It is very important accurate diagnosis and quick treatment in cerebrovascular disease, i.e. stenosis or occlusion that could be caused by risk factors such as poor dietary habits, insufficient exercise, and obesity. Time-of-flight magnetic resonance angiography (TOF-MRA), it is well known as diagnostic method without using contrast agent for cerebrovascular disease, is the most representative and reliable technique. Nevertheless, it still has measurement errors (also known as overestimation) for length of stenosis and area of occlusion in celebral infarction that is built by accumulation and rupture of plaques generated by hemodynamic turbulence. The purpose of this study is to show clinical trial feasibility for 3D-SPACE T2, which is improved by using signal attenuation effects of fluid velocity, in diagnosis of cerebrovascular disease. To model angiostenosis, strictures of different proportions (40%, 50%, 60%, and 70%) and virtual blood stream (normal saline) of different velocities (0.19 ml/sec, 1.5 ml/sec, 2.1 ml/sec, and 2.6 ml/sec) by using dialysis were made. Cross-examinations were performed for 3D-SPACE T2 and TOF-MRA (16 times each). The accuracy of measurement for length of stenosis was compared in all experimental conditions. 3D-SPACE 2T has superiority in terms of accuracy for measurements of the length of stenosis, compared with TOF-MRA. Also, it is robust in fast blood stream and large stenosis than TOF-MRA. 3D-SPACE 2T will be promising technique to increase diagnosis accuracy in narrow complex lesions as like two cerebral small vessels with stenosis, created by hemodynamic turbulence.
The practical application of modern space science and technology have resulted in many actual and potential gains of mankind. These successes have conditioned and increased the need for a viable space law regime and the challenge of space has ultimately led to the formation of an international legal regime for space. Space law is no longer a primitive law. It is a modern law. Yet, in its stages of growth, it has not reached the condition of perfection. Therefore, under the existing state of thing, we could carefully say that the space law is one of the most newest fields of jurisprudence despite the fact that no one has so far defined it perfectly. However, if space law can be a true jurisprudential entity, it must be definable. In defining the space law, first of all, the grasp of it's nature iis inevitable. Although space law encompasses many tenets and facets of other legal discriplines, its principal nature is public international law, because space law affects and effects law relating intercourse among nations. Since early 1960s when mankind was first able to flight and stay in outer space, the necessity to control and administrate the space activities of human beings has growingly increased. The leading law-formulating agency to this purpose is the United Nation's ad hoc Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space("COPUOS"). COPUOS gave direction to public international space law by establishing the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of the States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space("1963 Declaration"). The 1963 Declaration is very foundation of the five international multilateral treaties that were established successively after the 1963 Declaration. The five treaties are as follows: 1) The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including Moon and other Celestial Bodies, 1967. 2) The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 1968. 3) The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 1972. 4) The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 1974. 5) The Agreement Governing Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies: Moon Treaty, 1979. The other face of space law is it's commercial aspect. Space is no longer the sole domination of governments. Many private enterprise have already moved directly or indirectly into space activities in the parts such as telecommunications and space manufacturing. Since space law as the public international law has already advanced in accordance with the developments of space science and technology, there left only a few areas untouched in this field of law. Therefore the possibility of rapid growth of space law is expected in the parts of commerical space law, as it is, at this time, in a nascent state. The resources of the space environment are also commercially both valuable and important since the resources include the tangible natural resources to be found on the moon and other celestial bodies. Other space-based resources are solar energy, geostationary and geosynchronous orbital positions, radio frequencies, area possibly suited to human habitations, all areas and materials lending themselves to scientific research and inquiry. Remote sensing, space manufacturing and space transportation services are also another potential areas in which commercial. endeavors of Mankind can be carried out. In this regard, space insurance is also one of the most important devices allowing mankind to proceed with commercial space venture. Thus, knowlege of how space insurance came into existence and what it covers is necessary to understand the legal issues peculiar to space law. As a conclusion the writer emphasized the international cooperation of all nations in space activities of mankind, because space commerce, by its nature, will give rise many legal issues of international scope and concern. Important national and world-community interests would be served over time through the acceptance of new international agreements relating to remote sencing, direct television broadcasting, the use of nuclear power sources in space, the regularization of the activities of space transportation systems. standards respecting contamination and pollution, and a practical boundary between outer space and air space. If space activity regulation does not move beyond the national level, the peaceful exploration of space for all mankind will not be realized. For the efficient regulation on private and governmental space activities, the creation of an international space agency, similar to the International Civil Aviation Organization but modified to meet the needs of space technology, will be required. But prior to creation of an international organization, it will be necessary to establish, at national level, the Office of Air and Space Bureau, which will administrate liscence liscence application process, safety review and sale of launch equipment, and will carry out launch service.
Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation of assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights (Regulation No 261/2004) provides extra protection to air passengers in circumstances of denied boarding, cancellation and long-delay. The Regulation intends to provide a high level of protection to air passengers by imposing obligations on air carriers and, at the same time, offering extensive rights to air passengers. If denied boarding, cancellation and long-delay are caused by reasons other than extraordinary circumstances, passengers are entitled for compensation under Article 7 of Regulation No 261/2004. In Wallentin-Hermann v Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane SpA(Case C-549/07, [2008] ECR I-11061), the Court did, however, emphasize that this does not mean that it is never possible for technical problems to constitute extraordinary circumstances. It cited specific examples of where: an aircraft manufacturer or competent authority revealed that there was a hidden manufacturing defect on an aircraft which impacts on safety; or damage was caused to an aircraft as a result of an act of sabotage or terrorism. Such events are not inherent in the normal exercise of the activity of the air carrier concerned and is beyond the actual control of that carrier on account of its nature or origin. One further point arising out of the court's decision is worth mentioning. It is not just necessary to satisfy the extraordinary circumstances test for the airline to be excused from paying compensation. It must also show that the circumstances could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken. It is clear from the language of the Court's decision that this is a tough test to meet: the airline will have to establish that, even if it had deployed all its resources in terms of staff or equipment and the financial means at its disposal, it would clearly not have been able - unless it had made intolerable sacrifices in the light of the capacities of its undertaking at the relevant time - to prevent the extraordinary circumstances with which it was confronted from leading to the cancellation of the flight.
The main purpose of the investigation of an accident caused by aircraft is to be prevented the sudden and casual accidents caused by wilful misconduct and fault from pilots, air traffic controllers, hijack, trouble of engine and machinery of aircraft, turbulence during the bad weather, collision between birds and aircraft, near miss flight by aircrafts etc. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability for offender of aircraft accidents. Accidents to aircraft, especially those involving the general public and their property, are a matter of great concern to the aviation community. The system of international regulation exists to improve safety and minimize, as far as possible, the risk of accidents but when they do occur there is a web of systems and procedures to investigate and respond to them. I would like to trace the general line of regulation from an international source in the Chicago Convention of 1944. Article 26 of the Convention lays down the basic principle for the investigation of the aircraft accident. Where there has been an accident to an aircraft of a contracting state which occurs in the territory of another contracting state and which involves death or serious injury or indicates serious technical defect in the aircraft or air navigation facilities, the state in which the accident occurs must institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the accident. That inquiry will be in accordance, in so far as its law permits, with the procedure which may be recommended from time to time by the International Civil Aviation Organization ICAO). There are very general provisions but they state two essential principles: first, in certain circumstances there must be an investigation, and second, who is to be responsible for undertaking that investigation. The latter is an important point to establish otherwise there could be at least two states claiming jurisdiction on the inquiry. The Chicago Convention also provides that the state where the aircraft is registered is to be given the opportunity to appoint observers to be present at the inquiry and the state holding the inquiry must communicate the report and findings in the matter to that other state. It is worth noting that the Chicago Convention (Article 25) also makes provision for assisting aircraft in distress. Each contracting state undertakes to provide such measures of assistance to aircraft in distress in its territory as it may find practicable and to permit (subject to control by its own authorities) the owner of the aircraft or authorities of the state in which the aircraft is registered, to provide such measures of assistance as may be necessitated by circumstances. Significantly, the undertaking can only be given by contracting state but the duty to provide assistance is not limited to aircraft registered in another contracting state, but presumably any aircraft in distress in the territory of the contracting state. Finally, the Convention envisages further regulations (normally to be produced under the auspices of ICAO). In this case the Convention provides that each contracting state, when undertaking a search for missing aircraft, will collaborate in co-ordinated measures which may be