• 분석과 대안
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• 제7권3호
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• pp.27-59
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• 2023

이 연구는 현재 논란이 되고 있는 '신냉전'에 대해 비판적으로 비교하기 위한 시론의 역할을 하는 것을 목적으로 한다. '신냉전' 담론이 미디어와 학계에 주요 이슈로 등장하여 현실 정치적 힘으로 작용하게 된 것은 세 번의 계기를 통해서였다. 중국의 '일대일로' 프로젝트가 출범하고 러시아의 크림병합으로 '우크라이나 위기'가 발생하면서 '신냉전' 담론이 형성되기 시작하여, 트럼프정부의 미중 무역분쟁을 통해 '신냉전' 관련 논쟁이 본격적으로 전면화 된 데 이어, 바이든 정부의 '민주주의 대 권위주의'의 프레임과 푸틴의 우크라이나 침공으로 인해 '신냉전' 논쟁은 현재 심화되고 있다. 현재 논란이 되고 있는 '신냉전'이 역사적으로 공인된 '20세기의 냉전(Cold War)과 동일하거나 연속선상에 있다는 합의'가 부재하다. '신냉전'이라는 용어는 이론적인 검증과 체계화는 물론이고 아직 분석적 개념의 지위를 획득하지 못한 시사적인 용어에 가깝고, 관련 논쟁 또한 주장이나 담론discourse 수준에 머물고 있다. '신냉전' 관련 담론들을 지지 및 동의하는 주장과 이에 대한 비판적 입장을 비교하여, 과거의 냉전과 어떠한 유사성과 차별성이 있는지 분석할 것이다. 이러한 비교 분석을 통해 현재 진행되는 '신냉전' 담론이 오늘날 세계질서의 전환적 현상을 설명하는 데 적실성 있는 개념이 아니라는 것을 논증하고자 한다.

• 통상정보연구
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• 제13권3호
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• pp.249-274
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• 2011

농식품 수출활성화는 국내농업의 소득창출을 위한 새로운 전환기를 제공하는 방안이라는 인식이 확산되고 있다. 최근 한류열풍으로 국내 농식품에 대한 인식이 확산됨에 따라 농식품 수출은 새로운 도전이면서 기회이기도 하다. 그러나 국내 농업이 가지고 있는 구조적 문제와 수출시장 진입에 관한 중장기적 전략부재로 인해 수출시장 경쟁력이 향상되지 못하고 있는 설정이다. 이러한 환경 하에서 본 연구는 우리나라 수출농업 활성화를 위해 농식품 수출부문의 경쟁력을 제고시킬 수 있는 포괄적인 접근의 필요성을 인식하고 농식품 수출분야에 경쟁력의 개념을 도입하여 농식품의 수출정쟁력 결정요인에 대하여 분석하였다. 농식품 수출부문의 국가 경쟁력 비교분석을 위해서는 종합적인 시각에서 농식품 수출부문을 분석 할 수 있는 평가모델과 측정척도를 적용하는 것이 중요하다. 따라서 비농업분야에서 경쟁력 결정요인을 찾기 위해 다양하게 적용된 포터의 경쟁력 모델을 중심으로 농식품 수출부문의 경쟁력을 비교분석하였다. 이를 바탕으로 우리나라의 농식품 수출부문의 국가경쟁력 강화방안을 모색하고자 한다.

• 한국수자원학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국수자원학회 2023년도 학술발표회
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• pp.245-245
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• 2023

This paper examines the extent to which the Mekong River Basin countries have achieved socioeconomic benefits based on regional cooperation through the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Program, focusing on hydropower development and the Mekong Power Grid. This study pays attention to the time period from 2012 to 2022. The benefit sharing approach is employed to evaluate the extent to which hydropower development and the Mekong Power Grid have contributed to the regional energy trade in the GMS program. The GMS program was launched by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1992, and the Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Guangxi, Myanmar, Lao PDR, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam have taken an active part in the program. The goals of the GMS program are to achieve poverty alleviation, economic development, and regional cooperation in various sectors, including energy, tourism, and transportation. The GMS Economic Cooperation Program Strategic Framework 2030 (GMS-2030), in 2021, provides a new framework for prosperous and sustainable development in the river basin. In the energy sector, the GMS program has been instrumental in facilitating hydropower development and creating the Mekong Power Grid with the Regional Grid Code (RGC), contributing to economic benefits and promoting regional trade of hydroelectricity. It is argued that the GMS program has enhanced regional cooperation between the riparian countries. Despite such achievements, the GMS program has faced challenges, including the gap of economic development between the riparian countries, socioeconomic and environmental concerns regarding hydropower development between the Upper and Lower Mekong countries, and geopolitical tensions from the US-China rivalry. These challenges should adequately be addressed within the program, which can guarantee the sustainability of the program for the river basin.

