• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2015.10a
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• pp.107-110
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• 2015

In this paper, we propose a coalitonal game theoritic approach to the power control problem in resource-constrained wireless sensor networks, where the objective is to enhance power efficiency of individual sensors while providing the QoS requirements. We model this problem as two-sided one-to-one matching game and deploly deferred acceptance procedure that produces a single matching in the core. Furthermore, we show that, by applying the procedure repeatedly, a certain stable state is achieved where no sensor can anticipate improvements in their power efficiency as far as all of them are subject to their own QoS constraints. We evaluate our proposal by comparing them with cluster-based and the local optimal solution obtained by maximizing the total system energy efficiency, where the objective function is non-convex.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.10 no.8
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• pp.3474-3497
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• 2016

Network Function Virtualization (NFV) and Software Defined Networking (SDN) are recently considered as very promising drivers of the evolution of existing middlebox services, which play intrinsic and fundamental roles in today's networks. To address the virtual service deployment issues that caused by introducing NFV or SDN to networks, this paper proposes an optimal solution by combining quantum genetic algorithm with cooperative game theory. Specifically, we first state the concrete content of the service deployment problem and describe the system framework based on the architecture of SDN. Second, for the service location placement sub-problem, an integer linear programming model is built, which aims at minimizing the network transport delay by selecting suitable service locations, and then a heuristic solution is designed based on the improved quantum genetic algorithm. Third, for the service amount placement sub-problem, we apply the rigorous cooperative game-theoretic approach to build the mathematical model, and implement a distributed algorithm corresponding to Nash bargaining solution. Finally, experimental results show that our proposed method can calculate automatically the optimized placement locations, which reduces 30% of the average traffic delay compared to that of the random placement scheme. Meanwhile, the service amount placement approach can achieve the performance that the average metric values of satisfaction degree and fairness index reach above 90%. And evaluation results demonstrate that our proposed mechanism has a comprehensive advantage for network application.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.42 no.3
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• pp.31-39
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• 2011

This paper attempts to extend such analysis to the rather more difficult problem of optimal management of transnational fish stocks jointly owned by two countries. Transboundary fish such as Mackerel creates an incentive to harvest fish before a competitor does and leads to over-exploitation. This tendency is especially poignant for transnational stocks since, in the absence of an enforceable, international agreement, there is little or no reason for either government or the fishing industry to promote resource conservation and economic efficiency. In the current paper I examine a game theoretic setting in which cooperative management can provide more benefits than noncooperative management. A dynamic model of Mackerel fishery is combined with Nash's theory of two countries cooperative games. A characteristic function game approach is applied to describe the sharing of the surplus benefits from cooperation and noncooperation. A bioeconomic model was used to compare the economic yield of the optimal strategies for two countries, under joint maximization of net benefits in joint ocean. The results suggest as follows. First, the threat points represent the net benefits for two countries in absence of cooperation. The net benefits to Korea and China in threat points are 2,000 billion won(${\pi}^0_{KO}$) and 1,130 billion won(${\pi}^0_{CH}$). Total benefits are 3,130 billion won. Second, if two countries cooperate one with another, they reach the solution payoffs such as Pareto efficient. The net benefits to Korea and China in Pareto efficient are 2,785 billion won(${\pi}^0_{KO}$) and 1,605 billion won(${\pi}^0_{CH}$) or total benefits of 4,390 billion won : a gain of 1,260 billion won. Third, the different price effects under the two scenarios show that total benefit rise as price increases.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.15 no.5
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• pp.827-858
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• 2006

The paper presents game theoretic models for self-enforcing coalition formation in order to sustain effective international environmental agreements(IEAs). The model analyzes how the intrinsically strategic nature of a government's environmental policies(the emission allowance standard) calls for rules to sustain an IEA. Focusing on the recent theoretical developments in the infinitely repeated game, the paper introduces some mechanisms to show how self-interested sovereign countries are cooperatively able to maintain an IEA rather than defect to initially profit at the expense of a pollution heaven later on. For a more realistic case needed to sustain an IEA, an optimal international environmental policy with both signatories and non-signatories under imperfect monitoring is also explored. In this extension of the model, the derivation process for a critical discount factor, a trigger price level and the length of punishment period is briefly discussed.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.39 no.3
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• pp.47-55
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• 2016

The proliferation of the Internet and related technologies has led to a new form of distribution channels, namely online retailers. The conventional offline and the new online retailers have different transaction costs perceived by the consumers in the following perspectives: the accessibility to the product information, the traffic cost and the opportunity cost for the time to visit the store, the delivery time and the possibility of 'touch and feel' to test the quality of the product. In particular, the online retailers have lower distribution cost structure in that they do not have physical stores, which results in lower selling price. Thus they continuously offer price competition against offline retailers using the lower selling cost as competitive weapon. Moreover the emergence of the social commerce is likely to intensify the competition between the online and offline retailers. To survive in this fierce competition, the offline retailers are trying to defend their business interests by sticking to offline transaction in anticipation of increased customer loyalty, customer's preference for 'touch and feel' style shopping, and others. Despite of these efforts, customers who touch and feel a product in an offline store but purchase the product through an online retailer are increasing. To protect such customers, recently, some of the offline retailers began to provide the mobile discount service (MDS) which enables the offline customers to purchase a product at a discounted price through the mobile applications. In business competitions, the price discount strategy is usually considered to secure more market share at the cost of lower profit. In this study, however, we analyze the effect of MDS as a weapon for securing more profit. To do this, we set up a game model between the online and offline retailers which incorporates the effect of the MDS. By numerically analyzing the Nash equilibrium of the game, some managerial implications for using the MDS for more profit are discussed.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2006.11a
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• pp.219-221
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• 2006

