As so many marketers get to use diverse sales promotion methods, manufacturer and retailer in a channel often use them too. In this context, diverse issues on sales promotion management arise. One of them is the issue of unplanned buying. Consumers' unplanned buying is clearly better off for the retailer but not for manufacturer. This asymmetric influence of unplanned buying should be dealt with prudently because of its possibility of provocation of channel conflict. However, there have been scarce studies on the sales promotion management strategy considering the unplanned buying and its asymmetric effect on retailer and manufacturer. In this paper, we try to find a better way for a manufacturer in a channel to promote performance through the retailer's sales promotion efforts when there is potential of unplanned buying effect. We investigate via game-theoretic modeling what is the optimal cost sharing level between the manufacturer and retailer when there is unplanned buying effect. We investigated following issues about the topic as follows: (1) What structure of cost sharing mechanism should the manufacturer and retailer in a channel choose when unplanned buying effect is strong (or weak)? (2) How much payoff could the manufacturer and retailer in a channel get when unplanned buying effect is strong (or weak)? We focus on the impact of unplanned buying effect on the optimal cost sharing mechanism for sales promotions between a manufacturer and a retailer in a same channel. So we consider two players in the game, a manufacturer and a retailer who are interacting in a same distribution channel. The model is of complete information game type. In the model, the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader and the retailer is the follower. Variables in the model are as following table. Manufacturer's objective function in the basic game is as follows: ${\Pi}={\Pi}_1+{\Pi}_2$, where, ${\Pi}_1=w_1(1+L-p_1)-{\psi}^2$, ${\Pi}_2=w_2(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. And retailer's is as follows: ${\pi}={\pi}_1+{\pi}_2$, where, ${\pi}_1=(p_1-w_1)(1+L-p_1)-L(L-{\psi})+p_u(b+L-p_u)$, ${\pi}_2=(p_2-w_2)(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. The model is of four stages in two periods. Stages of the game are as follows. (Stage 1) Manufacturer sets wholesale price of the first period($w_1$) and cost sharing level of channel sales promotion(${\Psi}$). (Stage 2) Retailer sets retail price of the focal brand($p_1$), the unplanned buying item($p_u$), and sales promotion level(L). (Stage 3) Manufacturer sets wholesale price of the second period($w_2$). (Stage 4) Retailer sets retail price of the second period($p_2$). Since the model is a kind of dynamic games, we try to find a subgame perfect equilibrium to derive some theoretical and managerial implications. In order to obtain the subgame perfect equilibrium, we use the backward induction method. In using backward induction approach, we solve the problems backward from stage 4 to stage 1. By completely knowing follower's optimal reaction to the leader's potential actions, we can fold the game tree backward. Equilibrium of each variable in the basic game is as following table. We conducted more analysis of additional game about diverse cost level of manufacturer. Manufacturer's objective function in the additional game is same with that of the basic game as follows: ${\Pi}={\Pi}_1+{\Pi}_2$, where, ${\Pi}_1=w_1(1+L-p_1)-{\psi}^2$, ${\Pi}_2=w_2(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. But retailer's objective function is different from that of the basic game as follows: ${\pi}={\pi}_1+{\pi}_2$, where, ${\pi}_1=(p_1-w_1)(1+L-p_1)-L(L-{\psi})+(p_u-c)(b+L-p_u)$, ${\pi}_2=(p_2-w_2)(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. Equilibrium of each variable in this additional game is as following table. Major findings of the current study are as follows: (1) As the unplanned buying effect gets stronger, manufacturer and retailer had better increase the cost for sales promotion. (2) As the unplanned buying effect gets stronger, manufacturer had better decrease the cost sharing portion of total cost for sales promotion. (3) Manufacturer's profit is increasing function of the unplanned buying effect. (4) All results of (1),(2),(3) are alleviated by the increase of retailer's procurement cost to acquire unplanned buying items. The authors discuss the implications of those results for the marketers in manufacturers or retailers. The current study firstly suggests some managerial implications for the manufacturer how to share the sales promotion cost with the retailer in a channel to the high or low level of the consumers' unplanned buying potential.
Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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v.34
no.3
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pp.165-177
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2009
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of the Internet channel introduction on the channel composed of a monopoly manufacturer and an independent physical retailer. This study also examines what would be the best strategy for the Independent physical retailer to respond to the new internet channel entry. The game theoretic model consists of a monopolist manufacturer selling its product through a channel system including one independent physical store before the entry of an internet store. The audition of the internet store to this channel system results in a mixed channel comprised of two different types of channels. The new internet store is launched by the manufacturer. The results show that an Internet channel entry has the following impacts on the existing channel members. First, the manufacturer's internet channel introduction mitigates the double marginalization problem of the traditional channel. Second, the manufacturer could enhance Its channel power by introducing its own internet channel while it diminishes that of the incumbent independent physical retailer. Third, manufacturer's adding a new internet store leads to a higher demand. Finally, with its own internet direct channel, the manufacturer has an opportunity to practice price discrimination. The manufacture leaves only those with a strong preference for the physical store to be served by the Independent physical store. The results suggest that the independent physical store's best strategy to the entry of the manufacturer's Internet channel is to focus on the consumers who are highly loyal to the physical store while maintaining a high retail price.
The Economic Gab-Jil, where the stronger are forcing the weaker to sacrifice, is not only a serious social problem, but also it exhausts the vitality of the national economy. Especially, the issue of 'cost reduction (CR) of delivery price' in automobile industry, and the issue of 'tolls' and 'retaliating' in the franchise business are becoming more controversial. This paper suggests some measures to rectify the problems by an analysis using a game-theoretic model. One of the ways to change the 'bad equilibrium', where economic Gab-Jil is prevalent, to the 'good equiblium' is to strengthen the bargaining power of the weak by legal and institutional measures. It is also a more market-friendly system that is self-enforcing, where the regulation is automatically enforced by the incentives of the participants, without relying solely on the enforcement power of regulatory or supervisory bodies
Information security has become an important issue in the world. Various information and communication technologies, such as the Internet of Things, big data, cloud, and artificial intelligence, are developing, and the need for information security is increasing. Although the necessity of information security is expanding according to the development of information and communication technology, interest in information security investment is insufficient. In general, measuring the effect of information security investment is difficult, so appropriate investment is not being practice, and organizations are decreasing their information security investment. In addition, since the types and specification of information security measures are diverse, it is difficult to compare and evaluate the information security countermeasures objectively, and there is a lack of decision-making methods about information security investment. To develop the organization, policies and decisions related to information security are essential, and measuring the effect of information security investment is necessary. Therefore, this study proposes a method of constructing an investment portfolio for information security measures using game theory and derives an optimal defence probability. Using the two-person game model, the information security manager and the attacker are assumed to be the game players, and the information security countermeasures and information security threats are assumed as the strategy of the players, respectively. A zero-sum game that the sum of the players' payoffs is zero is assumed, and we derive a solution of a mixed strategy game in which a strategy is selected according to probability distribution among strategies. In the real world, there are various types of information security threats exist, so multiple information security measures should be considered to maintain the appropriate information security level of information systems. We assume that the defence ratio of the information security countermeasures is known, and we derive the optimal solution of the mixed strategy game using linear programming. The contributions of this study are as follows. First, we conduct analysis using real performance data of information security measures. Information security managers of organizations can use the methodology suggested in this study to make practical decisions when establishing investment portfolio for information security countermeasures. Second, the investment weight of information security countermeasures is derived. Since we derive the weight of each information security measure, not just whether or not information security measures have been invested, it is easy to construct an information security investment portfolio in a situation where investment decisions need to be made in consideration of a number of information security countermeasures. Finally, it is possible to find the optimal defence probability after constructing an investment portfolio of information security countermeasures. The information security managers of organizations can measure the specific investment effect by drawing out information security countermeasures that fit the organization's information security investment budget. Also, numerical examples are presented and computational results are analyzed. Based on the performance of various information security countermeasures: Firewall, IPS, and Antivirus, data related to information security measures are collected to construct a portfolio of information security countermeasures. The defence ratio of the information security countermeasures is created using a uniform distribution, and a coverage of performance is derived based on the report of each information security countermeasure. According to numerical examples that considered Firewall, IPS, and Antivirus as information security countermeasures, the investment weights of Firewall, IPS, and Antivirus are optimized to 60.74%, 39.26%, and 0%, respectively. The result shows that the defence probability of the organization is maximized to 83.87%. When the methodology and examples of this study are used in practice, information security managers can consider various types of information security measures, and the appropriate investment level of each measure can be reflected in the organization's budget.
