• 사회복지연구
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• 제41권1호
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• pp.145-173
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• 2010

본 연구에서는 아동·가족 복지지출의 결정요인들이 무엇인지, 기존의 총량 복지지출 결정요인을 설명하는 이론들이 아동·가족 복지지출 결정요인에서도 유용한지 고찰하고 아동·가족 복지지출에 영향을 미치는 고유의 요인을 규명하고자 하였다. 이를 위해 결합시계열 분석방법을 이용하여 OECD 회원국 14개 국가의 26년간 자료를 분석하였다. 분석결과 산업화 이론의 경우 여성경제활동참가율이 높을수록 아동·가족 복지지출 총량이 증가하고, 아동인구 비율은 통계적으로 유의미하지 않은 것으로 나타나 아동·가족 복지지출의 수요측 요인은 아동의 욕구가 아닌 일하는 여성의 욕구인 것을 알 수 있었다. 권력자원론의 경우 좌파내각 비율과 노조조직률 변수를 투입하여 권력자원론이 아동·가족복지지출에서도 어느 정도 유효한 설명인 것으로 판단할 수 있었다. 여성의 경제적·정치적 권한 강화가 아동·가족복지 지출에 부분적으로 긍정적인 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타나 아동·가족복지지출 결정요인의 여성주의 이론을 통한 설명 가능성을 제시하였다. 신제도주의론에서는 정책유제의 영향은 확인할 수 있었으나, 구축효과를 확인할 수는 없었다. 이를 통해 기존의 복지지출 결정요인을 설명하는 이론적 기반을 아동가족지출 영역으로까지 확대하여 해석할 수 있다는 것을 검증하였다는 점에서 이론적 함의를 찾을 수 있다. 또한 복지국가의 예산 제약 상황에서 점차 증가하는 새로운 사회적 위험에 효과적으로 대응하기 위하여 어떤 정치경제적·제도적 기반이 필요한지에 대해 본 연구가 시사하는 바가 크다.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• 제17권1호
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• pp.130-151
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• 2018

China's cultural diplomacy is mostly understood as an endeavour to build and project soft power, which draws on three sources of 'culture, political values and foreign policy' according to Nye. This paper focuses on the debates about the vehicle and agents of China's cultural diplomacy. It starts with a theoretical discussion of the competing views in the Chinese context, and develops an argument that the vehicle of China's cultural diplomacy tries to project soft power on two wheels of culture and political values, to serve the purpose of reshaping China's image away from being the 'cultural other' and 'ideological other' respectively. However, the state-led approach to driving this vehicle is generating some side effects with its sponsorship, censorship and presence in the driver's seat. Then the paper analyses the inherent tensions existing in practice both between the two sources of building soft power and between the two means of doing so, attraction and persuasion, with empirical evidence through a comparative case study of the Confucius Institutes in the US and South Korea. The finding shows that China's attempt at reshaping its image as an Eastern cultural contestant is often disrupted by its authoritarian political values, and the state-led persuasion is often reducing China's cultural attraction. Following this, the paper finishes with some recommendations regarding evolving the cultural diplomacy approach from a vertical one that is government-centred to a horizontal one that is network-based with multiple agents, and localising its practice by engaging the target audiences as stakeholders.

• 통상정보연구
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• 제12권1호
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• pp.179-202
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• 2010

Broadcasting services sector has been facing strong public pressure to shift gears from regulation to deregulation since mid-1990s, where a triggering role was played particularly by rapid development of IT technology and content digitization. Major agenda was how to reduce regulatory divides between more liberal telecommunication sector and less liberal broadcasting. After all, common solution package worldwide was for the latter to switch over from network-dependent(vertical) to network-independent(horizontal) regulation, and to facilitate more open and competitive transmission with content market kept protected. This is no other than decoupling content provision from broadcasting and promoting market access towards the latter. Policy experiences of US and UK show that there exists a complementary relationship between quantitative and qualitative restrictions in implementing such deregulation. While mitigating quantitative ownership regulations in broadcasting, they also sought to systematize, so-called, PIT(public interest test) as a qualitative safety device to cope with the risk of losing fundamental public values accordingly in broadcasting. Recent domestic progress in broadcasting legislation in 2009, however, seems to overlook the growing importance of PIT in the process of deregulation. Bearing this motivation in mind and taking account of the relevant WTO disciplines, this paper is to address policy issues and suggestions for PIT in Korea's broadcasting services sector.

