• Title/Summary/Keyword: Incumbent

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A Two Stage Game Model for Learning-by-Doing and Spillover (지식의 학습효과와 파급효과에 따른 선.후발기업의 생산전략 분석)

  • 김도환
    • Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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    • v.26 no.1
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    • pp.61-69
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    • 2001
  • This paper presents a two stage game model which examines the effect of learning-by-doing and spillover. Increases in the firm’s cumulative experience lower its unit cost in future period. However, the firm’s rival also enjoys the experience via spillover. Unlike previous theoretical research model, a cost asymmetric market entry game model is developed between the incumbent firm and new entrant. Mathematical results show that the incumbent firm exploits the learning curve to gain future cost advantage, and that the diffusion of learning to the new entrant induces the incumbent firm to choose decreasing output strategically. As a main result, we show that the relative magnitude between the learning and spillover rate determines the market share ratio of competing firms.

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The Effects of Product Line Rivalry: Focusing on the Issue of Fighting Brands (경쟁산품선적영향(竞争产品线的影响): 관주전두품패(关注战斗品牌))

  • Koh, Dong-Hee
    • Journal of Global Scholars of Marketing Science
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    • v.19 no.4
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    • pp.24-31
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    • 2009
  • Firms produce various products that differ by function, design, color, etc. Product proliferation occurs for three different reasons. When there exist economies of scope, the unit cost for a product is lower when it is produced in conjunction with another product than when it is produced separately. Second, consumers are heterogeneous in the sense that they have different tastes, preferences, or price elasticities. A firm can earn more profit by segmenting consumers into different groups with similar characteristics. For example, product proliferation helps a firm increase profits by satisfying various consumer needs more precisely. The third reason for product proliferation is based on strategy. Producing a number of products can not only deter entry by providing few niches, but can also cause a firm to react efficiently to a low-price entry. By producing various products, a firm can reduce niches so that potential entrants have less incentive to enter. Moreover, a firm can produce new products in response to entry, which is called fighting brands. That is, when an entrant tries to attract consumers with a low price, an incumbent introduces a new lower-quality product while maintaining the price of the existing product. The drawback of product proliferation, however, is cannibalization. Some consumers who would have bought a high-price product switch to a low-price product. Moreover, it is possible that proliferation can decrease profits when a new product is less differentiated from a rival’s than is the existing product because of more severe competition. Many studies have analyzed the effect of product line rivalry in the areas of economics and marketing. They show how a monopolist can solve the problem of cannibalization by adjusting quality in a market where consumers differ in their preferences for quality. They find that a consumer who prefers high-quality products will obtain his or her most preferred quality, but a consumer who has not such preference will obtain less than his or her preferred quality to reduce cannibalization. This study analyzed the effects of product line rivalry in a duopoly market with two types of consumers differentiated by quality preference. I assume that the two firms are asymmetric in the sense that an incumbent can produce both high- and low-quality products, while an entrant can produce only a low-quality product. The effects of product proliferation can be explained by comparing the market outcomes when an incumbent produces both products to those when it produces only one product. Compared to the case in which an incumbent produces only a high-quality product, the price of a low-quality product tends to decrease in a consumer segment that prefers low-quality products because of more severe competition. Prices, however, tend to increase in a segment with high preferences because of less severe competition. It is known that when firms compete over prices, it is optimal for a firm to increase its price when its rival increases its price, which is called a strategic complement. Since prices are strategic complements, we have two opposing effects. It turns out that the price of a high-quality product increases because the positive effect of reduced competition outweighs the negative effect of strategic complements. This implies that an incumbent needs to increase the price of a high-quality product when it is also introducing a low-quality product. However, the change in price of the entrant’s low-quality product is ambiguous. Second, compared to the case in which an incumbent produces only a low-quality product, prices tend to increase in a consumer segment with low preferences but decrease in a segment with high preferences. The prices of low-quality products decrease because the negative effect outweighs the positive effect. Moreover, when an incumbent produces both kinds of product, the price of an incumbent‘s low-quality product is higher, even though the quality of both firms’ low-quality products is the same. The reason for this is that the incumbent has less incentive to reduce the price of a low-quality product because of the negative impact on the price of its high-quality product. In fact, the effects of product line rivalry on profits depend not only on changes in price, but also on sales and cannibalization. If the difference in marginal cost is moderate compared to the difference in product quality, the positive effect of product proliferation outweighs the negative effect, thereby increasing the profit. Furthermore, if the cost difference is very large (small), an incumbent is better off producing only a low (high) quality product. Moreover, this study also analyzed the effect of product line rivalry when a firm can determine product characteristics by focusing on the issue of fighting brands. Recently, Korean air and Asiana airlines have established budget airlines called Jin air and Air Busan, respectively, to confront the launching of budget airlines such as Hansung airline and Jeju air, among others. In addition, as more online bookstores have entered the market, a leading off-line bookstore Kyobo began its own online bookstore. Through fighting brands, an incumbent with a high-quality product can increase profits by producing an additional low-quality product when its low-quality product is more differentiated from that of the entrant than is its high-quality product.

