• The Journal of Engineering Geology
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.609-613
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• 2014

The Korean Peninsula, located at the southeastern tip of the Eurasian Plate, is known to be tectonically stable, and no critical evidence has yet been found that would override the safety design of nuclear facilities in South Korea. Because a nuclear power plant, like other major social overhead capital facilities, could cause great damage to both the environment and society through an unexpected tectonic event, even one of extremely low probability, like the Fukushima accident, a defense-in-depth safety approach is required in geological and geotechnical site safety evaluation for nuclear projects. This paper introduces the regulatory procedures that are in place to confirm nuclear site safety and site monitoring (e.g., earthquakes and groundwater) systems applied to nuclear facilities in order to reduce inherent uncertainties within the site safety review of geological and seismological issues related with a NPP project.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.201-209
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• 2016

The object of this study was to evaluate the separation distance from a temporary storage facility satisfying the dose criteria. The calculation of ambient dose rates took into account cover soil thickness, facility size, and facility type by using MCNPX code. Shielding effects of cover soil were 68.9%, 96.9% and 99.7% at 10 cm, 30 cm and 50 cm respectively. The on-ground type of storage facility had the highest ambient dose rate, followed by the semi-ground type and the underground type. The ambient dose rate did not vary with facility size (except $5{\times}5{\times}2m\;size$) due to the self-shielding of decontamination waste in temporary storage. The separation distances without cover soil for a $50{\times}50{\times}2m\;size$ facility were evaluated as 14 m (minimum radioactivity concentration), 33 m (most probably radioactivity concentration), and 57 m (maximum radioactivity concentration) for on-ground storage type, 9 m, 24 m, and 45 m for semi-underground storage type, and 6 m, 16 m, and 31 m for underground storage type.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Systems Engineering
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• v.16 no.2
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• pp.97-109
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• 2020

On March 11, 2011, an earthquake followed by a tsunami caused an extended station blackout (SBO) at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP Units. The accident was initiated by a total loss of both onsite and offsite electrical power resulting in the loss of the ultimate heat sink for several days, and a consequent core melt in some units where proper mitigation strategies could not be implemented in a timely fashion. To enhance the plant's coping capability, the Diverse and Flexible Strategies (FLEX) were proposed to append the Emergency Operation Procedures (EOPs) by relying on portable equipment as an additional line of defense. To assess the success window of FLEX strategies, all sources of uncertainties need to be considered, using a physics-based model or system code. This necessitates conducting a large number of simulations to reflect all potential variations in initial, boundary, and design conditions as well as thermophysical properties, empirical models, and scenario uncertainties. Alternatively, data-driven models may provide a fast tool to predict the success window of FLEX strategies given the underlying uncertainties. This paper explores the applicability of Artificial Intelligence (AI) to identify the success window of FLEX strategy for extended SBO. The developed model can be trained and validated using data produced by the lumped parameter thermal-hydraulic code, MARS-KS, as best estimate system code loosely coupled with Dakota for uncertainty quantification. A Systems Engineering (SE) approach is used to plan and manage the process of using AI to predict the success window of FLEX strategies under extended SBO conditions.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.40 no.4
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• pp.223-230
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• 2015

The objective of this study is to identify the radionuclide distribution in public water by carrying out the analysis of artificial radionuclides($^{134}Cs$, $^{137}Cs$, $^{239+240}Pu$), natural radionuclide($^{210}Pb$) and TOC in the lake Euiam sediment in Chuncheon, South Korea. The $^{134}Cs$ concentration in all lake sediments showed below MDA values, and the $^{137}Cs$ concentration in lake sediment were ranged from MDA to $8.79Bq{\cdot}kg^{-1}-dry$. The $^{137}Cs$ concentrations in surface sediment were reported to be 2.4 to $4.2Bq{\cdot}kg^{-1}-dry$. The lowest concentration of $^{137}Cs$ was reported at St. 4 and the highest concentration was reported at St. 3, respectively. The $^{239+240}Pu$ concentration in lake sediment were ranged from 0.049 to $0.47Bq{\cdot}kg^{-1}-dry$. The lowest concentration was reported at St. 2 and the highest concentration was reported at St. 3. The correlation(r) between the $^{239+240}Pu$ concentration and $^{137}Cs$ concentration in lake sediment presented higher values (0.54 to 0.97) and this suggests the behavior and origin of $^{137}Cs$ is identical to the $^{239+240}Pu$ in the sediment. The $^{134}Cs$ concentration below MDA value and the $^{239+240}Pu/^{137}Cs$ ratio(mean value of 0.041) indicated that the artificial radionuclides in the sediment were originated from global fallout by the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons conducted by former USSR and U.S.A, but not from the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident. The sedimentation rate derived from $^{210}Pb$ age-dating method at St. 2 is calculated to be $0.31{\pm}0.06cm{\cdot}y^{-1}$. This value is similar to the value ($0.41{\pm}0.05cm{\cdot}y^{-1}$) estimated from the $^{137}Cs$ maximum peak produced from early 1960's. The content of TOC in lake Euiam sediments varied from 0.20 to 13.01%. While the highest correlation between TOC and $^{137}Cs$ concentration in the sediment were found at St. 1, the others presented the low correlation.