This paper provides a simple microeconomic model of terrorist attcks and anti-terrorism policies. The terrorists can be characterised as rational actors, choosing between legal activities and terrorist activities to promote their political goals. Since their resources are limited, one can think of anti-terrorist policies by examining how such policies affect the objectives and constraints of terrorists. Deterrence policy seeks to reduce terrorist attacks by raising the cost of undertaking terrorist acts. Proactive policy aims at preventing attacks by destroying terrorists' resources (fund, personnel, leadership). This paper suggests another type of anti-terrorist policy which is to reduce the benefits of (or in other words, raising the opportunity costs of) terrorist acts. Such a policy is based on decentralisation in political decision-making and economic power.
Conclusion is like below. First, as a private security area's mutual relationship and development device, it is necessary to bring up corresponding-terror expert. Second, a privatized corresponding-terror research center is necessary. Third, the importance of privatization's role for the corresponding-terror prevention law establishment. It is considered that a diversified examination research that can minimize a violation of human rights by bringing up various corresponding-terror expert, paradigm shift of workers related security area, and construct corresponding- terror education equipment as well as education content, it is not a special group's authority, should be continued by a following research. Academical area of terrorism's construction is necessary. You need to approach by private initiatively boldly with the academic world as an active mutual cooperation politically, culturally, socially, internationally, etc, rather than developing national institute initiatively. Also, in a following research, an academical research about a correlation of crime, war, terror should be done deeply, variously. It is necessary to establish an academic foundation of terror study.
China has become a G-2 Superpower country as result of rapid economic growth through the reform and opening-up in these days. It expressed its confidence by helding a few big international events, such as Bejing Olympic Games. Shanghai Expo. Though most Chinese people give their agreement and support to the government, there are serious, ill-concealed political problems behind the curtain in China. As a multi-ethnic nation, China has repeated experience of fragmentation and integration of various ethnic groups through her long history. In spite of top-level political leaders of communist party always concern the issues of separatism very sensitively, China has suffered occasional bloodshed terrorism because of erupting ethnic and religious conflicts. Especially there are many disruption and fear due to the bloodshed and terrorism by a minority race-seperatists of Uighur tribe in Xinjiang province. The Uighur in Xinjiang province is very different from major Chinese Han ethnically and culturally. Although Chinese government has presented various policies in order to suppress the Uighus's desire for seperation, they have not been able to offer a fundamental, satisfying solution. Because we, Korean people face the expansion of possibility of conflicts, such as increasing of foreign workers, multi-cultural families and extremists. At this point, I believe we can learn valuable lessons from Chinese experiences for anti-terrorism.
Proceedings of the Korea Technology Innovation Society Conference
/
2003.11a
/
pp.369-386
/
2003
Radiation technologies are being utilized in a wide range of daily modern life and provide the public with valuable benefits through applications in fields of medical, industrial, agricultural, and science & engineering research. On the other hand, there is a high possibility that radioactive materials can be used for malevolent purposes such as dirty bombs. The International community, therefore, has made efforts to improve the security of radioactive sources aimed at protecting the public from radiological terrorism. The paper investigated high-risk radioactive sources which could be used as dirty bombs. The paper reviewed the possibility of radiological weapon attacks and analyzed international trends to enhance security of radioactive sources. This study also proposed our countermeasures to reduce the threat of radiological terrorism and to properly respond to the radiological emergency caused by the radiological weapon attack.
Collecting international terrorism database is a challenging task not only for criminal justice personnel but also for criminologists in comparison to the case of common types of crime database. Yet, there has been growing interests and efforts in establishing a comprehensive terrorist events data base in the world. This current study has a goal to introduce an example world terrorism database case developed by START center in the United States. The START center developed the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) on the basis of by the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service data (PGIS) originally collected by the Pinkerton. Furthermore, The START expended the GTD by collecting data from open source terrorist event data via internet and other resources. In this study, specifically, it describes the development and the nature of the GTD in general and the data collection efforts made by the STATA until today. Finally, this study provides a sketchy of the nature of the GTD data by showing the descriptive statistical analyses and time-series analyses result illustrating distribution of the world terrorism events. The limitation, policy implications and contribution of this study discussed in this paper.