This paper analyzes insurance crimes using a game theoretic model. In blackmailing cases involving automobile accidents, insurance criminals deliberately induce innocent drivers(victims) to commit a moving violation such as crossing over the center dividing yellow line, and collide with the victims. After the collision, the criminals and the victims effectively engage in a bargaining game over the amount of the settlement for the damage. Because the penalty for that kind of moving violation is very severe (even criminally prosecuted), the victims do not have much bargaining power. Exploiting the weak bargaining power of the victims, the criminals demand and receive huge compensation (including settlement) from the victims. In the model, it is shown that under the current law agents have perverse incentives leading to insurance crimes. The criminals have incentive to induce car collisions and extract huge settlement from the victims. Based on the analysis, it is suggested that lowering the severity of penalty for certain kind of violation may be needed to prevent insurance crimes, in addition to increasing the crime investigation activities and strengthening punishment for insurance criminals.
The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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v.8
no.4
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pp.303-311
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2022
Recently the telemedicine platform firms which have been temporarily permitted since COVID-19 outbreak have increasingly provided online prescription drugs delivery, causing concerns among incumbent providers of medicine, some of whom began to take aggressive actions again them. In this study, using game theoretic market entry - deterrence model, we show that although the incumbent medicine provider can effectively deter entry by the telemedicine platform firms by its preemptive action, accommodation could be a optimal action when telemedicine platform firms already have penetrated the market with their being permitted to do business due to the COVID-19. However, for the incumbent to cooperate for the successful change in the retail market for medicines, policies like placing a ceiling on the maximum number of taking prescriptions by the pharmacists a day in the telemedince platform network, providing favorable exposure of community pharmacists on the telemedicine platform user interface, and allowing community pharmacies to participate as shareholders of the telemedicine platform firms in its initial public opening of capital, are suggested.
CS is one of the major concerns of managers in the world because it is well known to be a key medium construct for firms' superior outcome. One of the major agents for CS management is retailers. Firms try to manage not only employees but also retailers to promote CS behaviors. And so diverse incentives are used to promote their CS behaviors under diverse channel setting such as multi-channel. However in spite of the rising needs there has been scarce studies on the optimal incentive structure for a manufacturer to offer competing retailers at the multi-channel. In this paper, we try to find better way for a manufacturer to promote the competing retailers' CS behaviors. We investigated how to promote the retailers' CS behavior via game-theoretic modeling. Especially, we focus on the possible incentive, CS bonus type reward introduced in the studies of Hauser, Simester, and Wernerfelt(1994) and Chu and Desai(1995). We build up a multi stage complete information game and derive a subgame perfect equilibrium using backward induction. Stages of the game are as following. (Stage 1) Manufacturer sets wholesale price(w) and CS bonus($\eta$). (Stage 2) Both retailers in competition set CS effort level($e_i$) and retail price($p_i$) simultaneously. (Stage 3) Consumers make purchasing decisions based on the manufacturer's initial reputation and retailers' CS efforts. Structure of the Model We investigated four issues about the topic as following: (1) How much total incentive is adequate for a firm of a specific level of reputation to promote retailers' CS behavior under multi-channel setting ?, (2) How much total incentive is adequate under diverse level of complimentary externalities between the retailers' CS efforts to promote retailers' CS behavior?, (3) How much total incentive is adequate under diverse level of cost to make CS efforts to promote retailers' CS behavior?, (4) How much total incentive is adequate under diverse level of competition between retailers to promote retailers' CS behavior? Our findings are as following. (1) The higher reputation has the manufacturer, the higher incentives for retailers at multi-channel are required in the equilibrium. shows the increasing pattern of optimal incentive level along the manufacturer's reputation level(a) under some parameter conditions(b=1/2;c=0;$\beta$=1/2). (2) The bigger complimentary externalities exists between the retailers' CS efforts, the higher incentives are required in the equilibrium. shows the increasing pattern of optimal incentive level along the complimentary externalities level($\beta$) under some parameter conditions(a=1;b=1/2;c=0). (3) The higher is the retailers' cost, the lower incentives are required in the equilibrium. shows the decreasing pattern of optimal incentive level along the cost level(c) under some parameter conditions(a=1;b=1/2;$\beta$=1/2). (4) The more competitive gets those two retailers, the higher incentives for retailers at multi-channel are required in the equilibrium. shows the increasing pattern of optimal incentive level along the competition level(b) under some parameter conditions(c=0;a=1;$\beta$=1/2). One of the major contribution points of this study is the fact that this study is the first to investigate the optimal CS incentive system under multi-channel setting.
