• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2001.11b
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• pp.60-62
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• 2001

This paper shows the optimal bidding strategy determination method using Nash equilibrium concept by defining bidding strategy vector. This vector is 2-dimension vector whose components are generation amount and generation cost. Thereby we are able to make all possible strategies and their's payoff table. And then we erase dominated strategies one by one so that we obtain Nash equilibrium, the optimal bidding strategy of generation bidding game.

• Journal of Energy Engineering
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.59-66
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• 2002

The vertically integrated power industry was divided into six generation companies and one market operator, where electricity trading was launched at power exchange. In this environment, the profits of each generation companies are guaranteed according to utilizing strategies of their own generation equipments. This paper presents on generator maintenance scheduling and efficient bidding strategies for generation equipments through the calculation of the contract and the application of each generator cost function based on the past demand forecasting error and market operating data.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.58 no.4
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• pp.694-699
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• 2009

Combined cycle plants which feature distinct advantages for power generation such as fast response, high efficiency, environmental friendliness, fuel flexiblity represent the majority of new generating plant installations across the globe. Combined cycle plants have different operating modes where the operating parameters can differ greatly depending which mode is operating at the time. This paper addresses the bidding strategy model of combined cycle plants in a competitive electricity market by using a characteristic of multiple operating modes of combined cycle plants. Simulation results of case studies show that an operating mode among multiple ones is selected strategically in generation bidding for more profit of generation company.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.3A no.1
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• pp.47-52
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• 2003

This paper presents a schematic process based on the method of eliminating dominated strategies to obtain the optimal bidding strategy Pursuing the Nash equilibrium Point. The Proposed approach is demonstrated for a bidding game in a generation competitive market with 2-dimensional bidding strategy vectors constituting a price-quantity strategy curve.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2000.07a
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• pp.347-349
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• 2000

Under an open transmission access, the generation dispatch is determined by the bidding process of market participants. Congestion occurs when the dispatch would result in the violation of operational constraints. Congestion problem is formulated and solved by OPF(optimal power flow) calculation. The objective functions in OPF are given as quadratic cost functions or piecewise linear functions of bidding functions. In this study, the optimization technique of generation dispatch is presented for the combination of two types of quadratic and linear cost functions.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2001.07a
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• pp.550-552
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• 2001

The vertically integrated power industry was divided into six generation companies and one market operator, where electricity trading was launched at power exchange. In this environment, the profits of each generation companies are guaranteed according to utilization of their own generation equipments. Especially, the electricity demand shows seasonal and weekly regular pattern, which the some capacity should be provided into ancillary service based on the past demand forecasting error and operating results of electricity market. Namely, if generation cost function is applied to SMP and BLMP as announced the previous day, the available generation capacity of the following day could be optimally distributed, and therefore contract capacity of ancillary service applied to CBP(Cost Based Pool) and TWBP(Two-Way Bidding Pool) is determined. Consequently, it is Possible to use the retained equipments optimally. This paper represents on efficient bidding strategies for generation equipments through the calculation of the contract and the application of each generator cost function based on the past demand forecasting error and market operating data.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.1
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• pp.56-66
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• 2004

As deregulation evolves, pricing electricity becomes a major issue in the electric industry. Participants of competitive marketplace are able to improve their profits substantially by adequately pricing the electricity. In this paper, game theory is applied to analyze the price-clearing in the generation bidding competition and the competition is modeled as the noncooperative and complete information. The result of this analysis can be useful in understanding spot price-clearing of electricity and generating entity's strategic behavior in the competitive electricity market.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.4A no.4
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• pp.243-253
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• 2004

As deregulation evolves, pricing electricity becomes a major issue in the electric power industry. Participants in the competitive marketplace are able to improve their profits substantially by effectively pricing the electricity. In this paper, game theory is applied to analyze price-clearing in the generation bidding competition with the competition modeled as the non-cooperative and complete information game. The result of this analysis can be useful in understanding spot price-clearing of electricity as well as GENCOs' strategic behavior in the competitive electricity market.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• summer
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• pp.710-712
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• 2004

Generation companies(Genco) submit the supply functions as a bidding function to a bid market in a competitive electricity market. The profits of Gencos vary in accordance with the bid functions, so the selection of a bidding function plays a key role in increasing their profits. This paper presents an analysis of the selection of the supply function from the viewpoint of Nash equilibrium(NE). Four types of bidding function parameters are used for analizing the electricity market. The competition of selecting bidding parameters is modeled as subgame and overall game in this research. The NEs in both game are computed by using analytic method and payoff matrix method. It is verified in case studies for the NE of overall game to satisfy the equilibrium condition.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.5
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• pp.302-307
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• 2004

As deregulation of power industry is becoming a reality, there has been an intense interest in the strategic bidding for suppliers to maximize their profits. The profit gained by a supplier is related not only to its energy-price bid curve but also to its submitted operational parameters such as generation capacity, etc. So suppliers are willing to use those strategic parameters that can be manipulated by themselves and are effective to their profit. This paper deals with the competition model with compound strategies: generation capacity and bidding curve. The parameter space is modeled by dividing into the two strategies, so the problem is made up of the four types of sub-game in a two player game. This paper analyzes the global Nash Equilibrium (NE) over the whole divisions by computing the sub-game NEs in some divisions and by deriving the best response curves which have discontinuities in other divisions. The global NE is shown to correspond to the Cournot NE where the quantity variable is realized by a constraints of a generation capacity.