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Low-Power FFT Design for NC-OFDM in Cognitive Radio Systems (Cognitive Radio 시스템의 NC-OFDM을 위한 저전력 FFT 설계)

  • Jang, In-Gul;Chung, Jin-Gyun
    • Journal of the Institute of Electronics Engineers of Korea TC
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    • v.48 no.6
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    • pp.28-33
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    • 2011
  • Recently, the investigation of the cognitive radio (CR) system is actively progressed as one of the methods for using the frequency resources more efficiently. In CR systems, when the frequency band allocated to the incumbent user is not used, the unused frequency band is assigned to the secondary user. Thus, the FFT input signals corresponding to the actually used frequency band by the incumbent user are assigned as '0'. In this paper, based on the fact that there are many '0' input signals in CR systems, a low-power FFT design method for NC-OFDM is proposed. An efficient zero flag generation technique for each stage is first presented. Then, to increase the utility of the zero flag signals, modified architectures for memory and arithmetic circuits are presented. To verify the performance of the proposed algorithm, 2048 point FFT with radix-24SDFstructureisdesignedusingVerilog HDL. The simulation results show that the power consumption of FFT is reduced considerably by the proposed algorithm.

The Roles of Brand Loyalty and Switching Costs in the Purchase of a New Smartphone (스마트폰 신제품 구매에서 브랜드 충성도와 전환비용의 역할)

  • Lee, Woong-Kyu;Park, Jin-Hoon
    • The Journal of Information Systems
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    • v.25 no.1
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    • pp.183-200
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    • 2016
  • Purpose Although many users change their smartphone, most may be inclined to continue using incumbent smartphone series instead of switching to new brands. Brand loyalty and switching costs are major determinants of inclinations toward incumbent smartphones. This study addresses the research question, "what roles brand loyalty and switching costs play in the purchase of new smartphones?". Design/methodology/approach A research model consisting of six hypotheses for explaining purchase intentions toward new smartphone was proposed considering inclinations toward incumbent brands. The research model was empirically tested based on purchase intentions toward the LG smartphone brand G4, employing a sample of 177 university students in Korea. The data were analyzed using the PLS technique. The results provide support for all hypotheses. Findings First, perceived inclinations toward incumbent smartphone, brand loyalty and switching costs, explained the purchase of new smartphones as well as the perception of new smartphone. Second, brand loyalty was found to play the role of moderator between switching costs and relative advantage in the purchase of new smartphone. Third, perceived aesthetics and price value had considerable influence on the purchase of brand-new smartphone.

