• Proceedings of the Korea Port Economic Association Conference
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• 2006.08a
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• pp.1-12
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• 2006

As national economies globalize, demand for intercontinental container shipping services is growing rapidly, providing a potential economic boon for the countries and communities that provide port services. On the promise of profits, many governments are investing heavily in port infrastructure, leading to a possible glut in port capacity, driving down prices for port services and eliminating profits as ports compete for business. Further, existing ports are making strategic investments to protect their market share, increasing the chance new ports will be overcapitalized and unprofitable. Governments and port researchers need a tool for understanding how local competition in their region will affect demand for port services at their location, and thus better assess the profitability of a prospective port. We propose to develop such a tool by extending our existing simulation model of global container traffic to incorporate demand-side shipper preferences and supply-side strategic responses by incumbent ports to changes in the global port network, including building new ports, scaling up existing ports, and unexpected port closures. We will estimate shipper preferences over routes, port attributes and port services based on US and international shipping data, and redesign the simulation model to maximize the shipper's revealed preference functions rather than simply minimize costs. As demand shifts, competing ports will adjust their pricing (short term) and infrastructure (long term) to remain competitive or defend market share, a reaction we will capture with a game theoretic model of local monopoly that will predict changes in port characteristics. The model's hypotheses will be tested in a controlled laboratory experiment tailored to local port competition in Asia, which will also serve to demonstrate the subtle game theoretic concepts of imperfect competition to a policy and industry audience. We will apply the simulation model to analyze changes in global container traffic in three scenarios: addition of a new large port in the US, extended closure of an existing large port in the US, and cooperative and competitive port infrastructure development among Korean partner countries in Asia.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.56 no.9
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• pp.1665-1675
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• 2007

This paper presents the problem of controlling asynchronous sequential machines in the presence of input disturbances, which may be also regarded as an adversary in a game theoretic setting. The main objective is to provide necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a corrective controller that solves model matching problem of an asynchronous machine suffering from input disturbance. The existence condition can be stated in terms of a simple comparison of two skeleton matrices. The proposed controller eliminates the adversarial effect of input disturbance and makes the controlled machine mimic the behavior of a model in stable-state way. Whenever controller exists, algorithms for their design are outlined and demonstrated in a case study.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.56 no.9
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• pp.1655-1664
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• 2007

This paper presents the problem of controlling asynchronous sequential machines in the presence of input disturbances, which may be also regarded as an adversary in a game theoretic setting. The main objective is to develope a new methodology for including unpredictable behavior of input disturbance into models of asynchronous machines. The input disturbance, representing uncontrollable noise input, is embedded into a new model of asynchronous machines in form of input/state finite state machines. It is shown that the proposed modeling preserves the fundamental model and well-pose of asynchronous machines. The reachability matrix, an important performance index of asynchronous machines, is also adapted according to input disturbance and will be used for constructing corrective controllers in the companion paper.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.12 no.20
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• pp.123-138
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• 1989

The primary objective of the agency research in the game theory lives in the maintenance of Pareto is optimal condition for the optimal incentive contract. The basic concepts which are related to this objective are reviewed in connection with the general assumptions to model it, the moral hazard and adverse selection which arised from the information asymmetry, and finally the problem of risk distribution. The demand for auditing and the role of auditor have been addressed by ASOBAC. Issues which an auditor is explicitly introduced in a principal-agent framework have been addressed in this paper. These issues must be confronted to appropriately with the auditor, and to achieve an adequate understanding of optimal confronting arrangement with the auditor. The first step in introducing an auditor into this analysis is to examine the game-theoretic foundation of such a expended agency model. The Mathematical program formulated may not yield solution that are resonable. This arises because the program may call for the auditor and manager to play dominated Nash equilibra in some subgame. The nontrivial natures of the subgame implies that randomized strategies by the auditor and manager nay be of crucial importance. The possibilities for overcoming the randomized strategy problem were suggested; change the rule of the game and or impose covexity condition. The former seems unjustifiable in on auditing context, and the latter promising but difficult to achieve. The discussion ended with an extension of the revelation principle to the owner manager-auditor game, assuming strategies. An examination of the restriction and improvement direction of the basic concept of agency theory was addressed in the later part of this paper. Many important aspects of auditor incentives are inherently multiple-agent, multiple-period, multiple-objectine, phenomena and require further analyses and researches.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.22 no.7 s.78
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• pp.71-78
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• 2004

This paper presents a game-theoretic model of information transmission for variable message sign(VMS) operations. There are one VMS operator and many drivers as players. Operator wants to minimize the total travel time while the drivers want to minimize their own travel time. The operator who knows the actual traffic situation offers information strategically. The drivers evaluate the information from operator, and then choose the route. We model this situation as a cheap-talk game which is a simplest form of Bayesian game. We show that there is a possibility that the operator can improve the traffic efficiency by manipulating the electric signs at times. Indeed, it is an equilibrium of the game. This suggests that the operator must consider the strategic use of VMS system seriously.

