• Journal of Gastric Cancer
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• v.4 no.4
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• pp.235-241
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• 2004

Purpose: This study was performed to evaluate the effectiveness of the serum tumor markers CEA, CA 19-9, and CA 72-4 in monitoring the recurrence of gastric cancer and in its preoperative assessment. Materials and Methods: Two hundred fifty-five patients who underwent potentially curative surgery during period from January 1995 to December 2000 at the Department of Surgery were assessed. Serum samples were obtained preoperatively, 2 weeks after the surgery, and at 6-month intervals. The cut-off levels were established as 5 ng/ml for CEA, 36 U/ml for CA 19-9, and 4 U/ml for CA 72-4. The tumor stage was described according to the 5th edition of the Union Internationale Contra la Cancer (UICC) TNM classification in 1997. Results: The preoperative positivities were $10.5\%$ for CEA, $9.7\%$ for CA 19-9, and $12.4\%$ for CA 72-4. The serum levels of the three tumor markers decreased after curative surgery. The preoperative serum levels of the three tumor markers were significantly related to the depth of invasion, the tumor size, lymph-node metastasis, the pathologic stage, and recurrence, except that CEA was not associated with tumor size. The marker sensitivities in recurrent cases were $43.3\%$ for CEA, $\%41.8$ for CA 19-9, and $50.0\%$ for CA 72-4, and the marker specificities were $85.1\%$ for CEA, $96.8\%$ for CA 19-9, and $87.8\%$ for CA 72-4. Conclusion: The preoperative serum levels of CEA, CA 19-9, and CA 72-4 are not useful for the initial diagnosis of gastric cancer because of their low positivity. However, we should consider their relationship with depth of invasion, lymph-node metastasis, tumor size, pathologic stage, and recurrence. Also, the follow-up levels of the three markers have a statistical relationship with recurrence of gastric cancer even though their sensitivities are low.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Traditional Landscape Architecture
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• v.35 no.2
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• pp.77-86
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• 2017

A study on the population ecology of gregarious Wisteria habitat was conducted in Beomeosa temple, Busan. The area has been protected since it was designated as No. 176 natural monument in 1966. Such a large habitat of native wisteria (Wisteria floribunda DC.) in Korea is very rare so that it has a very high academic value. However, there are no high-resolution researches on the distribution and ecology of wisteria in the Gregarious Wisteria Habitat of Beomeosa Temple. The study aimed to identify the distribution and characteristics of wisteria populations in the Wisteria habitat. The study identified the distribution of Wisteria, RCC, the climbing direction, the plant and flora in the research area in the Gregarious Wisteria Habitat of Beomeosa Temple in Busan and the surrounding areas based on an on-site research. As a result, the total number of the wisteria populations in the research area was confirmed to be 1,158 and the RCC of wisteria was on average 69.0 mm (${\pm}45.5$) and in maximum 365 mm. In terms of the climbing direction, the number of wisteria that climbs clockwise or counterclockwise was determined to be 40. It was identified that there are 28 taxa of the climbing plant species and the wisteria of the same kind was the most favorable. The populations were found to be dispersed adjacent to the valleys, and were found to be maintained by constant disturbance. 76.6 % of the population was found to be distributed in the valley forest, and the Carpinus tschonoskii-Pseudosasa japonica forest, Pueraria lobata community and Pinus densiflora forest were found to be relatively dispersed. The study proposed to conduct the follow-up researches to preserve the wisteria that is spreading in this research area, the wisteria with the highest RCC and regional habitat through continuous monitoring; and maintain the protection area of No. 176 natural monument; and discussed the management measures and approaches that reflect the habitat.

• Investigative Magnetic Resonance Imaging
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.181-191
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• 2013

