• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.59-89
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• 2009

The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.1
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• pp.147-162
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• 1989

The current status of the application and interpretation of the Warsaw Convention and its subsequent Protocols in Asian countries is in its fredgling stages compared to the developed countries of Europe and North America, and there is thus little published information about the various Asian governments' treatment and courts' views of the Warsaw System. Due to that limitation, the accent of this paper will be on Korea and Japan. As one will be aware, the so-called 'Warsaw System' is made up of the Warsaw Convention of 1929, the Hague Protocol of 1955, the Guadalajara Convention of 1961, the Guatemala City Protocol of 1971 and the Montreal Additional Protocols Nos. 1,2,3 and 4 of 1975. Among these instruments, most of the countries in Asia are parties to both the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol. However, the Republic of Korea and Mongolia are parties only to the Hague Protocol, while Burma, Indonesia and Sri Lanka are parties only to the Warsaw Convention. Thailand and Taiwan are not parties only to the convention or protocol. Among Asian states, Indonesia, the Phillipines and Pakistan are also parties to the Guadalajara Convention, but no country in Asia has signed the Guatemala City Protocol of 1971 or the Montreal Additional Protocols, which Protocols have not yet been put into force. The People's Republic of China has declared that the Warsaw Convention shall apply to the entire Chinese territory, including Taiwan. 'The application of the Warsaw Convention to one-way air carriage between a state which is a party only to the Warsaw Convention and a state which is a party only to the Hague Protocol' is of particular importance in Korea as it is a signatory only to the Hague Protocol, but it is involved in a great deal of air transportation to and from the united states, which in turn is a party only to the Warsaw Convention. The opinion of the Supreme Court of Korea appears to be, that parties to the Warsaw Convention were intended to be parties to the Hague Protocol, whether they actually signed it or not. The effect of this decision is that in Korea the United States and Korea will be considered by the courts to be in a treaty relationship, though neither State is a signatory to the same instrument as the other State. The first wrongful death claim in Korea related to international carriage by air under the Convention was made in Hyun-Mo Bang, et al v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. case. In this case, the plaintiffs claimed for damages based upon breach of contract as well as upon tort under the Korean Civil Code. The issue in the case was whether the time limitation provisions of the Convention should be applicable to a claim based in tort as well as to a claim based in contract. The Appellate Court ruled on 29 August 1983 that 'however founded' in Article 24(1) of the Convention should be construed to mean that the Convention should be applicable to the claim regardless of whether the cause of action was based in tort or breach of contract, and that the plaintiffs' rights to damages had therefore extinguished because of the time limitation as set forth in Article 29(1) of the Convention. The difficult and often debated question of what exactly is meant by the words 'such default equivalent to wilful misconduct' in Article 25(1) of the Warsaw Convention, has also been litigated. The Supreme Court of Japan dealt with this issue in the Suzuki Shinjuten Co. v. Northwest Airlines Inc. case. The Supreme Court upheld the Appellate Court's ruling, and decided that 'such default equivalent to wilful misconduct' under Article 25(1) of the Convention was within the meaning of 'gross negligence' under the Japanese Commercial Code. The issue of the convention of the 'franc' into national currencies as provided in Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol has been raised in a court case in Korea, which is now before the District Court of Seoul. In this case, the plaintiff argues that the gold franc equivalent must be converted in Korean Won in accordance with the free market price of gold in Korea, as Korea has not enacted any law, order or regulation prescribing the proper method of calculating the equivalent in its national currency. while it is unclear if the court will accept this position, the last official price of gold of the United States as in the famous Franklin Mint case, Special Drawing Right(SDR) or the current French franc, Korean Air Lines has argued in favor of the last official price of gold of the United States by which the air lines converted such francs into us Dollars in their General Conditions of Carriage. It is my understanding that in India, an appellate court adopted the free market price valuation. There is a report as well saying that if a lawsuit concerning this issue were brought in Pakistan, the free market cost of gold would be applied there too. Speaking specifically about the future of the Warsaw System in Asia though I have been informed that Thailand is actively considering acceding to the Warsaw Convention, the attitudes of most Asian countries' governments towards the Warsaw System are still wnot ell known. There is little evidence that Asian countries are moving to deal concretely with the conversion of the franc into their own local currencies. So too it cannot be said that they are on the move to adhere to the Montreal Additional Protocols Nos. 3 & 4 which attempt to basically solve many of the current problems with the Warsaw System, by adopting the SDR as the unit of currency, by establishing the carrier's absolute liability and an unbreakable limit and by increasing the carrier's passenger limit of liability to SDR 100,000, as well as permiting the domestic introduction of supplemental compensation. To summarize my own sentiments regarding the future, I would say that given the fact that Asian air lines are now world leaders both in overall size and rate of growth, and the fact that both Asian individuals and governments are becoming more and more reliant on the global civil aviation networks as their economies become ever stronger, I am hopeful that Asian nations will henceforth play a bigger role in ensuring the orderly and hasty development of a workable unified system of rules governing international commercial air carriage.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.30 no.2
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• pp.201-248
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• 2015