• 한국경영정보학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2007.06a
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• pp.141-146
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• 2007

The importance of the net-based customer service in delivering supplementary after-sale services associated with product has been well documented. The strategic advantages of a well-implemented the net-based customer service are enhanced customer loyalty and higher lock-in of customers, and the resulting reduction in competition and the consequent increase in profits. However, not all customers utilize such the net-based customer service. This is partly due to the e-commerce divide, and partly due to privacy and security concerns of the customer for sharing personal information with firms. The limited level of customer adoption of the net-based customer service affects the firm profits and the customers' welfare. We use a game-theoretic model in which we model the net-based customer service system as a mechanism to enhance customers' loyalty. We find that an increase in adoption of the net-based customer service by the customer base is not always desirable for firms. and that customers who utilize such services are better off only when the overall adoption is limited.

• East Asian Economic Review
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.191-228
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• 2016

This paper analyzes the role of absorptive capacity in R&D spillovers through strategic R&D investments in a game-theoretic framework. In the model, a firm's effective R&D is composed of idiosyncratic R&D, which produces its own innovations, and identical R&D, which improves absorptive capacity. The model shows that in the presence of absorptive capacity firms have a tendency to underinvest (overinvest) in idiosyncratic (identical) R&D relative to the social optimum. As the spillover becomes larger, firms decrease their own R&D while they become more inclined towards strategic exploitation of rivals' efforts. Since the former effect overpowers the latter, the total amount of R&D decreases as the spillover increases. This is socially undesirable, providing a potential justification for a governmental subsidy for idiosyncratic R&D and a tax on identical R&D. The findings may have important implications for newly industrialized or emerging countries that consider a redirection of national R&D policy and intellectual property rights (IPR) regime.

• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2005.10a
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• pp.996-1001
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• 2005

Today, government is no longer considered the sole provider of public works or services. Public-Private Partnership (PPP) has been recognized as an important approach to solving problems for governments in providing public works and services. However, the joint ownership of public works/services complicates the administration of PPP projects. Particularly, the fact that government may rescue a distressed project and renegotiate with the developer causes serious problems in project procurement and management. This paper aims to study when and how government will rescue a distressed project and what impacts government's rescue behavior has on project procurement and contract management. A game-theory based model for government rescue will be developed. This pilot study, the author hopes, may provide theoretic foundations to practitioners/policy makers for prescribing creative PPP procurement and management policies and for examining the effectiveness of PPP policies.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2015.10a
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• pp.107-110
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• 2015

In this paper, we propose a coalitonal game theoritic approach to the power control problem in resource-constrained wireless sensor networks, where the objective is to enhance power efficiency of individual sensors while providing the QoS requirements. We model this problem as two-sided one-to-one matching game and deploly deferred acceptance procedure that produces a single matching in the core. Furthermore, we show that, by applying the procedure repeatedly, a certain stable state is achieved where no sensor can anticipate improvements in their power efficiency as far as all of them are subject to their own QoS constraints. We evaluate our proposal by comparing them with cluster-based and the local optimal solution obtained by maximizing the total system energy efficiency, where the objective function is non-convex.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.10 no.8
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• pp.3474-3497
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• 2016

Network Function Virtualization (NFV) and Software Defined Networking (SDN) are recently considered as very promising drivers of the evolution of existing middlebox services, which play intrinsic and fundamental roles in today's networks. To address the virtual service deployment issues that caused by introducing NFV or SDN to networks, this paper proposes an optimal solution by combining quantum genetic algorithm with cooperative game theory. Specifically, we first state the concrete content of the service deployment problem and describe the system framework based on the architecture of SDN. Second, for the service location placement sub-problem, an integer linear programming model is built, which aims at minimizing the network transport delay by selecting suitable service locations, and then a heuristic solution is designed based on the improved quantum genetic algorithm. Third, for the service amount placement sub-problem, we apply the rigorous cooperative game-theoretic approach to build the mathematical model, and implement a distributed algorithm corresponding to Nash bargaining solution. Finally, experimental results show that our proposed method can calculate automatically the optimized placement locations, which reduces 30% of the average traffic delay compared to that of the random placement scheme. Meanwhile, the service amount placement approach can achieve the performance that the average metric values of satisfaction degree and fairness index reach above 90%. And evaluation results demonstrate that our proposed mechanism has a comprehensive advantage for network application.