This paper represent the algorism for analysis effect of the long-term contract to reduce market power of pivotal supplier using Agent Based model.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.570-595
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• 2017

Robust and perceptually-adaptive image watermarking algorithms have mainly targeted gray-scale images either at the modeling or embedding levels despite the widespread availability of color images. Only few of the existing algorithms are specifically designed for color images where color correlation and perception are constructively exploited. In this paper, a new perceptual and high-capacity color image watermarking solution is proposed based on the extension of Tsui et al. algorithm. The $CIEL^*a^*b^*$ space and the spatio-chromatic Fourier transform (SCFT) are combined along with a perceptual model to hide watermarks in color images where the embedding process reconciles between the conflicting requirements of digital watermarking. The perceptual model, based on an emerging color image model, exploits the non-uniform just-noticeable color difference (NUJNCD) thresholds of the $CIEL^*a^*b^*$ space. Also, spread-spectrum techniques and semi-random low-density parity check codes (SR-LDPC) are used to boost the watermark robustness and capacity. Unlike, existing color-based models, the data hiding capacity of our scheme relies on a game-theoretic model where upper bounds for watermark embedding are derived. Finally, the proposed watermarking solution outperforms existing color-based watermarking schemes in terms of robustness to standard image/color attacks, hiding capacity and imperceptibility.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.67-86
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• 2013

This study first provides a stylized model that captures the essential features of the SC (Social Commerce) business and the competition process. The model focuses on the relationship between key decision issues such as marketing inputs and market value. As more SCs join the industry, they are inevitably faced with fierce competition, which may lead to sharp increase in the total marketing and advertising expenditure. This type of competition may lead the industry away from its optimal development path, and at worst, toward a disruption of the entire industry ecosystem. Such being the case, another goal of this study is to examine the possibility that the ToC (Tragedy of the Commons) may occur in the SC industry. We build game models, each of which assumes homogeneity and heterogeneity of SC providers, respectively, and derive explicit equilibrium solutions from both models. Our basic analysis presents Nash equilibria in both models and shows that SC providers are inevitably faced with fierce competition, which may lead to sharp increase in the total marketing expenses. We also compare the game outcomes with one with a hypothetical social planner who determines the total marketing level that optimizes the entire market value. Then, ToC can be defined to describe the situation where the total marketing efforts exceed the socially optimal level of marketing efforts. In both models, we examine the possibility of the ecosystem disruption and specify the conditions under which ToC may occur. However, the chance of avoiding ToC is higher with heterogeneous players than with homogeneous players. To supplement our analytical results, we develop a simulation model which incorporates a market dynamics based on the gap between actual marketing efforts and socially optimal marketing level. Simulation experiments present some lessons and insights which also confirm out findings from equilibrium analysis. For example, heterogeneity in SC providers alleviates the severity of ToC and makes it faster for survivors to escape from the ToC trap. As a result, the degree of industrial concentration tends to increase, which also explains the 'rich-get-richer' phenomenon observed in some empirical studies on the SC industry. Lastly, based on our analytical and experimental results, we come up with some measures to avoid ToC and overcome the shortcomings intrinsic to the current business model. And further discussions provide strategic implications and policy directions to overcome the possible trap of ToC in this ecosystem, and eventually help the industry to sustainably develop itself toward the next level. To name a few examples of policy measures, regulations on the marketing activities so that the overall marketing expenses cannot go beyond the socially optimal level; institutional guidelines and rules to straightening up the distortions in the way that SC providers view the marketing costs (the current marketing costs are underestimated, thereby encouraging SC providers to increase marketing expenditure); and so on.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.7 no.3
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• pp.245-256
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• 2008

In order to cope with the ill-defined problem of human behavior being immanent uncertainty, several methodologies have been studied in game theoretic, social psychological and political science frameworks. As methods to arrange system elements systematically and draw out the consenting structural model concretively, ISM, FSM and DEMATEL based on graph theory etc. have been proposed. In this paper, we propose a modified structural modeling method to recognize the nature of problem. We introduce the statistical method to adjust the establishment levels in group decision situation. From this, it will become possible to obtain effectively and smoothly the structural model of group members in comparison with the traditional methods. Further we propose a procedure for achieving the consenting structural model of group members based on the structural modeling method. By applying the method to recognize the nature of ill-defined problems, it will be possible to solve the given problem effectively and rationally. In order to inspect the effectiveness of the method, we conduct a practical problem as an empirical study: "Behavior analysis of passengers for the Joban line of East Japan Railway Company after new railway service of Tsukuba Express opened".

