• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.39C no.12
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• pp.1352-1361
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• 2014

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which regulates interstate and international communications in the United States, has established a plan to allocate high demand spectrum to the usage of mobile communication by inducing voluntary relinquishment from broadcasters. This plan was introduced by the National Broadband Plan as an incentive auction in 2010. The FCC suggested the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in 2012 and issued Report and Order (R&O) on May 2014 regarding the overall rules of incentive auctions expected to be implemented in mid-2015. The incentive auction attracts the attention of many countries because this policy suggests a novel approach regarding the alteration of use from an inefficient usage to an efficient usage in limited spectrum resources. In this paper, we define the key issues in order for implementation of incentive auction. Since the incentive auction is a highly complicated process compared to previous allocation procedures, a careful review of the incentive auction regarding whether this spectrum policy can be introduced is required. In this paper, we describe the detailed procedure of the incentive auction and present policy considerations for the introduction of the incentive auction.

• Electronics and Telecommunications Trends
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• v.34 no.6
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• pp.17-27
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• 2019

This paper introduces the 5G spectrum auction in Germany that occurred last summer and ended overheatedly after an extraordinarily long period. We describe the context of the latest German spectrum auction and trace the participants' bidding behavior. This case details the trend of the 5G spectrum auction and the factors that affect the spectrum auction as follows: First, it is determined that investment obligations that force network installations can be a financial burden to mobile network operators (MNOs) and require a careful approach. Second, excess demands can cause auction overheating and the spectrum supply volume needs to be determined by a proper demand forecast and investment incentive. Third, 'Set-Aside' for local usage aids in developing the vertical industry; however it limits the spectrum supply for mobiles and leads to higher bidding prices. Fourth, a modified adoption of a typical spectrum auction can alleviate MNO's financial burdens to secure the broadband spectrum. Finally, competition to secure the necessary bandwidth in the situation of limited spectrum supply may delay the process of the spectrum auction, causing it overheated.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2004.11b
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• pp.266-268
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• 2004

This paper presents the greenhouse gas emission trading scheme which is under progress as a pilot project at the power sector in preparation for UNFCCC. By referring UK's, Emission Trading is introduced incentive auction to maximize the reduction of greenhouse gas emission. At the 1st step, from year 2006 to 2008, only CO2 is regarded as an objective target to decrease but emission credit is excluded with an assumption and only 5 Generation company take part in as participants. The market operating procedure is composed of participants' registration, baseline verification, incentive auction, the registration of initial and yearly allocation, emission trading, yearly emission verification & approval, yearly obligation conformity, carry forward & incentive grant. It can be serve a guideline the whole aspects of emission trading which will start in 2006 including operation, verification and profit sharing.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.16 no.4
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• pp.458-464
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• 2014

In the future, an increasing number of heterogeneous networks will be connected with each other. Each of them has its own interest. Existing systems lack good incentive mechanisms to attract more networks to participate in cooperations. In this paper, we design an auction-based incentive mechanism for routing protocols applied in heterogeneous networking which is computationally efficient, individually rational, profitable, and truthful. Through several simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate the properties of our mechanism.

• The Journal of Economics, Marketing and Management
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.33-43
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• 2021

Purpose: This study aims to verify sellers' economic incentives for voluntarily disclosing negative information in online markets and provide practical guidelines to online sellers in terms of whether, when, and how sharing low quality to buyers increase sales. Research design, data and methodology: Our model examines the number of bidders in Internet auctions to measure potential demand and uses count data analysis following previous studies that have also analyzed the number of bidders in auctions. After checking over-dispersion and zero-inflation in our data, we have run a Poisson regression to analyze the effect of sharing negative information on sales. Results: This study presents a counterintuitive result that low-quality sellers can increase their demand by fully disclosing negative information in an online market, if appropriate risk-reducing methods are employed. Our finding thus shows that there exists economic incentive for online sellers to voluntarily disclose negative information about their products, and that the context of transactions may affect this incentive structure as the incentive varies across product categories. Conclusions: As the positive impact of disclosing negative information has rarely been studied so far, this paper contributes to the literature by providing a unique empirical analysis on the impact of sellers' honesty on sales. By verifying economic incentives of disclosing low quality with actual online sales data, this study suggests practical implications on information disclosure strategy to many online sellers dealing with negative information.