Today's high-rise buildings are increasing concern about the safety and evacuation of people related to the fire and threat from outside. Terrorism breaking out in high-rise buildings, a symbol of the national economy results in a number of casualties, economic loss, social fear and damage to national status. That's why high-rise building has also emerged as a target of major terrorist attacks, compared to other types of buildings. We have 54 high-rise buildings in 15 regions over the country. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and Seoul Metropolitan Government have offered the guidelines to prevent terrorist attacks toward high-rise buildings. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has developed and taken advantage of the Risk Management Manual Series. According to this manual, pre-assessment is conducted for the prevention of terrorism and particularly in FEMA 455, risk of the surrounding areas, vulnerability, possibility from terrorist attacks are checked. After the check, experts classify the risk of terrorist attacks toward the high-rise buildings and according to the risk classification, architects, security experts and structure engineers can carry out terrorism prevention program for high-rise buildings. The U.K. NaCTSO has also offered the terrorism prevention guidelines. Therefore, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and Seoul Metropolitan Government should make more concrete guidelines for high-rise buildings such as what U.S. FEMA and U.K. NaCTSO implement, including prior evaluation technique for terrorism risk.
The Fundamental purpose of the Warsaw Convention was to establish uniform rules applicable to international air transportation. The emphasis on the benefits of uniformity was considered important in the beginning and continues to be important to the present. If the desire for uniformity is indeed the mortar which holds the Warsaw system together then it should be possible to agree on a worldwide liability limit. This liability limit would not be so unreasonable, that it would be impossible for nations to adhere to it. It would preclude any national supplemental compensation plan or Montreal Agreement type of requirement in any jurisdiction. The differentiation of liability limits by national requirement seems to be what is occurring. There is a plethora of mandated limits and Montreal Agreement type 'voluntary' limits. It is becoming difficult to find more than a few major States where an unmodified Warsaw Convention or Hague Protocol limitation is still in effect. If this is the real world in the 1980's, then let the treaty so reflect it. Upon reviewing the Warsaw Convention, its history and the several attempts to amend it, strengths become apparent. Hijackings of international flights have given rise to a number of lawsuits by passengers to recover damages for injuries suffered. This comment is concerned with the liability of an airline for injuries to its passengers resulting from aviation terrorism. In addition, analysis is focused on current airline security measures, particularly the pre-boarding screening system, and the duty of air carriers to prevent weapons from penetrating that system. An airline has a duty to exercise a high degree of care to protect its passengers from the threat of aviation terrorism. This duty would seemingly require the airline to exercise a high degree of care to prevent any passenger from smuggling a weapon or explosive device aboard its aircraft. In the case an unarmed hijacker who boards having no instrument in his possession with which to promote the hoax, a plaintiff-passenger would be hard-pressed to show that the airline was negligent in screening the hijacker prior to boarding. In light of the airline's duty to exercise a high degree of care to provide for the safety of all the passengers on board, an acquiescene to a hijacker's demands on the part of the air carrier could constitute a breach of duty only when it is clearly shown that the carrier's employees knew or plainly should have known that the hijacker was unarmed. A finding of willful misconduct on the part of an air carrier, which is a prerequisite to imposing unlimited liability, remains a question to be determined by a jury using the definition or standard of willful misconduct prevailing in the jurisdiction of the forum court. Through the willful misconduct provision of the Warsaw Convention, air carrier face the possibility of unlimited liability for failure to implement proper preventive precautions against terrorist. Courts, therefore, should broadly construe the willful misconduct provision of the Warsaw Convention in order to find unlimited liability for passenger injuries whenever air carrier security precautions are lacking. In this way, the courts can help ensure air carrier safety and prevention against terrorist attack. Air carriers, therefore, would have an incentive to increase, impose and maintain security precautions designed to thwart such potential terrorist attacks as in the case of Korean Air Lines Flight No.858 incident having a tremendous impact on the civil aviation community. The crash of a commercial airliner, with the attending tragic loss of life and massive destruction of property, always gives rise to shock and indignation. The general opinion is that the legal system could be sufficient, provided that the political will is there to use and apply it effectively. All agreed that the main responsibility for security has to be borne by the governments. I would like to remind all passengers that every discovery of the human spirit may be used for opposite ends; thus, aircraft can be used for air travel but also as targets of terrorism. A state that supports aviation terrorism is responsible for violation of International Aviation Law. Generally speaking, terrorism is a violation of international law. It violates the soverign rights of the states, and the human rights of the individuals. I think that aviation terrorism as becoming an ever more serious issue, has to be solved by internationally agreed and closely co-ordinated measures. We have to contribute more to the creation of a general consensus amongst all states about the need to combat the threat of aviation terrorism.