• Journal of Global Scholars of Marketing Science
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.37-46
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• 2009

The Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce announced in May 2008 that U.S. retail e-commerce sales for 2006 reached $ 107 billion, up from $ 87 billion in 2005 - an increase of 22 percent. From 2001 to 2006, retail e-sales increased at an average annual growth rate of 25.4 percent. The explosive growth of E-Commerce has caused profound changes in marketing channel relationships and structures in many industries. Despite the great potential implications for both academicians and practitioners, there still exists a great deal of uncertainty about the impact of the Internet channel introduction on distribution channel management. The purpose of this study is to investigate how the ownership of the new Internet channel affects the existing channel members and consumers. To explore the above research questions, this study conducts well-controlled mathematical experiments to isolate the impact of the Internet channel by comparing before and after the Internet channel entry. The model consists of a monopolist manufacturer selling its product through a channel system including one independent physical store before the entry of an Internet store. The addition of the Internet store to this channel system results in a mixed channel comprised of two different types of channels. The new Internet store can be launched by the independent physical store such as Bestbuy. In this case, the physical retailer coordinates the two types of stores to maximize the joint profits from the two stores. The Internet store also can be introduced by an independent Internet retailer such as Amazon. In this case, a retail level competition occurs between the two types of stores. Although the manufacturer sells only one product, consumers view each product-outlet pair as a unique offering. Thus, the introduction of the Internet channel provides two product offerings for consumers. The channel structures analyzed in this study are illustrated in Fig.1. It is assumed that the manufacturer plays as a Stackelberg leader maximizing its own profits with the foresight of the independent retailer's optimal responses as typically assumed in previous analytical channel studies. As a Stackelberg follower, the independent physical retailer or independent Internet retailer maximizes its own profits, conditional on the manufacturer's wholesale price. The price competition between two the independent retailers is assumed to be a Bertrand Nash game. For simplicity, the marginal cost is set at zero, as typically assumed in this type of study. In order to explore the research questions above, this study develops a game theoretic model that possesses the following three key characteristics. First, the model explicitly captures the fact that an Internet channel and a physical store exist in two independent dimensions (one in physical space and the other in cyber space). This enables this model to demonstrate that the effect of adding an Internet store is different from that of adding another physical store. Second, the model reflects the fact that consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences for using a physical store and for using an Internet channel. Third, the model captures the vertical strategic interactions between an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer, making it possible to analyze the channel structure issues discussed in this paper. Although numerous previous models capture this vertical dimension of marketing channels, none simultaneously incorporates the three characteristics reflected in this model. The analysis results are summarized in Table 1. When the new Internet channel is introduced by the existing physical retailer and the retailer coordinates both types of stores to maximize the joint profits from the both stores, retail prices increase due to a combination of the coordination of the retail prices and the wider market coverage. The quantity sold does not significantly increase despite the wider market coverage, because the excessively high retail prices alleviate the market coverage effect to a degree. Interestingly, the coordinated total retail profits are lower than the combined retail profits of two competing independent retailers. This implies that when a physical retailer opens an Internet channel, the retailers could be better off managing the two channels separately rather than coordinating them, unless they have the foresight of the manufacturer's pricing behavior. It is also found that the introduction of an Internet channel affects the power balance of the channel. The retail competition is strong when an independent Internet store joins a channel with an independent physical retailer. This implies that each retailer in this structure has weak channel power. Due to intense retail competition, the manufacturer uses its channel power to increase its wholesale price to extract more profits from the total channel profit. However, the retailers cannot increase retail prices accordingly because of the intense retail level competition, leading to lower channel power. In this case, consumer welfare increases due to the wider market coverage and lower retail prices caused by the retail competition. The model employed for this study is not designed to capture all the characteristics of the Internet channel. The theoretical model in this study can also be applied for any stores that are not geographically constrained such as TV home shopping or catalog sales via mail. The reasons the model in this study is names as "Internet" are as follows: first, the most representative example of the stores that are not geographically constrained is the Internet. Second, catalog sales usually determine the target markets using the pre-specified mailing lists. In this aspect, the model used in this study is closer to the Internet than catalog sales. However, it would be a desirable future research direction to mathematically and theoretically distinguish the core differences among the stores that are not geographically constrained. The model is simplified by a set of assumptions to obtain mathematical traceability. First, this study assumes the price is the only strategic tool for competition. In the real world, however, various marketing variables can be used for competition. Therefore, a more realistic model can be designed if a model incorporates other various marketing variables such as service levels or operation costs. Second, this study assumes the market with one monopoly manufacturer. Therefore, the results from this study should be carefully interpreted considering this limitation. Future research could extend this limitation by introducing manufacturer level competition. Finally, some of the results are drawn from the assumption that the monopoly manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader. Although this is a standard assumption among game theoretic studies of this kind, we could gain deeper understanding and generalize our findings beyond this assumption if the model is analyzed by different game rules.