• 수완나부미
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• 제7권2호
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• pp.57-78
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• 2015

Southeast Asia has been a showcase for democratic transitions in the past 30 years. This paper proposes a conceptual lens for studying political shifts in the Southeast Asian region. The argumentative storyline follows two fundamental propositions about democratic transitions. My first proposition is that during democratic transitions, human phenomena arise on nested analytical layers namely the global arena, the state, prodemocracy movements, and individuals. Each layer is conventionally studied by international relations, political science, sociology, and psychology respectively. I propose a multidisciplinary lens that transverses all these analytical layers. A second proposition is that during political shifts, social conditions are historically-situated. Historicity is anchored on stages of democratization, namely the authoritarian regime, toppling the regime, power shift, state building, and nation building. This paper describes a 4 × 5 matrix (analytical layer × historical stage) that may guide a regional agenda on the empirical study of democratic transitions in the Southeast Asian region. It likewise gives examples of research findings in Philippine-based studies that have already begun to provide empirical data about segments of this research matrix.

• 수완나부미
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• 제9권2호
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• pp.145-164
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• 2017

In the 21^st century, the growing use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and social media platforms has influenced our way of life, including international diplomacy. With the use of new interactive communication technologies such as WhatsApp, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, video sharing website, blogs, and other social media networks, digital diplomacy has become an active diplomatic mode in modern society and plays an increasing important role in international relations. Although Indonesia has gradually realized the pivotal role of internet diplomacy and recently put it into practice, it is still lagging far behind. This paper will examine how Indonesia conducts its diplomacy in the new era of digital world. How far and in what ways does the Indonesian government make use of digital technology to conduct its diplomacy? What opportunities and challenges are confronted to develop digital diplomacy? How does it navigate diplomacy in the digital age? Unless Indonesia embraces new channels and methods of diplomacy, its foreign policy implementation may not run optimally to support its aim of attaining its objectives in the international stage.

• 스마트미디어저널
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• 제11권1호
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• pp.67-80
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• 2022

스마트도시의 다양한 융합기술 분야는 효율성과 생산성을 혁신적으로 높이는 4차 산업혁명 시대의 미래 먹거리로서, 성장이 멈춰버린 선진국이나 우리나라에 있어, 기존산업군의 성장 한계를 극복할 수 있는 중요한 대안이라 할 수 있다. 특히 최근 산업 발전과 함께 인구의 집중으로 도시화가 급격하게 진행되고 있는 아세안 국가를 중심으로 신도시 건설을 통해 스마트도시를 구축하는 것에 관심이 고조되고 있으며, 아세안 국가들의 본격적인 스마트도시화가 진행되고 있는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구의 목적은 스마트도시 관련 기업의 현황을 분석하고 우선 순위가 높은 스마트도시 기술을 발굴하여 산업 활성화와 해외수출을 위한 전략적 접근 방안을 제시하는 데 있다. 이를 위해 선행연구를 통해 스마트도시 이론과 아세안 스마트도시에 대해 고찰하고, 국내 스마트도시 기술을 보유한 기업의 설문조사를 실시하였다. 설문조사 결과, 국내 스마트도시 기술 보유기업은 해외수출 참여 의지가 높으며, 건설, 교통, 그린·에너지 등의 기술 분야와 IoT, 플랫폼, AI 등의 서비스 유형에서 우선순위가 높았다. 또한 해외수출 활성화 방안으로, 1)규제완화와 인센티브, 2)글로벌 인재육성, 3)정보제공 및 현지 네트워크 강화, 4)재정 및 홍보지원을 통한 전략적 접근 방안을 도출하였다.

• 수완나부미
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• 제14권2호
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• pp.233-249
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• 2022

Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) is an Islamic social movement that struggles to change the existing political system to the Islamic system. HT argues that all problems in the Muslim world are rooted in adopting secular thought and ideology and the separation between Islam and the state. Hence, HT works to persuade Muslims to abandon that way of life and only apply Islam as the country's only ideology and constitution. HT has spread this narrative since it started in 1953 in Jordan. With this ideological and political attitude, many countries consider HT a threat to their political and community life, suppressing this movement by arresting members and banning the group to reduce or end HT activities in these countries. The Indonesian government has also carried out this repressive policy to limit the influence of Indonesian HTI since 2017. This paper aims to discuss the strategy of Hizb ut-Tahrir to continue its political activities Indonesia after being dissolved by the Indonesian government in 2017. This article used content analysis method to interpret the data collected from interview and documents from Hizb ut-Tahrir. Responding to state repression, HTI sought other methods of action by changing the place of resistance or activities, and by changing its identity.