Purpose : To evaluate the usefulness of in vivo magnetic resonance (MR) imaging for tracking intravenously injected superparamagnetic iron oxide (SPIO)-labeled human umbilical vein endothelial cells (HUVECs) in an acute renal failure (ARF) rat model. Materials and Methods: HUVECs were labeled with SPIO and poly-L-lysine (PLL) complex. Relaxation rates at 1.5-T MR, cell viability, and labeling stability were assessed. HUVECs were injected into the tail vein of ARF rats (labeled cells in 10 rats, unlabeled cells in 2 rats). Follow-up serial $T2^*$-weighted gradient-echo MR imaging was performed at 1, 3, 5 and 7 days after injection, and the MR findings were compared with histologic findings. Results: There was an average of $98.4{\pm}2.4%$ Prussian blue stain-positive cells after labeling with SPIOPLL complex. Relaxation rates ($R2^*$) of all cultured HUVECs at day 3 and 5 were not markedly decreased compared with that at day 1. The stability of SPIO in HUVECs was maintained during the proliferation of HUVECs in culture media. In the presence of left unilateral renal artery ischemia, $T2^*$-weighted MR imaging performed 1 day after the intravenous injection of labeled HUVECs revealed a significant signal intensity (SI) loss exclusively in the left renal outer medulla regions, but not in the right kidney. The MR imaging findings at days 3, 5 and 7 after intravenous injection of HUVECs showed a SI loss in the outer medulla regions of the ischemically injured kidney, but the SI progressively recovered with time and the right kidney did not have a significant change in SI in the same period. Upon histologic analysis, the SI loss on MR images was correspondent to the presence of Prussian blue stained cells, primarily in the renal outer medulla. Conclusion: MR imaging appears to be useful for in vivo monitoring of intravenously injected SPIO-labeled HUVECs in an ischemically injured rat kidney.

• Korean Journal of Heritage: History & Science
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• v.43 no.1
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• pp.56-85
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• 2010

UNESCO World Heritage Programme was introduced following the adoption of Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage by the General Conference of UNESCO in 1972 in order to protect cultural and natural heritage with superb value for all mankind. Despite its short history of less than 40 years, it has been evaluated as one of the most successful of the cultural area projects of UNESCO with 890 world heritage registered worldwide. For systematic protection management of World Heritage, UNESCO, through systemization of registration, emphasis on the importance of preservation management plan, institutionalization of monitoring, and operation of World Heritage Fund, has utilized World Heritage Programme not just as a means of listing excellent cultural properties, but as a preservation planning tool, and accordingly, such policies have had a significant influence on the cultural heritage protection legislations of numerous nations. Korea has ratified World Heritage Convention in 1988, and with the registration of the Royal Tombs of the Joseon Dynasty in 2009, it has 9 World Heritage Sites. Twenty years have passed since Korea joined the World Heritage Programme. While World Heritage registration contributed to publicity of the uniqueness and excellence of Korean cultural properties and improvement of Korea's national culture status, it is now time to devise various legislative/systematic improvement means to reconsider the World Heritage registration strategy and establish a systematic preservation management system. While up until now, the Cultural Properties Protection Law has been amended to arrange for basic rules regarding registration and protection of World Heritage Sites, and some local governments have founded bodies exclusive for World Heritage Site management, a more fundamental and macroscopic plan for World Heritage policy improvement must be sought. Projects and programs in each area for reinforcement of World Heritage policy capacity such as: 1) Enactment of a special law for World Heritage Site preservation management; 2) enactment of ordinances for protection of World Heritage Sites per each local government; 3) reinforcement of policies and management functionality of Cultural Heritage Administration and local governments; 4) dramatic increase in the finances of World Heritage Site protection; 5) requirement to establish plan for World Heritage Site preservation protection; 6) increased support for utilization of World Heritage Sites; 7) substantiation and diversification of World Heritage registration; 8) sharing of information and experiences of World Heritage Sites management among local governments; 9) installation of World Heritage Sites integral archive; 10) revitalization of citizen cooperation and resident participation; 11) training specialized resources for World Heritage Sites protection; 12) revitalization of sustainable World Heritage Sites tourism, must be selected and promoted systematically. Regarding how World Heritage Programme should be domestically accepted and developed, the methods for systemization, scientific approach, and specialization of World Heritage policies were suggested per type. In the future, in-depth and specialized researches and studies should follow.

