• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.57
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• pp.283-303
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• 2013

When a trade conflict arises related to an officially supported export credit programme, The World Trade Organization(WTO), decides on whether the programme is a forbidden subsidy stipulated in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures(the ASCM Agreement). Korea was taken to the WTO panel two times for the export credit programme. One is the semiconductor case in 2002 and the other was the shipbuilding disputes in 2004. And, In 2012, the U.S. Commerce Department ruled K-SURE's export insurance for Korean refrigerator manufacturers as a forbidden subsidy even if the case was not taken to the WTO. This paper examines the significance of export credit programmes on the WTO ASCM Agreement and discusses how to operate these programmes so they would not infringe upon the Agreement by analyzing the actual cases of WTO subsidy conflicts that involved Korean enterprises in relation to export credit programmes for the purpose of determining the related issues and impacts. From this research the results were as follows: First, on whether export credit is a prohibited subsidy, the deciding factor was whether a benefit has been conferred to the beneficiary. On the presence of a benefit, the WTO panel used market benchmarks as the main criteria. Thus, official export credit agencies(ECAs) should be careful not to provide export credit support which had been granted to the beneficiary at better than market terms. Second, in the case of export credit, the special status of ECA as a public body receiving government support itself does not constitute a subsidy. However, caution must be taken not to provide export credit that may lead to WTO ASCM subsidy conflicts involving a certain exporter or industry by setting up clear and valid regulations and fair work processes in the operation of export credit programmes. Third, item (j) of Annex I cannot be interpreted reversely as this item is for interpreting the presence of a prohibited subsidy, not the presence of a benefit. Thus, an export credit program that confers a financial contribution, a benefit and specificity, could qualify as a prohibited subsidy. Fourth, ECAs not only have to maintain long-term account balance but also introduce additional measures to meet this long-term balance such as a clear and systematic premium system. Finally, export credit programmes that are not defined in item (j) of Annex I of the ASCM Agreement would not deemed as an prohibited export subsidy as long as the continued support of the programmes are not being forced.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.22 no.3
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• pp.459-479
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• 2013

To assess the feasibility of 'low carbon, sustainable growth' policy pursued of the Chinese government, this paper first measures technical efficiency, $CO_2$ shadow prices, and indirect Morishima elasticity of substitution between capital and energy for 24 of manufacturing sectors in Beijing and Chongqing, in which China launched pilot carbon emissions trading scheme, by estimating the input distance function. Based on these results, then the potential for $CO_2$ reduction, cost savings from emissions trading, and the effectiveness of capital investment in reducing $CO_2$ are compared across industries and provinces. In 2010, manufacturing industries in Beijing and Chongqing could potentially reduce the largest $CO_2$ emissions, amounting 5.2 and 17 million tons, respectively, by achieving 100% technical efficiency. While, on average, Chongqing has a comparative advantage in the cost savings from carbon trading over Beijing, Beijing is more likely to reduce $CO_2$ by expanding capital investment.

• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.44 no.4
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• pp.347-353
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• 2020

Aids to Navigation (AtoN) contribute to preventing marine accidents and protecting marine environment by providing various information such as location information etc. to ships. Recognizing the importance of the AtoN, a 24 won of the AtoN service fee is charged for ships entering and leaving international trade ports. However, while the 24 won of the AtoN service fee has been maintained since its establishment in 1999, the demand for new roles of the AtoN service for autonomous shipping and smart port operations, etc. has gradually increasing with the change of shipping and port 4.0. Thus the purpose of this study was to estimate the appropriate level of the AtoN service fee in accordance with such changes in the shipping and port industries. To accomplish this, a method of recovering the total cost was introduced to the PROOF (Pyeongtaek Regional Office of Ocean and Fisheries). It is estimated that there are four cases in which estimation of the AtoN service fee is estimated in two cases year by year and conversion year, the AtoNs of PROOF are classified into the all and part of a ship using the trade port. As a result of the estimation, the AtoN service fee of PROOF is estimated at 53.78-71.62 won (as of 2019), and 29.78-47.62 won is higher than the today at 24 won. The results of this study can be used as useful basic data for the operation of budgets and policy management considering the role of the AtoN.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.95-124
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• 2009

