Journal of Fisheries and Marine Sciences Education
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v.17
no.3
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pp.340-360
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2005
Fishery resource rents(i.e. windfall gains or excess profit), which tend to lead a variety of important economic, social, political problems, have been a fundamental cause of unbalance between fishery resource use and management. Thus, there may exist several sorts of optimal level of resource utilization such as economic maximum sustainable yield, biological maximum sustainable yield, social optimum production, socio-political optimum yield, etc. The fishery resource use level seems to a large extent to be determined by the characteristics of fishermen's rent seeking structure. As well known, fishery resources as common properties have a characteristic of being difficult to establish private property rights. Therefore, their use rights are controlled by the permit and/or the license system. As a result, absolute or differential rents are formed by the changes in institutional arrangements. Rent problems are often transformed into serious socio-political issues when the rent in a given industry is much higher to a socially unacceptable extent than the average of other industries. However, individual fishermen or fishermen's groups tend to behave aggressively to change the existing fishery institutions towards maximizing fishery rents. These rent-seeking behaviors often tend to nullify fishery management schemes. The larger is the relative rent difference between fisheries and other industries, the more aggressive tend to be the rent-seeking behaviors in fisheries.
Journal of Fisheries and Marine Sciences Education
/
v.17
no.2
/
pp.180-192
/
2005
In this paper I tried quantitative measures of the rent-seeking for budgetary allocations in Korean fisheries. There is a great deal of ignorance about the level of rent-seeking that takes place as a consequence of government expenditures and the potential for influencing their allocation, and so the attempt by Kats and Rosenberg(1989) to measure this in terms of the extent of annual changes in these allocations was a significant step forward. The opportunity to concentrate net public expenditure benefits within the fiscal function of the state gives rise to rent-seeking by special interest taxpayer-citizens through government budget allocations, special interest groups and coalitions of special interest groups. There are several important implications of budgetary rent-seeking. Budgetary rent-seeking is composed of 'income' and substitution effects, the budgetary 'income' effect is the general increase in government expenditures from one period to another. According to result of this analysis, average expenditures were 17.0% of total fisheries budget in 1966-2005. Therefore, distribution of fisheries budget should be converted by indirect support systems to reduce these rent-seeking behaviors.
In fisheries, as well as in other natural resource-based industries, there is difference between profit and rent. The former is a basic indicator for gauging the business performance of firms, while the latter is for the evaluation of the contribution of resources and industry to economic welfare. Put simply, resource economists are mainly concerned about rent, including pure resource rent and producer surplus (intra-marginal rent [IMR]). In other hand, business economists are mainly concerned about the profitability of the firms comprising the industry. In the academic literature, there are not always clear definitions of the profit and rent concepts and their use in actual analyses. This article will mainly discuss and clarify differences and similarities in profit and rent concepts. In the classical fisheries economic model with one-dimensional homogenous effort and a constant cost per unit of effort, no rent exists in open-access equilibrium. A simple change in this model, for example by introducing heterogeneous effort, opens it to the existence of rent, specifically IMR, at open-access equilibrium. We estimated resource rent and profit from the data using SNA(system of national accounts) and accounting data methods. RR(resource rent) is composed of value-added, compensation of employees, consumption of fixed capital and normal profit in SNA. RR(resource rent) is composed of EBT, Depreciation of fishing rights, financial costs of fishing rights and calculated interests on equity in accounting data methods. We found that the result of two methods is equal. RR is composed of excess profit, rent and interest expenses. In Korea, the magnitude of RR and profit is not different significantly.
Journal of Fisheries and Marine Sciences Education
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v.16
no.1
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pp.84-98
/
2004
Due to a publicly owned resources, the overexploitation of the fisheries resources can result in externalities in the form of reduced future levels of yield. These problems can be theoretically improved through effective management of the fishery. The paper illustrates maximum sustainable yield(MSY), maximum economic yield(MEY) and F0.1 level of fishing mortality as the concept of optimal yield, and it theoretically shows that MSY is more appropriate for the optimal yield than MEY where prices increase even though MEY achieves the maximization of economic rent in a fishery assuming constant prices. And the paper presents several fisheries management tools and policies such as input controls, output controls and taxes. As the traditional approach to fishery management, input controls involve restrictions on the physical inputs into the production process(e.g. capital, time or technology) and output controls involve limits on the quantity of fish that can be landed. To introduce user cost into the harvest decisions of rent-seeking fishers, taxation, as a bioeconomic management policy of the fisheries, directly addresses the problems associated with the resource being unpriced. As most fisheries management plans, however, have increasing fisher income as an objective, taxes have not been introduced into any fisheries management policies despite their theoretical attraction.
