has been no active research undertaken on it. Thus, the investigator conducted comprehensive research on it based on related content found in JeonRokTongGo (典錄通考), Dae'JeonHu-Sok'Rok (大典後續錄), JeongHeonSwaeRok (貞軒?錄) and other geography books (地理志) as well as the materials mentioned by researchers in previous studies. The investigator demonstrated that the ChoSonT'ongPaeJiIn was established based on the concept of circulating Choson fabric notes (朝鮮布貨) with a seal on ChongOseungp'o (正五升布) in entreaty documents submitted in 1401 and that the fabric currency (布幣) with the imprint of the ChoSonT'ongPaeJiIn was used as a currency for trade, pecuniary or taxation means of having one's crime exempted, or replacing one's labor, and as a tool of revenue from ships. The use of ChoSonT'ongPaeJiIn continued even after a ban on fabric currencies (布幣) in March 1516 due to a policy on the "use of Joehwa (paper notes)" in 1515. It was still used as an official seal on local official documents in 1598. During the reign of King Yeongjo (英祖), it was used to make a military service (軍布) hemp fabric. Some records of 1779 indicate that it was used as a means of taxation for international trade. It is estimated that approximately 330 ChoSonT'ongPaeJiIn were in circulation based on records in JeongHeonSwaeRok (貞軒?錄). Although there was the imprint of ChoSonT'ongPaeJiIn in An Inquiry on Choson Currency (朝鮮貨幣考) published in 1940, there had been no fabric currencies (布幣) with its imprint on them or genuine cases of the seal. It was recently found among the artifacts of Wongaksa Temple. The seal imprint was also found on historical manuscripts produced at the Jikjisa Temple in 1775. The investigator compared the seal imprints found on the historical manuscripts of the Jikjisa Temple, attached to TapJwaJongJeonGji (塔左從政志), and published in An Inquiry on Choson Currency with the ChoSonT'ongPaeJiIn housed at the Wongaksa Temple. It was found that these seal imprints were the same shape as the one at Wongaksa Temple. In addition, their overall form was the same as the one depicted in Daerokji (大麓誌) and LiJaeNanGo (?齋亂藁). These findings demonstrate that the ChoSonT'ongPaeJiIn at Wongaksa Temple was a seal made in the 15th century and is, therefore, an important artifact in the study of Choson's currency history, taxation, and seals. There is a need for future research examining its various aspects.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.65-113
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• 1991

Korea's rapid economic growth of the past thirty years was led by extremely fast export growth under extensive government intervention. Until very recently, the political regimes were authoritarian and oppressed human rights and labor movements. Because of these characteristics, many inside and outside Korea are under the impression that the rapid economic growth was made possible by the government's relentless push for export growth through industrial targetjng. Whether or not the government intervention was pivotal in Korean economic growth is an important issue because of its normative implications on the role of government and the degree of economic policy intervention in a market economy. A good example of industrial targeting policy in Korea is the "Heavy and Chemical Industry (HCI)" policy, which began in the early 1970s and lasted for one decade. Under the HCI policy the government intervened in resource allocation through preferential tax, trade, and credit and interest rate policies for "key industries" which included iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, shipbuilding, general machinery, chemicals, and electronics. This paper investigates the effects of. the HCI policy on the efficiency of capital and the export competitiveness of manufacturing industries. For individual three-digit KSIC (Korea Standard Industrial Classification) industries and for two industry groups, one favored by HCI Policy and the other not, this paper: (1) computes capital intensities and discusses the impact of the HCI policy on the changes in the intensities over time, (2) estimates the capital efficiencies and examines them on the basis of optimal condition of resource allocation, and (3) compares the Korean and Taiwanese shares of total imports by the OECD countries as a way of weighing the effects of the policy on the industries' export competitiveness. Taiwan is a good reference, as it did not adopt the kind of industrial targeting policy that Korea did, while the Taiwanese and Korean economies share similar characteristics. In the 1973-78 period, the capital intensity rose rapidly for the "HC Group" the group of industries favored by the policy, while it first declined and later showed an anemic rise for the "Light Group," the remaining manufacturing industries. Capital efficiency was much lower in the HC Group than in the Light Group, at least until the late 1970s. This paper acribes these results to excess investments in the favored industries and concludes that growth could have been faster in the absence of the HCI policy. The Korean Light Group's share in total imports by the OECD was larger than that of its Taiwanese counterpart but has become much smaller since 1978. For the HC Group Korea's market share was smaller than Taiwan's and has declined even more since the mid-1970s. This weakening in the export competitiveness of Korea's industries relative to Taiwan's lasted until the mid-1980s. This paper concludes that the HCI policy had either no positive effect on the competitiveness of the Korean manufacturing industries or negative effects.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.105-138
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• 2009