In Korea the number of unlawful interference act on board aircrafts has been increased continuously according to the growth of aviation demand, and there were 55 incidents in 2000, followed by 354 incidents in 2014, and an average of 211 incidents a year over the past five years. In 1963, a number of states adopted the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (the Tokyo Convention 1963) as the first worldwide international legal instrument on aviation security. The Tokyo Convention took effect in 1969 and, shortly afterward, in 1970 the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft(the Hague Convention 1970) was adopted, and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation(the Montreal Convention 1971) was adopted in 1971. After 9/11 incidents in 2001, to amend and supplement the Montreal Convention 1971, the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation(the Beijing Convention 2010) was adopted in 2010, and to supplement the Hague Convention 1970, the Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft(the Beijing Protocol 2010) was adopted in 2010. Since then, in response to increased cases of unruly behavior on board aircrafts which escalated in both severity and frequency,, the Montreal Protocol which is seen as an amendment to the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft(the Tokyo Convention 1963) was adopted in 2014. Korea ratified the Tokyo Convention 1963, the Hague Convention 1970, the Montreal Convention 1971, the Montreal Supplementary Protocol 1988, and the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosive 1991 which have proven to be effective. Under the Tokyo Convention ratified in 1970, Korea further enacted the Aircraft Navigation Safety Act in 1974, as well as the Aviation Safety and Security Act that replaced the Aircraft Navigation Safety Act in August 2002. Meanwhile, the title of the Aviation Safety and Security Act was changed to the Aviation Security Act in April 2014. The Aviation Security Act is essentially an implementing legislation of the Tokyo Convention and Hague Convention. Also the language of the Aviation Security Act is generally broader than the unruly and disruptive behavior in Sections 1-3 of the model legislation in ICAO Circular 288. The Aviation Security Act has reflected the considerable parts of the implementation of national legislation under the Beijing Convention and Beijing Protocol 2010, and the Montreal Protocol 2014 that are the modernized international conventions relating to aviation security. However, in future, when these international conventions would come into effect and Korea would ratify them, the national legislation that should be amended or provided newly in the Aviation Security Act are as followings : The jurisdiction, the definition of 'in flight', the immunity from the actions against the aircraft commander, etc., the compulsory delivery of the offender by the aircraft commander, etc., the strengthening of penalty on the person breaking the law, the enlargement of application to the accomplice, and the observance of international convention. Among them, particularly the Korean legislation is silent on the scope of the jurisdiction. Therefore, in order for jurisdiction to be extended to the extra-territorial cases of unruly and disruptive offences, it is desirable that either the Aviation Security Act or the general Crime Codes should be revised. In conclusion, in order to meet the intelligent and diverse aviation threats, the Korean government should review closely the contents of international conventions relating to aviation security and the current ratification status of international conventions by each state, and make effort to improve the legislation relating to aviation security and the aviation security system for the ratification of international conventions and the implementation of national legislation under international conventions.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.6
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• pp.191-215
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• 1994