Since 11 September 2001, warnings of risk in the nexus of terrorism and nuclear weapons and materials which poses one of the gravest threats to the international community have continued. The purpose of this study is to analyze the aim, principles, characteristics, activities, impediments to progress and developmental recommendation of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism(GICNT). In addition, it suggests implications of the GICNT for the ROK policy. International community will need a comprehensive strategy with four key elements to accomplish the GICNT: (1) securing and reducing nuclear stockpiles around the world, (2) countering terrorist nuclear plots, (3) preventing and deterring state transfers of nuclear weapons or materials to terrorists, (4) interdicting nuclear smuggling. Moreover, other steps should be taken to build the needed sense of urgency, including: (1) analysis and assessment through joint threat briefing for real nuclear threat possibility, (2) nuclear terrorism exercises, (3) fast-paced nuclear security reviews, (4) realistic testing of nuclear security performance to defeat insider or outsider threats, (5) preparing shared database of threats and incidents. As for the ROK, main concerns are transfer of North Korea's nuclear weapons, materials and technology to international terror groups and attacks on nuclear facilities and uses of nuclear devices. As the 5th nuclear country, the ROK has strengthened systems of physical protection and nuclear counterterrorism based on the international conventions. In order to comprehensive and effective prevention of nuclear terrorism, the ROK has to strengthen nuclear detection instruments and mobile radiation monitoring system in airports, ports, road networks, and national critical infrastructures. Furthermore, it has to draw up effective crisis management manual and prepare nuclear counterterrorism exercises and operational postures. The fundamental key to the prevention, detection and response to nuclear terrorism which leads to catastrophic impacts is to establish not only domestic law, institution and systems, but also strengthen international cooperation.
Purpose: The purpose of this study was to analyze the current state of drone terrorism response at such critical national facilities and derive improvements, especially to identify problems in laws and systems to effectively utilize the anti-drone system and present directions for improvement. Method: A qualitative research method was used for this study by analyzing a variety of issues not discussed in existing research papers and policy documents through in-depth interviews with subject matter experts. In-depth interviews were conducted based on 12 semi-structured interviews by selecting 16 experts in the field of anti-drone and terrorism in Korea. The interview contents were recorded with the prior consent of the study participants, transcribed back to the Korean file, and problems and improvement measures were derived through coding. For this, the threats and types were analyzed based on the cases of drone terrorism occurring abroad and measures to establish anti-drone system were researched from the perspective of laws and systems by evaluating the possibility of drone terrorism in the Republic of Korea. Result: As a result of the study, improvements to some of the problems that need to be preceded in order to effectively respond to drone terrorism at critical national facilities in the Republic of Korea, have been identified. First, terminologies related to critical national facilities and drone terrorism should be clearly defined and reflected in the Integrated Defense Act and the Terrorism Prevention Act. Second, the current concept of protection of critical national facilities should evolve from the current ground-oriented protection to a three-dimensional protection concept that considers air threats and the Integrated Defense Act should reflect a plan to effectively install the anti-drone system that can materialize the concept. Third, a special law against flying over critical national facilities should be enacted. To this end, legislation should be enacted to expand designated facilities subject to flight restrictions while minimizing the range of no fly zone, but the law should be revised so that the two wings of "drone industry development" and "protection of critical national facilities" can develop in a balanced manner. Fourth, illegal flight response system and related systems should be improved and reestablished. For example, it is necessary to prepare a unified manual for general matters, but thorough preparation should be made by customizing it according to the characteristics of each facility, expanding professional manpower, and enhancing response training. Conclusion: The focus of this study is to present directions for policy and technology development to establish an anti-drone system that can effectively respond to drone terrorism and illegal drones at critical national facilities going forward.
Recently, alarmed by the frequent international terrorism or safety accidents, the host countries of world sports events are focusing on security activities for the sake of the participants, facilities, events and competitions. They are alarmed because in case any happenings like international terrorism or safety accident, the contest itself can be criticized to be a failure as much as the international reliability of the host nation may well crash. We can see that any failure in coping with terrorism or safety matters can lead to a nation-wise crisis in the case of Indonesia where the October 12th of 2002 terrorist bomb attack in Bali damaged the image of the nation followed by the similar case in Philippine (Oct. 20th, 2002) where the same terrorist attack dramatically scared away the tourists to the nation. Korea is scheduled to hold the World Championship in Athletics in Daegu Metropolitan City in 2011. Also, it is slated to host various world sports events such as Yeosu International Exposition and Incheon Asian Games. In these contexts, this study analyzes counter-terrorism cases related with the recent international sports events that have been organized in a variety of manners in the era of globalization. This study aims to show alternatives for the safety management in these events. In other words, it is focusing on giving directions to the safety policies of the nation -which may become the future hub of north-east Asia and the world - for more perfect guard and defense, and counter-terrorism activities in all the conferences, sports events and international festivals where any private defense and guard companies are allowed to cooperate with the police force or public security agencies.
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