• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제22권2호
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• pp.31-52
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• 2012

Although political uncertainty exists between China and Taiwan, the two countries have been expanding their economic exchange since the 1980s. That economic exchange is not limited to trade, and its investment segment is constantly expanding. The investment was one-sided by Taiwan in the past, but since a change in policy by the Taiwan government in 2009, Chinese capital is able to flow into Taiwan for direct investment. These kinds of policy changes related to investment between the two countries require follow-up actions such as profit protection for investors, elimination of investment limitations, simplification of investment procedures, and establishment of an investment dispute resolution system. The main topic of this study is the resolution mechanism for investment disputes between China and Taiwan. At present, an individual investment dispute between two countries is settled according to each country's own regulations for dispute resolution. However, these two countries have not prepared dispute resolution regulations related to cases of investment disputes between Chinese or Taiwanese investors and the Chinese or Taiwanese government, or between the Chinese government and the Taiwanese government. Moreover, they do not have any agreements related to investment disputes. Therefore, in this paper, I enumerate the regulations related to investment dispute resolution between China and Taiwan, and then I point out the problems and suggest solutions for improvement. Also, through this study, I would like to contribute to establishing and implementing an investment dispute resolution mechanism between South Korea and North Korea.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제29권4호
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• pp.77-100
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• 2019

Third-party funding in international and domestic disputes is a fast-growing trend and it is increasingly used by large, solvent companies that simply wish to share risk in their finance. On January 10, 2017, the Civil Law Amendment Bill was passed in Singapore and on June 2017 an "Arbitration and Mediation Legislation (Third Party Funding) Bill" in Hong-Kong had a third-party funding to finance the international arbitration and other dispute resolutions expressly approved. This arbitral tribunal's expanding discretion over critical interim measure of security cost was in issue. In Essar v. Norscot (2016), the arbitrator found that the additional third-party funding costs were recoverable as "other costs of the parties." In here, the decision showed the issue of a tribunal's power over cost measures could spread out to be reviewed and broadened through the legislative process. A recent investor-state arbitration case of ICSID, RSM Production Corporation v. Saint Lucia, covered the express awarding of security for costs where a claimant was funded by a third-party funder. It seems inevitable that the volume of third-party funding industry will grow more as time goes on. The next step would be to formulate guidelines on how to determine criteria against which an application for security for costs is measured.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제24권2호
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• pp.33-52
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• 2014

기후변화문제는 이미 글로벌 이슈로 부상한 지 오래이지만, 기후변화문제를 각국의 정책으로 이식시키는데 필요한 국제투자법상의 적합한 기준들은 아직 마련되어 있지 않은 실정이다. 최근 ICSID중재에 회부된 Vattenfall v. Germany 사례는 독일 정부의 원전폐쇄 조치에 대한 기후변화 관련 국제투자분쟁의 대표적 사례라고 할 수 있다. 2005년 발효된 교토의정서는 환경오염의 주범인 온실가스를 감소시키는 방안으로 공동이행체제와 청정개발시스템 등의 유연한 메카니즘들을 제안하였다. 교토의정서의 이러한 교토메카니즘들은 이행규칙상, 사적 영역의 투자자들이 각국이 이행하는 교토메카니즘의 규제아래 놓일 수도 있게 함으로써 잠재적으로 투자분쟁의 위험을 지니고 있다고 할 수 있다. 각 국가가 교토메카니즘을 잘 이행하기 위한 배출기준의 더욱 엄격한 규제 등을 한다면 온실가스 감축이라는 글로벌 명제와 상관없이, 정부의 기후변화 조치들조차 수용의 금지라고 하는 국제투자중재의 투자자 보호 원칙들의 잣대 하에 놓일 가능성을 배제할 수 없는 것이다. 수 용의 문제에 있어 이제까지 대부분의 국제투자중재 판정에서 내려진 '침해의 결과(effect-based)'만을 기준으로 적용한다면, 각국 정부들의 배출기준 조정에 대해 투자자들이 자신들의 투자를 유치국 정부가 수용했다고 볼 수 있는 가능성이 생긴다. 투자중재 회부의 두려움으로 인한 각국 정부의 '규제적 위축(regulatory chill)'의 문제도 세계 각국이 기후 변화정책을 강화하는 것을 방해하는 역할을 할 수 있다. 투자 계약상 투자자를 보호하기 위한 정부조치의 '정지조항(stablization clause)'도 투자 유치국의 기후변화 이행과 새로운 입법에 된서리 효과를 가지고 올 것이다. 그리고 현재까지의 투자중재 판정부의 공정하고 공평한 대우 기준(FET)의 적용을 본다면, 교토메카니즘 이전에 탄소 집약적 산업들이 저탄소 운영체제로 가기 위해 투자유치국에 진입할 때, 투자유치국이 적절한 이행을 하는데에 상당한 부담을 줄 수도 있다. 그러므로 Methanex 사건 판정부에서처럼, 수용에 있어서 침해결과만을 볼 것이 아니라, 정부의 규제결정이 의도적으로 외국인 투자자의 투자를 침해할 목적이 아니고 비차별적이며 공공적인 목적이라면 수용의 범주에 포함시키지 않도록 하는 것이 바람직할 것이다. 또한 환경법상의 지속가능한 발전의 원칙을 투자조약이나 투자계약에 포함하도록 하는 것을 고려해 볼 수 있다. 덧붙여 이후부터 정부가 투자자-국가 중재 회부 가능성이라는 부담을 벗어나서 환경규제를 이행하기 위해서는 투자자-국가 중재이외의 다른 적절한 분쟁해결 조항을 입안하여 합의하는 것도 고려해 볼만 하다.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제30권2호
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• pp.91-120
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• 2020