Mankind has made traditional use of various ocean resources in such several forms as fish, plants food, means of transportation, and military purpose, followed by the recent exploitation of offshore subsoil or sea-bed minerals, energies, and utilization of ocean space. These available ocean resources come from the marine natural environment which has a distinct feature in view of the relationship between human wants and their capacity to meet them. Though these socially basic resources however bring forth the so-called scarcity or differential rent, their communal nature of ownership dissipates free gifts of nature endowed to society as a whole. Thus to maximize these rents and social welfare thereof, rents should be secured and preserved through a well-defined arrangements of property-ownership as well as appropriate comparison of competing uses of marine resources, taking full cognizance of their irreversible adverse effects of a specific choice on the alternatives. Here I showed the sources of rent yielded from the multiple uses of navigation, fishery, mariculture, minerals, and recreation site, and also summarized the presently widely-known analytic tool to measure these rents with emphasis on due care of the telescopic faulty of the appraiser in charge, viewed from the communal point, Finally, as communal property is in strict sense owned by the public at large, notwithstanding the restricted communal ownership at government or local governments control, effectiveness of competition I expect should be kept while transferring claims of these resources from the legal owner to private enterprise as well as while extracting their rent by her. In particular, various national or social objectives look forward to tile maximization of social efficiency. Discretionary system in noncompetitive method thus, is exceptionally suggested because of probable suspicion from the public whether these resources are transferred as a give away or not in discretion. And these realized rent payments, I propose, should be wisely taken advantage of in advancement of scientific research in marine nature to bring an incremental rent therefrom successively.
This study examines, from an economic perspective, the reasons for introducing a resource taxe system into the Korean off-shore fisheries and the type of charges that can be introduced. Following a review of the charging systems in other advanced fisheries, we consider the types of charging scheme and some implications for the Korean off-shore fishing industry. Charges could be used for recovering part of fisheries management cost from the industry(i.e. administration, enforcement, research, etc). This can be justified on the grounds that the fishing industry is the main beneficiary of management and that it should therefore bear at least part of the cost involved. It is arguable that publicly-funded management is in effect a subsidy to the industry. Using charges to raise revenue in excess of the cost of management would represent the extraction of a public rent from the fishery resource, but the short-run financial consqquences for the industry would be significant. Results from a qualtitative analysis suggest that while any new charge will have a significant financial impact on the industry in the short run, a landings tax would have a lesser impact on fleet structure in the long run. The study also considers the possibility of a capital gains tax on license sales in order to recover some rent from the industry. Despite any short run-financial consequences, making the fishing industry pay for at least some of the cost of management could benefit the industry as a whole if there were more cooperation between industry and managers as a result. It is acknowledged, however, that there could be disputes over the relative management costs of different sectors of the industry. Even though this study makes few specific recommendations about charging the Korean off-shore fishing industry, it does advise that the issue be reviewed on the basis of the entire Korea fisheries. Finally, the study notes that insufficient data are available on the economic performance of the Korean off-shore fishing vessels and it recommands that a comprehensive system for the collection of costs and earnings data be put in place. It also suggests that MOMAF pay much attention to the permit right market and its transactions.
The experience of many countries strongly suggests that bad governments and institutions have been a serious, if not the most serious, obstacle to economic growth and industry-structural adjustments. All public sectors pursue a mix of both predatory and productive activities-bad governments emphasizing the former, while good governments finding a way of promoting the later. In fishery public policy studies, much confusion exists about the roles of policy illustration and prescription. In general fishery public sectors involve collective actions by numerous individuals under conditions of uncertainty, complexity, bounded rationality, and imperfect information structure. All collective fisheries action organizations consist of a center(e.g., government), which leads fishery group actions, and peripheral participants(e.g., fishermen), which are controlled by the government. A paradigm is developed that gives both theoretical and empirical meaning to the constitutional determination of fisheries political preference function or fishery public sector governance structures. Three relevant spaces are specified: policy instrument, results, and constitutional. The collective-choice rules of the constitutional space structure the tradeoff between public and special fishery interest groups. Fishery public sectors seeking sustainable reductions in wasteful rent-seeking fishing activities should select constitutional principles and institutional structures that tend to promote resource sustainability. In particular, the effects of internal and external events on fisheries may result in a greater or lesser concentration of interest group power. Thus, the structure of the fishereis political power must be assessed in any prescriptive evaluation of alternative fishery governance weights.