• 환경정책연구
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• 제7권4호
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• pp.1-34
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• 2008

신재생에너지전력의 중심적인 보급정책으로서는 FIT제도와 RPS제도를 들 수 있다. 그런데 2008년 들어 한국 정부는 2012년부터는 기존의 FIT제도로부터 RPS를 중심으로 하는 제도로 이행할 것을 발표했다. 일본의 경험에서 RPS제도는 FIT제도에 비하여 특히 태양광발전 등 설비형 신재생에너지전력의 보급 확대 측면 에서 성과가 떨어지는 제도로 인식되고 있다. RPS제도로의 이행 철회가 불가능하다면 RPS도입 이후 몇 가지 문제점을 안고 있는 일본의 경우를 타산지석으로 삼아서 (1) 도입 의무량을 높게 설정하며, (2) 태양광이나 풍력 등 설비형 신재생에너지전력을 RPS제도로부터 분리하여 별도 지원책을 실시하거나, (3) RPS 할당량을 기술별 규모별로 가능한 한 세분화 및 차별화하는 등으로 동일 신재생에너지 발전기술 내의 경쟁 촉진을 유도하는 제도로 이행하는 방안을 마련해야 할 것이다. 아울러 신재생에너지 발전 지원을 위한 재원으로서 석유기반기금, 그리고 전력산업기반기금 등의 기존 에너지관련기금 재원의 일부로 구성되는 신재생에너지개발보급촉진기금(가칭)의 신설이나 독일처럼 차액 지원분을 전기요금으로 자동 전가하는 방식, 즉 전국민이 골고루 부담하는 방식을 검토해 볼 필요가 있다.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• 제27권1호
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• pp.79-100
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• 2023

Purpose - The purpose of this study is to analyze the market power of the Korea Container Shipping Market (Intra Asia, Korea-Europe, and Korea-U.S.) to verify the existence of collusion empirically, and to answer whether the joint actions of liner market participants in Korea have formed market dominance for each route. Precisely, it will be verified through the Lerner index as to whether the regional market of Asia is a monopoly, oligopoly, or perfect competition. Design/methodology - This study used a Lerner index adjusted with elasticity presented in the New Imperial Organization (NEIO) studies. NEIO refers to a series of empirical studies that estimate parameters to judge market power from industrial data. This study uses B-L empirical models by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982). In addition, NEIO research data statistically contain self-regression and stability problems as price and time series data. A dynamic model following Steen and Salvanes' Error Correction Model was used to solve this problem. Findings - The empirical results are as follows. First, λ, representing market power, is nearly zero in all three markets. Second, the Korean shipping market shows low demand elasticity on average. Nevertheless, the markup is low, a characteristic that is difficult to see in other industries. Third, the Korean shipping market generally remains close to perfect competition from 2014 to 2022, but extreme market power appears in a specific period, such as COVID-19. Fourth, there was no market power in the Intra Asia market from 2008 to 2014. Originality/value - Doubts about perfect competition in the liner market continued, but there were few empirical cases. This paper confirmed that the Korea liner market is a perfect competition market. This paper is the first to implement dynamics using ECM and recursive regression to demonstrate market power in the Korean liner market by dividing the shipping market into Deep Sea and Intra Asia separately. It is also the first to prove the most controversial problems in the current shipping industry numerically and academically.

• Strategy21
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• 통권37호
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• pp.104-143
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• 2015

China's new grand strategy, the "One Belt, One Road Initiative" (also Belt Road Initiative, or BRI) has two primary components: Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the "Silk Road Economic Belt" in September 2013 during a visit to Kazakhstan, and the "21^st Century Maritime Silk Route Economic Belt" in a speech to the Indonesian parliament the following month. The BRI is intended to supply China with energy and new markets, and also to integrate the countries of Central Asia, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), and the Indian Ocean Region - though not Northeast Asia - into the "Chinese Dream". The project will be supported by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), due to open in 2016 with 57 founding members from all around the world, and China has already promised US$ 50 billion in seed funding. China's vision includes networks of energy pipelines, railways, sea port facilities and logistics hubs; these will have obvious commercial benefits, but also huge geopolitical significance. China seems to have two distinct aims: externally, to restore its historical sphere of influence; and internally, to cope with income inequalities by creating middle-class jobs through enhanced trade and the broader development of its economy. In South Korea, opinion on the BRI is sharply polarized. Economic and industrial interests, including Korea Railroad Corporation (KORAIL), support South Korean involvement in the BRI and closer economic interactions with China. They see how the BRI fits nicely with President Park Geun-hye's Eurasia Initiative, and anticipate significant commercial benefits for South Korea from better connections to energy-rich Russia and the consumer markets of Europe and Central Asia. They welcome the prospect of reduced trade barriers between China and South Korea, and of improved transport infrastructure, and perceive the political risks as manageable. But some ardently pro-US pundits worry that the political risks of the BRI are too high. They cast doubt on the feasibility of implementing the BRI, and warn that although it has been portrayed primarily in economic terms, it actually reveals a crucial Chinese geopolitical strategy. They are fearful of China's growing regional dominance, and worried that the BRI is ultimately a means to supplant the prevailing US-led regional security structure and restore the Middle Kingdom order, with China as the only power that matters in the region. According to this view, once China has complete control of the regional logistics hubs and sea ports, this will severely limit the autonomy of China's neighbors, including South Korea, who will have to toe the Chinese line, both economically and politically, or risk their own peace and prosperity.

