• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.183-193
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• 2021

Purpose - The purpose of this study is to examine the impacts of global uncertainty on gross and net capital flows in Korea. Design/methodology/approach - We conduct an empirical analysis of the impact of global uncertainty on the net and gross capital flows in korea. To investigate the impacts, we incorporate linear and nonlinear ARDL models. Findings - We find global uncertainty has negative impacts on the gross and net capital flows. But this impact is nonlinear. The negative global uncertainty shocks are bigger than the positive global uncertainty shocks on capital flows in Korea. And we find this relationship is noticeable in gross capital inflows. We also find interest rate difference between the US and Korea is the main driving source in capital flow after the Global financial crisis. Research implications or Originality - The results of this study suggest that the negative impacts of global uncertainty are noticeable. This means that economic players in financial markets should be more concerned about the bad news.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.24 no.7
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• pp.38-53
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• 2020

Purpose - A financial crash triggers asset fire sales by foreign investors and, as a consequence, the price of domestic assets severely decreases. Domestic investors take advantage of these low prices by replacing foreign assets with domestic assets, which helps to alleviate the liquidity shock caused by foreigners. However, is the amount of capital retrenchment by domestic investors sufficient to protect the Korean economy from capital stop by foreign investors during financial crisis? This paper answers this question and suggests the implications of this phenomenon for the Korean economy. Design/methodology - We estimate the associations between capital stop and retrenchment and various financial crises such as banking, currency, debt, and inflation crises using the complementary log-log model. Specifically, we use data of gross capital flows to differentiate between the role of foreign and domestic investors in financial markets. Capital stop and retrenchment designate a sharp decrease in gross capital inflows and outflows, respectively. Findings - Capital stop is significantly associated with financial crises, especially currency and debt crises. This implies that increased risk aversion during times of financial turmoil encourages foreign investors to retrench their investments, worsening liquidity shocks. Conversely, capital retrenchment is not significantly associated with such crises. The results show that, although financial crises reduce gross capital outflows, the reduction is not as large as that with capital inflows. Originality/value - The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, this study investigates how domestic investors behave during times of financial distress by studying gross capital flows-not net capital flows. Second, we concentrate on sharp changes in capital flows during crises. Third, we examine the associations between capital stop and retrenchment and financial crises in general, not specific events.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.23 no.7
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• pp.113-127
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• 2019

Purpose - This paper investigates whether financial crises could be the indicators of capital outflow waves or vice versa in Korea. Korea has experienced two severe financial crises, which are the Asian Crisis and the global financial crisis. Although there were many variables associated with these two remarkable events, one notable variable was gross capital outflows, which had significantly increased around them. Motivated by existing literature which built theoretical frameworks explaining the relationship between capital flight and financial crises, we examine the empirical evidence for this relationship. Design/methodology - We use panel data from 61 countries including Korea from 1980 to 2009 to study the associations between capital flight and diverse financial crises such as banking, currency, debt, and inflation crises. To be specific, we use the complementary log-log model to see whether capital outflow waves are reliable indicators for domestic financial crises. Findings - The results show, first, that banking, currency, and inflation crises are associated with capital flight. Second, debt crises are also associated with capital flight, but the result is not robust to different specifications. And, third, the positive associations between capital flight and crises are mainly driven by banking flows rather than FDI and portfolio flows. Originality/value - This paper is one of a few studies that investigates domestic (not foreign) investors' behavior during financial turmoil. Furthermore, theoretical studies which provide contradictory explanations on the movements of gross capital outflows during financial crises emphasizes the importance of empirical evidence in this paper.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.42 no.4
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• pp.59-90
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• 2020

U.S. monetary policy has been claimed to generate global spillover and to destabilize other small open economies. We analyze the effects of certain identified U.S. monetary shocks on gross capital flows in the Korean economy using the local projection method. Consistent with previous results on other small open economies, we initially confirm that U.S. interest rate hikes are dynamically correlated with foreign outflows and residents' inflows. That is, not only are they correlated with withdrawals by foreigners but they are also correlated with those by domestic (Korean) investors. The results are mostly driven by portfolio flows. Second, however, the marginal response to a U.S. monetary policy shock is, on average, subdued if we focus on the sample periods after the Global financial crisis of 2007-2008 (henceforth, global financial crisis). We conjecture a possible reason behind the change, an institutional change related to financial friction. If the degree of pledgeability of the value of net worth increases, the marginal responses by both investors would drop with a U.S. monetary policy shock, consistent with our findings.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.32 no.4
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• pp.153-195
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• 2010

The recent global financial crisis has been the outcome of, among other things, the mismatch between institutions and the reality of the market in the current global financial system. The International financial institutions (IFIs) that were designed more than 60 years ago can no longer effectively meet the challenges posed by the current global economy. While the global financial market has become integrated like a single market, there is no international lender of last resort or global regulatory body. There also has been a rapid shift in the weight of economic power. The share of the Group of 7 (G7) countries in global gross domestic product (GDP) fell and the share of emerging market economies increased rapidly. Therefore, the tasks facing us today are: (i) to reform the IFIs -mandate, resources, management, and governance structure; (ii) to reform the system such as the international monetary system (IMS), and regulatory framework of the global financial system; and (iii) to reform global economic governance. The main focus of this paper will be the IMS reform and the role of the Group of Twenty (G20) summit meetings. The current IMS problems can be summarized as follows. First, the demand for foreign reserve accumulation has been increasing despite the movement from fixed exchange rate regimes to floating rate regimes some 40 years ago. Second, this increasing demand for foreign reserves has been concentrated in US dollar assets, especially public securities. Third, as the IMS relies too heavily on the supply of currency issued by a center country (the US), it gives an exorbitant privilege to this country, which can issue Treasury bills at the lowest possible interest rate in the international capital market. Fourth, as a related problem, the global financial system depends too heavily on the center country's ability to maintain the stability of the value of its currency and strength of its own financial system. Fifth, international capital flows have been distorted in the current IMS, from EMEs and developing countries where the productivity of capital investment is higher, to advanced economies, especially the US, where the return to capital investment is lower. Given these problems, there have been various proposals to reform the current IMS. They can be grouped into two: demand-side and supply-side reform. The key in the former is how to reduce the widespread strong demand for foreign reserve holdings among EMEs. There have been several proposals to reduce the self-insurance motivation. They include third-party insurance and the expansion of the opportunity to borrow from a global and regional reserve pool, or access to global lender of last resort (or something similar). However, the first option would be too costly. That leads us to the second option - building a stronger globalfinancial safety net. Discussions on supply-side reform of the IMS focus on how to diversify the supply of international reserve currency. The proposals include moving to a multiple currency system; increased allocation and wider use of special drawing rights (SDR); and creating a new global reserve currency. A key question is whether diversification should be encouraged among suitable existing currencies, or if it should be sought more with global reserve assets, acting as a complement or even substitute to existing ones. Each proposal has its pros and cons; they also face trade-offs between desirability and political feasibility. The transition would require close collaboration among the major players. This should include efforts at the least to strengthen policy coordination and collaboration among the major economies, and to reform the IMF to make it a more effective institution for bilateral and multilateral surveillance and as an international lender of last resort. The success on both fronts depends heavily on global economic governance reform and the role of the G20. The challenge is how to make the G20 effective. Without institutional innovations within the G20, there is a high risk that its summits will follow the path of previous summit meetings, such as G7/G8.