• 수완나부미
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• 제6권2호
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• pp.65-84
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• 2014

Asia-Pacific Confucian Capitalism is comparable to Atlantic Protestant Capitalism in terms of economic success, as most economies influenced by Confucian culture in East Asia and Southeast Asia are economically well-off in the past 50 years, save for Vietnam. This paper seeks to determine whether Vietnam can follow the path of development of the other Confucian economies, especially in the context of globalization and upcoming regional integration. In the paper, I will use an analytic framework derived from Weber and Huntington to examine the cultural dimension of Vietnam's economic development. In the domestic field, I argue that the core values of Confucianism continue to contribute to the development in Vietnam in many ways; yet one critical element needs to be tapped: the political culture of strong leadership and efficient bureaucracy. Confucian values for development may be compromised by pushing for democratization too early in Vietnam. On a positive note, Confucianism for Vietnam is instrumental in its regional integration into Southeast Asia since it is integrative rather than exclusive. Vietnam's cultural similarity with China may however lead to too much passive learning and conflicts. In conclusion, Confucianism is a valuable asset for Vietnam's economic development, but challenges have to be addressed in order for Vietnam to become the next tiger.

• 수완나부미
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• 제16권1호
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• pp.39-80
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• 2024

Guided by the prism of cultural studies, this paper takes a look at the Manila Korea Town in Malate, Manila. The location, Manila Korea Town, figures as the paper's object of study by exploring, theorizing, and reflecting on its presence and location within the horizon of the signifying powers of Korea-Philippine relations in the contemporary period. With the subject position of this essay, the paper theorizes by responding to the following questions: How does the meaning-making of South Korea fare with other Koreatowns in the world from the scale of Koreatown in Manila? Subsequently, what happens to a place when a global cultural phenomenon evolves into a form of placemaking in a different nation and territory? As Koreatown finally grounds itself in the anarchic lifeworld of Manila, what does this historical development in our urban lives reveal about our contemporary times? Responding to this set of questions led this paper to foreground the idea of a modular imagined community within a four-part discussion. The body of the essay begins by theorizing on the concept that this paper proposes, modular imagined community, and such a concept work draws from the theories of nationalism by Benedict Anderson and Partha Chatterjee. Subsequently, the antinomy between Anderson and Chatterjee is pursued by looking at the history of such a place, and through this step, the paper unravels the character of the place of Manila Korea Town, which explains the conditions of possibility of such social and communitarian formation. Yet as the public is caught by the presence of such development especially at the heart of Manila, the paper expands the scale and viewpoint by shining light on the globality of South Korea in relation to the Philippines. Lastly, this paper closes with a discussion on the food culture facilitated by this recent development, which also pushes us to imagine its potential, especially in light of the critique raised against South Korea and the popular culture associated with this phenomenon.

• Strategy21
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• 통권37호
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• pp.104-143
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• 2015

China's new grand strategy, the "One Belt, One Road Initiative" (also Belt Road Initiative, or BRI) has two primary components: Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the "Silk Road Economic Belt" in September 2013 during a visit to Kazakhstan, and the "21^st Century Maritime Silk Route Economic Belt" in a speech to the Indonesian parliament the following month. The BRI is intended to supply China with energy and new markets, and also to integrate the countries of Central Asia, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), and the Indian Ocean Region - though not Northeast Asia - into the "Chinese Dream". The project will be supported by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), due to open in 2016 with 57 founding members from all around the world, and China has already promised US$ 50 billion in seed funding. China's vision includes networks of energy pipelines, railways, sea port facilities and logistics hubs; these will have obvious commercial benefits, but also huge geopolitical significance. China seems to have two distinct aims: externally, to restore its historical sphere of influence; and internally, to cope with income inequalities by creating middle-class jobs through enhanced trade and the broader development of its economy. In South Korea, opinion on the BRI is sharply polarized. Economic and industrial interests, including Korea Railroad Corporation (KORAIL), support South Korean involvement in the BRI and closer economic interactions with China. They see how the BRI fits nicely with President Park Geun-hye's Eurasia Initiative, and anticipate significant commercial benefits for South Korea from better connections to energy-rich Russia and the consumer markets of Europe and Central Asia. They welcome the prospect of reduced trade barriers between China and South Korea, and of improved transport infrastructure, and perceive the political risks as manageable. But some ardently pro-US pundits worry that the political risks of the BRI are too high. They cast doubt on the feasibility of implementing the BRI, and warn that although it has been portrayed primarily in economic terms, it actually reveals a crucial Chinese geopolitical strategy. They are fearful of China's growing regional dominance, and worried that the BRI is ultimately a means to supplant the prevailing US-led regional security structure and restore the Middle Kingdom order, with China as the only power that matters in the region. According to this view, once China has complete control of the regional logistics hubs and sea ports, this will severely limit the autonomy of China's neighbors, including South Korea, who will have to toe the Chinese line, both economically and politically, or risk their own peace and prosperity.