In this paper, a simple game-theoretic entry deterrence model is developed that integrates both limit pricing and predatory pricing. While there have been extensive studies which have dealt with predation and limit pricing separately, no study so far has analyzed these closely related practices in a unified framework. Treating each practice as if it were an independent phenomenon is, of course, an analytical necessity to abstract from complex realities. However, welfare analysis based on such a model may give misleading policy implications. By analyzing limit and predatory pricing within a single framework, this paper attempts to shed some light on the effects of interactions between these two frequently cited tactics of entry deterrence. Another distinctive feature of the paper is that limit and predatory pricing emerge, in equilibrium, as rational, profit maximizing strategies in the model. Until recently, the only conclusion from formal analyses of predatory pricing was that predation is unlikely to take place if every economic agent is assumed to be rational. This conclusion rests upon the argument that predation is costly; that is, it inflicts more losses upon the predator than upon the rival producer, and, therefore, is unlikely to succeed in driving out the rival, who understands that the price cutting, if it ever takes place, must be temporary. Recently several attempts have been made to overcome this modelling difficulty by Kreps and Wilson, Milgram and Roberts, Benoit, Fudenberg and Tirole, and Roberts. With the exception of Roberts, however, these studies, though successful in preserving the rationality of players, still share one serious weakness in that they resort to ad hoc, external constraints in order to generate profit maximizing predation. The present paper uses a highly stylized model of Cournot duopoly and derives the equilibrium predatory strategy without invoking external constraints except the assumption of asymmetrically distributed information. The underlying intuition behind the model can be summarized as follows. Imagine a firm that is considering entry into a monopolist's market but is uncertain about the incumbent firm's cost structure. If the monopolist has low cost, the rival would rather not enter because it would be difficult to compete with an efficient, low-cost firm. If the monopolist has high costs, however, the rival will definitely enter the market because it can make positive profits. In this situation, if the incumbent firm unwittingly produces its monopoly output, the entrant can infer the nature of the monopolist's cost by observing the monopolist's price. Knowing this, the high cost monopolist increases its output level up to what would have been produced by a low cost firm in an effort to conceal its cost condition. This constitutes limit pricing. The same logic applies when there is a rival competitor in the market. Producing a high cost duopoly output is self-revealing and thus to be avoided. Therefore, the firm chooses to produce the low cost duopoly output, consequently inflicting losses to the entrant or rival producer, thus acting in a predatory manner. The policy implications of the analysis are rather mixed. Contrary to the widely accepted hypothesis that predation is, at best, a negative sum game, and thus, a strategy that is unlikely to be played from the outset, this paper concludes that predation can be real occurence by showing that it can arise as an effective profit maximizing strategy. This conclusion alone may imply that the government can play a role in increasing the consumer welfare, say, by banning predation or limit pricing. However, the problem is that it is rather difficult to ascribe any welfare losses to these kinds of entry deterring practices. This difficulty arises from the fact that if the same practices have been adopted by a low cost firm, they could not be called entry-deterring. Moreover, the high cost incumbent in the model is doing exactly what the low cost firm would have done to keep the market to itself. All in all, this paper suggests that a government injunction of limit and predatory pricing should be applied with great care, evaluating each case on its own basis. Hasty generalization may work to the detriment, rather than the enhancement of consumer welfare.