During the past 100 years, Korean fisheries management policies have enforced the license system, it is the most typical regulation system in Korean fisheries. Even now, it has caused resource management failure, it has also invited economic inefficiency and inequity. Accordingly, the Korean government has recently introduced the self-regulatory management system for fishermen with the TAC system. These systems are one of the most market-oriented regulation systems in fisheries management systems. It is defined as regulatory policy tools other than regulations with command and control approach. It is also called “alternatives” which is composed of regulatory alternatives and non-regulatory alternatives. The self-regulatory management system and the ITQ system are cooperative-based co-management between government and fishermen as an alternative management strategy ; it is gaining the increasing attention to improve the effectiveness of fisheries management in Korea. It is expected not only to positively improve function in fisheries regulation, but also to decrease inefficiency in fisheries policies. However, these systems have many problems. The monopolization of rent is one of the typical examples. As solutions for the problem in the aspect of fishery management, fisheries policy is need of approach to industrial organization. For instance, Contestable market theory is one of the good theoretical background, it mean that market is able to free entry and free exit. Thus, fisheries management carry out policies such as revitalization of the used market of capital goods in fisheries, organize of the self-regulatory management group. Conclusively, as the exploiters and managers, fishers and the government should put emphasis on improving economic efficiency so that fishery would grow as an industry that contributes to the increase of social welfare, and the change to that direction will be the only way for our fisheries to preserve its importance.
Geun Ho Shimg;Geum Yeong Hwang;So Young Lee;Ji Bum Um
Journal of Practical Agriculture & Fisheries Research
/
v.25
no.4
/
pp.67-77
/
2024
This study analyzed the profitability and diagnosed business performance of fruit and vegetable (cherry tomatoes, tomatoes, strawberries, cucumbers) businesses targeting young farmers participating in the youth business incubation center of A Smart Farm Innovation Valley. The purpose of this is to provide basic data for decision-making by prospective young entrepreneurs. As a result of the analysis, Smart Farm Innovation Valley had the advantage of having a fixed rental fee. As a result, it was analyzed that various costs such as depreciation of large farm equipment, depreciation of farming facilities, repair and maintenance costs, land rent, floating capital service cost, fixed capital service cost, and land capital service cost are being reduced. However, excessive input of labor, water, electricity, other materials, and fertilizer costs was being made. Guidance to reduce these costs is expected to make a significant contribution to expanding the influx of young farmers.
The coastal and offshore fishery to manage from a fishery permit system in our country at present seems to be a sign of lots problem, which are illegal fishing, a permit rent, non fishing vessel the purpose of vessel reduction, fishery compensation, tax exemption oil, the excessive occurrence of administrative cost due to differences during a period of a fishery permit. All the readjustment system for the permit has suggested an effective solution for a fishery permit management, the maintenance of a fishery order(the prevention of illegal fishery), the prevention of unused fishery, the entrance of new vessel in coastal fishery and it's system has prevent this problems in ahead. This paper has estimated an prevention convenience for an illegal spill of the tax exemption oil, actual effects of vessel reduction, the conservation of fishery resource for the future value and carried out an economic analysis to estimate compliance cost for the system introduction. Also, this study have analyzed throughly the coastal fishery situation and catched lots of issues on the management for the permit system. Especially, the problems improving the readjustment introduction for the permit have estimated the social and economic effects quantitatively and qualitatively with a calculated technique to classify various scenarios. This paper has judged correctly the term of validity for the permit to shorten as a result of the estimation and it will be to take the net convenience cost 1,655thousand million won. The results of this study have expect to provide a basic data to introduce the readjustment system for the permit.
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