• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
• /
• v.60 no.3
• /
• pp.509-516
• /
• 2011

This paper studies a novel method to find the profit-maximizing Nash Equilibriums in allocating generation quantities with consideration of ramp-rates under competitive market environment. Each GenCo in a market participates in a game to maximize its profit through competitions and play a game with bidding strategies. In order to find the Nash equilibriums it is necessary to search the feasible combinations of GenCos' strategies which satisfy every participant's profit and no one wants various constraints. During the procedure to find Nash equilibriums, the payoff matrix can be simplified as eliminating the dominated strategies. in each time interval. Because of the ramp-rate, generator's physically or technically limits to increase or decrease outputs in its range, it can restrict the number of bidding strategies of each generator at the next stage. So in this paper, we found the Nash Equilibriums for multi-stage generation allocation game considering the ramp-rate limits of generators. In the case studies, we analyzed the generation allocation game for a 12-hour multi-stage and compared it with the results of dynamic economic dispatch. Both of the two cases were considered generator's ramp-rate effects.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society of Computer Information Conference
• /
• 2022.07a
• /
• pp.183-185
• /
• 2022

2022년을 기점으로 점점 더 커지는 모바일게임 시장에서 수익 창출을 위한 요소를 찾기 위해 참고 문헌과 함께 조사하였다. 기존 연구인 민동현의 논문에서는 13가지(자기 표현, 허영심, 스토리, 게임진행, 즐거움, 기회 제공, 실세계 반영, 경쟁심, 조작보정, 능력치 상승, 랜덤성, 광고활용, 현실 상품 판매 촉진)항목을 제시했으나 시기적, 상황적 차이에 의해 새로운 제안이 필요하다. 따라서 본 논문에서는 기존 연구를 바탕으로 10년 전과 달리 새로이 도출해야 할 요소를 3가지를 찾아 수익 창출을 위한 새로운 모델을 제시한다.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
• /
• v.53 no.5
• /
• pp.302-307
• /
• 2004

As deregulation of power industry is becoming a reality, there has been an intense interest in the strategic bidding for suppliers to maximize their profits. The profit gained by a supplier is related not only to its energy-price bid curve but also to its submitted operational parameters such as generation capacity, etc. So suppliers are willing to use those strategic parameters that can be manipulated by themselves and are effective to their profit. This paper deals with the competition model with compound strategies: generation capacity and bidding curve. The parameter space is modeled by dividing into the two strategies, so the problem is made up of the four types of sub-game in a two player game. This paper analyzes the global Nash Equilibrium (NE) over the whole divisions by computing the sub-game NEs in some divisions and by deriving the best response curves which have discontinuities in other divisions. The global NE is shown to correspond to the Cournot NE where the quantity variable is realized by a constraints of a generation capacity.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 2009.07a
• /
• pp.569_570
• /
• 2009

This paper presents a methodology to find the profit maximized Nash Equilibriums of each generator(or GenCo), which considers the Ramp-rate of each generator under a competitive market environment. The ramp-rate of a generator is one of the physical or technical constraints of a generator and means the ability to increase or decrease the output instantaneously. In this paper, we found several Nash Equilibriums of the generation allocation problem through Dynamic Programming in a competitive market. Individual generators participate in a game to maximize its profit through competitions and play a game with bidding strategies of its generation quantities in a spot market.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
• /
• v.52 no.11
• /
• pp.668-674
• /
• 2003

The electric marketplace is in the midst of major changes designed to promote competition. No longer vertically integrated with guaranteed customers and suppliers, electric generators and distributors will have to compete to sell and buy electricity. Unit commitment (UC) in such a competitive environment is not the same as the traditional one anymore. The objective of UC is not to minimize production cost as before but to find the solution that produces a maximum profit for a generation firm. This paper presents a hi-level formulation that decomposes the UC game into a generation-decision game (first level game) and a state(on/off)-decision game (second level game). Derivation that the first-level game has a pure Cournot Nash equilibrium(NE) helps to solve the second-level game. In case of having a mixed NE in the second-level game, this paper chooses a pure strategy having maximum probability in the mixed strategy in order to obviate the probabilistic on/off state which may be infeasible. Simulation results shows that proposed method gives the adequate UC solutions corresponding to a NE.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
• /
• v.5A no.1
• /
• pp.85-92
• /
• 2005