• 융합경영연구
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• 제12권2호
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• pp.73-81
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• 2024

Purpose: South Korea is a close ally of the US and an important partner of China. Caught between the two most powerful countries, South Korea's strategic directions are critical. This article emphasizes that the deeper core of the US-China trade war is to improve the business environment to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to boost the economy, rather than engaging in the trade war. Research design, data, and methodology: Considering the complexity of this issue, this article applies a systematic analytical tool, the ABCD (Agility, Benchmarking, Convergence, and Dedication) model, to provide strategic guidance for inducing investments into South Korea in the context of the ongoing US-China trade war. Results: Specifically, South Korea needs to provide a more attractive business environment along the four points: expedite commercial activities through deregulation (Agility); adopt global standards of the flexible labor markets and technological developments (Benchmarking); integrate various industries and connect them to global value chains (Convergence); and create more economy-friendly policies rather than politics-oriented ones such as protectionism (Dedication). Conclusion: This study stands out not just by utilizing the ABCD model but, also by providing more systematic analysis and practical implications, particularly within the context of the escalating US-China competition. Unlike many existing studies that analyze the broader impacts of this geopolitical rivalry, this research delves into specific strategic guidelines for South Korea to attract FDI. The findings also provide implications for multinational corporations (MNCs) in choosing the locations for their overseas operations, particularly in South Korea.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제2권2호
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• pp.111-141
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• 2018

By the middle of 2018 there are signs of China's entry into a new period of development, characterized by a change in the old model: "market reforms-inner-party democratization - moderate foreign policy" to another: "market reforms - Xi Jinping personality cult - offensive foreign policy." This model contains the risks of arising of the contradiction between economic freedom and political-ideological rigidity which can lead to destabilization of the political life. However, in the current positive economic dynamics, these risks may come out, rather, in the medium and long term. Today, the political situation in China remains stable - despite growing dissatisfaction in scientific expert and educational circles due to increased control over the intellectual sphere by the authorities. The need for a new redistribution of power between central and provincial authorities could potentially disrupt political stability in the medium term, but, at the moment, is not a critical negative factor. The economic situation is positive-stable. Forecasts indicate a possible increase in China's GDP in 2018 at 6.5%. At the same time, there are negative expectations in connection with the Sino-US and potentially Sino-European "trade war". In the Chinese foreign policy, as a response to Western pressure, China increasingly uses the Russian direction of its diplomacy in the expanded version of Russia + SCO. The nuance here is seen in China's adjusted approach to the SCO: first of all, not as a mechanism for cooperation with Russia, but as an organization that allows using Russia's potential for pressure on the US in the Sino-US strategic rivalry. In the second half of 2018, the Chinese economy will continue to develop steadily, albeit with unresolved traditional problems (debts of provinces and state-owned enterprises, ineffective state sector, risks on the financial and real estate market). In politics, discontent with the cult of Xi will accumulate, but without real threats to its power. Weakening in economic opposition between China and the United States is possible due to Beijing's search for compromises on tariffs, intellectual property, trade deficit. To find such trade-offs, Xi will use the so-called. "Personal diplomacy" of direct contacts with Trump.