• Pediatric Infection and Vaccine
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• v.28 no.3
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• pp.133-143
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• 2021

Purpose: This study aimed to determine the incidence of central line-associated bloodstream infection (CLABSI) in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU), evaluate the patients' clinical characteristics, and identify the etiologic agents for guidance in prevention and treatment. Methods: A retrospective chart review study of infants classified as having CLABSI was conducted at the NICU of Seoul National University Bundang Hospital from January 2016 to December 2020. Results: Of the 45 infants, 53 had CLABSIs within a follow-up period of 18,622 catheter days. The incidence of CLABSIs was 2.85 per 1,000 catheter days. The most common catheter type was a peripherally inserted central catheter (n=47, 81%). A total of 57 pathogens were isolated, of which 57.9% (n=33) were Gram-positive bacteria, 36.8% (n=21) were Gram-negative bacteria, and 5.3% (n=3) were Candida spp. The most common pathogens were Staphylococcus aureus (n=12, 21%) and coagulase-negative staphylococci (n=12, 21%), followed by Klebsiella aerogenes (n=8, 14%). The median duration of bacteremia was 2 days, and 19 episodes showed bacteremia for 3 days or more. The mortality rate of infants within 14 days of CLABSI was 13.3% (n=6). Conclusions: This study analyzed the incidence of CLABSI and the distribution of pathogens in the NICU. Continuous monitoring of CLABSI based on active surveillance serves as guidance for empiric antibiotic use and also serves as a tool to assess the necessity for implementation of prevention strategies and their impact.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.

• Journal of Preventive Medicine and Public Health
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• v.23 no.3 s.31
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• pp.324-337
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• 1990

To assess the effectiveness of the interventions in working environment and personal hygiene for the occupational exposure to the lead, 156 workers (116 exposed subjects and 40 controls) of a newly established battery factory were examined for their blood lead concentration (Pb-B) in every 3 months up to 18 months. Air lead concentration (Pb-A) of the workplaces was also checked for 3 times in 6 months interval from August 1987. Environmental intervention included the local exhaust ventilation and vacuum cleaning of the floor. Intervention of the personal hygiene included the daily change of clothes, compulsory shower after work and hand washing before meal, prohibition of cigarette smoking and food consumption at the work site and wearing mask. Mean Pb-B of the controls was $21.97{\pm}3.36{\mu}g/dl$ at the preemployment examination and slightly increased to $22.75{\pm}3.38{\mu}g/dl$ after 6 months. Mean Pb-B of the workers who were employed before the factory was in operation (Group A) was $20.49{\pm}3.84{\mu}g/dl$ on employment and it was increased to $23.90{\pm}5.30{\mu}g/dl$ after 3 months (p<0.01). Pb-B was increased to $28.84{\pm}5.76{\mu}g/dl$ 6 months after the employment which was 1 month after the initiation of intervention program. It did not increase thereafter and ranged between $26.83{\mu}g/dl\;and\;28.28{\mu}g/dl$ in the subsequent 4 tests. Mean Pb-B of the workers who were employed after the factory had been in operation but before the intervention program was initiated (Group B) was $16.58{\pm}4/53{\mu}g/dl$ before the exposure and it was increased to $28.82{\pm}5.66{\mu}g/dl$(P<0.01) in 3 months later (1 month after the intervention). The values of subsequent 4 tests remained between 26.46 and $28.54{\mu}g/dl$. Mean Pb-B of the workers who were employed after intervention program had been started (Group C) was $19.45{\pm}3.44{\mu}g/dl$ at the preemployment examination and gradually increased to $22.70{\pm}4.55{\mu}g/dl$ after 3 months(P<0.01), $23.68{\pm}4.18{\mu}g/dl$ after 6 months, and $24.42{\pm}3.60{\mu}g/dl$ after 9 months. Work stations were classified into 4 parts according to Pb-A. The Pb-A of part I, the highest areas, were $0.365mg/m^3$, and after the intervention the levels were decreased to $0.216mg/m^3\;and\;0.208mg/m^3$ in follow-up tests. The Pb-A of part II was decreased from $0.232mg/m^3\;to\;0.148mg/m^3,\;and\;0.120mg/m^3$ after the intervention. Pb-A of part III and W was tested only after intervention and the Pb-A of part III were $0.124mg/m^3$ in Jannuary 1988 and $0.081mg/m^3$ in August 1988. The Pb-A of part IV not stationed at one place but moving around, was $0.110mg/m^3$ in August 1988. There was no consistent relationship between Pb-B and Pb-A. Pb-B of the group A and B workers in the part of the highest Pb-A were lower than those of the workers in the parts of lower Pb-A. Pb-B of the workers in the part of the lowest Pb-A incerased more rapidly. Pb-B of group C workers was the highest in part I and the lowest in part IV. These findings suggest that Pb-B is more valid method than Pb-A for monitoring the health of lead workers and intervention in personal hygiene is more effective than environmental intervention.