• 아태비즈니스연구
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• 제10권1호
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• pp.117-133
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• 2019

This paper examines the most-favored-nation treatment clause on the BITs concluded by China and examines the attitudes of China on the application of the most-favored-nation treatment clause to the ISDs by period as the scope of arbitration increases. Moreover, this study pointed out the problems that would be exposed if the most-favored-nation treatment clause applies to ISDs and then also suggested solutions. The conclusions of this study are as follows; if the Chinese government strictly restricts the applicable expansion of the most-favored-nation treatment clause to the dispute settlement procedure by considering only the position of the capital importing country, it implies a contradiction against the development trend of the arbitration system related to international investment disputes. Of course, in order to protect the rights of Chinese investors investing abroad, expanding the applicability of the most-favored-nation treatment clause to the ISDs procedure unconditionally may have a negative impact under China's dual status of being a capital-importing country and a capital-exporting country. Therefore, China should clearly define the scope of application of the most-favored-nation treatment clause, the completion of the local remedy for the host country in cases of BIT to be concluded in the future or amended, and also clearly define that the most-favored-nation treatment clause should not be retroactively applied into BITs already concluded as an exception of applicability of the most-favored-nation treatment.

• 무역상무연구
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• 제71권
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• pp.195-216
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• 2016

In determining the content of the FET standard, the tribunals stated protection of investor's legitimate expectations, due process and denial of justice, transparency, discrimination and arbitrariness, good faith, etc. The most major elements of the FET standard is the protection of the investor's legitimate and reasonable expectations. It is necessary to consider whether it is possible to what the expectations of investors are protected as legitimate and it is formed under any circumstances. If host state frustrate investor's legitimate expectations, it found a breach of the FET. The host state's specific assurance may reinforce investor's expectations, but such explicit statement is not always necessary. The host state must preserve a stable environment for investments. However, It must not be understood as the inalterability of the host state's legal framework. It implies that the host state's subsequent changes should be made consistently and predictably. The host state is entitled to exercise a reasonable regulatory authority to respond to changing circumstances in the public purpose. Therefore, whether the violation FET shall be determined through a balanced against the investor's legitimate expectations and the host state's reasonable regulatory exercise in the public interest. And investor should keep in mind that the principle of proportionality is applied unless host state provides stabilization clause or similar commitments to investor. Also host state should establish the basis of an argument about reasonable regulatory authority for public interest.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제25권4호
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• pp.3-23
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• 2015

The Chevron saga including Chevron/TexPet v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 34877(hereinafter referred to as "Chevron I") and Chevron/TexPet v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23(hereinafter referred to as "Chevron II") started out of domestic litigations between TexPet and Ecuador in the early 1990s. In Chevron I, the Tribunal decided that Article 2(7) of the U.S.-Ecuador BIT on effective means of provision was breached because of undue delays in the seven legal proceedings TexPet had brought against Ecuador in respect to contractual obligations. In Chevron II, it was contended that through the actions and inactions of the judiciary and the executive, Ecuador breached her several obligations under the BIT. Ecuador objected to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal because TexPet's investment was terminated in 1992, and because Chevron is not a party to the 1995 Settlement Agreement and 1998 Final Release. In its Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Tribunal applied a prima facie standard to the facts alleged by the Claimants but denied by the Respondent, and decided that questions in respect of the Respondent's jurisdictional objections should be joined to the merits under Article 21(4) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. In the merits phase of Chevron II, the Tribunal divided the merits of the Parties' dispute into two parts, entitled "Track 1" and "Track 2". In its Partial Award on Track 1, the Tribunal decided that Chevron is a "Releasee" under the 1995 Settlement Agreement. In a decision on "Track 1B", the Tribunal decided that the Lago Agrio complaint cannot be read as pleading "exclusively" or "only" diffuse claims, and that, to this extent, the Claimants' reliance on the 1995 Settlement Agreement as a complete bar to the Lago Agrio complaint must fail, as a matter of Ecuadorian law. The Tribunal maintained the position that the Parties' disputes on both merit and jurisdiction should be reserved for Track 2. It remains to be seen how the Tribunal addresses the Claimants' allegations of multiple denials of justice under international law against the judgments of the Respondent's Courts, together with the Respondent's jurisdictional objections in Track 2 of the arbitration.

• 무역상무연구
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• 제36권
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• pp.87-109
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• 2007

This Comment explores the ICSID case of CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, awarded on May 12, 2005. The Part II of this Comment first describes the relevant facts of the case including the some background for readers' understanding and the Part III summaries the claimant's requests and the decisions rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal in the Award. At Part IV, the Comment addresses the issue of determinating laws applicable to the merits of dispute in case that the parties of the case have not chosen a governing law, and at Part V, takes a close look into three main issues of (i) the indirect expropriation of the investment, (ii) the breach of fair and equitable treatment and (iii) the protections under umbrella clauses. In this CMS case, we see first that while the Tribunal affirmed that any indirect expropriation can occur from incidental interference depriving the foreign investor of the use or reasonable-to-be-expected economic benefit even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State, the Tribunal denied the occurrence of indirect expropriation in this case by holding that the Government of Argentina has not breached the standard of protection laid down in the Treaty. Secondly, however, regarding the issue of fair and equitable treatment, we see that the Tribunal, finding Argentina's breach of obligations, affirmed that the foreign investor can expect the host State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, which can give the foreign investor certain degree of foreseeability. Thirdly and finally, we see that, on base of the effect of the umbrella clause, the Tribunal recognized the obligation of the host State undertaken not to freeze the tariff regime or subject it to price controls and not to alter the basic rules governing contracts between the foreign investor and the host State without the first's written consent. However, the protection under the umbrella clause is available only when there is a specific breach of rights and obligations under BIT or a violation of contract rights protected under BIT.