recommended from time to time pursuant to the Convention. Since 1944 further international regulations relating to safety and investigation of accidents have been made, both pursuant to Chicago Convention and, in particular, through the vehicle of the ICAO which has, for example, set up an accident and reporting system. By requiring the reporting of certain accidents and incidents it is building up an information service for the benefit of member states. However, Chicago Convention provides that each contracting state undertakes collaborate in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures and organization in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all matters in which such uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation. To this end, ICAO is to adopt and amend from time to time, as may be necessary, international standards and recommended practices and procedures dealing with, among other things, aircraft in distress and investigation of accidents. Standards and Recommended Practices for Aircraft Accident Injuries were first adopted by the ICAO Council on 11 April 1951 pursuant to Article 37 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation and were designated as Annex 13 to the Convention. The Standards Recommended Practices were based on Recommendations of the Accident Investigation Division at its first Session in February 1946 which were further developed at the Second Session of the Division in February 1947. The 2nd Edition (1966), 3rd Edition, (1973), 4th Edition (1976), 5th Edition (1979), 6th Edition (1981), 7th Edition (1988), 8th Edition (1992) of the Annex 13 (Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation) of the Chicago Convention was amended eight times by the ICAO Council since 1966. Annex 13 sets out in detail the international standards and recommended practices to be adopted by contracting states in dealing with a serious accident to an aircraft of a contracting state occurring in the territory of another contracting state, known as the state of occurrence. It provides, principally, that the state in which the aircraft is registered is to be given the opportunity to appoint an accredited representative to be present at the inquiry conducted by the state in which the serious aircraft accident occurs. Article 26 of the Chicago Convention does not indicate what the accredited representative is to do but Annex 13 amplifies his rights and duties. In particular, the accredited representative participates in the inquiry by visiting the scene of the accident, examining the wreckage, questioning witnesses, having full access to all relevant evidence, receiving copies of all pertinent documents and making submissions in respect of the various elements of the inquiry. The main shortcomings of the present system for aircraft accident investigation are that some contracting sates are not applying Annex 13 within its express terms, although they are contracting states. Further, and much more important in practice, there are many countries which apply the letter of Annex 13 in such a way as to sterilise its spirit. This appears to be due to a number of causes often found in combination. Firstly, the requirements of the local law and of the local procedures are interpreted and applied so as preclude a more efficient investigation under Annex 13 in favour of a legalistic and sterile interpretation of its terms. Sometimes this results from a distrust of the motives of persons and bodies wishing to participate or from commercial or related to matters of liability and bodies. These may be political, commercial or related to matters of liability and insurance. Secondly, there is said to be a conscious desire to conduct the investigation in some contracting states in such a way as to absolve from any possibility of blame the authorities or nationals, whether manufacturers, operators or air traffic controllers, of the country in which the inquiry is held. The EEC has also had an input into accidents and investigations. In particular, a directive was issued in December 1980 encouraging the uniformity of standards within the EEC by means of joint co-operation of accident investigation. The sharing of and assisting with technical facilities and information was considered an important means of achieving these goals. It has since been proposed that a European accident investigation committee should be set up by the EEC (Council Directive 80/1266 of 1 December 1980). After I would like to introduce the summary of the legislation examples and system for aircraft accidents investigation of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden, Swiss, New Zealand and Japan, and I am going to mention the present system, regulations and aviation act for the aircraft accident investigation in Korea. Furthermore I would like to point out the shortcomings of the present system and regulations and aviation act for the aircraft accident investigation and then I will suggest my personal opinion on the new and dramatic innovation on the system for aircraft accident investigation in Korea. I propose that it is necessary and desirable for us to make a new legislation or to revise the existing aviation act in order to establish the standing and independent Committee of Aircraft Accident Investigation under the Korean Government.
The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.