The concept of 'wilful misconduct" was initally used in article 25 of the Warsaw Convention of 1929. The concept was defined in the Hague Protocol, 1955, as having the following two differing concepts: i) "with the intent to cause damage" and ii) "recklessly and with the knowledge that damage would probably result." The concepts contained in the Hague Protocol were used in various international Conventions on carriage by sea, such as Article 2(e) and Article 3(4) of the Protocol adopted at Brussels on Feb. 23, 1968 to amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading, signed at Brussels, Aug. 25, 1929(Hague-Visby Rules), Article 13 of the Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, Dec. 13. 1974, Article 4 of the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976, Article 8(1) of the U.N. Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978(Hamburg Rules) and Article 21 (1) of the U.N. Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods, Geneva, 1980. The same concepts were also adopted in Article 746, 789-2(1), 789-3(2) of the Korean Maritime Commercial Law, revised in 1991. As of yet, the legal system of Korean Private Law recognizes only the concepts of "Vorsatz" and "grobe Nachlassigkeit", as is the case with German Private Law. The problem is that the concepts in the Convention do not coincide precisely with the concepts of "Vorsatz" and "grobe Nachlassigkeit". The author has conducted a comparative analysis of the treatment of the concepts of wilful misconduct and its varied interpretations, that is, "with the intent to cause damage" and "recklessly and with the knowledge that damage would probably result" in the Anglo-American law and in the continental European law in the following manner: 1. Background in which the concept of wilful misconduct was introduced in the Warsaw Convention. 2. The concept of "dol" in French private law. 3. The concepts of "Vorsatz" and "grobe Nachlassigkeit" in Korean private law. 4. Analysis of the concept of wilful misconduct in Anglo-American case law. 5. Analysis of the cases interpreting the concepts of "with intent to cause damage" and "recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result" in various jurisdictions. 6. The need to incorporate the concepts of "with the intent to cause damage" and "recklessly and with the knowledge that damage would probably result." 7. Faute inexcusable in French private law. Based upon the comparative analysis, the author points out the difference between the concepts of "wilful misconduct" or "with the intent to cause damage" and "Vorsatz", and between the concepts of "recklessly and with the knowledge that damage would probably result" and "grobe Nachlassigkeit" in the Convention and that of the Korean Private Law system. Additionally, the author emphasizes the importance of the unification in the interpretation of the provisions of the Conventions world wide.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.16
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• pp.160-196
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• 2002

In this thesis. I have first introduced and studied Chubb & Son. Inc. v. Asiana Airlines. 214 F.3d 301 (2nd Cir. 2000). which held that at the time that the dispute in this case arose. there was no treaty relationship between the United States and South Korea under the Original Warsaw convention. the Hague Protocol. or a treaty consisting of those provisions of the Original Convention that were not amended by the Protocol. And I have analyzed U.S. government s position that was expressed in Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on petition for a writ certiorari to the 2nd Circuit on Chubb & Son case and 2nd Circuit s Fujitsu Limited v. Federal Express Corporation. 247 F.3d 423 (2001) which was held in a related question afterwards but was somewhat inconsistent with Chubb & Son s holding. Furthermore. I also examined U.S. government s measures which have been considered and taken to cope with consequences of Chubb & Son case's ruling. Lastly. I have examined several effects which Chubb & Son s ruling would give our nation s airlines and suggested our government's countermeasures.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.385-405
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• 2010

The purpose of this study is to investigate liability risk of air cargo carrier and suggests ideas for solving problems which could be happen to air transporters on the future. because of Air transport remains one of the world's fastest growing and most important industries. And important treaties and contracts specifying transporters' responsibility regarding big scale aircraft accidents are such as Warsaw Convention in 1929, Hague Protocol in 1955, Montreal Convention in 1999. The Montreal Convention, formally the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage, is a treaty adopted by Diplomatic meeting of ICAO member states in 1999. It amended important provisions of the Warsaw Convention's concerning compensation for the victims of air disasters. In conclusion, suggests to the method of air cargo security and cargo legal liability insurance which is for air cargo carrier's risk management.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.3-35
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• 2009