This study aims to introduce greenhouse gas emission trading in Korea as a highly cost-effective mechanism for controlling emissions. The Basic Act on Low-Carbon Green Growth will cover methods of emissions allocation, national inventory, and trading systems (i.e. emissions trading platforms, national registry,and clearing and settlement platforms). The Korean emission scheme will be based on the Korean Climate Change Act proposed by the National Assembly and Government with a cap-and-trade scheme. The national allowances will be allocated by the hybrid system. To establish the national inventory, TRADEMARKS (Telemetering System) and emissions factors are effective for greenhouse gas emissions measurement. It will likewise be effective for the national registry to be implemented via a Korean Integrated Registry, the emissions trading platform via the KRX (Korean Exchange), and the clearing and settlement platform via the KSD (Korean Securities Depository). In other words, the KRX will manage product development and marketing for Korean Carbon Financial Instruments (including commodities, futures, and options contracts) listed and admitted to trading on the KRX. All emissions trades will be standardized and cleared by the KSD.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.177-213
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• 2011

The purpose of this paper is to research on the liability and cases for space damage with reference to the space activity under the international space treaty and national space law of major countries. The United Nations has adopted two treaties relating to the liability for space damage as follows: the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the Liability Convention of 1972. Korea has enacted the Outer Space Damage Compensation Act of 2008 relating to the liability for space damages. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 regulates the international responsibility for national activities in outer space, and the national tort liability for damage by space launching object. The Liability Convention of 1972 regulates the absolute liability by a launching state, the faulty liability by a launching state, the joint and several liability by a launching state, the person claiming for compensation, the claim method for compensation, the claim period of compensation, the claim for compensation and local remedy, the compensation amount for damage by a launching state, and the establishment of the Claims Commission. The Outer Space Damage Compensation Act of 2008 in Korea regulates the definition of space damage, the relation of the Outer Space Damage Compensation Act and the international treaty, the non-faulty liability for damage by a launching person, the concentration of liability and recourse by a launching person, the exclusion of application of the Product Liability Act, the limit amount of the liability for damage by a launching person, the cover of the liability insurance by a launching person, the measures and assistance by the government in case of occurring the space damage, and the exercise period of the claim right of compensation for damage. There are several cases with reference to the liability for damage caused by space accidents as follows: the Collision between Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251, the Disintegration of Cosmos 954 over Canadian Territory, the Failure of Satellite Launching by Martin Marietta, and the Malfunctioning of Westar VI Satellite. In the disputes and lawsuits due to such space accidents, the problems relating to the liability for space damage have been settled by the application of absolute(strict) liability principle or faulty liability principle. The Liability Convention of 1972 should be improved as follows: the clear definition in respect of the claimer of compensation for damage, the measure in respect of the enforcement of decision by the Claims Commission. The Outer Space Damage Compensation Act of 2008 in Korea should be improved as follows: the inclusion of indirect damage into the definition of space damage, the change of the currency unit of the limit amount of liability for damage, the establishment of joint and several liability and recourse right for damage by space joint launching person, and the establishment of the Space Damage Compensation Review Commission. Korea has built the space center at Oinarodo, Goheung Province in June 2009. Korea has launched the first small launch vehicle KSLV-1 at the Naro Space Center in August 2009 and June 2010. In Korea, it will be the possibility to be occurred the problems relating to the international responsibility and the liability for space damage in the course of space activity. Accordingly the Korean government and launching organization should make the legal and systematic policy to cope with such problems.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.11 no.6
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• pp.31-40
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• 2013

Purpose - The Northeast Asian Logistic Hub strategy was established to create a national competitive advantage in northeast Asia. Countries in this region are competing fiercely to become the central base distribution port as the volume of container shipping continues to increase due to the northeast Asian (especially Chinese) economic growth. The primary method by which shippers are improving their customer service and distribution is enhancing profits by minimizing call ports on the key route through strategic affiliations and the use of large vessels. Each nation is planning large-scale investments in the construction of sea ports that can accommodate large vessels. This paper proposes ways by which the logistical strategies of domestic corporations can keep pace with changes in government policy concerning the Northeast Asian Business Hub policy. It examines the logistics system in the Northeast Asian region, analyzes the government's Northeast Asian Business Hub policy, and suggests logistical strategies for domestic corporations through an analysis based on a questionnaire designed to grasp domestic firms' needs and goals. Research design, data and methodology - The purpose of this study is to determine how shipping companies establish partnerships with third-party logistics providers and draws out the implications of the results. The survey methods used were personal interviews and questionnaires distributed to a sample population through e-mail, fax, mail, and telephone. A total of 600 questionnaires were distributed, of which 165 were returned. Among these, ten were excluded due to insufficient content; ultimately, 155 were used for the sample. The statistical data collection process was analyzed through data coating and a statistical package program. Results - This study argues that greater flexibility in policies, administration, and systems will be needed to significantly improve established business practices. In this dissertation, we primarily identify that in order to become a center of northeast Asian logistics, Korea must adopt a new paradigm and abandon the existing systems that are based on the economic and social systems that have stemmed from bureaucracy, inflexibility, chauvinism, and equalitarianism. Flexible policies, administration, and systems will be necessary to improve business practices. Domestic corporations must establish a strategic logistics hub and related network while simultaneously pursuing value-added logistics businesses by increasing their manpower and building a logistics information system. This will strengthen their competitive edge and lead to system improvements. Conclusions - Domestic corporations must adopt a new paradigm and use more reasonable business laws, systems, and policies that are based on market-driven flexibility and transparency. Moreover, social norms and regulations should be established to help ensure political and social security. Korea must also develop a culture of tolerance for foreign companies. Finally, the paradigm defining the policy governing the development of the capital city and its satellite cities in this context must be changed.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.5-29
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• 2018

