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http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/JCN.2014.000076

Incentive Mechanism Design for Heterogeneous Networking Routing  

Shu, Yongan (Computer Science and Technology Institute, Anhui University)
Shu, Ziyu (School of Information and Electronics, Beijing Institute of Technology)
Luo, Bin (Computer Science and Technology Institute, Anhui University)
Publication Information
Journal of Communications and Networks / v.16, no.4, 2014 , pp. 458-464 More about this Journal
Abstract
In the future, an increasing number of heterogeneous networks will be connected with each other. Each of them has its own interest. Existing systems lack good incentive mechanisms to attract more networks to participate in cooperations. In this paper, we design an auction-based incentive mechanism for routing protocols applied in heterogeneous networking which is computationally efficient, individually rational, profitable, and truthful. Through several simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate the properties of our mechanism.
Keywords
Heterogeneous networking; incentive mechanism design; routing;
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