• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
• /
• v.55 no.6
• /
• pp.2263-2275
• /
• 2023

In general, an internal fire events probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) model is quantified by modifying the pre-existing internal event PSA model. Because many pieces of equipment or cables can be damaged by a fire, a single fire event can lead to multiple internal events PSA initiating events (IEs). Consequently, when the fire events PSA model is quantified, inappropriate minimal cut sets (MCSs), such as duplicate MCSs, may be generated. This paper shows that single quantification of a hypothetical single-top fire event PSA model may generate the following four types of inappropriate MCSs: duplicate MCSs, MCSs subsumed by other MCSs, nonsense MCSs, and MCSs with over-counted fire frequencies. Among the inappropriate MCSs, the nonsense MCSs should be addressed first because they can interfere with the right interpretation of the other MCSs and prevent the resolution of the issues related to the other inappropriate MCSs. In addition, we propose a resolution process for each of the issues caused by these inappropriate MCSs and suggest an overall procedure for resolving them. The results of this study will contribute to the understanding and resolution of the inappropriate MCSs that may appear in the quantification of fire events PSA models.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
• /
• v.54 no.1
• /
• pp.110-116
• /
• 2022

Human failure event (HFE) dependency analysis is a part of human reliability analysis (HRA). For efficient HFE dependency analysis, a maximum number of minimal cut sets (MCSs) that have HFE combinations are generated from the fault trees for the probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) of nuclear power plants (NPPs). After collecting potential HFE combinations, dependency levels of subsequent HFEs on the preceding HFEs in each MCS are analyzed and assigned as conditional probabilities. Then, HFE recovery is performed to reflect these conditional probabilities in MCSs by modifying MCSs. Inappropriate HFE dependency analysis and HFE recovery might lead to an inaccurate core damage frequency (CDF). Using the above process, HFE recovery is performed on MCSs that are generated with a non-zero truncation limit, where many MCSs that have HFE combinations are truncated. As a result, the resultant CDF might be underestimated. In this paper, a new method is suggested to incorporate HFE recovery into the MCS generation stage. Compared to the current approach with a separate HFE recovery after MCS generation, this new method can (1) reduce the total time and burden for MCS generation and HFE recovery, (2) prevent the truncation of MCSs that have dependent HFEs, and (3) avoid CDF underestimation. This new method is a simple but very effective means of performing MCS generation and HFE recovery simultaneously and improving CDF accuracy. The effectiveness and strength of the new method are clearly demonstrated and discussed with fault trees and HFE combinations that have joint probabilities.