The advent of the Internet and related Web technologies has created an easily accessible link between a firm and its customers, and has provided opportunities to a firm to use information technology to support supplementary after-sale services associated with a product or service. It has been widely recognized that supplementary services are an important source of customer value and of competitive advantage as the characteristics of the product itself. Many of these supplementary services are information-based and need not be co-located with the product, so more and more companies are delivering these services electronically. Net-based customer service, which is defined as an Internet-based computerized information system that delivers services to a customer, therefore, is the core infrastructure for supplementary service provision. The importance of net-based customer service in delivering supplementary after-sale services associated with product has been well documented. The strategic advantages of well-implemented net-based customer service are enhanced customer loyalty and higher lock-in of customers, and a resulting reduction in competition and the consequent increase in profits. However, not all customers utilize such net-based customer service. The digital divide is the phenomenon in our society that captures the observation that not all customers have equal access to computers. Socioeconomic factors such as race, gender, and education level are strongly related to Internet accessibility and ability to use. This is due to the differences in the ability to bear the cost of a computer, and the differences in self-efficacy in the use of a technology, among other reasons. This concept, applied to e-commerce, has been called the "e-commerce divide." High Internet penetration is not eradicating the digital divide and e-commerce divide as one would hope. Besides, to accommodate personalized support, a customer must often provide personal information to the firm. This personal information includes not only name and address, but also preferences information and perhaps valuation information. However, many recent studies show that consumers may not be willing to share information about themselves due to concerns about privacy online. Due to the e-commerce divide, and due to privacy and security concerns of the customer for sharing personal information with firms, limited numbers of customers adopt net-based customer service. The limited level of customer adoption of net-based customer service affects the firm profits and the customers' welfare. We use a game-theoretic model in which we model the net-based customer service system as a mechanism to enhance customers' loyalty. We model a market entry scenario where a firm (the incumbent) uses the net-based customer service system in inducing loyalty in its customer base. The firm sells one product through the traditional retailing channels and at a price set for these channels. Another firm (the entrant) enters the market, and having observed the price of the incumbent firm (and after deducing the loyalty levels in the customer base), chooses its price. The profits of the firms and the surplus of the two customers segments (the segment that utilizes net-based customer service and the segment that does not) are analyzed in the Stackelberg leader-follower model of competition between the firms. We find that an increase in adoption of net-based customer service by the customer base is not always desirable for firms. With low effectiveness in enhancing customer loyalty, firms prefer a high level of customer adoption of net-based customer service, because an increase in adoption rate decreases competition and increases profits. A firm in an industry where net-based customer service is highly effective loyalty mechanism, on the other hand, prefers a low level of adoption by customers.
Internet commerce has been growing at a rapid pace for the last decade. Many firms try to reach wider consumer markets by adding the Internet channel to the existing traditional channels. Despite the various benefits of the Internet channel, a significant number of firms failed in managing the new type of channel. Previous studies could not cleary explain these conflicting results associated with the Internet channel. One of the major reasons is most of the previous studies conducted analyses under a specific market condition and claimed that as the impact of Internet channel introduction. Therefore, their results are strongly influenced by the specific market settings. However, firms face various market conditions in the real worlddensity and disutility of using the Internet. The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of various market environments on a firm's optimal channel strategy by employing a flexible game theory model. We capture various market conditions with consumer density and disutility of using the Internet.
shows the channel structures analyzed in this study. Before the Internet channel is introduced, a monopoly manufacturer sells its products through an independent physical store. From this structure, the manufacturer could introduce its own Internet channel (MI). The independent physical store could also introduce its own Internet channel and coordinate it with the existing physical store (RI). An independent Internet retailer such as Amazon could enter this market (II). In this case, two types of independent retailers compete with each other. In this model, consumers are uniformly distributed on the two dimensional space. Consumer heterogeneity is captured by a consumer's geographical location (ci) and his disutility of using the Internet channel (${\delta}_{N_i}$).
shows various market conditions captured by the two consumer heterogeneities.