Limit Pricing by Noncooperative Oligopolists (과점산업(寡占産業)에서의 진입제한가격(進入制限價格))

  • Nam, Il-chong
    • KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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    • v.12 no.1
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    • pp.127-148
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    • 1990
  • A Milgrom-Roberts style signalling model of limit pricing is developed to analyze the possibility and the scope of limit pricing in general, noncooperative oligopolies. The model contains multiple incumbent firms facing a potential entrant and assumes an information asymmetry between incombents and the potential entrant about the market demand. There are two periods in the model. In period 1, n incumbent firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose quantities. At the end of period 1, the potential entrant observes the market price and makes an entry decision. In period 2, depending on the entry decision of the entrant, n' or (n+1) firms choose quantities again before the game terminates. Since the choice of incumbent firms in period 1 depends on their information about demand, the market price in period 1 conveys information about the market demand. Thus, there is a systematic link between the market price and the profitability of entry. Using Bayes-Nash equilibrium as the solution concept, we find that there exist some demand conditions under which incumbent firms will limit price. In symmetric equilibria, incumbent firms each produce an output that is greater than the Cournot output and induce a price that is below the Cournot price. In doing so, each incumbent firm refrains from maximizing short-run profit and supplies a public good that is entry deterrence. The reason that entry is deterred by such a reduced price is that it conveys information about the demand of the industry that is unfavorable to the entrant. This establishes the possibility of limit pricing by noncooperative oligopolists in a setting that is fully rational, and also generalizes the result of Milgrom and Roberts to general oligopolies, confirming Bain's intuition. Limit pricing by incumbents explained above can be interpreted as a form of credible collusion in which each firm voluntarily deviates from myopic optimization in order to deter entry using their superior information. This type of implicit collusion differs from Folk-theorem type collusions in many ways and suggests that a collusion can be a credible one even in finite games as long as there is information asymmetry. Another important result is that as the number of incumbent firms approaches infinity, or as the industry approaches a competitive one, the probability that limit pricing occurs converges to zero and the probability of entry converges to that under complete information. This limit result confirms the intuition that as the number of agents sharing the same private information increases, the value of the private information decreases, and the probability that the information gets revealed increases. This limit result also supports the conventional belief that there is no entry problem in a competitive market. Considering the fact that limit pricing is generally believed to occur at an early stage of an industry and the fact that many industries in Korea are oligopolies in their infant stages, the theoretical results of this paper suggest that we should pay attention to the possibility of implicit collusion by incumbent firms aimed at deterring new entry using superior information. The long-term loss to the Korean economy from limit pricing can be very large if the industry in question is a part of the world market and the domestic potential entrant whose entry is deterred could .have developed into a competitor in the world market. In this case, the long-term loss to the Korean economy should include the lost opportunity in the world market in addition to the domestic long-run welfare loss.

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The Effect on Social Welfare of Asymmetric Mobile Termination Rate (이동망 접속료 차등화가 사회후생에 미치는 효과에 관한 분석)

  • Jung, Choong-Young;Jung, Song-Min;Lee, Jong-Yong
    • The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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    • v.37 no.6B
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    • pp.453-463
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    • 2012
  • The Effect of asymmetric interconnection charge is different between where the retail price of incumbent is regulated and that of incumbent is not regulated. When the retail price of incumbent is not regulated, the brand loyalty and the relative magnitude of each marginal cost determine the effect of consumer surplus. However, when the retail price of incombent is regulated, network substitution effect also plays a important role to the consumer surplus. The higher the brand loyalty, the lower the network substitution effect, or the higher the marginal cost of the entrant, the social welfare through the asymmetric interconnection charge is more increased. In the other cases, the consumer surplus might be decreased.