In this paper, Nash equilibriums of generation markets are investigated using a game theory application for simplified competitive electricity markets. We analyze the characteristics of equilibrium states in N-company spot markets modeled by uniform pricing auctions and propose a new method for obtaining Nash equilibriums of the auction. We assume that spot markets are operated as uniform pricing auctions and that each generation company submits its bids into the auction in the form of a seal-bid. Depending on the bids of generation companies, market demands are allocated to each company accordingly. The uniform pricing auction in this analysis can be formulated as a non-cooperative and static game in which generation companies correspond to players of the game. The coefficient of the bidding function of company-n is the strategy of player-n (company-n) and the payoff of player-n is defined as its profit from the uniform price auction. The solution of this game can be obtained using the concept of the non-cooperative equilibrium originating from the Nash idea. Based on the so called residual demand curve, we can derive the best response function of each generation company in the uniform pricing auction with N companies, analytically. Finally, we present an efficient means to obtain all the possible equilibrium set pairs and to examine their feasibilities as Nash equilibriums. A simple numerical example with three generation companies is demonstrated to illustrate the basic idea of the proposed methodology. From this, we can see the applicability of the proposed method to the real-world problem, even though further future analysis is required.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
• /
• v.52 no.9
• /
• pp.542-549
• /
• 2003

In this paper, a novel approach to generator maintenance scheduling strategy in competitive electricity markets based on non-cooperative dynamic game theory is presented. The main contribution of this study can be considered to develop a game-theoretic framework for analyzing strategic behaviors of generating companies (Gencos) from the standpoints of the generator maintenance-scheduling problem (GMP) game. To obtain the equilibrium solution for the GMP game, the GMP problem is formulated as a dynamic non-cooperative game with complete information. In the proposed game, the players correspond to the profit-maximizing individual Gencos, and the payoff of each player is defined as the profits from the energy market. The optimal maintenance schedule is defined by subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. Numerical results for two-Genco system by both proposed method and conventional one are used to demonstrate that 1) the proposed framework can be successfully applied in analyzing the strategic behaviors of each Genco in changed markets and 2) both methods show considerably different results in terms of market stability or system reliability. The result indicates that generator maintenance scheduling strategy is one of the crucial strategic decision-makings whereby Gencos can maximize their profits in a competitive market environment.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 2000.11a
• /
• pp.3-5
• /
• 2000

It has been the paradigm of game theory that more than two utilities compete and determine the price and amount of dispatch. In order for this theory to be available on real power system, it is necessary to consider the transmission costs as well as the generation costs. In addition Independent System Operator(ISO) should be able to mitigate the congestion, recover the transmission costs and provide information for long-term capacity investment by devising reasonable pricing schemes for the transmission services. Generators also have to take the transmission costs into account when building the bidding strategies. This paper proposes an approach to analyzing the profit maximizing game considering the transmission cost in a competitive electricity market.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
• /
• v.51 no.7
• /
• pp.311-316
• /
• 2002

It has been a basic model for the present electric power industry that more than two generators compete, and thereby the market clearing price and the generation schedules are determined through the bid process. In order for this paradigm to be applicable to real electric power systems and markets, it is necessary to reflect many physical and economic constraints related to frequency and transmission in the dispatching schedule. The paper presents an approach to deriving a Nash bargaining solution in a competitive electricity market where multiple generators are playing with the system operator who mitigates the transmission congestion to minimize the total transaction cost. In this study, we take the effect of the line flows and the role of system operator into the Game. Finally, a case study has been demonstrated to verify the proposed cooperative game.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
• /
• 2022.05a
• /
• pp.615-617
• /
• 2022

Currently, the 'Gacha' system is becoming an indispensable profit generation method for online and mobile games. The system, also called "probability randomization," proceeds with cash-based payments, and it is not clear how much money you need to use to obtain the item you want. So, in response to the backlash of users, game companies introduced a "ceiling" system that allows users to get the items they want if they use it for more than a certain amount, and added several profit generation methods using it. We examine the impact of this system on continuous billing induction.