A concept of Aircraft crime includes an Air range, unlawful seizure of aircraft and unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. There are international treaties and conventions which have mainly been enacted by ICAO. The following treaties and conventions are categorical and unconditional norms that any States are clearly condemned. Convention on Offences and Certain other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation, Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection In this essay, I present the meaning of the aircraft crime mentioned on the treaties above and jurisdiction of the crime. Moreover, I explain how to demand reparation for damages onboard or on the surface when an aircraft crime is occurred. Lastly, I indicate legal bases of how to protect the victims of the aircraft crime by mentioning specific cases relating to the crime.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.7
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• pp.101-134
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• 1995

Article 3 Paragraph 1 of the Warsaw Convention regulates the requirements of passenger tickets, Article 4 Paragraph 3, the requirements of baggage tickets, Article 8, the requirements of airway bills. In this article the writer has discussed the legal nature of the documents of air carriage, such as air waybills, passenger tickets and baggage checks. Further, the writer has also discussed several issues relating to the use of the documents of air carriage under the Warsaw Convention. Article 3 Paragraph 2, as well as Article 4 Paragraph 4 and 9 provides that the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of the Convention which evade or limit his liability. In particular, the Montreal Agreement of 1966 provides that the notification on the carrier's liability in passenger ticket should be printed in more than 10 point type size with contrasting ink colors. However, another question is whether the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the liability limit under the Convention in case the type size is below 10 points. The Convention does not specify the type size of certain parts in passenger tickets and only provides that the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of liability limit, when a carrier fails to deliver the ticket to passenger. However, since the delivery of passenger tickets is to provide an opportunity for passengers to recognize the liability limit under the Convention and to map out a subsequent measures, the carrier who fails to give this opportunity shall not be entitled to avail himself of the liability limit under the Convention. But some decisions argue that when the notice on the carrier's liability limit is presented in a fine print in a hardly noticeable place, the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself under the Convention. Meanwhile, most decisions declare that regardless of the type size, the carrier is entitled to avail himself of liability limit of the provisions of the Convention. The reason is that neither the Warsaw Convention nor the Montreal Agreement stipulate that the carrier is deprived from the right to avail himself of liability limit of the provisions of the Convention when violating the notice requirement. In particular, the main objective of the Montreal Agreement is not on the notice of liability limit but on the increase of it. The latest decisons also maintain the same view. This issue seems to have beeen settled on the occasion of Elisa Chan, et al. vs. Korean Airlines Ltd. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the type size of passenger ticket can not be a target of controversy since it is not required by law, after a cautious interpretation of the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Agreement highlighting the fact that no grounds for that are found both in the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Agreement. Now the issue of type size can hardly become any grounds for the carrier not to exclude himself from the liability limit. In this regard, any challenge to raise issue on type size seems to be defeated. The same issue can be raised in both airway bills and baggage tickets. But this argument can be raised only to the tranportation where the original Convention is applied. This creates no problem under the Convention revised by the Hague Protocol, because the Hague Protocol does not require any information on weight, bulk, size, and number of cargo or baggage. The problem here is whether the carrier is entitled to avail himself of the liability limit of the provisions of the Convention when no information on number or weight of the consigned packages is available in accordance with Article 4 of the Convention. Currently the majority of decisions show positive stance on this. The carrier is entitled to avail himself of the liability limit of the provisions of the Convention when the requirement of information on number and weight of consigned packages is skipped, because these requirements are too technical and insubstancial. However some decisions declare just the opposite. They hold that the provisions of the Convention Article 4 is clear, and their meaning and effect should be imposed on it literally and that it is neither unjust nor too technical for a carrier to meet the minimum requirement prescribed in the Convention. Up to now, no decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court on this issue is available.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.4
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• pp.65-85
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• 1992