Market Efficiency Analysis between Facility-Based and Service-Based Competition

  • Seo, Il-Won;Lee, Duk-Hee;Kim, Byung-Woon
    • ETRI Journal
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    • v.30 no.4
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    • pp.587-596
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    • 2008
  • Facility-based competition (FBC) in the telecommunications market is considered to have lower static efficiency in the short term and higher dynamic efficiency in the long term. Under service-based competition (SBC), the entrant can reduce its setup costs by leasing network facilities from the incumbent, which makes the entrant viable, pushes the market price down and promotes static efficiency. This paper attempts to measure static efficiency by comparing the profits of the incumbent and entrant in terms of consumer surplus and social welfare under each competition type by extending the Stackelberg model. The results, assuming a linear demand function and variation in regulatory level, show that FBC results in higher social welfare than SBC on the whole. However, SBC accompanied by strong regulation is also shown to have the potential to be superior over FBC. It is also revealed that FBC exhibits a higher producer surplus (particularly, the incumbent's producer surplus) and is, therefore, more desirable in terms of dynamic efficiency. When the entrant's cost is high in FBC, social welfare is shown to be lowered, implying that cost competitiveness is a necessary condition for social welfare.

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Antecedents of Accepting Disruptive Innovation: The Perspective of Value Congruence

  • CUI, Yuan;ZHANG, Tingting;KIM, Seungwoon;FENG, Shi
    • The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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    • v.8 no.2
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    • pp.353-364
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    • 2021
  • Originating in value congruence theory, this study aims to give a clear understanding of the transformation process of consumers from incumbent technology to disruptive innovation technology. Moreover, the moderating effect of personal innovativeness in the process of consumers' switching to disruptive innovation is investigated. This study combines value congruence with expectation-disconfirmation theory, technology-switching theory, and the personal innovativeness of the disruptive innovation product, explaining why consumers have transformed from an incumbent product into a disruptive innovation. Data was collected through a questionnaire from 280 smartphone users in China. The respondents were mainly potential consumers who had never bought Redmi phones, namely, a smart product owned by the renowned Chinese company Xiaomi. The hypothesis of the research model is based on the example of the Redmi smartphone, which has been confirmed by existing smartphone users in China. Through investigation, the results of multivariable regression analysis show the decisive variables that influence consumer intentions, and we analyze the role of personal innovativeness in moderating between dissatisfaction with the incumbent product and purchase intention of a product based on disruptive innovation. The findings of this study can provide a certain reference for the sustainable growth of Xiaomi and the development of new products.

Roles of Brand Loyalty in Determination of Smartphone Purchasing Intention (스마트폰 구매의도 결정에서 브랜드 충성도의 역할)

  • Lee, Woong-kyu;Park, Jin-Hoon
    • The Journal of Information Systems
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    • v.26 no.1
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    • pp.125-142
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    • 2017
  • This study aims to identify and analyze the roles of incumbent smartphone's brand loyalty in smartphone adoption considering rational judgments and aesthetics evaluation. For this purpose, two hypotheses are developed based on dual process theory. For the validation of these hypotheses, G4, a smartphone brand from LG, was adopted as the target smartphone. The participants were university students in Korea, non-LG smartphones. In result, two hypotheses were statistically supported. This study showed that users with higher brand loyalty toward incumbent smartphone would be more sensitive to rational judgment while lower brand loyalty more sensitive to aesthetic evaluation.

The Types of Nurses Perception of Whistle-Blowing;Q-Methodology (간호사의 내부고발 인식유형에 관한 연구)

  • Kwak, Myung-Soon;Kim, In-Soon
    • Journal of Korean Academy of Nursing Administration
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    • v.10 no.2
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    • pp.265-276
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    • 2004
  • Purpose: This study was to define structural subjectivity pattern of whistle-blowing of hospital nurses. Method: This study was conducted using Q-methodology in order to classify the types of perception to an whistle-blowing from the inside of the incumbent hospital nurses. Nineteen members, including hospital nurses, professors and students majoring in the nursing department made 47 statements about the insider's accusation after an in-depth interview about the statements. Forty incumbent hospital nurses were the participants for the Q-Methodology. The statement data was analyzed with QUANL PC Program and five different types were classified according to how the nurse had replied to the statements. Result: The first one is a Propeller type. The second one is a Denial type. The third type is a Patient Advocate type. The fourth one is a Anonymous type. The fifth is a Netizen type. Conclusion: this study as a momentum, a reasonable and constitutional legislation in the nurses organization should be established as soon as possible.

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