The Scope of Application of North Korea's Foreign Economic Arbitration Act and Foreign Investment Act This article examines whether the Foreign Economic Arbitration Act and the Foreign Investment Act of North Korea apply to South Korean parties or companies. This article analyzes laws and agreements related to economic cooperation between South Korea and North Korea. Furthermore, this article compares and evaluates laws related to foreign investment and enacted in North Korea. Now, North Korea's door is closed due to economic sanctions against it, but it will be opened soon. Thus, this article prepares for the future opening of North Korea's markets. Is there a rule of laws in North Korea or just a ruler? Are there laws in North Korea? North Korea has enacted a number of legislation to attract foreign investors, referring to those Chinese laws. For example, North Korea enacted the Foreigner Investment Act, the Foreigner Company Act, the Foreign Investment Bank Act, the Foreign Economic Arbitration Act, the Foreign Economic Contract Act, the International Trade Act, and the Free Economy and Trade Zone Act, among others. Article 2 (2) of the Foreign Investment Law of North Korea states, "Foreign investors are corporations and individuals from other countries investing in our country." It is interpreted that South Korea is not included in the "other countries" of this definition. According to many mutual agreements signed by South Korea and North Korea, the relationship between the two Koreas is a special relation inside the Korean ethnic group. An arbitration between a South Korean party and a North Korean party has the characteristics of both domestic arbitrations and international arbitrations. If the South Korea and North Korea Commercial Arbitration Commission or the Kaesong Industrial Complex Arbitration Commission is not established, the possibility of arbitration by the Chosun International Trade Arbitration Commission, established under North Korea's Foreign Economic Arbitration Act, should be examined. There have been no cases where the Foreign Economic Arbitration Act is applied to disputes between parties of South Korea and North Korea. It might be possible to apply the Foreign Economic Arbitration Act by recognizing the "foreign factor" of a dispute between the South Korean party and North Korean party. It is necessary to raise legislative clarifications by revising the North Korea's Foreign Economic Arbitration Act as to whether Korean parties or companies are included in the scope of this Act's application. Even if it is interpreted that South Korean parties or companies are not included in the scope of North Korea's Foreign Economic Arbitration Act, disputes between South Korean companies and North Korean companies can be resolved by foreign arbitration institutes such as CIETAC in China, HKIAC in Hong Kong, or SIAC in Singapore. Such arbitration awards could be enforced in North Korea pursuant to Article 64 of North Korea's Foreign Economic Arbitration Act. This is because the arbitration awards of foreign arbitration institutes are included in the scope of North Korea's Foreign Economic Arbitration Act. The matter is how to enforce the North Korean laws when a North Korean party or North Korean government does not abide by the laws or their contracts. It is essential for North Korea to join the New York Convention (Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards) and the ICSID Convention (Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States).