Models of South-North Korean economic integration have the problem of circular reasoning. While many studies argue that South-North Korean economic integration would contribute to alleviate security risks in the Korean peninsular, they emphasize the success of any economic model of inter-Korean economic integration is subject to favorable geo-political and security environment. It is a failure in distinguishing between goals and constraints. After identifying three major goals of South-North Korean economic cooperation, this study shows the trilemma among the goals; they are 1) formation of a complete economic community, 2) maintaining independent sovereignty of the two Koreas, 3) promotion of mutual economic interests. The trilemma suggests that it is theoretically impossible to achieve the above three goals at the same time. Only two goals are achievable simultaneously. This study argues that the most practical option is to pursue the combination of goals 2) and 3) considering the complex political and security environment around the Korean peninsular. Recognizing that North Korea is the least developed country in the Northeast Asia region, South Korea's initiatives for inter-Korean economic cooperation should focus on assisting industrialization and integration of the North Korea economy into the Northeast Asian regional production sharing structure. In view of the 'flying geese model' of the sequential industrialization in the region, the least developed economic status of North Korea can partially be explained by its failure to participate in the production network in the region as well as lack of effective implementation of appropriate industrial policy. Therefore, promotion of industrialization of North Korea should be the immediate goal of economic cooperation between North and South Korea. It is an interesting fact that North Korea has rapidly expanded its apparel exports in recent years. It could mean that the North Korean economy is actively responding to the dynamics of international comparative advantage structure, although the production activities are limited to exports to China since the closure of the Gaesung Industrial Complex. The recent increase in apparel export is a starting point for incorporating the Easy Import Substitution fulfilling both domestic and neighboring regional demand of North Korea. It could help integrate North Korea's industry into the production network of Northeast Asia. An immediate policy implication is that the economic cooperation between the two Koreas should focus on facilitating this process and supporting North Korea's industrial policy through South Korea's contribution of capital, technology, and service intermediary inputs.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.128-148
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• 2014

In south Korea, the so-called 'conservative-liberal' rivalry over the assessment of the government's North Korean policies is seen to be impeding the road to right policy choices. For example, the liberals accused former President Lee Myung-bak's hardline policy of provoking Pyongyang and leading to a deterioration of inter-Korean relations, while the conservatives appreciated it for helping nurture mutually beneficial inter-Korean relations in the longer term by compelling North Korea to observe international norms. However, such debate over the vices and virtues of Seoul's North Korea policies is hardly meaningful as the measuring sticks used by the liberals and the conservatives are entirely different matters. The two major goals South Korea must pursue with its North Korean policies should be 'peaceful management of division' and 'change in North Korea'. The former is related to maintaining stability within South Korea and promoting co-prosperity with North Korea. For this, the nation needs to engage, encompass and assist the Pyongyang regime. The second goal is also necessary since South Korea, as a divided nation, must seek a unified Korea under the system of democracy and market economies by bringing change in North Korea. For this, South Korea needs powerful leverages with which it can persuade and coerce the North. This means that the nation is destined to simultaneously chase the above-mentioned two goals, while also both recognizing and negating the legitimacy of the North Korean regime. This situation necessitates Seoul to apply flexibility in reconciling with Pyongyang while applying firm principles to sever the vicious circle involving the North's military provocations. The May 25 Measures, which banned trade and economic cooperation with the North except those related to humanitarian assistance, were taken as sanctions against Pyongyang for sinking the South Korean corvette Chonan in March 2010. The Measures were taken by the Seoul government immediately after a multinational investigation team discovered evidence confirming that the South Korean naval ship had been torpedoed by a midget North Korean submarine. Naturally, the May 24 Measures have since then become a major stumbling block in inter-Korean exchange, prompting opposition politicians and concerned entrepreneurs to demand Seoul to unilaterally lift the Measures. Given the significant damages the Measures have inflicted on inter-Korean economic relations, removing them remains as homework for both Koreas. However, the Measures pertains to the 'principles on national security' the Seoul government must adhere to under all circumstances. This is why North Korea's apology and promises not to repeat similar provocations must come first. For now, South Korea has no alternative but to let North Korea solve the problems it has created. South Korea's role is to help the North do so.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.82-113
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• 2016