Although the decline in fertility rate is generally observed along the history of economic development throughout the world, the continuing decline hitting below the replacement level in Korea over the recent years gathered serious social concerns on the ground that it accelerates the process of population aging. The total fertility rate in Koreareached 2.08 in 1983, and gradually fell to the levels of 1.08 in 2005 and 1.26 in 2007. The policy debate over the role of the government has been focused mainly on the level of theoretical discussion without substantial basis on firm empirical evidence and the determinants of fertility. The objective of the paper is to empirically investigate the fertility effect of the female wage, which is understood as one of the most important determinants of fertility in Koreasince 1980 focusing on one aspect of fertility, namely birth spacing. Using the Korean National Fertility Survey conducted in 2006, I estimate a duration model of first and second births taking into account individual heterogeneity, which turned out to be an important factor to control for. Compared with previous studies in the literature on the Korean fertility, the study has an advantage of using the complete pregnancy history of women in a more representative sample. Unlike the previous studies, the analysis also deals with the endogeneity of marriage by treating a certain age, rather than age at marriage, as the time in which a woman becomes exposed to the risk of pregnancy. The study shares the common problem in the literature on birth spacing of lacking relevant wage information for respondents in a retrospective survey. I estimate the wage series as a function of the basic characteristics using the annual Wage Structure Survey from 1980 to 2005, which is considered as a nationally representative sample for wage information of employees. The results suggest that the increase in female wage by 10 percent leads to a decrease in second birth hazard by 0.56~0.92 percentage points and that the increase in spouse's wage by the equal amount is accompanied by the increase in second birth hazard by 0.36~1.13 percentage points. These estimates are more precisely estimated and of smaller magnitude than those presented by the previous studies. The results are robust to the different specifications of the wage equation. The simulation analysis based on the predicted values shows that about 17% of the change in the second birth hazard over the period 1980 to 2005 was due to the change in the female wage. Although there is some limitation in data, the results can be viewed as one estimate of the role of female wage on the recent fertility decline in Korea. The question raised by the paper is not a normative one of whether a government should promote childbearing but a positive one thatexplains fertility decline. Therefore, if there is a wide consensus on promoting childbearing, the finding suggests that the policies designed to reduce the opportunity cost of women in the labor market would be effective. The recent movement of implementing a wide range of family-friendly policies including child care support, maternity leave, parental leave and tax benefit in developed countries should be understood in this context.

• Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.502-516
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• 2014

This study has decomposed the Gini coefficient using Korean Labor & Income Panel Study data and empirically analyzed the impact of demographic characteristics and source-specific income of householder on the household income gap using panel analysis. The scope of areas were divided into 'nationwide,' 'metropolitan areas,' and 'non-metropolitan areas,' and the period before and after the global financial crisis was examined. The analysis findings are as follows. First, when the entire period was examined by income source using Gini decomposition with division of areas into 'nationwide,' 'metropolitan areas,' and 'non-metropolitan areas', the following results were revealed. The absolute and relative contribution level of property income to the gross income was the largest in the category of 'nationwide' and 'metropolitan areas,' while the contribution level of earned income was the largest in the category of 'non-metropolitan areas'. In addition, property income worsened the household income gap the most in the category of 'nationwide' and 'metropolitan areas.' Second, property income worsened the household income gap less after the financial crisis than before the crisis. It is probably because the price of real estate skyrocketed before the global financial crisis, worsening the household income gap, whereas the price drop after the crisis temporarily alleviated the gap. Third, a correlation analysis revealed that households with older householders whose education is high school graduation or below had relatively low gross income, and households with higher source-specific income, especially earned income, had relatively high gross income. Fourth, when the household income determinants were compared through panel analysis with division of areas into 'nationwide,' 'metropolitan areas,' and 'non-metropolitan areas,' the following results were obtained. While the impact of earned income, financial income, and other incomes was greater in non-metropolitan areas than in metropolitan areas, the impact of property income was greater in metropolitan areas than in non-metropolitan areas. To reduce the income gap, the government should impose higher taxes on the high-income class and provide tax benefits to the low-income class, with efforts to create a wide variety of jobs. In addition, since income inequality gets worse as the proportion of incomes generated through asset holdings becomes higher, the government should focus on stabilizing property prices while paying attention to the regional differentiation when carrying out related policies.

• International Area Studies Review
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• v.22 no.3
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• pp.3-27
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• 2018

This paper analyzes Cuba's market-oriented reforms to alleviate essential problems with socialist countries such as soft budget constraints and incentive problems. It also discuss about effectiveness of industrial policy as a development strategy. The soft budget constraints and incentive problems resulted in the collapse of Soviet bloc and COMECON in early 1990s. After the collapse, Cuban economy suffered a steep dive, and national income tumbling down rapidly. Cuban faced serious shortages of food, gasoline, and other basic necessities of life. To halt and partially reverse economic downturn and dire austerity in the 1990's, the Cuban government made some partial reforms to the inherited Soviet system of cental planningand faced severe shortage in food, energy, and daily necessities. In response to the economic crisis. Cuba introduced economic reforms and implemented industrial policy as a development strategy as long as Cuba maintained a strong socialist country. Cuban government established the economic free zone law and attempted to induce foreign direct investment by implementing export-led industrial policy. Fiedel Castro approved the Law No. 165 "Free Zones and Industrial Parks", in 1996. However, Cuba's ESZ strategy seems to have failed because of the U.S. sanctions, but also because of Cuba's own policies, which do not allow foreign investors to hire workers directly and impose a high implicit tax on wages. By limiting advanced techniques of personnel and organization management, indirect employment can result in lowering work efforts and productivity of workers, and aggravating production efficiency in the ESZs. Another reason to fail comes from the double wage structure due to the double monetary-exchange rate system. Most of the high non-wage costs result from the double exchange rate system. Due to Cuba's imbalanced industry and production structures, concentrated labor force, and urbanization and centralization of agriculture production, the industrial transformation development model suggested by Lewis has not been successful unlike other Asian agriculture-led development model. Cuba has to overcome many difficulties in implementing industrial policy as a development strategy.