• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.109-134
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• 2014

Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation of assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights (Regulation No 261/2004) provides extra protection to air passengers in circumstances of denied boarding, cancellation and long-delay. The Regulation intends to provide a high level of protection to air passengers by imposing obligations on air carriers and, at the same time, offering extensive rights to air passengers. If denied boarding, cancellation and long-delay are caused by reasons other than extraordinary circumstances, passengers are entitled for compensation under Article 7 of Regulation No 261/2004. In Wallentin-Hermann v Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane SpA(Case C-549/07, [2008] ECR I-11061), the Court did, however, emphasize that this does not mean that it is never possible for technical problems to constitute extraordinary circumstances. It cited specific examples of where: an aircraft manufacturer or competent authority revealed that there was a hidden manufacturing defect on an aircraft which impacts on safety; or damage was caused to an aircraft as a result of an act of sabotage or terrorism. Such events are not inherent in the normal exercise of the activity of the air carrier concerned and is beyond the actual control of that carrier on account of its nature or origin. One further point arising out of the court's decision is worth mentioning. It is not just necessary to satisfy the extraordinary circumstances test for the airline to be excused from paying compensation. It must also show that the circumstances could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken. It is clear from the language of the Court's decision that this is a tough test to meet: the airline will have to establish that, even if it had deployed all its resources in terms of staff or equipment and the financial means at its disposal, it would clearly not have been able - unless it had made intolerable sacrifices in the light of the capacities of its undertaking at the relevant time - to prevent the extraordinary circumstances with which it was confronted from leading to the cancellation of the flight.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.31 no.2
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• pp.3-35
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• 2016

The United States Constitution gives power to the federal district courts to hear admiralty cases. 28 U.S.C. §.133, which states that "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the Courts of the States, of any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction." However, the determination of whether a case is about admiralty or maritime so that triggers admiralty jurisdiction was not a simple question. Through numerous legal precedents, the courts have drawn a line to clarify the boundary of admiralty cases. This unique jurisdiction is not determined by the mere involvement of a vessel in the case or even by the occurrence of an event on a waterway. As a general rule, a case is within admiralty jurisdiction if it arises from an accident on the navigable waters of the United States (locus test) and involves some aspect of maritime commerce (nexus test). With regarding to the maritime nexus requirement, the US Supreme Court case, Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, held that federal courts lacked admiralty jurisdiction over an aviation tort claim where a plane during a flight wholly within the US crashed in Lake Erie. Although maritime locus was present, the Court excluded admiralty jurisdiction because the incident was "only fortuitously and incidentally connected to navigable waters" and bore "no relationship to traditional maritime activity." However, this historical case left a milestone question: whether an aircraft disaster occurred on navigable water triggers the admiralty jurisdiction, only for the reason that it was for international transportation? This article is to explore the meaning of admiralty jurisdiction over aviation accidents at US courts. Given that the aircraft engaged in transportation of passenger and goods as the vessels did in the past, the aviation has been linked closely with the traditional maritime activities. From this view, this article reviews a decision delivered by the Seventh Circuit regarding the aviation accident occurred on July 6, 2013 at San Francisco International Airport.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.34 no.1
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• pp.39-77
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• 2019

Crew members engaged in international air transportation provide work in many countries due to the nature of their work. According to the Private International Act, the place where the employee habitually carries out his/her work plays an important role in the determination of the governing law of the international labor contract (Article 28, Paragraph 2) and in the decision of international jurisdiction (Article 28, Paragraphs 3 and 4). The concept of the place where the employee habitually carries out his/her work was proposed by the EU to determine international jurisdiction and governing law. In international aviation law, the legislative purpose of the place where the employee habitually carries out his/her work is different from that of home base, which is a concept introduced for fatigue management of the crew in order to secure the aviation safety; thus the place where the employee habitually carries out his/her work and home base are not the same concept. In order to determine the place where the employee habitually carries out his/her work, following matters should be considered comprehensively; (i) where the crew starts and ends work, (ii) where the aircraft the crew is performing work on is primarily parked, (iii) where the crew is informed of the instructions and organizes his/her work activities, (iv) where the crew is obliged to reside according to the labor contract, (v) where there is an office provided by the employer and available to the crew, (vi) where the crew is obliged to be when he/she is ineligible for the work or subject to discipline. However, since all of the above items are the same as the location of the home base, it is reasonable to consider the home base as the most important factor when deciding on the place where the employee habitually carries out his/her work. In contrast, the state where the aircraft is registered (Article 17 of the Chicago Convention), should not be regarded as a place of where the employee habitually carries out his/her work. In this case, CJEU provided the first judging standard for the concept of the place where the employee engaged in international air transportation habitually carries out his/her work. It is the interpretation of the Brussels regulations which became a model -for the Korean Private International Act,- so it would be helpful to understand the concept of the place where the employee habitually carries out his/her work.