This paper analyzes the contents and the effects of the UNSC 2270, and its implications to South Korea's defense strategy and navy. The UN Security Council passed strong sanctions against North Korea which punish North Korea's 4^th nuclear test. The sanctions compared to the previous ones require international society to take practical actions such as comprehensive trade bans as well as diplomatic isolation which will put significant pains on North Korea. Especially, these measures would greatly hamper economic development policy of Kim Joung-un regime. Because Kim Jung-un regime has inherent legitimacy problems which stems from the third family succession of the power, economic difficulties may play an important cause on the regime instability in the long term. In fact, the United States sees this possibility as an option to coerce North Korea in which North Korea choose denuclearization for its regime survival. Nevertheless, the prospects of the UN sanctions are not so optimistic. Considering North Korea's willingness for nuclear development and its level of nuclear technology, North Korea will try to play a gambit with the US and South Korea by exploiting its strategic advantages. North Korea's response will have three following strategies. First, it would actively pursue political and economic survival strategy by using China's support for the regime, strengthening its power grip in the name of countering US hostile policy, and enhancing peace propaganda. Second, North Korea will accelerate efforts to position its status as a nuclear de facto state. For this purpose, it could create nuclear crisis on the peninsula. Third, it would exploit local provocations as an exit strategy to get over the current situation. In order to counter North Korea's actions and punish North Korea's behavior strongly, South Korea needs following strategies and efforts. It should first make all the efforts to implement the UN sanctions. Strong and practical nuclear deterrence strategy and capability with the U.S. should be developed. Effective strategy and capabilities for the prevention and deterrence of North Korea's provocation should be prepared. For this purpose, North Korea's provocation strategy should be thoroughly reviewed. Active international cooperation is needed to punish and coerce North Korea's behavior. Finally, South Korea should prepare for the possible occurrence of North Korea's contingency and make use of the situation as an opportunity to achieve unification. All these strategies and efforts demand the more active roles and missions of South Korea's navy and thus, nullify North Korea's intention militarily.

• Asian-Australasian Journal of Animal Sciences
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• v.30 no.7
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• pp.1054-1060
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• 2017

Objective: This study was aimed at evaluating effects of cattle breed resources and alternative mixed-feeding practices on meat productivity and emission intensities from household farming systems (HFS) in Daklak Province, Vietnam. Methods: Records from Local $Yellow{\time}Red$ Sindhi (Bos indicus; Lai Sind) and 1/2 Limousin, 1/2 Drought Master, and 1/2 Red Angus cattle during the growth (0 to 21 months) and fattening (22 to 25 months) periods were used to better understand variations on meat productivity and enteric methane emissions. Parameters were determined by the ruminant model. Four scenarios were developed: (HFS1) grazing from birth to slaughter on native grasses for approximately 10 h plus 1.5 kg dry matter/d (0.8% live weight [LW]) of a mixture of guinea grass (19%), cassava (43%) powder, cotton (23%) seed, and rice (15%) straw; (HFS2) growth period fed with elephant grass (1% of LW) plus supplementation (1.5% of LW) of rice bran (36%), maize (33%), and cassava (31%) meals; and HFS3 and HFS4 computed elephant grass, but concentrate supplementation reaching 2% and 1% of LW, respectively. Results: Results show that compared to HFS1, emissions ($72.3{\pm}0.96kg\;CH_4/animal/life$; least squares $means{\pm}standard$ error of the mean) were 15%, 6%, and 23% lower (p<0.01) for the HFS2, HFS3, and HFS4, respectively. The predicted methane efficiencies ($CO_2eq$) per kg of LW at slaughter ($4.3{\pm}0.15$), carcass weight ($8.8{\pm}0.25kg$) and kg of edible protein ($44.1{\pm}1.29$) were also lower (p<0.05) in the HFS4. In particular, irrespective of the HSF, feed supply and ratio changes had a more positive impact on emission intensities when crossbred 1/2 Red Angus cattle were fed than in their crossbred counterparts. Conclusion: Modest improvements on feeding practices and integrated modelling frameworks may offer potential trade-offs to respond to climate change in Vietnam.