• 동남아시아연구
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• 제28권1호
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• pp.145-171
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• 2018

라오스의 2017년은 정치적 '정체'와 경제적 '변화'가 혼재한 1년이다. 정치 분야는 부패지수(CPI)가 개선되는 등의 성과에도 불구하고 지속적인 개혁 여부의 성과는 지켜봐야 한다. 외교적으로 중국의 영향력은 더욱 증가할 것으로 보이며, 특히 2017년 11월 시진핑(Xi Jinping) 국가 주석이 라오스를 방문한 이후 경제회랑과 란창-메콩회의 협력회의(Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Meeting)의 틀은 더욱 강화될 것으로 전망된다. 다른 접경국인 아세안 국가와는 우호적 관계를 지속해왔지만 캄보디아의 총선에 따른 라오스-캄보디아 국경 문제 이슈는 잠재된 위험 요소이다. 경제 부문은 대형 인프라 건설로 인한 자본 유입과 관광 산업의 호조로 높은 성장률이 유지되었지만, 재정 경상수지의 적자와 같은 구조적 문제는 해결되어야 한다. 한국과 라오스는 2017년 3월 메콩고위관리회의, 9월 한-라오스 외교장관회의를 통해 양국간의 포괄적 협력을 논의하였다. 라오스는 한국의 ODA 원조 8위(무상)를 차지하고 있으며 향후에도 ODA는 양국의 중요한 외교적 협력 채널이 될 것이다. 경제관계에 있어 무역 부문은 감소 추세이지만 투자와 인적교류는 지속적으로 증가하고 있다.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제6권1호
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• pp.69-114
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• 2022

본 논문은 '균형'과 '편승'의 관점에서 대만 '신남향정책'을 분석한다. 구체적으로는 리덩후이 정부 시기부터 이어져온 남향정책의 변화양상과 특징을 살펴보고, 차이잉원 정부가 추진하는 신남향정책이 갖는 의미를 살펴본다. 대만의 대외정책은 미·중관계라는 대외적 변수에 의해 강한 영향을 받아왔다. 역대 대만 정부는 '탈중국'을 목표로 아세안 등 동남아 국가로 진출하는 남향정책을 적극적으로 추진했지만, 큰 성과를 거두지 못했다. 이것은 당시 협조적인 미·중관계와 중국의 강한 견제 등 변수가 작용했기 때문이다. 이러한 환경 속에서 대만은 미국과 중국 그리고 동남아 국가들 사이에서 적절한 균형을 추구해야만 했다. 그러나 트럼프 행정부 출범 이후 미·중 간 전략적 경쟁이 격화되면서 대만의 대외정책 역시 새로운 공간이 창출되고 있는데, 이는 미국이 중국의 부상을 억제하기 위해 인도태평양 전략 등을 구체화하는 과정에서 대만과의 협력을 중시하였기 때문이다. 차이잉원 정부가 추진하는 신남향정책은 미국의 '인도태평양 전략'과의 연계를 모색하고 또 인도 등 남아시아 국가로 진출을 시도한다는 점에서 기존 남향정책과 차별성을 갖고 있다. 탈중국을 적극적으로 추진함과 동시에 미국과의 협력을 모색하는 차이잉원의 신남향정책은 기존의 균형에 더해 미국으로의 '편승'으로 해석할 수 있다. 앞으로도 상당 기간 미·중 간 전략적 경쟁은 심화될 것으로 보이며, 민진당 정권 하에서 대만과 미국의 상호 협력적 관계 역시 지속될 것으로 전망된다. 신남향정책과 인도태평양 전략 간의 연계 등을 적극적으로 추구하는 대만의 편승전략 역시 강화될 것으로 보인다.

• 수완나부미
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• 제6권1호
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• pp.107-135
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• 2014

Cham identities which are socially constructed and multilayered, display their markers in a variety of elements, including homeland attachment to the former Kingdom of Champa, religion, language and cultural traditions, to mention a few. However, unlike other contemporary diasporic experience which binds the homeland and the host country, the Cham diaspora in Cambodia has a unique pattern as it seems to have no voice in the political and economic spheres in Vietnam, its homeland. The relations between the Cham in Cambodia and Vietnam seem to be limited to cultural heritages such as Cham musical traditions, traditional clothing, and the architectural heritage. Many Cham people have established networks outside Cambodia with areas of the Muslim world, like Malaysia, Indonesia, southern Thailand and the Middle Eastern countries. Pursuing education or training in Islam as well as working in those countries, especially Malaysia has become a way for the Cham to widen their networks and increase their knowledge of particularly, Islam. Returning to Cambodia, these people become religious teachers or ustadz (Islamic teachers in the pondok [Islamic boarding school]). This has developed slowly, side by side with the formation of their identity as Cham Muslims. Among certain Cham, the absence of an ancient cultural heritage as an identity marker has been replaced by the Islamic culture as the important element of identity. However, being Cham is not a single identity, it is fluid and contested. Many scholars argue that the Cham in Cambodia constitute three groups: the Cham Chvea, Cham, and Cham Bani (Cham Jahed). The so-called Cham Jahed has a unique practice of Islam. Unlike other Cham who pray five times a day, Cham Jahed people pray, once a week, on Fridays. They also have a different ritual for the wedding ceremony which they regard as the authentic tradition of the Cham. Indeed, they consider themselves pure descendants of the Cham in Vietnam; retaining Cham traditions and tending to maintain their relationship with their fellow Cham in Central Vietnam. In terms of language, another marker of identity, the Cham and the Cham Jahed share the same language, but Cham Jahed preserve the written Cham script more often than the Cham. Besides, the Cham Jahed teaches the language to the young generation intensively. This paper, based on fieldwork in Cambodia in 2010 and 2011 will focus on the process of the formation of the Cham identity, especially of those called Cham and Cham Jahed.