• Journal of Korea Trade
• /
• v.27 no.2
• /
• pp.22-46
• /
• 2023

Purpose - study aims to investigate the relationships between global value chain (GVC)- and transportation-related determinants and economic performance. Also, moderating effects of COVID-19 on the relationships are theoretically and empirically discussed. A limitation of previous studies includes their over-reliance on the opportunities of GVC participation and larger transportation. This study represents the challenges associated with them. Also, it shows how GVC and logistics can be difficult in case of a market fluctuation such as COVID-19. Design/methodology - The sample for this study includes 828 observations from 138 countries. A semi-panel data set has been used. Six observations for each country are used to empirically test the hypotheses and a Two-way cluster model is conducted. Findings - It is confirmed that GVC forward participation contributes more than the backward participation to enhance performance. Transportation infrastructure is critical, but large scales of marine and air transportations are not positive in terms of economic performance. Stricter government response to COVID-19 negatively moderates economic performance by GVC backward participation and transportation infrastructure. Originality/value - The spread of COVID-19 is causing a severe collapse of GVC and transportation. This study empirically verifies the moderating effects of the government stringency on GVC and transportation. Previous studies usually discuss a positive impact of GVC and transportation size on economic performance. However, this study aims to show various challenges behind GVC participation and large scale transportation.

• Korea Trade Review
• /
• v.44 no.2
• /
• pp.203-219
• /
• 2019

Recently, the Trump administration initiated a new United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) that strengthened NAFTA's rules of origin to enhance protectionism while maintaining the framework of trade agreements rather than completely abolishing them. This study focuses on the behavior of firms motivated to influence the government to practice protectionist trade by analyzing the rules of origin verification and adopting the political economics model. This paper explains the process of endogenous determination of the stringency of rules of origin verification as a non-tariff barrier using the lobbying model. Comparative static analysis shows that the more efficient technology a domestic firm has and the more government prefers to raise political contribution, the more is verification likely to be strict. This suggests that a rationale exists to maintain a free trade agreement in the form of the new agreement (USMCA) without abolishing the current NAFTA regime.

• Korea Trade Review
• /
• v.45 no.1
• /
• pp.155-171
• /
• 2020

In reality, there are numerous [Note: I advise to change the tone to being more certain, as opposed to offering a possibility. You need to emphasize the seriousness of the conditions that your study wants to talk about] non-tariff trade barriers under free trade agreements, with various stakeholders having different trade-off interests. This study focuses on the rules of origin verification and considers cases in which domestic firms, foreign firms, and domestic consumer groups compete politically for their rent protection in the domestic market. As in Gwande et al. (2006), cross-border lobbies are considered possible wherein foreign firms also lobby the government to influence the decision-making process of how stringently to verify the rules of origin. [Note: Starting here, switch to past tense because a: study intentions above can be in present tense, b: study procedures should be in past tense] In this study, we assumed that all stakeholders form interest groups and present political contributions to the government based on their interests. The stringency of the rules of origin verification was then determined through this political process, and we compared this to a socially optimal one in the analysis. It was found that the verification was less stringent when there was cross-border lobbying than the socially optimal one.

• Journal of Climate Change Research
• /
• v.4 no.2
• /
• pp.159-175
• /
• 2013

Emission reduction targets to respond to climate change have been discussed and set locally, nationally and globally. After Korean government set the national target in 2009, 16 metropolitan cities established voluntary emission reduction targets by 2020. This study review and compare historical greenhouse gas emissions, reduction target by 2020 and strategies in 16 metropolitan cities. Most cities chose a consumption-based inventory approach. Some cities set the reduction target excluding land use change and forestry (LUCF) at 30% against business-as-usual by 2020, while others set the absolute reduction target against past year including LUCF. The stringency of reduction target in metropolitan cities was evaluated differently according to the comparative indicators such as the targets against BAU or past year and per capita emission, etc. Key mitigation sectors were different across metropolitan cities. It is suggested that national government share detailed raw data for metropolitan cities' emission inventory with the local government. Using advanced mitigation model and two types' target based on BAU and historical year and integrating local government's climate change plan with its energy plan are also required.

• Journal of Technology Innovation
• /
• v.30 no.1
• /
• pp.21-56
• /
• 2022

Since Michael Porter (1991) has proposed that environmental regulation can help a firm increase its competitiveness by encouraging it to engage in more innovative activities to meet the environmental regulation, a number of researchers have empirically investigated the "Porter Hypothesis." However, the empirical results still remain mixed. Combining the perspectives of the behavioral theory of the firm and firm heterogeneity, we argue that the levels of regulation stringency and time-pressure would differentially influence a firm's innovative behavior depending on the firm's aspiration level, performance feedback and technological capabilities. Using the U.S. Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) regulation context, we empirically demonstrate that lagging firms that do not meet the new regulation standard announced by the government tend to search for more distant knowledge and that the impact of the patents they file for decreases as the regulation becomes more stringent. In addition, we also find that as time-pressure increases, lagging firms stand to apply for more patents than do leading firms whereas the overall impact of the patents decreases. These results help us advance our understanding of the nuanced causal relationship between regulation and innovation and provide practical implications for policymakers.