(a) illustrates a market with symmetric consumer distributions. The model captures explicitly the asymmetric distributions of consumer disutility in a market as well. In a market like that is represented in
(c), the average consumer disutility of using an Internet store is relatively smaller than that of using a physical store. For example, this case represents the market in which 1) the product is suitable for Internet transactions (e.g., books) or 2) the level of E-Commerce readiness is high such as in Denmark or Finland. On the other hand, the average consumer disutility when using an Internet store is relatively greater than that of using a physical store in a market like (b). Countries like Ukraine and Bulgaria, or the market for "experience goods" such as shoes, could be examples of this market condition.
summarizes the various scenarios of consumer distributions analyzed in this study. The range for disutility of using the Internet (${\delta}_{N_i}$) is held constant, while the range of consumer distribution (${\chi}_i$) varies from -25 to 25, from -50 to 50, from -100 to 100, from -150 to 150, and from -200 to 200.
summarizes the analysis results. As the average travel cost in a market decreases while the average disutility of Internet use remains the same, average retail price, total quantity sold, physical store profit, monopoly manufacturer profit, and thus, total channel profit increase. On the other hand, the quantity sold through the Internet and the profit of the Internet store decrease with a decreasing average travel cost relative to the average disutility of Internet use. We find that a channel that has an advantage over the other kind of channel serves a larger portion of the market. In a market with a high average travel cost, in which the Internet store has a relative advantage over the physical store, for example, the Internet store becomes a mass-retailer serving a larger portion of the market. This result implies that the Internet becomes a more significant distribution channel in those markets characterized by greater geographical dispersion of buyers, or as consumers become more proficient in Internet usage. The results indicate that the degree of price discrimination also varies depending on the distribution of consumer disutility in a market. The manufacturer in a market in which the average travel cost is higher than the average disutility of using the Internet has a stronger incentive for price discrimination than the manufacturer in a market where the average travel cost is relatively lower. We also find that the manufacturer has a stronger incentive to maintain a high price level when the average travel cost in a market is relatively low. Additionally, the retail competition effect due to Internet channel introduction strengthens as average travel cost in a market decreases. This result indicates that a manufacturer's channel power relative to that of the independent physical retailer becomes stronger with a decreasing average travel cost. This implication is counter-intuitive, because it is widely believed that the negative impact of Internet channel introduction on a competing physical retailer is more significant in a market like Russia, where consumers are more geographically dispersed, than in a market like Hong Kong, that has a condensed geographic distribution of consumers. illustrates how this happens. When mangers consider the overall impact of the Internet channel, however, they should consider not only channel power, but also sales volume. When both are considered, the introduction of the Internet channel is revealed as more harmful to a physical retailer in Russia than one in Hong Kong, because the sales volume decrease for a physical store due to Internet channel competition is much greater in Russia than in Hong Kong. The results show that manufacturer is always better off with any type of Internet store introduction. The independent physical store benefits from opening its own Internet store when the average travel cost is higher relative to the disutility of using the Internet. Under an opposite market condition, however, the independent physical retailer could be worse off when it opens its own Internet outlet and coordinates both outlets (RI). This is because the low average travel cost significantly reduces the channel power of the independent physical retailer, further aggravating the already weak channel power caused by myopic inter-channel price coordination. The results implies that channel members and policy makers should explicitly consider the factors determining the relative distributions of both kinds of consumer disutility, when they make a channel decision involving an Internet channel. These factors include the suitability of a product for Internet shopping, the level of E-Commerce readiness of a market, and the degree of geographic dispersion of consumers in a market. Despite the academic contributions and managerial implications, this study is limited in the following ways. First, a series of numerical analyses were conducted to derive equilibrium solutions due to the complex forms of demand functions. In the process, we set up V=100, ${\lambda}$=1, and ${\beta}$=0.01. Future research may change this parameter value set to check the generalizability of this study. Second, the five different scenarios for market conditions were analyzed. Future research could try different sets of parameter ranges. Finally, the model setting allows only one monopoly manufacturer in the market. Accommodating competing multiple manufacturers (brands) would generate more realistic results.
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