The air waybill is supposed to be made out by the consignor. If the carrier makes it out, he is deemed, subject to proof to the contrary, to have done so on behalf of the consignor. The air waybill shall be made out in three original parts. The first part shall be marked "for the carrier", and shall be signed by the consignor. The second part shall be marked "for the consignee", it shall be signed by the consignor and by the carrier and shall accompany the goods. The third part shall be signed by the carrier and handed by him to the consignor, after the goods have been accepted. According to the original Warsow Convention article 8, the air waybill must contain 17 particulars or items. However, the Hague Protocol reduced to three the number of particulars required to appear on the air waybill. Only one item is obligatory, namely, the notice that the carriage is subject to the rules of the Warsaw Convention. The absence of the air waybill entails unlimited liability of the carrier because it deprives him of the right to avail himself of the provisions of the Warsaw Convention which exclude or limit his liability. The consignor shall be liable for all damages suffered by the carrier or any other person by reason of the irregularity, incorrectness or incompleteness of the particulars and statements in the air waybill. Although the contract of the carriage of goods by air is not a formal contract, the document of carriage is issued. The issue of air wayhill is not essential for the existence or validity of the contract, but serves merely as a means of proof. The Hague Protocol has lessened the consequences of the carrier's neglect to faithfully accomplish the required formalities. Henceforth, these formalities no longer constitute legal obligations. The air waybill is the consignment note used for the carriage of goods by air. It is often called an air consignment note and is not a document of title or transferable/negotiable instrument. It is basically a receipt for the goods for despatch and is prima facie evidence of the conditions of carriage. Each of the original parts of the air waybill has evidential value and possession of his part is a condition for the exercise by the consignor or cosignee of his rights under the contract of carriage. Oveall, it is an usage that under a documentary letter of credit, the consignee on the air waybill is the opening bank of the letter of credit, and the notify party is the importer who applied for the letter of credit. In Korea there is an usage as to process of cargo delivery in air transportation as follows: The carrier carries the cargo into the bonded area of the airport and gives both the notice of arrival of the cargo and the consignee's air waybill to the notify party who is the importer. Then the notify party obtains the Letter of Guarantee from the opening bank in exchange for reimbursing the amount of the letter of credit or tendering the security therefor to the opening bank. The notify party then presents this document to the customs authorities for the process of customs clearance. The opening bank becomes a consignee only to ensure repayment of the funds it has expended, and the only interest of the opening bank as consignee is the reimbursement of the money paid to the exporter under the documentary letter of credit. Just as the bill of lading in maritime law, the air waybill has always been considered negotiable although the Warsaw Convention does not emphasize this aspect of negotiability. However, the Hague Protocol article 4 corrected the situation by stating that "nothing in this Convention prevents the issue of a negotiable air waybill." This provision officially recognizes that the air waybill must meet the needs of the present day business circles by being a negotiable instrument. Meanwhile, Montreal Additional Protocol no. 4 has brought important changes. Registration by computer is acceptable and the parties to the contract of carriage are allowed to replace the air waybill with a receipt for the goods. In conclusion, as the Warsaw Convention has not details of provisions relating to the issuing of the negotiable air waybill, it is hoped that there should be supplement to the Warsaw Convention and establishment of international commercial usage with regard to the negotiable air waybill.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.17
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• pp.9-28
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• 2003

The Warsaw Convention of 1929 and the amendments thereto including the Hague Protocol, Montreal Protocols Nos. 1,2,3 and 4, the Guadalajara Convention and the IATA Intercarrier Agreements, which are the rules (as called "War saw System") have played as a major rule in the international air transportation for more than 70 years, will be replaced by the Montreal Convention of 1999 for its effectiveness on November 4, 2003. While a major portion of the Montreal Convention follows the language of the Warsaw System, the Montreal Convention makes significant changes to the scope and extent of the carrier's liability, expands the jurisdictions where the carrier can be sued, and recognizes the effect of code sharing on air carrier liability. The Montreal Convention heralds the single biggest change in the international aviation since the diplomatic efforts in the mid-1920's which resulted in the enactment of the Warsaw Convention. Until now, the legal liability of almost all the international air carriers has been governed by the Warsaw System. The Montreal Convention incorporates provisions of these instruments to create a single document and to set a uniform regime for carrier liability in international transportation. At the same time the issue of the low liability limits of the Warsaw has been resolved to a more satisfactory level in the Montreal Convention. The Convention has been hailed as consumer friendly and progressive in nature. If this Convention is ratified by Korea, the virtual elimination of the liability limits between the passengers and the airlines will become law by treaty. The airlines in Korea as well as Korean consumers of international air carriage will immensely benefit from the ratification. As opposed to the Warsaw Convention, the Montreal Convention has been described to be the one that is no longer a Convention for airlines, but it would serve the interests of both the consumers and the air carriers.