• Strategy21
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• 통권34호
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• pp.128-148
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• 2014

In south Korea, the so-called 'conservative-liberal' rivalry over the assessment of the government's North Korean policies is seen to be impeding the road to right policy choices. For example, the liberals accused former President Lee Myung-bak's hardline policy of provoking Pyongyang and leading to a deterioration of inter-Korean relations, while the conservatives appreciated it for helping nurture mutually beneficial inter-Korean relations in the longer term by compelling North Korea to observe international norms. However, such debate over the vices and virtues of Seoul's North Korea policies is hardly meaningful as the measuring sticks used by the liberals and the conservatives are entirely different matters. The two major goals South Korea must pursue with its North Korean policies should be 'peaceful management of division' and 'change in North Korea'. The former is related to maintaining stability within South Korea and promoting co-prosperity with North Korea. For this, the nation needs to engage, encompass and assist the Pyongyang regime. The second goal is also necessary since South Korea, as a divided nation, must seek a unified Korea under the system of democracy and market economies by bringing change in North Korea. For this, South Korea needs powerful leverages with which it can persuade and coerce the North. This means that the nation is destined to simultaneously chase the above-mentioned two goals, while also both recognizing and negating the legitimacy of the North Korean regime. This situation necessitates Seoul to apply flexibility in reconciling with Pyongyang while applying firm principles to sever the vicious circle involving the North's military provocations. The May 25 Measures, which banned trade and economic cooperation with the North except those related to humanitarian assistance, were taken as sanctions against Pyongyang for sinking the South Korean corvette Chonan in March 2010. The Measures were taken by the Seoul government immediately after a multinational investigation team discovered evidence confirming that the South Korean naval ship had been torpedoed by a midget North Korean submarine. Naturally, the May 24 Measures have since then become a major stumbling block in inter-Korean exchange, prompting opposition politicians and concerned entrepreneurs to demand Seoul to unilaterally lift the Measures. Given the significant damages the Measures have inflicted on inter-Korean economic relations, removing them remains as homework for both Koreas. However, the Measures pertains to the 'principles on national security' the Seoul government must adhere to under all circumstances. This is why North Korea's apology and promises not to repeat similar provocations must come first. For now, South Korea has no alternative but to let North Korea solve the problems it has created. South Korea's role is to help the North do so.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제7권1호
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• pp.229-258
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• 2023

Для основных ведущих стран Азиатско-Тихоокеанского региона США, Китая и России сложилась ситуация "новой нормальности". Причем для каждой из указанных стран эта "новая нормальность" имеет свои собственные особенности, характеристики и значение. Для США – это обострение военного противостояния с Китаем в Тайваньском проливе. Для Китая – обострение соперничества с Соединенными Штатами до нового уровня и, одновременно, замедление темпов экономического развития с очень высокой вероятностью их дальнейшего снижения. "Новая нормальность" для России – это почти полное свертывание отношений с США, ЕС и их партнёрами и союзниками на фоне специальной военной операции и введенных санкций. Эти нюансы, в дополнение к результатам 20-го съезда КПК, во многом и будут определять основные тенденции в китайско-американских и китайско-российских отношениях. С высокой вероятностью отношения Китая и России не претерпят серьезных изменений на фоне украинского кризиса. Пекин будет стараться сохранять позицию "доброжелательного нейтралитета" по отношению к Москве. В то же время баланс между "доброй волей" и "нейтралитетом" может варьироваться в зависимости от масштабов китайско-российского сотрудничества. Например, в экономической сфере китайские компании будут лимитировать сотрудничество с российскими партнерами, опасаясь западных вторичных санкций. Однако, в целом, Россия сохранит свое значение для Китая как сильнейший антиамериканский полюс. В отношениях с США Китай продолжит твердо отстаивать свои интересы, в то же время, не исключая нормализации отношений с Вашингтоном в определенных областях сотрудничества: стратегическая стабильность, нетрадиционные угрозы, экология и т.д. В целом решения 20-го съезда КПК не позволяют говорить ни за, ни против идеи о готовности Китая возобновить диалог с США в период после конгресса. Китайско-американские отношения, как отмечалось выше, имеют свою собственную логику и, вероятно, продолжат развиваться в ее рамках. Впрочем, как и китайско-российские отношения. В рамках этой логики Пекин, похоже, продолжает балансировать между двумя векторами своей внешней политики. С одной стороны – это развитие двустороннего сотрудничества с Россией с целью укрепления собственных переговорных позиций в противостоянии с Вашингтоном: военное сотрудничество с акцентом на совместные учения, политическое сотрудничество, основанное на антиамериканизме, экономическое сотрудничество с оглядкой на риски вторичных санкций. С другой стороны, для Китая неприемлемо, во-первых, нарушение территориальной целостности Украины, во-вторых, прямое военное столкновение с США и, в-третьих, дальнейшее обострение отношений с Вашингтоном по фактору китайской дружбы с Россией.