• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.31-48
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• 2002

This paper is aimed to analyze how to evaluate the choice of optimal management measures and level of control in fisheries management under the costly and imperfect management system by comparing with costless and perfect management system that is commonly assumed in the analysis of fisheries regulations. Fishermen would set the level of fishing efforts at the point where the marginal fishing profit for fishing effort is equal to the marginal level of fine under costly and imperfect management system. Therefore, under the case where the marginal fishing profit is higher than the marginal level of fine, the level of fishing efforts would be made at the point which is higher than the level of fishing efforts made under costless and perfect management system and is not a point where the economic profit is maximized in regulated fisheries. From this conclusion, the fishermens avoidance activities against regulations as well as the level of control in fisheries management substantially have an influence on the choice of fisheries management instruments. According to the analysis of optimal fisheries management policy, the economic profits in regulated fisheries are determined by the level of fisheries enforcement costs and total fishing profits, in which as enforcement costs increase the economic profits decrease. In addition, the economic profits vary in response to the level of control in avoidance activities. That is, as avoidance costs decrease, the economic profits increase. The determination of optimal level of control in fisheries management should be made at the point where the marginal regulation costs are equal to the marginal profits from regulated fisheries, in which marginal regulation costs are different according to the type of management measures. And the level of profits changes in response to different levels of avoidance activities. The management measure that can maximize the difference between the marginal regulation costs and marginal profits from regulated fisheries should be chosen as an optimal fisheries management instrument.

• Journal of Fisheries and Marine Sciences Education
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.99-109
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• 2004

This study analyzed the multivariate impacts of subsidies on the sustainability of fish stock using a dynamic bioeconomic modeling and fisheries resources economic approaches for understanding impacts of a subsidy on the sustainability of a fish stock. According to the results of analysis, the conclusion of former studies is true only there are imperfect control of fishing effort and enforcement under management rerime and under open access. However, if there are perfect control of effort and enforcement, the subsidies do not give any negative impacts on the sustainability of fish stock. Further, if even so-called bad subsidy is also provided necessarily in response to the condition of fishing industry and the characteristic of fishermen, it can give positive impacts on fishing income by which fishermen can improve their fishing condition.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.1-12
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• 2000

The experience of many countries strongly suggests that bad governments and institutions have been a serious, if not the most serious, obstacle to economic growth and industry-structural adjustments. All public sectors pursue a mix of both predatory and productive activities-bad governments emphasizing the former, while good governments finding a way of promoting the later. In fishery public policy studies, much confusion exists about the roles of policy illustration and prescription. In general fishery public sectors involve collective actions by numerous individuals under conditions of uncertainty, complexity, bounded rationality, and imperfect information structure. All collective fisheries action organizations consist of a center(e.g., government), which leads fishery group actions, and peripheral participants(e.g., fishermen), which are controlled by the government. A paradigm is developed that gives both theoretical and empirical meaning to the constitutional determination of fisheries political preference function or fishery public sector governance structures. Three relevant spaces are specified: policy instrument, results, and constitutional. The collective-choice rules of the constitutional space structure the tradeoff between public and special fishery interest groups. Fishery public sectors seeking sustainable reductions in wasteful rent-seeking fishing activities should select constitutional principles and institutional structures that tend to promote resource sustainability. In particular, the effects of internal and external events on fisheries may result in a greater or lesser concentration of interest group power. Thus, the structure of the fishereis political power must be assessed in any prescriptive evaluation of alternative fishery governance weights.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.35 no.2
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• pp.117-137
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• 2004

지속적인 어업자원 이용에 대한 수산보조금의 역할을 분석한 기존 연구들은 단순히 세계 전체적이거나 국가별 총어업수입과 총어업비용만을 고려하여 잠정적으로 비용 절감형 또는 수입조장형 보조금이 어획노력량 수준을 증가시켜 어업자원의 감소를 부추기거나 남획을 초래했다고 결론짓고 있다. 또한 어업의 특성상 어업에 있어서 각종 규제수단이 사용되고 있음에도 불구하고 이들 수단들의 효과와 보조금과의 관계를 분석하지 못함으로써 어업자원에 대한 보조금의 영향을 명확하게 설명하지 못하였다. 본 연구에서는 어업에 있어서의 각종 규제수단의 사용에 따른 보조금의 영향을 국제적으로 권고되고 있는 생물경제모델을 이용하여 분석함으로써 보조금이 어업자원에 미치는 영향을 살펴보았다 분석결과에 따르면, 기존 연구들의 잠정적인 결론은 관리수단조치가 전혀 이루어지지 않거나, 이루어지더라도 불완전하게 어획노력량 등이 통제될 경우에만 타당한 것으로 나타났다. 반대로, 관리수단 하에서 어획노력량 등에 대한 감시 및 통제가 완벽하게 이루어질 경우에는 기존 연구결과와 달리 수산보조금이 어업자원에 부정적인 영향을 미치지 않는 것으로 분석되었다 오히려 일반적으로 부정적인 것으로 취급되는 보조금의 경우도 어업상황에 따라서는 어업자원에 대한 부정적인 피해 없이 어업에 긍정적인 영향을 줄 수 있는 것으로 나타났다.