• The Journal of Economics, Marketing and Management
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.23-32
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• 2023

Purpose: This study examines the effect of full information disclosure on seller profit when there exists information asymmetry between sellers and buyers, focusing on the risk averseness of buyers. By investigating the interaction between product quality and perceived risk through online sales data, we attempt to figure out the incentive structure of full information disclosure specifically when buyers are risk-averse, so that we can suggest more feasible information disclosure strategy to sellers. Research design, data and methodology: Our empirical model analyzes the sales data of collectible goods from a major online seller using Poisson regression. In our model, we have specifically considered risk-averseness of buyers by estimating the interaction effect between the product quality and perceived risk on seller profit, aiming for a more precise empirical analysis on sellers' incentive structure of full disclosure. Results: Our empirical analysis strongly supports the effect of interaction between product quality and perceived risk, showing that the incentive for full disclosure is much stronger when product quality is higher, and vice versa. Therefore, sellers are strongly encouraged to voluntarily reveal product weaknesses when their product quality is higher than average, while it is more profitable to hide any product defects when quality claim is lower than average. Conclusions: This study supports the related literature by confirming economic incentives for full disclosure, and also supplements and strengthens previous studies by presenting that the effect of interaction between product quality and perceived risk strongly affects seller profit. Our unique finding supports both mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure arguments and presents practical implications to marketing managers by suggesting that seller's incentive for revealing weaknesses depends on the level of seller's product quality.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Electromagnetic Engineering and Science
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• v.29 no.3
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• pp.200-213
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• 2018

Herein, we survey the current state of the recent legal revision of the Citizens Broadband Radio Service, a type of city spectrum-sharing service used in the United States of America, and the introduction of spectrum sharing in the frequency ranging from 3.8~4.2 GHz, based on the United Kingdom framework for spectrum sharing. Specifically, the subjects of topical interest, including the radio station licensing of the spectrum-sharing service system face-to-face multitier user structure, regional frequency allocation, and applicable service types, are discussed. Furthermore, factors to be considered while selecting candidate channels for joint use are suggested, emphasizing their importance for introducing spectrum sharing in Korea and revitalizing the related industrial sectors. In addition, methods of introducing a radio station license system for spectrum sharing, techniques of introducing incentive auctions, and the types of services where spectrum sharing is applicable are discussed.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.271-300
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• 2004

We investigate the two recent simulations of the proto-type domestic carbon emission trading system in Korea and draw some policy implications. The first simulation includes the 5 electric power companies based on baseline and credit. But the second one is with the 7 energy-intensive companies based on cap and trade. The voluntary approaches in this paper revealed the instability of market equilibrium, i.e., price volatility or distortion, excess supply or demand. These phenomena stems from excess incentives to the players, asymmetric information, players' irresponsible strategic behaviors, and non acquaintance of trading system. This paper suggests the basic design for domestic carbon trading system in future and a stepwise introduction strategy for it including the incentive auction scheme, the total quantity of incentive needed, and how to finance it. Meantime, the further simulations on the various sectors based on voluntary participation must be essential for learning experiences and better policy design.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.12 no.9
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• pp.263-272
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• 2023

Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is an important factor in increasing production efficiency in industrial sectors, along with data collection, exchange and analysis through large-scale connectivity. However, as traffic increases explosively due to the recent spread of IIoT, an allocation method that can efficiently process traffic is required. In this thesis, I propose a two-stage task offloading decision method to increase successful task throughput in an IIoT environment. In addition, I consider a hybrid offloading system that can offload compute-intensive tasks to a mobile edge computing server via a cellular link or to a nearby IIoT device via a Device to Device (D2D) link. The first stage is to design an incentive mechanism to prevent devices participating in task offloading from acting selfishly and giving difficulties in improving task throughput. Among the mechanism design, McAfee's mechanism is used to control the selfish behavior of the devices that process the task and to increase the overall system throughput. After that, in stage 2, I propose a multi-armed bandit (MAB)-based task offloading decision method in a non-stationary environment by considering the irregular movement of the IIoT device. Experimental results show that the proposed method can obtain better performance in terms of overall system throughput, communication failure rate and regret compared to other existing methods.