• Strategy21
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• 통권31호
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

• 스마트미디어저널
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• 제9권4호
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• pp.44-51
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• 2020

1990년대 중후반 이래 북한경제에 많은 변화가 나타나는 것은 분명하다. 2012년 김정은 집권 이후 그 변화는 더욱 뚜렷하게 나타나고 있기 때문에 시기별 경제정책 흐름을 추적하여 변화추이를 파악하는 데 논문의 목적이 있다. 본 논문에서는 텍스트마이닝 분석기법인 LDA 토픽모델링을 활용하여 북한에서 발간되는 경제 분야 대표문헌인 경제학술지 『경제연구』 논문을 분석한다. 『경제연구』에 게재된 논문을 기본 텍스트로 활용하여 북한 경제 전략과 정책변화를 파악한다. 북한에서 생산되는 경제 관련 학술지로 독보적 위치를 차지하고 있는 『경제 연구』에 대한 심층 분석은 북한 당국이 경제 관련 인식하고 있는 현실, 직면 하고 있는 한계, 대안 등을 추적하는데 필수적인 작업이라고 할 수 있다. 다양한 북한 경제 관련 논쟁 주제가 숨어있는 『경제연구』를 빅데이터를 통해 분석하여 북한 지도자의 경제정책 흐름을 살펴보고, 현 김정은 체제가 의도하는 '변화'의 내용을 분석한다.

• 환경정책연구
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• 제9권1호
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• pp.57-81
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• 2010

고유가 시대인 현실에서 우리나라는 화석연료에 대한 의존도가 높아 저탄소 녹색성장이 가능한 경제사회 구조로의 전환이 시급하다. 현재 화석연료 사용과 관련된 보조금 개편은 환경에 유해한 투입요소에 대한 보조금을 감축 또는 제거하여 경제적 효율성을 제고하고 환경 피해를 완화시켜 사회 전체적으로 편익을 가져올 수 있는 Win-Win 효과가 기대되는 정책방안이다. 특히, 우리나라 전력부문에서 시행되는 보조금 제도 중에서 산업용, 농업용 및 심야전력에 대한 교차보조금의 경우, 전체 전력부문 보조금의 80% 이상을 차지하는 가장 큰 규모인데 본 논문은 전력부문 환경유해보조금 가운데 가장 큰 비중(연간 약 1조 6,583억원)을 차지하는 교차보조금 제도 중에서 산업용 전기의 환경유해보조금 개편 시 기대될 수 있는 파급효과를 가격탄력성 추정을 통해 파악하였다. 가격탄력성 추정에는 ARDL(자기회귀시차분포) 모형을 이용하였고, 기본 데이터는 1990년부터 2007년까지의 분기별 자료를 이용하였다. 본 연구에서 환경유해보조금 제거로 산업용 전력에 대한 연간 에너지 수요변화량은 -12,475,930MWh만큼 사용량이 감소할 것으로 추정되었으며, 이산화탄소 배출량의 경우를 보면 연간 2,644,897톤이 감소하는 것으로 추정되어 보조금 폐지가 이산화탄소 저감에 상당한 기여를 하는 것으로 나타났다. 또한 EU에서 제시한 오염물질 단위당 환경오염비용을 이용하여 배출저감량을 금액으로 환산하면 산업용 전력보조금 제거로 연간 약 1조 1,914억원의 환경개선편익 발생하는 것으로 나타났다. 그리고 이산화탄소의 경우 톤당 25유로를 적용하여 계산하면 산업용 전력보조금 제거로 연간 약 1,062억원의 환경개선편익이 발생하는 것으로 나타났다.

• 융합보안논문지
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• 제14권1호
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• pp.11-21
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• 2014

한국은 과거처럼 국제관계의 예속자가 아니라 명실상부한 중견국으로서, 북한의 핵과 재래전 도발위협을 극복하고 동북아지역의 평화를 유지하는 '균형자' 역할을 할 수 있도록 군사력을 건설해야 한다. 군사력 건설을 통해 다양한 안보위협에 대한 억제력 발휘가 가능하다. 군사적 억제력 발휘를 위해 첫 번째로 '선제적 억제'(deterrence by preemptive)와 '응징적 억제'(deterrence by punishment)는 현재와 미래의 위협에 대비하여 '감시정찰체계와 지휘통제체계'(C41SR)를 공통전력으로 공격무기체계를 결합한 '공격체계 축'을 건설함으로써 달성할 수 있다. 두 번째로 '거부적 억제'(deterrence by denial)는 공통전력과 방어무기체계를 결합한 '방어체계 축'을 건설함으로써 달성할 수 있다. 마지막으로 자주적으로 첨단전력을 개발하기 위해서는 기존의 방위산업과 연구개발 역량을 통합하여 '인프라 축'을 구축해야 한다. 우리는 미래 한국군의 군사력을 건설함에 있어서 정부의 균형자 역할에 대한 국가적 비젼, 이에 대한 국민적 합의를 토대로 본고에서 제시한 군사력 건설 모형에 따른 일관성 있는 정책적인 노력과 신념이 반드시 필요하다.